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SUMMARY
“ SEXTANT IN DOGTOWN
The fundamental basis of the project concentrates upon an interactive manoeuvre 
involving Modern Continental Philosophy and the Postmodern Visual Arts. The primary 
components that structure the thesis conduct a Deleuzoguattarian "process” of action to 
produce a series of mechanisms designed to “open-up" a space in which to manifest a 
range of interpretations/translations that follow the developmentary trajectory of 
designated specific areas of art production. The primary aims concern the advance of 
the action to communicate an innovative/original set of expositions with a view to both 
“animate" and enhance these designated perspectives.
The structural framework of the project tracks through “passages'Tlines of flight” that 
occur/result from the impact of the Deleuzoguattarian mechanisms upon chosen material 
- "Introduction" (Primary) sets forth some guiding themes (how to think knowledge without 
the presumption of the neutral interchangeability o f the subject?). “Tours of the Black 
Clock" (Dark) elaborates the Nietzschean background that informs the philosophical 
basis of the complete project. “Electrolite” (Spin the Black Circle), “W here Angels Play" 
(In a Network of Lines that Intersect), “Not to Touch the Earth” (Elephant Stone) “Across” 
(Out of Time) are sections designed to trace a number of alternative pathways through 
the major texts of the Deleuzoguattarian enterprise
“Becoming X" (Impact) initiates a secondary movement o f experimentation. “Animal 
Nitrate" (The Image of Chance) effects “an encounter" with the work of painter Francis 
Bacon via the Deleuze text(s) “Logique de la Sensation" (1981), “Time and Again" (New 
Damage) introduces and articulates a number of instances from Deleuzian film-theory 
“The Fountainhead” (Vision Machines) is the main section o f the project which evolves 
a detailed process analysing the paintings of American painter David Salle “The Mirror 
of Enigmas" (Numbers in the Dark) traces related Deleuzeoguattarian themes through
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the films of David Lynch, maintaining as a background an examination of Postmodern 
American culture/society. “Breaking into Heaven" (Elegia) returns to the more specific 
analysis of the late paintings of David Salle and uses the mechanics elaborated in 
Deleuze's book “Le Pli”. “Final C u tT L a s t ExitTM em orial Beach" is an attempt at a 
series of concluding remarks within th e  project divisions are resolved within a 
comprehensive Deleuzoguattarian structural system - evolving to be primarily defined in 
terms of two “active" processes/movements which engage theory and explanation, 
practice and application respectively, being therefore both a philosophical /academic 
debate while incorporating a high-level o f “creative" experimentation.
The first sections of the project detail an extensive series of explanatory 
“pathwaysTjoumeys” through the texts o f Deleuze and Guattari with a view to indicating 
measures that can be deployed/utilized in a Deleuzoguattarian process of art/cultural 
analysis. Constructing the architectural pa ttern fanatom y” of a series of interpretative 
surfaces to reflect the dimensions of the cultural material approached.
The sections in the second part of the pro ject enact a number of experimental designs, 
dispatching Deleuzoguattarian m echanism s in the body of the chosen cultural material. 
An interpretative surface is never under the  influence o f a single differentiated flow it 
constitutes the mutual boundary of num erous adjacent flows. The same interpretative 
surface is therefore available to be understood in as many different ways as there are 
adjacent flows along its fractural surface.
This project is essentially a speculative enterprise, a philosophical experiment whose aim 
is to enhance, enlarge and intensify our “ knowledge" o f the area defined, through a 
synthesis, here labelled as a “Deleuzoguattarian process of Art analysis” .
For Deleuze, thought creates what it thinks, as perception creates what it perceives (and 
therefore does not relate to it). The philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, but 
consists through its own creation, in setting up an event that surveys ("survole“) the whole
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of the lived no less than every state of affairs Deleuzoguattarian philosophy does not 
establish a relationship “between” philosophy and other disciplines, other ways of making 
sure, but eliminates this relationship to the advantage of a type of “greater philosophy” 
Thought/Philosophy thinks the sufficient reason of the actual in this manner.
For Nietzsche, whose enterprise constitutes (I have suggested) the base/departure for 
the Deleuzoguattarian program, “the world" we know lies in our interpretation of it. 
However, the task of interpretation is not to discover “ truth" but to “create" it. According 
to Nietzsche, there is no “world-in-itself, no unconditioned and stable entities that await 
our discovery, but a dynamic and turbulent “becoming" in which the forms w e perceive 
are not separate from our interpretations of them
Because we are ourselves part of this becoming, there is no vantage point from which 
it is possible to gain the absolute/unconditioned knowledge that we have imbued with the 
idea of “truth”. The exercise merely becomes self-reflective. However, despite this 
skepticism, Nietzsche realizes that the game of truth is unavoidable, so therefore he, and 
In consequence we, departing/initiating the pathways through this project, have to cast 
in the role o f the philosopher who knows what he invents and invents while he knows.
In Postmodern Art no style dominates Alternatively we experience endless 
improvisations and variations on themes, parody/playfulness. Postmodern artists are 
unabashedly eclectic and call attention to it, combining traditions borrowing from  rituals 
and myths All the world's cultural symbols are now available in the public domain - 
“SANTA CLAUS IS ON THE CROSS",
The Deleuzoguattarian process of art delineated is a play with the game of “truth” and not 
an explanation of a “whole" a description of the network of the "dynamicVfluid nature of 
our transitional relationship to it. It is the flow of energy that encompasses what 
Deleuze/Nietzsche refer to as “the whole" A flow invokes the dynamic/fluid nature of 
becoming, while energy/activity implies a potentiality - the inherent capacity and growth
iv
actuated by the will to power The flows of energy are manifested into differentiated flows 
within flows, “Ad infinitum” and powered by the parameters of state space - a potential 
i.e field defined by the characteristics of the subject flows associated Nothing exists in 
isolation Differentiation exists only via relations to other flows in a dynamic/non linear 
network of resistances
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FOREWORD (LITHIUM)
"C'est seulement ces sortes de vérités, celles qui ne sont pas 
demonstrables et meme qui sont ’fausses", celles que Ton ne peut conduire 
sans absurdité jusqu' à leur extrémité'sans aller à la négation d'elles et 
de soi, c'est celles-là qui doivent être exaltées par l'oeuvre d'art"
(Jean Genet) (1)
The initiation o f the project necessarily must concern the conditions for the possibility of 
"truthful" narration, or, more specifically, about what kind of narrative technique is 
required in order to address/encompass contemporary art practice. The question then becomes: 
Can writing tell the "truth"? or must writing always exist within an economy of betrayal?
The blank page becomes crossed from top to bottom with small black characters - 
letters/words/commas/etc - and it Is because of them that the page is said to be legible. 
However a kind of unease, an irresolution emerges/becomes apparent that leads one to 
question: do the black marks add up to a reality? Do these legible written signs of a 
narrative form/correspond to the reality which they are said to describe. The answer is 
emphatically in the negative. The reality/actuality/presence o f art does not reside in the 
written signs that attempt to describe it, but rather that reality locates itself in the space 
between the written signs. The white space between the words contains more reality than the 
words themselves The corollary of this is that we cannot claim to understand the experience 
o f art within writing; alternatively, its reality is situated elsewhere, in an engagement, 
in a silence that exceeds the written sign.
Therefore at the outset we must confront the veridical inadequacy of the project itself. 
There will be no adequation between language and reality and no narrative technique will be 
able to relate an accurate "experience" of art. True narration is not a possibility Writing 
must ultimately be regarded as a betrayal - by transforming experience into words/characters 
you create other facts that can never fully create the original one. The
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conversion/transfiguration of a "fact" into words does not/cannot be said to represent this 
"fact" in any way truthfully, but instead creates a new and different verbal fact that does 
not correspond with the one that was to be described. This is the Nietzschean claim which the 
project both presupposes/promotes and from which we commence/undertake the analysis.
It is possible to organize the Nietzschean programme coherently, but even if one assumes such 
a continuous discourse as a background to Nietzsche's discontinuous writings, there is 
however a concomitant Nietzschean dissatisfaction apparent. His discourse is always already 
a step ahead of itself. Nietzsche formulates his philosophy in a completely different 
language, a language no longer assured of the whole, but consisting of fragments/points of 
conflict/division.
By acknowledging the fluidity with which Nietzsche uses language, appropriating concepts 
when necessary and then discarding them when no longer useful, one may utilize Nietzsche's 
theories of language and metaphor, and track the way he activates these theories as concrete 
manifestations of theoretical insights into the world as a play of becoming.
"One is an artist at the cost of regarding that which all non-artists call "form" as content, as 
the "thing in itse lf'
(Friedrich Nietzsche (2)
The primary Nietzschean design/modus operandi of the project is orientated from a "question 
of style" - the relation between the "content" o f Nietzsche's thought and the way in which 
this content is presented. The point of departure concerns the Nietzschean insight into the 
inseparable unity of philosophical form and content. By attending to these theories of 
language/rhetoric/metaphor/myth/strategic deployment of different literary genre one may 
explore a range of new interpretative possibilities.
Nietzsche's program affords a direct insight into a “new" kind of philosophy, a philosophy 
of the aesthetic self, and specifically Nietzsche's complex attitude towards the human
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condition/the worid/philosophical-aesthetic discourse. The distance opened up between 
"knowledge" and "truth" - whose convergent identity had been since Plato philosophy's 
grounding discourse - in addition to the integral place of "art" in Nietzsche's schema 
operates in two ways: art displaces knowledge/truth as a grounding criterion for "world" 
consisting of association and fabrication and "s e lf  like art, cannot be "itself'. That is 
art must always be, and always is identified as, distanced and perpetually distancing from 
itself. For Nietzsche the world is arranged perspective^ - within Nietzschean philosophy 
the agency of art production/fabrication, of world-creation is the self, produdng/produced 
by self-fabrication/self-imagining, and self-imagining that philosophy has become in 
Nietzsche.
This Nietzschean basis manifests a principally problematic and fundamentally self­
contradictory notion of the self and art - Nietzsche acknowledges that the aestheticizing of 
life entails its inventive/stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and "un-self- 
ness". The creative/chimerical construction of the (un) self initiates the development of 
strategies of self-regulation, power over art and production, a convergence with the self at 
the "locus" of creation/interpretation o f art and a complex/tendentious metaphorical dis­
u n itin g  of the artist-self. This m ove contains the internal dynamics o f its own self- 
negation/denial - simultaneously announcing and cancelling its motion, that is, 
persistently re-opening a distance between the unity "s e lf  implies and the primary disunity 
contained in the condition of perspectivism.
Nietzsche's philosophy/aesthetics reverberates not only with heavily ironized self- 
revelatory possibilities - mechanization/syntatic predeterminations and violently displaced 
narrative openings - not only does Nietzsche's nascent world create itself out of itself, but 
it does so according to no apriori set o f aesthetic doctrines/principles, creating any such 
principles out of itself as well. Nietzsche's strategy is interrogative - 
all self-assertions are interrogations o f the texts of selfhood, a 
distancing/undermining(the more Zarathustra affirms, the more we doubt).Interrogation 
implies both energy anddoubt and this is the conundrum o f the self that Nietzschean
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philosophy bequeaths to contemporary art/theory. Only In the view of the constant threat of 
reversal can Nietzsche's apparent categorical assertions be viewed/assimilated. This 
strategy of self-subversion/interrogation may subsequently be identified as postmodern - a 
so called disillusionment with action and indeed with value itself.
Nietzsche does not concur with any of the traditional relationships between artwork and 
artist, for Nietzsche art as such destroys the complacency/serenity of any possible aesthetic 
balance/closure. Nietzsche's conception of art is one where art cannot be 
controlled/cognatized but only sensed/experienced. In this vertiginous/inverted complex, 
(in which what we term content, regarded as something merely formal, no more or less than a 
question of style lies the problem/value of art), and its power/capacity of/for self­
creation. Nietzsche conceives the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork. Nietzsche 
poists art as the sole agent for philosophy's chief function - to break the hegemony of pure 
knowledge, not from without but from within. Art attacks the panacea o f knowing at its 
source, translating a false solution into a true one, acknowledging its incompleteness in a 
perpetual tumult of desire. This disruption of "knowledge" via art entails a transcendence 
o f the state in which knowledge is/seems sufficient, it entails what Nietzsche calls 
"becoming creative".
According to Nietzsche the artist is caught within an animating but morbid dialectic: by 
becoming, the artist moves towards absence - by being the artist disappears. In this context 
the artist who can "truly" represent/present material causes it to cease to exist. The artist 
because he/she continues to live/exist continues to produce imperfectly/falsely/partially - 
the conundrum is that according to Nietzsche the closer the artist comes to the perfection of 
creation, the more "falsely" that production will be accomplished, given that the artist 
creates himself/herself as he/she produces works. For Nietzsche, the seemingly ironic 
m im etic power of art is precisely its ability to reproduce falsehood, "only" appearance.
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"It is "art" which invents the lies that raise falsehood to this highest affirmative power, that 
turns the will to deceive into something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood For the 
artist "appearance" no longer means the negation of the real in this world, but this kind of 
selection, correction, redoubling and affirmation. This truth perhaps takes on a new sense 
Truth is appearance".
(Gilles Deleuze) (3)
The artist is "truthful", according to Nietzsche, precisely in the recognition of 
illusion/falsehood for what they are, therefore he/she accesses a strategic affective 
freedom.
The work o f Jean Genet provides an example of the themes that prevail upon this project. 
Genefs novels are formally overdetermined and semantically under- determined In each there 
is a clear form (usually three plots interwoven/cinematically intercut). His method is to 
situate himself in the foreground in such a way to illustrate his ambiguous relationship to 
his material/highlight his power as a creator of a fictional universe. He is entirely in 
ultimate control o f ambiguous narratives recounted - is this autobiography/fiction, 
chronicle/erotic fantasy, sociology/invention?. Everything centres around Genet's 
caprices.
Genet's novels which integrate such diverse fictional structures as suspense/mystery/- 
foreshadowing/character development/"progression d'effecf'/yearning for closure - also 
suggest ethnological information/spiritual transfiguration and a complete Nietzschean 
transvaluation of all values - these are all dynamic tensions calling for resolution. One 
might suggest that they offer psychological/moral questions principally to serve formalist 
means, primarily to inject momentum to an essentially static world view
Genet is semantically underdetermined, that is we are never entirely sure what his 
novels/plays mean - we are never able to fix upon a definite meaning, which is all the more 
surprising in view of the material presented.
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One of the principle methods Genet adopts in order to ensure that his messages will remain 
ambiguous is via the construction of plots that undermine the narrative (he frequently fails 
to give us the conclusion of a scene, or relates it when we no longer want/need to know about 
it, or he will omit an obligatory scene. Often he favours the falling away of a sentencefthe 
fem inine ending'Vthe dying of the voice). Genet's books are highly disciplined and 
orchestrated narratives, spectacular displays of formal exactitude. A  sign of this essential 
purity is his inimical domination of every aspect of the narrative, the unfailing confidence 
o f his tone/his inspired verbal invention. He never merely relates a single narrative or 
represents picturesque scenes. Structural clarity is however always contrasted with the 
ambiguity of what his books mean.
For Nietzsche there is no truth in the traditional sense of this word. The world of the will 
to power is in constant flux, a flux of shifting centres of power that increase and decrease, 
but never remain the same. Definitive knowledge of this world is not possible, in fact, it 
is incommensurate with the very nature o f the world ("knowing" is simply a pragmatic 
falsification of the world for the purpose of dealing with it more effectively). There is no 
static/finished world to be known, meaningful activity in the world of flux/will to power 
becomes art, structuring the world, giving it "meaning" and "values". The only meaningful 
way to proceed is to create ("schaffen") (4).
It is precisely the fact that there is no predetermined mechanistic or teleological order in 
the world that enables us to be radically creative - because the world is not prestructured 
there is the space to shape the world and the self In creating one is affirming the world by 
transform ing it. Nietzsche suggests that there is no such thing as pessimistic/nihilistic 
art Art is affirmation.
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FORW ARD (LITHIUM) 
NOTES
Jean Genet "Ce qui est reste d’un Rembrandt 
déchiré en petits carres bien réguliers 
et routu aux chiottes "in” Oeuvres Complates” 
Vol 1V Paris: Gallimard (1968)
2 F red rich Nietzsche 'T h e  W ill to Power" Trans W alter 
Kaufmann and R J . Hollingdale 
New York: Vintage (1997)
3 Gilles Deleuze "Nietzsche et la philosophie" 
Paris PUF (1962)
See the ‘Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra" - The Spirit changes from a camel, 
the load-bearing spirit who says "you must", to the lion, the destroyer o f old values who says 1  will", to 
the child who alone has the power to create something new The key word is "power", in the sense of ability, 
o f being able to do something, links the creating child to  the artist, the "KUnstler" who has the ability 
o f enacting the desired proceedure (It is possible that creativity "creare" is related to growth 
"crescere", and this would lead to Nietzsche's idea o f power as self-increasing ability)
7
INTRODUCTION (PRIMARY)
The fundamental basis o f this operation is to conduct an analysis of the implications o f  the 
philosophically critical issues promoted by the application of, in the first instance the 
programme of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to the art-practice of the contemporary 
postmodern age. Specifically, via the incorporation/through an operative enactment of these 
discourses it is the primary intention of the engagement to "open-up” a space/establish a 
mechanism designed to present an account of the art production/oeuvre of the American artist 
David Salle, following the trajectory o f the developments expressed within this conceptual 
framework.
"A philosophical theory" commented Deleuze in an early work.
" .....is a developed question and nothing else: by itself, in itself, it involves, not the
resolution of a problem, but the development to the fullest extent of the necessary implications 
of a formulated question....To put things in question means to subordinate and submit things to 
the question in such a way that, in this forced and constrained submission, things reveal to us 
an essence, a nature."
(Gilles Deleuze) (1)
In addition to the ability to assimilate, Deleuze's work displays a transformative power, the 
capacity to reconstruct a body of thought by discovering, and working from within its 
animating centre, in an original and on occasion a disruptive manner, utilizing not only the 
basic surface of the field of inquiry/text but the secondary correlate or subordinate 
doctrines Philosophies are in general characterized in terms of first principles, rem arks 
Deleuze, however,
" the first principle is always a mask, a simple image, it doesn't exist; things only 
begin to move and come alive at the level of the second, third, fourth principle, and these aren't 
even principles any longer Things only start to live in the middle"
(Gilles Deleuze) (2)
These twin parallel interactions, assimilation/transformation do not merely constitute 
appropriation by Deleuze W hat we discover as Deleuze's enterprise progresses, is
8
consistently a subtle shift in orientation from one project to the next, as if each one of his 
creative transformations o f another's thought facilitated a consequent/analogous 
transformation within that o f his own. In collaboration with Felix Guattari, Deleuze 
consciously induces a mutual metamorphosis, a productive coalescence in which each becomes 
other. There is a sense in which every work of Deleuze's is an encounter, a concordance that 
motivates a decentering shift in the object o f thought and simultaneously in the thinker as 
well. An author, states Deleuze, "does not designate a subject, but something that happens, 
between at least two terms w hich are not subject, but agents, elements." (3)
Philosophy states Deleuze is an undertaking that tracks a pre-philosophical plane of 
immanence (reason) invents pro-philosophical characters (imagination) and produces 
philosophical concepts (understanding) It is within the invention of the conceptual 
characters that the creation o f concepts and the tracking of the procedures that compromise 
the plane of immanence is induced (4)
Philosophy, like painting, is a form of creation, and to this extent it also similarly 
resembles aspects of science. In a 1985 interview, Deleuze said, 'The true object of science 
is to create functions; the true object of art is to create sensible aggregates; and the 
object of philosophy is to create concepts" (5) Truth is not an element that is pre-existent, 
something to be discovered but which -
" ....... must be created in e a ch  domain. .. There is no truth wh ich does not " fa ls ify  pre-
established ideas. To say "tru th  is a creation" implies that the production o f truth passes 
through a series o f ope rations which work and shape a m aterial, a senes o f literal 
falsifications"
(Gilles Deleuze) (6)
Deleuze delineates specific m odes of thought - philosophy/art/science - and their 
correspondent objects (concept/sensible aggregates/functions) but primarily thought 
remains for him both experimentation and creation, something that in operation structures 
materials and therein generates a form of truth. (7)
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In this context Deleuze's notion of the function of singularities appears ambiguous. In the 
framework of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference singularities are identified with the 
chaotic forces that encroach upon thought, a view that emphasizes the 
experiential/experimental dimensions of thought. In a interview in 1980 (8) however he 
describes singularities as concepts that react with the ordinary fluxes of thought, an 
approach which highlights the creative force of difference within thought and that structure 
an individual philosophic convention. With singularity concepts are such components as 
rhizomes/abstract-machines/haecceities paradoxical elements that induce a disequilibrium 
within ordinary thought. The essential strategy of Deleuze and Guattari is to advance such 
paradoxical elements and disseminate their dissonant consequences across various 
disciplines. Similarly this practice informs Deleuze's philosophy of difference, except 
that within this model he utilizes an alternative range of paradoxical elements - aleatory 
points/incorporeal surfaces/simulacra/the pure and empty form of time etc. Therefore 
singularities can be interpreted in terms of their passive reception by thought or their 
active production within thought, but in both cases they act as forces of difference that 
compel thought to move outside the logic of identity.
Deleuze is philosophy is orientated towards inventing concepts within a system that is 
accessible and useful.
"In fact, systems have not lost any of their vital forces. There is today in science or in logic 
the complete beginnings o f a theory of the so-called open systems based on various interactions.
They repudiate purely linear series o f causes and they transform the notion of time.... W hat 
Guattari and I call a "rhizome", is precisely a case o f an open 
system" (Gilles Deleuze) (9)
The essence of the Deleuzian project has been fundamentally orientated to avoid the 
formulation of a closed system. Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise could be paradoxically 
constructed in a dualistic correlation: in one respect their concepts must be correspondingly 
"rigorous and inexact” , so that they can produce their own movement and can be utilized in 
different fields. In another respect the very coherence of these concepts within the
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schizoanalytic machinery renders them problematic in characterization. Therefore each 
reader/operator working with these concepts must re-define them within his/her own field of 
inquiry, while they already present themselves as being in constant metamorphosis.
Deleuze has described his concepts:
T h e re  are also notions that are fundamentally Inexact and, however, absolutely rigorous.
Scientists cannot do without them. They belong at the same time to philosophers and to artists.
The problem indeed Is to give these concepts a rigor that is not directly scientific and such 
that, when a scientist uses them, he is a philosopher as well as an artist"
(Gilíes Oeleuze) (10)
Deleuze's most recent work adheres closely to the "rigorous inexactitude" of schizoanalysis 
as it metamorphoses itself according to its various objects of study in order to create new 
concepts(11). Deleuze's work is exceptional in the subtle networks of 
differences/repetitions/metamorphoses that unify and diversify the project. It is this 
perpetual transient metamorphoses within Deleuzian thought itself that indicates how it may 
be employed within various fields o f enquiry. The reader/operator m ust 
apprehend/refute/confirm/metamorphose Deleuzian concepts in order to unfold other systems 
of signs, to reinforce and follow their own becomings.
The primary rationale that structures this undertaking concentrates upon the notion o f a 
philosophical thinking about art, how the nature of philosophy might address art, bringing 
art criticism and contemporary philosophy into a close interaction. In the opening-up of this 
process art will be inevitably concerned with the question of its own objectivity and thus its 
own being as art. Part of the project will concern an operation that allows for the re- 
positioning/re-working of the art object/painting As a preliminary move the art 
object/painting will come to be regarded as sustaining a critical dimension. It will be 
within the articulation of the work of the painting, within the terms/critical dimensions 
established by a continual questioning of the artwork that we may perceive a site that resists 
a synthesis. Tracing the operative movement o f this factor will figure predominantly in the 
proceeding discussions.
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Within this process of a re-conceptualization/re-working it will be argued that the artwork 
will come to be re-formulated via an active engagement/through the articulation of 
philosophical texts, in w hich the effect o f the work may be clearly discerned - the work 
constituting an integral component o f the result itself. In the engagement, in the operative 
procedure, a point of departure is afforded - it is being maintained ensures that the project 
will constitute a working relation to the presence o f an ineliminatable connection, a link 
with structured force (between pre-conditions and presentation) that illustrates a re­
working of the relatlon/a re-thinking of the relation. In summary the present appositeness 
of these conditions, even though they may be essentially non-reducible, are nonetheless still 
intimately connected to that which is inscribed within a particular formulation of the 
emergence of the philosophical.
Postmodem/contemporary art and certain forms of philosophy necessitate an acknowledgement 
that the foundations of art/phllosophy have been disrupted and that we can no longer assume 
that we understand precisely what might constitute art/philosophy. Art imposes a question/is 
in question, and the philosophical thus proves a vital mechanism .through the process o f its 
own questioning to pursue the implications of the question/ing of art. Central to this 
undertaking are the presuppositions at stake in the problematics of 
presentation/representation - presentation comes to be linked to a mode o f experimentation, 
it is this that the programme confirms the argument for a re-configuration of the artwork. 
This implies essentially a re-thinking, breaking loose from the conceptions that have long 
framed the discussion. As Gilles Deleuze would state to re-think a notion of abstraction 
both in the philosophy and art means to think another kind of theory to configurate another 
picture of what it is to th ink abstractly.
In one sense the analysis involved in the project attempts to challenge the state/function 
assumed of art and aesthetics and to suggest the possibilities not only of other conceptions 
of art, but other configurations of art within the philosophical. In this situation the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze appears compellingly appropriate. In the fashion of another
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prominent "anti-Platonist", Ludwig Wittgenstein, Deleuze proposes another image of, what he 
terms, abstraction in philosophy, more "empiricist” , more "immanentist". more 
"experimental", (12) simultaneously he re-conceives what abstraction means in a r t : more 
"chaoticTformless" and no longer defined in the opposition to figure or image These two 
types of abstraction interarticulate in numerous ways, forming a new procedure of conducting 
art-connected philosophy.
For Deleuze a sense of abstract consists in an impure mixing and mixing up, prior to Forms, 
a re-assemblage that moves towards an Outside, rather than a purification that produces 
essential Ideals or addresses singularly the constitutive "forms" of a medium In a Deleuzian 
scheme, philosophy itself becomes a practice of abstract mixing and re-organizing/re-
assembling, a symptomatic/conceptual "And...... " engaged with narratives and histories
Thus Deleuze would state that philosophy is muted when reduced to merely reflecting on art, 
on forms of judgement, for it has a much more incarnate function 
linking/interacting/intersecting with art prior to defined judgements. To transform the 
notion of what it is to think abstractly is concurrent to transforming the notion o f the 
relations abstract thought m ight have with art/painting.
Much contemporary art (or what we might term postmodern art) radically questions the 
affirmative discourse of high art, the inadequacy of artistic categories (on art whose very 
pictorial means embodies a scepticism as to the possibility o f high art, by internalizing 
this scepticism and making it thematic within the art practice itself) and undermines arts 
supposed autonomy/authenticity We come to experience art not as a well defined notion with 
definite limits/criteria, but rather as an insecure shifting totality, where categories 
constantly interweave and are transformed. Postmodern art operates through a 
crossing/transgression o f boundaries that consequently involves a struggle of location 
A viewer may compare and contrast works to see how far they satisfy such and such a stylistic 
label, only to discover that through such an analysis the label itself now seems flexible and 
only o f relative value. Thus the very basis which forms the notion of art is loosened/pulled 
apart - these works at their best, elucidate a struggle/site o f conflict that shows the very
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notion o f art itself to be so complex as to strain imaginative and perceptual capacities to 
the limit
Conducting a philosophical project in this vein implies raising philosophical questions - 
questions that are philosophical in essence and that are about philosophy, it's pre- 
suppositions/critical effects/limitations/possibilities. The programme to follow 
incorporates a philosophical dimension that does not seek to institute itself in its means 
of exercise and thus exclude or dominate others, rather the form of philosophical approach 
on one level attempts via Deleuzian mechanisms to confront and utilize unexamined aspects of 
the dominant critical strategies/analytical methods and to address 
contradictions/complexities inherent in traditional questions, and to initiate within this 
procedure points of departure/lines of flight. In continuing we might promote different 
kinds of questions or rather questions in a different manner, therefore to facilitate 
alternative forms of philosophical/critical practice. The philosophical in this regard is 
concerned to maintain an open critical process, of undermining/exceeding the sta te  of 
philosophy at any particular moment in addition to the states of the disciplines, form ostly 
art/painting, with which it intersects.
The Deleuzian programme is provocative. It is correspondingly enigmatic/difficult, on 
occasion troubling and even paradoxical - located via philosophical concepts yet inimical 
to philosophy's traditional/essential totalizing gestures. It is the heterogeneous 
condition o f the contemporary situation which Deleuze perceives as the interruption o f the 
traditional project Deleuze's philosophical thinking is always a return to a philosophical 
dilemma o f the resolution of a state via conflict, the re-iteration of the possibility o f a 
state of heterology in philosophy and art that resists any delineation of the same. It is thus 
that Deleuze's work affirms an-other philosophical project.
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7 It is necessary to identify two co-existent systems of thought, Deleuze's philosophy of 
difference and the Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalytic philosophy o f desiring production. 
Intrinsic to both m odels is primarily a Nietzschean conception of the Cosmos as the 
fundam ental/pre-ordinated becoming o f a multiplicity o f reciprocal forces. The state of 
multiplicity is composed not of stable entities but "dynamic quanta" and therefore must be 
perceived in terms o f difference rather than identity.
An essential requisite to the Deleuzian philosophy of difference and the Deleuzo-guattarian 
philosophy of desiring-production is an extensive Nietzschean concentration on the problematic 
nature o f "physis" - corre ctive ly  as the becoming of a multiplicity o f forces, and as the 
virtual realm of d ifference and the will to power/eternal return. The Nietzschean factor is 
determined by a rudimentary conception o f thought as creation and experiment negating common 
sense/rationality/representation.
In the philosophy of difference Deleuze applies Nietzschean perspectivism and aestheticism 
proposing that all thought is prefigured by evaluation and interpretation, and that "truth" is 
created rather than discovered. Difference necessarily evades reason, since reason functions 
in terms of a logic of identity and the Same. The notion of a thought o f difference must be 
initiated by a paradoxical factor/entity (an intensity/singularity) that resists rational 
comprehension and effects the state o f disequilibrium. In consequence thought must 
articulate/emphasize/unfold the impulse o f difference embodied within the paradoxical 
factor/entity reciprocally inventing a perspectival truth and activating an incarnation o f the 
virtual realm of d ifference via an experimentation of the real.
In their collaborative programme Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly feature/demonstrate 
Nietzschean themes, (however the conception o f the plane o f consistency is presented as a pre­
existent yet determ ined dimension o f creation) but it is evident that the Nietzschean 
ideal/assemblage of thought sustains and informs their enterprise. (Deleuze and Guattari 
appreciate various Nietzschean motifs which they put to work in the development o f their own 
critical project.)
"When one asks what painting is, the response is relatively simple. A 
Painter is someone who creates in the domain of lines and colours (even 
though lines and colours exist in nature). Likewise a philosopher is 
someone who creates in the domain of concepts, someone who invents new 
concepts There again, thought obviously exists outside philosophy, but 
not in this special form of concepts. Concepts are singularities which 
react with ordinary life, with ordinary or everyday fluxes o f thought".
(Gilles Deleuze) ("Entretien 1980" L'Arc 49 (rev.edn. 1980))
8. "Entretien 1980" L'Arc 49  (rev. edn 1980)
9. Liberation O ctober 23 1980
10 Ibid
I I  Deleuze displays little interest in the hermeneutical tradition. Alternatively (departing from 
his interpretation of Spinoza - "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968) 
-) he creates intricate systems o f concepts that are arranged/function according to a self- 
contained logic/anti-logic o f paradoxes. Deleuze has been termed a write of "science fiction". 
(Deleuze says of Hume that "his empiricism is before the term existed, a sort of science-fiction 
universe. As in science-fiction, one has the impression of a fictive, strange, foreign world.
seen by other creatures; but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and these 
other creatures ourselves" - "Hume" in "Historié de la philosophie: les lumières, ed. Francois 
Châtelet Paris: Hatchette 1972 IV 65-)
Alternatively Deleuze develops concepts in a procedure similar to a theoretical scientist, 
examining the logical consequences of such counter-intuitive notions as black-holes/n- 
dim ensional space/particle-waves etc. Also he constructs elaborate/intricate imaginary 
worlds/altemative universes in the manner of Jorge Luis Borges illustrating how "reality" would 
appear if it were constructed upon simulacra/virtual singularities/anonymous forces or formless 
bodies and incorporeal surfaces. He invents paradoxically structured concepts and deploys them 
as a framework to establish an alternative world. W ith in this alternative cosmos, Deleuze 
identifies an incorporeal dimension of difference and advocates the necessary significance of 
such a dimension within any philosophy of language/theory of the proposition. He 
correspondingly asserts that difference manifests itself in sub-representative experience (for 
example; Proustian reminiscence or Masochian fantasy: See "Marcel Proust et les signes" Paris: 
PUF (1964) - Rev. edn. published 1970/1971/1976 as 'Proust et les signes", and 'Présentation de 
Sacher-Masoch" Paris: Minuit (1971)).and that non-discursive bodies /forces co-exist and 
interact with the incorporeal surface of difference,
In contrast to the deconstructive programme Deleuze does not regard philosophy as a form o f 
exegesis wherein thought should be situated/grounded in a ’Irad itional" philosophical 
discourse, in a constant antagonistic/oppositional and reactive relationship with metaphysics. 
Deleuze initially creates a different fiction that facilitates the location o f language within 
a w ider non-discursive field o f difference and forces.
The Deleuzian philosophy of difference does not so ley restrict the focus of attention to language 
and it's metastatic foundations yet neither does he explore directly the interaction o f 
discourse and forces. By maintaining a correlational dualism of incorporeal difference and 
formless forces, Deleuze adapts the "deconstructive" play of difference that embodies/typifies 
rational discourse from the exhilarating oscillation o f word-shards and sonic-blocks that 
occurs within the schizophrenic field of body forces.
Within the parameters o f Deleuze and Guattari's scheme of the philosophy of desiring-production 
the interconnection of forces to language and signs is prominently articulated. By the 
application of a monism o f forces they explore the materiality o f signs and open up an 
examination o f semosis as a m ode o f action
In a manner similar to Deleuze, Wittgenstein does not adopt a theoretical attitude to language 
as if it were a construction for the purposes of communication. The human subject is not to be 
regarded as an observer who responds to things on the basis of his/her epistemic appropriation 
of the properties that are appropriate to desires We cannot dis-connect our reactions from the 
bodily form which constitute their expressiveness, w ithout loosing sense.
With respect to art Wittgenstein wrote: "it is not only difficult to describe what appreciation 
consists in - it is impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the 
whole environment" (Ludwig Wittgenstein "Lectures and Conversations" ed. C. Barrett Oxford: 
Blackwell (1966)). Language is a practice, the meaning and syntax of language cannot be defined 
independently o f the speech acts they presuppose.
An account of the understanding o f language must initiate from the actual understanding of 
language. There is no transcendent form of language/defmition/understanding in themselves, 
because our actual understanding is always presupposed, it is never transcended. O ur 
understanding is ungrounded, our account of it must begin with it. It cannot be explained, only 
described. The language game starts with understanding Explanation can only occur after the 
language game has commenced, if we require it to avert misunderstanding The sense of a sentence 
is "IN" the sentence. Therefore the understanding of the sense of the sentence is not separate 
from our perceptions o f it.
"Doesnt the theme point to something outside itself?. Oh Yes!. But that means: - The impression 
made on me hangs together with things in its surroundings - e g. with the existence of our 
language and its intonation; but that means; with the whole field of our language games". (Ludwig 
Wittgenstein "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology", trans/ed G E M Anscombe Oxford: 
Blackwell (1980))
The theme does not point to an independently existing text which transcends the actual theme and 
gives it sense. Sense is expressed. As Deleuze writes: " The significance of Spinozism seems 
to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to 
emanative or exemplary casuality. Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles 
anything". (Gilles Deleuze "Spinoza et le problème d l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968)).
And to return to Wittgenstein: 'W e  regard understanding as the essential thing, and signs as 
something inessential. - But in that case, why have the signs at all?. If you think that it is
only to make ourselves understood by others, then you are very likely looking on the signs as the 
drug which is to produce in other people the same condition as my own "(Ludwig Wittgenstein
"Philosophical Grammar" trans A  Kenny Oxford Blackwell (1974))
It is the signs as perceived that constitute the sense Deleuze attempts to promote the 
suggestion that language can be regarded as a collective assemblage of acts/statements that can 
be utilized in the process o f deterritorialization Becomings belong to a geography, they are 
orientations/directions/entnes/exists - Deleuze initiates a language of becoming, that which 
is imperceptible, a veritable assemblage of enunciation The form of expression of language can 
be translated into an almost infinite variety o f substances. Not only is its form of expression 
alienable from its substance, but it can alienate the forms of its contents from their substances 
and translate them into its own substancefmeamng Additionally it can re-translate those forms 
of content from its substance into other substances (incorporeal transformation) Language is 
highly deterritohalized/deterntonalizing It is activeAransformational operating on many 
levels/superlinear.
TOURS OF THE BLACK CLOCK (DARK)
The opening o f the project is initiated via an investigation transposing Nietzschean 
Philosophy, firstly with the work of Deleuze and secondly with the collaborative programme 
of Deleuze and Guattari. The foundational structure of the project is based upon Deleuze and 
Guattari's attempt to articulate their own philosophy via a systematic engagement with 
Nietzsche. It is the assumed that Nietzschean philosophy constitutes a primary framework 
that structures many of the central themes/concems that inform and emanate from the Deleuzo- 
guattarian enterprise.
Deleuze identifies three major lines of strategy that orchestrate the symmetry of Nietzsche's 
philosophic design - the subversion of Platonism and consequent promotion of a philosophy 
derived from a physics of force; the replacement of the Hegelian notion of "negation of 
negation” with a philosophy of affirmation; and the completion o f the Kantian scheme for a 
critical philosophy by directing it against the traditional principles of Western 
rationality. Similarly these modes of thought relate to the positions illuminated by Deleuze 
throughout much o f his work.
In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" (1) Deleuze presents Nietzsche as an anti-Platonic 
philosopher who attempts to overturn Platonism by completing the Kantian project o f a 
critical philosophy (2). Deleuze in situating Nietzsche within the history of philosophy is 
particularly careful to establish his relationship to Kant. Deleuze argues that in Nietzsche 
there is not merely "a Kantian heritage, but a half- avowed, half-hidden rivalry" (3).
Nietzsche's programme in effect, attempts to complete the task of a Critical Philosophy, only 
imperfectly instigated by Kant Kant according to Nietzsche fails to include "values" within 
his critical analysis (4). Kant assumes the value of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, and his 
critique is wholly subservient to these unexamined values. Nietzsche subsequently proposes 
to introduce the "question "of value into thought and to make the critique of value the centre 
of a new genealogical philosophy.
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Nietzschean evaluations are not simply values, they become ways of being (modes of existence 
of those who evaluate). Deleuze states, "we have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts we 
deserve given our way of being or style of life." (5). A concentration upon the origins of 
values signifies exactly the differential element of their origin - which for Nietzsche is 
the distance/difference between high/low, noble/base.
The Kantian critique not only fails to be total, but it also fails to be positive - in effect 
the failure to be total excludes the possibility of being positive The partial destructive 
impulse of the critique allows essential established values to endure and in this respect 
fails to clear the ground necessary fo r value-creating constructive power.
The Deleuzian attack on Kanfs transcendental method, invoking perspectivism (Deleuze 
accepts no transcendental position external to the plane of forces that 
determines/legitimates absolute knowledge and universal values, it Is necessary therefore 
to situate the perspective on the immanent plane and define the functions it activates. In 
consequence the only possible principle of a total critique is perspectivism) is allied to 
the Nietzschean attack on Platonic idealism
Deleuzian analysis concentrates upon "the form of the question” that animates philosophical 
examination The central question for the Platonic model, Deleuze says, is "Qu'est-ce que?' 
"W hat is beauty, W hat is justice?' Nietzsche alternatively changes the central question to 
"Qui?" Who is beautiful?" or more exactly, 'W hich one is beautiful?" (again the focus of 
attack is the transcendental method). "Qu'est-ce que?" is the principle transcendental 
question that seeks an ideal that is located above, as a suprasensible ordering element of the 
various material instantiations. "Qui?" is a materialist question that adheres to the 
movement o f real forces from a specific perspective In effect the two questions relate to 
different worlds for their answers Deleuze in later work comes to term the materialist 
question "the method o f dramatization" and claims that it is the fundamental basis of inquiry 
throughout the history o f philosophy. The method of dramatization is essentially an 
elaboration of perspectivism as part o f a critique of interest/value It is not sufficient
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to offer the abstract question "W hat is truth?" ("qu'est-ce que le vrai?"); in contrast one 
should pose 'W ho wants truth?’ ("qui veut le vrai?"). Where/whom/how/how much?. "According 
to Nietzsche's method the concept of truth must be dramatized" (Gilles Deleuze) (5).
The question "Qui?" brings us to the terrain of will and value and asks for an immanent dynamic 
of being, an internal efficient force of differentiation.
Deleuze conceives Nietzsche's valuations/evaluations as both critical/creative and 
ethical/aesthetic, they constitute an affirmative difference at the origin po in t and 
therefore are active. The negation of Nietzschean judgements and the concentration on the 
ethical/aesthetic dimensions of Nietzsche's thought characterizes Deleuze's interpretation 
o f Nietzsche's texts and correspondingly form the basis of Deleuze's re-thinking of 
philosophy Deleuze identifies an "aesthetic form of joy" produced via 
affirmation/creation, (as opposed to the Kantian passive sensation of aesthetics) and 
additionally an "ethic of joy" derived from an evaluation of the origin/genesis o f value.
Difference at the point of origin, as determined by Nietzschean affirmation/evaluation, may 
be the reason that not all evaluations are the effect o f what Deleuze terms active force (most 
evaluations may be generated by revenge and caused by a base modes/ of living/reaction). 
Deleuze by tracing the singular history of a thing, illustrates how reactive forces have to 
date dominated the evaluative process.
The history of a thing is the product of the compound of reciprocating forces that constitute 
its existence, in addition to the conflict between those forces to  attain 
superiority/superior influence (6). Nietzsche writes of how we mis-conceive the history of 
a thing in spite of its function.
"But purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something 
less powerful and imposed upon It the character o f a function; and the entire history o f a 
"thing", an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain o f ever new 
interpretations and adaptations" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (7)
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In this regard, in view of the history, the reciprocating compound of independent/individual 
processes o f subduing forces/resistances/ reactions/counteractions, "the form (of a thing) 
is fluid, but the "meaning” is even more so" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (8). Therefore only a 
genuine critique can effect an analysis of the forces that constitute something, and as 
Deleuze proposes it is within the Nietzschean philosophical programme that such a critique 
operates. "In Kant, critique was not able to discover the truly active instance which would 
have been capable of carrying it through. . . it never makes us overcome the reactive forces 
which are expressed in man, self-consciousness, reason, morality, and religion" (Gilles 
Deleuze) (9). In contrast Nietzsche's fundamental genetic and plastic principles develop, 
"an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations" (Gilles 
Deleuze) (10). The Kantian critique simply subjectivized predominant values rather than 
proposing any evaluative process and therefore negated the possibilities of the creation of 
new values. Deleuze writes it is, "W hen we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason 
appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are 
giving the orders" (11). This is why, Deleuze proposes, that thought must think against 
reason Becoming a genealogist, the philosopher no longer affirms/integrates existing 
values but constructs alternative ones He/She becomes a philosopher of the future, which 
Nietzsche characterizes as wanting to venture beyond/to overcome - in the respect that he/she 
is overcome in the construction o f a new/different type of thinking/sensibility. (12).
Thinking in opposition to reason and becoming a genealogist requires the 
derivation/activation of new principles, and in order to facilitate this state/occurrence 
Nietzsche utilizes the notion o f force Deleuze defines force as "the appropriation, 
domination and exploitation of reality" (13). Forces are comprised quantitatively and 
qualitatively - the difference in quantity between two forces is a "differential" element, 
a quantitative element of difference between two forces, and it generates the qualitative 
element of a force, that is the  force as active/reactive. Forces are constituted 
differentially.
21
One of the important circumstances that determine the relational action between forces is the 
absence of dialectical negativity. (14). The force that dominates is not motivated by 
negation but via the affirmation and enjoyment of its own difference from other forces. This 
is the primary constituent of Nietzsche's empiricism: instead of negation there is difference 
as affirmation/enjoyment. "Dialectic is labor” but "(Nietzsche's) empiricism is an 
enjoyment" (15). - affirmation as a feeling of pleasure/power
Deleuze argues that the final result of Nietzsche's completion of the Kantian critique is the 
foundation of a new image of thought. What Nietzsche identifies as absent in the Kantian 
critique o f reason is a genealogy of reason - an analysis of the "genesis of reason its e lf 
of "the will that hides and expresses itself in reason" (16). Kant is limited because of this 
missing genealogy - "Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a 
conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to 
knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves" (17).
Nietzsche dramatizes the conception of truth discovering ultimately that the truth seeker 
strives above all not to be fooled. The world is deceptive/misleading, of "appearance", so 
in defence the man of truth opposes it to another world, a world beyond, a true world. 
Underlying this speculative opposition one positions a moral opposition of good knowledge 
and false life, and it is this opposition which is symptomatic of the will to correct 
life/m ake it confirm to knowledge. Consequently, this will to correct life is a nihilistic 
will, because the man of truth desires life that will become reactive/vengeful, as he is, in 
effect, to  turn on itself, annihilate itself. Underlying the search for truth Nietzsche 
discovers a moral/ascetic/nihilistic will and proposes to replace the will to truth with an 
affirm ative will to falsehood - an artistic will that would transform the will to deception 
into a higher creative will. Thought informed by such will would not stand in opposition to 
knowledge to life and would not confine life within the parameters of rational knowledge and 
consequently measure knowledge by the reductive standard of a reactive life - alternatively 
it would evolve an active force of thought, the affirmative power of life. "Thinking would 
then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life" (18).
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For Deleuze, such a method of thinking entails a new conception of thought, antithetical to 
the traditional/dogmatic notion of thought. Thought is always interpretation and evaluation 
is noble or base, depending upon the forces that activate it. When thought is energized the 
resultant effect is a profound/excited destruction of the negative and the creation of new 
possibilities. Interpretation and evaluation consist of two dimensions, "the second also 
being the return of the first, the return of the aphorism or the cycle of the poem" (19). In 
its affirmative capacity, the return of interpretation and evaluation which Deleuze 
highlights is the eternal return, and the focus of its interpretation and evaluation is the 
will to power
Deleuze identifies the rigorous consistency o f Nietzsche's philosophy contained within his 
terminology. Nietzsche, he states, "uses precise new terms for very precise new concepts" 
(20). In the proceeding section in continuing to outline Deleuze's reading/appropriation 
o f Nietzsche the tactical focus will concentrate upon the innovative interpretation o f the 
will to power and the eternal return The analysis in addition to demonstrating Deleuze's 
abilities to transform the thought/programme o f another philosopher will also initiate the 
construction o f the framework for a continuing survey of Deleuze's complete stratagem.
Deleuze acknowledges explicitly an anti-Hegelian polemic that motivates his reading o f 
Nietzsche (21). In effect openly declaring war on Hegel Deleuze attacks what he regards as 
mis-guided attempts to enact a compromise between the Hegelian dialectic and Nietzsche's 
genealogy. Within the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy Deleuze illustrates the 
erroneous nature of attempts to regard Nietzsche as a neo-Hegelian. Hegel's thinking is 
directed by the movement constantly towards some form of unifying synthesis. Nietzsche, in 
contrast is viewed as affirming multiplicity and diversity. (22). Essentially Deleuze 
interprets the Nietzschean programme as an immanent polemical reaction against the Hegelian 
dialectic, one which counters its own basis - "The negativity of the positive" - to the 
Hegelian proposition of the "positivity of the negative".
Deleuze approaches the notion of a Nietzschean synthesis via an affirmation of multiplicity
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and an attack on the Hegelian dialectic. Pluralism and multiplicity counteract the dialectic 
precisely because they are irreducible to unity.
Deleuze elucidates the concept of the will to power via the elements of force and the body. 
According to Nietzsche the world exists in a state of becoming, in constant flux/change in 
which no entities maintain a stable identity. The will to power is both a differential and 
a genetic object o f thought, it is that which interprets; it "estimate(s) the quality of force 
that gives meaning to a given phenomenon, or event, and it measures the relation of the forces 
which are present' (Gilles Deleuze) (23). The will to power evaluates "The will to power 
as genealogical element is tha t from which senses derive their significance and values and 
their value" (Gilles Deleuze) (24).
In Nietzsche’s interpretational model of the world "no things remain but only dynamic quanta, 
in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta" (25). Nature is an interrelated 
multiplicity of forces, and all forces are either dominant or dominated. A body is evaluated 
by "this relation between dom inant and dominated forces. Every relationship of force 
constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political....in a body the 
superior or dominant forces are known as active and the interior or dominated forces are known 
as reactive" (Gilles Deleuze) (26)
The Deleuzian Nietzsche is a "pluralist" ("Nietzsche's philosophy cannot be understood 
without taking his essential pluralism into account And, in fact, pluralism (otherwise 
known as empiricism) is almost indistinguishable from philosophy its e lf (Gilles Deleuze)) 
(27), that is for Nietzsche reality consists entirely of a plethora of unstable forces. These 
unstable forces, constantly com e into existence, seek to assert themselves by dominating 
other forces and then pass out o f existence. Furthering this model Deleuze contends that this 
conception of reality determines every aspect of Nietzschean thought - including the cultural 
analysis and moral vision. We might observe how in "Beyond Good and Evil" Nietzsche attempts 
to explain everything as derivative from the notion that the world consists of unstable forces 
constantly struggling to overcom e other forces.
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The will to power is internal to force, but not reducible to it, and Deleuze states, "force 
is what can, will to power is what wills" (La force est ce qui peut, la volonte de puissance 
est ce qui veut") (28) Deleuze defines the will to power as:
"the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic The will to power is the 
element from which we derive both the quantitive difference of related forces and the quality 
that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the 
principle o f the synthesis o f forces'"
(Gilles Deleuze) (29)
The will to power determines the relationship between forces, in terms of both quantity (as 
the differential element that determines the difference between quantities) and o f quality 
(as the genetic element that determines the quality of each force as either active/reactive). 
The will to power is a plastic principle which may be conceptually distinct from force but can 
never exist entirely divorced from the specific forces it determines in any single occurrence 
(it is neither a universal will nor an individual/self-identical will),
'The will to power is plastic, inseparable from  each case in which it is determined; just as the 
eternal return is being, but being which is affirmed of becoming, the will to power is unitary, 
but unity which is affirmed of multiplicity" (Gilles Deleuze) (30).
The ordinary notion of force requires amendment/supplementation both in terms of something 
of the order of a will or inner centre that generates the relations between forces (31) and 
also with "senses", sensation-feelings that enable forces to "perceive" each other and be 
affected by each other (32).
The sensibility or affectivity of force is the product of the will to power, and the more 
affirmative the will to power, the more significant the power of being affected that is 
produced in force Therefore the will to power incorporates a "feeling" of power and 
consequently all affectivity/sensation/emotion originate from it.
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The will to power Is the genealogical element of force that initiates differential relations 
of quantities of force, from which precipitate the qualities of each force active or reactive. 
The will to power functions as a type of internal focal point/core of force, a pow er of 
becoming active or reactive, whose quality is either affirmative or negative, and it emanates 
as the affectivity of force - the will o f being affected The will to power is the concept 
which stimulates/motivates/authorizes a theory of nature as relations of forces - dynamic 
( becoming-active/reactive), determined in quality (the genealogical element of force) and 
encompassing the reciprocal effect of each force upon the other (the affectivity o f force).
Within this conception the will to power may be perceived as an interpretative and evaluative 
mechanism, that which catalyses thought and determines whether it is active/reactive, 
affirmative/negative. Interpretation estimates "the quality of force that gives m eaning to 
a given phenomenon, or event, and from that to measure the relation of the forces which are 
present" (33). Evaluation determines "the will to power which gives value to a thing" (34). 
Interpretation and evaluation are, however, not disinterested activities but in themselves 
functions of the will to power. The will to power, is the differential element of force, is 
that which determines the qualities of forces, and thus that which interprets. Nietzsche asks 
of the will to power in each case: Is it affirmative or negative? (creative/slavish). The 
signification of a sense and the value of a value can be derived or determined only in term s 
of the differential relations between forces, that is in terms of quantity and quality, and 
they are not a function of some underlying principle, nor some telos
The will power, either as force of affirmation or force of negation is that which creates 
value, and thus that which evaluates. The will to power is the origin of meaning and value 
and, "the will to power is essentially creative and giving it does not aspire, it does not 
seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives." (Gilles Deleuze) 
(35). Evaluation is both ethical and aesthetic, in the sense of critical and creative.
W ith the will to power Nietzsche challenged all future dualisms - it would no longer be 
possible for understanding to proceed according to a model that operated in terms of a simple
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binary logic. Alternatively Nietzsche constructs a polyvalent monism that distinguishes 
correspondingly both degrees and types of will to power. The world is much more complicated 
than dualistic thinking acknowledges, and Nietzsche's claim 'This world is a will to power - 
and nothing besides! A nd  you yourselves are also will to power - and nothing besides!" (36) 
suggests that the radically contextual and contingent nature of all conceptual distinctions 
and renders suspect a n y  rigidly hierarchized metanarrative of binary opposition.
The perspective o f a pluralist/polyvalent monism which acknowledges differences without 
falling victim to conceiving these differences as representing inherently opposed subjects 
is one of the central po in ts of contact between the projects of Nietzsche and Deleuze.
For Nietzsche, according to  Deleuze, "There is no event, no phenomenon, word or thought which 
does not have a multiple sense". (Gilles Deleuze)(37). It is, however, not just meanings that 
are plural, objects are in themselves pluralities. Deleuze attributes to Nietzsche, as does 
Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, the view that the world comprises of an infinity of plural unstable 
forces constantly coming into existence and then being extinguished. Suggesting that forces 
are plural entails, for Deleuze as for MCiller-Lauter, that they always exist in relationship 
to other forces. "Innocence" is one of the terms Deleuze adopts to illustrate this notion of 
pluralism - Innocence is the reality of the multiple, "la vérité du multiple".
"Everything is re fe rred  to a force capable o f interpreting it; every force is referred to what it is able 
to do, from which it is  inseparable It is this way of being referred, of affirming and being affirmed, which 
is particularly innocent. Whatever does not let itself be interpreted by a force no r evaluated by a will 
calls out for ano ther w ill capable o f evaluating it. another force capable of interpreting it".
(Gilles Deleuze)(38)
Forces are defined by their inter-relation rather than any inherent core. Determined by their 
confrontation with o ther forces, there is no agent behind the will, nor are they the 
expression of an inner essence. Additionally by "innocence of existence" Deleuze advocates 
that Nietzsche makes an affirmation out of becoming. This suggests that there is in affirming 
only enduring becoming - that is there is no substance/residual/substratum behind that which 
becomes - the affirm ation of the being of becoming.
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There is no being beyond becoming or beyond the multiplicity of becoming, nor are there 
multiple realities and eternities that are essences beyond the realm of becoming. Forces do 
not stand behind objects, in effect all that exists is in itself force. Extending this model 
Deleuze says:
"A phenomenon is not an appearanoe or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its 
meaning in an existing force The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a nemeiology" 
(Gllles Deleuze) (39)
Deleuze's point is that the object/phenomenon is a network of forces, temporarily dominated 
by one force. The world is essentially pluralistic therefore the domination is only a 
temporary/unstable state and continual overcoming is the only constant. To perceive the 
meaning/sense of something f ie  sens") is to recognise the force currently 
governing/dominating the unstable network of forces that constitutes the phenomena 
Deleuze’s pluralism is founded upon the notion offeree, and force through the notion o f the 
will/will to power - that is, a force in a relationship to another force.
"La volonté (volonté de puissance) est l'element différentiel de la force (the will/ (will to 
power) is the differential element of force)"
(Gilles Deleuze) (40)
For Deleuze, via Nietzsche, the world is composed of forces constantly in flux and constantly 
in opposition with other forces and the determinant factor of these forces is the will to 
power
In going beyond good and evil, beyond truth and error to claim that all is will to power, 
Nietzsche attempted to think relationally without substances, relations without relata, 
difference without exclusion
Nietzsche conceives the history of the Western tradition as that o f the triumph of reactive 
forces and the negative will to power - termed the triumph o f nihilism. The central problem
28
confronting Nietzsche is to determine how reactive forces supplant active forces and to 
discover a procedure/method to overcome nihilism and express the affirmative will to power. 
In his interpretation of Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals", Deleuze details the 
complex stages in which the reactive forces attain a dominating influence over active forces. 
Reactive forces, he demonstrates always outmanoeuvre active forces via negative/imaginary 
fictions the most prominent of which is "the fiction of a super-sensible world in opposition 
to this world, the fiction of a God in contradiction to life" (41 ).
When a force becomes active it extends its power to its limit as an affirmation. W hen a force 
becomes reactive, it does so as negative and nihilistic - its will to power is a will to 
nothingness, and not a will to dialectic.
"M ankind itself is still ill with the effects of this priestly naïveté in medicine.. .the entire 
antisensualistic metaphysic of the priests that makes men indolent and overrefined... .and 
finally the only-too-comprehensible satiety with all this, together with the radical cure fo r 
it nothingness."
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (42).
Accordingly, following the Deleuzian interpretational scheme, it is not possible for 
reactive force to extend its power to its limit and become more powerfully reactive. Reactive 
forces are in accord with negativity and denial and they may, via the will to nothingness - 
the ultimate extension of their force - only negate themselves (they negate their own reactive 
force). This "active negation'Tactive nihilism" is the method whereby reactive forces 
become active, (negation never negates active force and affirmation, it only divides them 
from its own power until subsequently weakened they become reactive). Similarly active 
affirmation cannot become negative via an extension of its power to its limit. W ithin this 
complicity between active forces and affirmation, such a becoming simply enhances the power 
of active forces However because o f its reciprocal interaction within negation, reactive 
force extends the full power of negation - the will to nothingness - toa further extent at 
which point forces actively negate their own reactive negativity and become active. 
Nietzsche writes describing nihilism: "It reaches its maximum of relative strength as a
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violent force of destruction - as active nihilism." (43).
Deleuze argues that for Nietzsche "Nihilism is not an event in history but the motor o f the 
history of man as universal history". (44). Humanity is essentially reactive, and human 
history is the universal history of becoming - reactive o f force. The only means to attain 
the affirmation is the overcoming of the self to become something other than human (“the 
overman"). Definitive affirmation entails capriciousness - a freedom from reactive forces. 
The process enacted in which the affirmation may be attained, says Deleuze is the eternal 
return; which to be extensively comprehended must be interpreted as a physical/ethical 
doctrine and a doctrine o f selective ontology.
One of the major themes that structure sections of Deleuze's later projects is a process he 
terms "becoming" The central feature that distinguishes “becoming" is the absence o f any 
fixed terms:
'W hat is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms
through which that wh ich becomes passes.......... Becoming produces nothing, other than
itself becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself ...Becoming is a verb with a consistency 
all o f its own; it does no t reduce to, o r lead back to, “appearing", “being", “equ a tin g", or 
"producing".
(Gilles D e leuze/F ilix  Guattari) (45)
Evolutionary language concentrates attention on the beginning and endpoint of a process in 
a way that obscures the passage between them, in contrast the language of compound becoming 
focuses upon what occurs between these ever-receding endpoints. Becomings operate between 
poles, they are the in-betweens that pass only and always along a middle without origin or 
destination
Within the Deleuzo-guattarian interpretative programme, anything appears as possible - the 
subject is a process of multiple becomings in which anything can be connected to anything 
else
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If applied to Nietzsche's concept of the "Übermensch" the Deleuzo-guattarian model of 
“Becoming" experiments with how "Übermensch" functions in the Nietzschean text. As an 
alternative to a particular being or type of being. (46). ("Übermensch" does not designate 
an ontological state or way of being that a subject could/should instantiate). "Übermensch" 
is rather the name given to a certain idealized conglomeration of forces, what Nietzsche 
defines in "Ecce Homo", "a type of supreme achievement' (47). Nietzsche does not configure 
a philosophical complex for "Übermensch", he provides suggestions for actions to be followed 
to “become" "Übermensch". Following a Deleuzo-guattarian procedure we can draw attention 
to an active process of assembling Becoming "Übermensch" in the context of a human subject 
refers to a process of "life-enhancement', a selfovercoming, increasing the will to power 
Experimenting with the different possibilities of becoming "Übermensch" we can read 'Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra" (48) not as providing the outline for creating a centred super-subject 
called "Overman", but alternatively as a technique of experimentalism noting that one must 
derive one's own way, "for "the" way -that does not exist' (49). This method emphasises not 
a way of Being but the affirmation of self-overcoming and transvaluation that allows for the 
infinite process of becoming that can be termed "Becoming "Übermensch".
Nietzsche formulated the eternal return in "Ecce Homo" as "the highest formula of affirmation 
that is at all attainable" and as the key concept of "Thus spoke Zarathustra". Nietzsche's 
philosophy Is an affirmation o f becoming and if the eternal return is its "highest 
affirmation", then, states Deleuze, the eternal return must be a return, not o f being and the 
same, but of becoming and difference Deleuze presents the thought of the eternal return as 
comprehensible in terms of two moments (a moment of absorption in the game/creative activity 
and a moment o f distanced contemplation of the game/creative activity). Initially one 
participates in becoming and thereby affirms it, then subsequently one recognizes that all 
moments of the world are moments of becoming - that the very being of the world is becoming - 
and one affirms the fact that every instance is the return or coming anew of becoming. 
Therefore, says Deleuze, "return (revenir) is the being of becoming (devenir) itself, being 
which affirms itself in becoming" (50).
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The World is in a constant state of change - it is "becoming" not "being" However, a 
"becoming" world cannot be "known", this is the conceptual basis of Nietzsche’s denial of the 
possibility of knowledge - we can "know" only the simulacra of being which we ourselves have 
constructed.
"Continual transitions forbid us to speak o f an "individual” , etc., the "number of beings is 
itself in flux W e would know nothing o f time or of motion if we did not. in a crude fashion, 
believe we observed "that which is at rest 'beside" "that which is in motion". The same applies 
to cause and effect, and without the erroneous conception of "empty space", we would never have 
carried at the conception of space. The law of identity has as its background the appearance that 
there are identical things. A world in a state of becoming could not in a strict sense be 
"comprehended" or "known", only in so far as the "comprehending" and "knowing" intellect 
discovers a crude ready-made world put together out of nothing but appearances, but appearances 
which, to the extent that they are o f the kind that have preserved life, have become firm - only 
to this extent is there anything like "knowledge", i.e. a measuring o f earlier and later errors 
by one another".
(Friedrich Nietzsche ) (51)
Thinking/Thought is conceivable only from the basis of an "assumption of beings... logic deals 
only with the formulas for that which remains the same": but this assumption "belongs to our 
perspectives". Because "the world is a state of becoming" is "unformulatable", and "knowledge 
and becoming exclude one another'', "knowledge" must be something other than knowledge: "there 
must first be a will to make knowable, a kind of becoming must itself create the illusion of 
beings" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (52)
There are two central notions that structure the Nietzschean Philosophical scheme: the will 
to power and eternal recurrence.
In saying that the world is the "will-to-power", Nietzsche sees the will to power as 
manifesting itself in multifarious ways But the will to power as such in its general form  is 
fundamental, and manifestations are modes of it In many aspects we see the will to power 
characterized the drive to control/organize/overcome. Any attempt to bring under control 
our environment is a mode of the will to power, and one of the primary examples o f this is 
knowledge itself.
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Knowledge is "not "to know" but to schematize - to impose upon chaos as much regularity and 
form as suffices for our practical requirements“ , in the derivation of reason what was 
important was "the requirement not to "know", but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose 
of intelligibility and calculation”; the development of reason is "adaptation 
(Zurechtmachung), invention, in order to produce similarity, identity - the same process 
every sense impression goes through" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (53)
"Knowledge both deductive and empirical is "a determining, designating, making-conscious of
conditions" (Friedrich N ietzsche) (54)
The mechanics of knowledge concentrates upon abstraction/simplification - "directed, not at 
knowledge, but at obtaining possession of things: "end" and "means" are as remote from its 
essences as are "concepts" W ith "end" and "means" one obtains possession of the process (- 
one invents a process which is graspable), with "concepts", however, of the "things" which 
constitute the process" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (55)
W e come to see the truth o f o u r claims to knowledge in all fields of activity for what they 
are; interpretations from certain perspectives Humanity acquires the idea of becoming as 
its ruling idea - if everything develops then "truth" in accordance is in process (Everything 
develops comes to imply that "nothing is true"). Nietzsche characterizes this paradoxical 
formulation by articulating truth as a matter o f perspective. A 
metaphysical/religious/moral/rational statement can only be called “true" from the 
perspective of the mind which views it. Since "there are no facts", all knowledge of facts 
are interpretations, "introduction of meaning - not "explanation"". (Friedrich Nietzsche) 
(56).
Any attempt to discern what we know thus resolves itself into an attempt to discover why we 
interpret as we do
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Another way of presenting Nietzsche's perspectivism is that all truths/knowledge about the 
world are interpretations: a mode of organizing experience under concepts which render a 
world-view with the condition that no such view can possibly be complete because it is 
dependent upon qualifying reference to a point of view. Nietzsche is not arguing against any 
view because it is an interpretation - he objects only to the view being promoted as more than 
an interpretation, as an objective truth. This is applicable to various systems of 
metaphysics/Kantian "apriori" categories/natural science/common sense/logic. W hat 
Nietzschean philosophy counters is interpretations being viewed/regarded as absolute 
transcendental objective truths.
Nietzsche's position consists of a general attack on the notion of separating theories about 
the world from the world itself. There are no facts, only interpretations, and no world 
remains once all interpretations have been subtracted. Theories, considered in their 
entirety cannot be compared with reality because there exists no reality outside of 
interpretation which is in itself part o f an interpretation. (There is no neutral ground to 
locate whereby interpretation can be compared with reality because to have a conception of 
reality with which an interpretation could be compared is itself to articulate an 
interpretation)
An alternative method of phrasing this situation in which all viewpoints are inherently 
interpretative is that the traditional philosophical dichotomy of the appearance/reality 
distinction is eliminated - the "real world" is negated because there is no single universal 
complete description possible and it cannot be constructed from amalgamating /constructing 
a summary of various different views This does not however imply that what remains is a 
merely apparent world - "appearance" and "reality" are correlative/mutually reciprocating 
contrasting concepts, and when the "real world" is removed there remains no sense to support 
the supposedly contrasting "apparent world", so consequently that too is removed The 
apparent world "is" the world - the world as construed under an interpretation "is" the world
The doctrine of "the eternal return" is situated in the genesis of the notion that the world
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is infinite in time, but finite in space/energy, and therefore states inexorably, allocated 
sufficient time, repeat. Thus this world forms our eternity. Although Nietzsche does seem 
to adhere to "eternal recurrence" being perceived as a scientific/cosmological theory, the 
importance and main grounds of the view reside not there but, rather, in its significance as 
a "myth" whereby our decisions are focused on this world.
Once the notion of an absolute/correct viewpoint, and even its pursuit, is eliminated, an 
exploration of alternative modes of interpreting the world can be adopted The m ode of 
exemplifying the world - all views are interpretations from a perspective - is analogous to 
the relinquishment of habit/custom/a belief in absolute standards and promotes by contrast 
the production of singular viewpoints in accord with their own values/purposes.
The will to power, both as an interpretative mechanism in a world of ontological flux with no 
objective order, and as an account of the motivation of knowledge can be a disinterested 
activity separable from specific values - knowledge is rather a means to support specific 
values. The doctrine of eternal recurrence emphasizes the priority of choice and the creative 
power to transfigure the world with new truths/values in a way that has no end.
The eternal return represents, for Deleuze, the affirmation of plurality - to a ffirm  the 
eternal return is to affirm one's willingness to roll the dice. Additionally, the affirm ation 
that Deleuze identifies in the eternal return includes the possibility of the construction 
of a hierarchy in a world devoid o f inherent ordering systems. It is here that Deleuze 
transform s Nietzsche's thought for his own purpose, denying the possibility of an exact 
return (An exact return would imply that the forces that constitute the world are not in 
constant transition. Exact repetition would counteract Deleuze's assertion that, for 
Nietzsche, the world consists of the apparitions of forces, not their reappearance, fo r it 
would signify that forces reappear). Pluralism, as Deleuze presents it, insists tha t the 
world is constantly changing, every-renewing (57).
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The will to power has a specific relationship to the eternal return: "the eternal return is 
the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power'1 (Gilles Deleuze) (58). Deleuze’s 
perception o f "synthesis" is integral to his analysis of becoming and its implications for 
an understanding of time. Deleuze exemplifies the eternal return as a "synthesis of time and 
its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity as its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the 
being which is affirmed is becoming, a synthesis o f double affirmation" (59).
"The game has two moments which are those of a dice throw • the dice that is thrown and the dice 
that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dice throw as taking place on two distinct tables, the
earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back.... "
(Gilles Deleuze) (60)
The two moments of the dicethrow constitute the basic elements of Nietzsche's alternative to 
the dialectic of the one and the multiple. In the first moment o f the game the throw of the 
dice is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity because it is the denial o f control. It 
is the indeterminate/unforeseeable. In Nietzsche's terms this is the being of becoming - pure 
multiplicity. The second moment when the dice fall back is more complex.
’The  dice which are thrown once are  the affirmation of"chance", the combination which they form 
on falling is the affirmation of “necessity" Necessity is affirmed o f chance in exactly the 
sense that being is affirmed of becom ing and unity is affirmed o f multiplicity” .
(Giiles Deleuze) (61).
The falling back of the dice is not sim ply a confirmation of the necessity of the given/of 
multiple reality because this would only be a determinism and would risk negating rather than 
affirming the first moment o f the gam e. The falling back of the dice is a moment of the 
organization of unity, an active creation of being. To fully comprehend this it is necessary 
to relate the dicethrown metaphor to  the concept of the eternal return.
” ........the dice which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny which bnngs the
dice back.... The eternal return is the second moment, the result o f the dicethrow, the
affirmation o f necessity, the num ber which bnngs together all the parts o f chance. But it is
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also the return o f the first moment, the repetition o f the dicethrow, the repetition and 
reaffirmation o f chance itse lf’.
(Gilles Deleuze) (62).
The return o f the dice is an affirmation o f the dicethrow in that it constitutes the original 
elements o f chance in a coherent whole - an original organization Not only does the first 
moment - o f multiplicity and becoming - imply the second moment it is also the return of the 
first. The two moments imply one another as a perpetual series of fragmentation and 
recombination, as a centrifugal movement and a centripetal moment, as emanation and 
constitution
The will to power is the principle of the synthesis of the eternal return, and the eternal 
return is the manifestation of the principle which functions as an explanation of diversity 
and its multiplication, o f difference and its repetition. The will to power is the 
differential element which locates forces in relation, and the eternal return is the 
affirmation of difference characterized as multiplicity/becoming/chance. The will to power 
also operates as "the power of becoming active, "becoming active", personified or the power 
of becoming reactive, "a becoming reactive". (Gilles Deleuze)(63). The eternal return is the 
synthesis of becoming, which incorporates this principle of a ubiquitous becoming offerees.
The conception of the eternal return as the synthesis of forces which affirms 
becoming/multiplicity/chance, Deleuze terms the physical doctrine of the eternal return. 
In the Deleuzian scheme the eternal return is also symbolized as an ethical doctrine, which 
affords the initial factors for humankind (essentially reactive) to transform/reincarnate 
themselves and stimulate within themselves the affirmative will to power
As an ethical doctrine the eternal return comprises of a selective principle, expressed in 
the practical form: "whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal 
return" (64). In conjunction a second selection, a selection o f "being" rather than thought 
is required to engender full affirmation - the eternal return as selective ontology. The
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double affirmation o f the eternal return acquires a new sense of this second selection - the 
eternal return as a physical doctrine "affirms the being of becoming", but "as selective 
ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the "self-affirming" of becoming-active" (65).
In the secondary stage o f nihilism (reactive nihilism) the negative will discharges and the 
human subject as the becoming reactive of forces is correspondingly discharged. The 
possibility o f one overcoming humankind and attaining the affirmation is confirmed. The 
negative will is divided from the reactive forces and subsequently inspires in humanity a new 
inclination for the destruction of the self, but in an active mode. The affirmation that 
inaugurates the "Übermensch" incorporates a double negation - an active self-destruction of 
all human faculties. W hich is immediately preceeded by affirmation, and an active 
destruction o f all known values, which immediately follows affirmation. This process of 
affirmation catalyses the transvaluation of values - not simply the substitution of one set 
of values for another, but the construction of a new, active process of life, for the 
derivation o f values. This new scheme is the essence of the eternal return- the affirmation 
of the being o f becoming/the unity of multiplicity/the necessity of chance.
The logic o f synthesis/constitution of being is the eternal return the logic o f will.
'T h e  synthesis is one o f forces, o f their difference and their reproduction; the eternal return 
is the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power We should not be surprised by the 
word "will", "which one” apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis 
of forces by determining the relation o f force with forces?“.
(G illes Deleuze) (66).
The will to power is the principle of the synthesis that demarcates the being of becoming, the 
unity of the multiplicity and the necessity of chance Essentially therein it defines a role 
as a primary cause, comprising of the necessity and substantiality of being. Nietzsche's 
basics, however, transform this logical/ontological position into an ethics. The eternal 
return is an ethics in the fact that it constitutes a "selective ontology" (67). It is 
selective because not every will returns - negation comes only once, only affirmation
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returns The eternal return is the selection o f the affirmative will as being. Being is not 
a given in Nietzsche, being m ust be willed (In this sense ethics comes before ontology in 
Nietzsche). The ethical w ill is the will that returns and the ethical will is the will that 
wills being This is the manner in which the eternal return may be regarded as a temporal 
synthesis o f forces - it necessitates that the will to power wills unity in time. Deleuze 
formulates the ethical selection of the eternal return as a practical rule for the will.
"As an ethical thought the  eternal return is the new formulation o f the practical synthesis:
whatever you will, will it  in  such a way that you also will its eternal return" (G illes Deleuze)
( 68)
The eternal return is not separate from the will but internal to it. The ethical will is 
whole, internal to its return. The principle of the eternal return as being is the efficient 
will as an ethical will. The fundamental notion of efficiency and internality may now be 
conceived - from the logical centrality o f the efficient difference (the difference internal 
to the thing) to the ontological centrality of efficient power (the force internal to its 
manifestation) and to the ethical centrality of the efficient will, the principle o f the 
eternal return. A Scholastic vein runs throughout this series as a guideline, affording a 
materialist/metaphysical basis - the internal formulation of the cause to its effect is what 
constructs the necessity/substantiality/singularity/univocity o f being This is the means 
via which one can interpret the eternal return of the efficient will as the ethical key-stone 
o f the Nietzschean philosophy o f being.
The dicethrow (the moment o f becoming) is followed by the dice falling back (the selection of 
being) which consequently leads to a new dicethrow. The ontological selection is not a 
negation of the indeterminacy o f the dicethrow, but an enhancement of it, an affirmation, just 
as the eternal return is an affirmation of the will.
With the ethical background o f the efficient/affirmative will, Deleuze re-configurates the 
drama of the “critique” - in term s of a valuation/as "transmutation". Deleuze presents the
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critique via a combination of reconditioned Kantian and Scholastic terms: In effect a 
transmutational move from Kantianism to Scolastidsm that comprises of a move from a critique 
o f knowledge to a foundation of being. (69). In the transformative moment there is a 
conversion from knowledge to creation, from  negation to absolute affirmation, from 
inferiority to exteriority/ ".....creation ta kes  the p lace o f  know ledge itse lf and 
affirm ation takes the place of all negations. (Gilles Deleuze) (70). With the active 
completion of nihilism and the transmutation to affirm ation and creation, 
negativity/interiority/consciousness are dismissed. Exteriority is the condition for the 
foundation of being - the "ratio essendi" o f the will to power according to Deleuze is 
affirmation. Deleuze reformulates a statement o f Zarathustra as an ontological ethics - "I 
love the one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio cognoscendi o f the will to power, but who 
finds in the will to power a ra th  essendi in which man is overcome and therefore nihilism is 
defeated" (Gilles Deleuze)(71). Being is primary over knowledge.
In working through Nietzschean concepts Deleuze is to a significant extent characterizing 
his own positions. (Deleuze is not however simply a disciple of Nietzsche, his analysis of 
N ietzsche's philosophy is selective/creative and clearly is orientated more towards the 
exposition of certain possibilities arising from Nietzschean texts/from a singular 
examination of a philosophical "architectural" structure). Deleuze similarly to Nietzsche 
views the object o f philosophy as the "affirmation of difference", as the chaotic 
multiplicity of the becoming of the World. In addition Deleuze regards thought as directed 
against reason but without it ceasing to be thought - it must interpret/evaluate and 
ultimately create new horizons of contingency in life - it must discover its evaluation in the 
conflict o f a force that confronts thought and impels it to think that which defines thought - 
and it must examine the body and the unconscious to reveal it’s capabilities. Nietzsche and 
Deleuze both attempt a synthesis of critique and creation without reduction. Ultimately 
Deleuze derives from Nietzsche a process towards new forms of expression of thought - forms 
compatible with a philosophy of difference.
Nietzsche illustrates the limits of knowledge. He highlights the notion that judgement is
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grounded in perspectivism and questions claims of objectivity At the extreme Nietzschean 
thought m ight lead to solipsism - a sisyphisian internal discourse where the lack o f  any 
universal truth becomes a justification for negating alternative values The challenge of 
Nietzsche's philosophy is the presentation of the possibility to develop an aesthetic vision 
conscious o f the limits of subjective view-points and aware of contrasting views, in a 
condition where necessity may be located only in fictions.
The Deleuzian model of difference is grounded within/informed by a theory of forces/a 
physics Differences are created through the interaction of one force with another. The 
world Is composed as a network of forces in which signs are the symptoms, symptomatology of 
forces. Throughout Deleuze's project, force/bodiesTphysis" remain in essence irreducible 
to language. Through his exposition o f the concept of thought, Deleuze questions the 
distinction between philosophy and art. Philosophy and art do not issue from separate 
positions o f truth and fiction/objectivity and subjectivity, but are integrated w ith in  a 
single realm of thought, whose fundamental aim is the creation of new possibilities o f life. 
(72).
Establishing pluralism as the essential form o f metaphysics Deleuze continues the 
structuring of his Nietzschean system with an explication of the derivation of values. 
Deleuze traces the interarticulation of pluralism and a philosophy of value. He suggest that 
by introducing the concepts of meaning/value (sens et valeur) Nietzsche constructs a purely 
critical enterprise. Philosophy should be a critical programme, according to Deleuze, and 
the institution o f a philosophy o f sense and value is the only way to initiate this critique.
Values presuppose evaluation, and evaluations are manners of being. The Deleuzian critical 
project investigates the origin of values Thoughts/beliefs/sentiments are not accidental 
but rather defined by virtue of being/the condition of existence. For humans, to exist is to 
evaluate It is not values that determine our being, but our being that determines values
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"Evaluations, in essence are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge 
and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge” (servant 
précisément de principes aux valeurs par rapport auxguelles ils jugent) (Gilles Deleuze) (73)
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche suggests that the manner of existence is pluralistic and 
therefore values should reflect a pluralism. The noble and the base are not values but 
represent 'Telement différentiel dont derive la valeur des valeurs elles-mêmes” Deleuze 
argues that values are derived from an ever-changing reality. (Deleuze develops his model on 
the derivation of values from an analysis of the three-stage metamorphosis described in the 
first section of'Thus Spoke Zarathustra", "On the Three Metamorphoses". Where Dionysus is 
presented as the god who constantly changes - the authentic representation of a transitory 
reality). Pluralism shatters the im age of a continuity o f forces to reveal the existence o f 
new forces. Affirmation becomes “ la raison d'être" for the will to power Nietzsche in 
affirming the world affirms the will to  power. Deleuze assigns to Dionysus the function/role 
of developing an affirmation based on the "principles" of pluralism.
"It is still necessary for the will to  power to be related to affirmation as its "raison d'être” , 
and for affirmation to be related to  the will to power as the element which produces, reflects 
and develops its own "ratio". T h is  is the task of Dionysus".
(Gilles Deleuze). (74)
Deleuze paralleling Nietzsche's thought interprets art as being founded upon two principles: 
firstly art is a "stimulant of the w ill power" - "something that excites willing" (75). 
Nietzsche demands an aesthetics o f creation - an affirmation that is the product of a way of 
thinking which presupposes an active life as its condition and concomitant. With regard to 
the second principle of art, Deleuze presents it as the "highest power of falsehood" that 
magnified the "world as error" it in e ffect sanctions the deception - the will to deception 
is promoted to a superior ideal The second principle is characterized as the converse of the 
first; what is active in life can only be animated in relation to a deeper affirmation. The 
activity of life is similar to a power o f falsehood, disingenuous falsifying/seducing. But 
in order to be operative, this power of falsehood must be selected redoubled/repeated and in
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consequence elevated to a higher power 'The power of falsehood must be taken as far as a 
"will" to deceive, an artistic will which alone is capable of competing with the ascetic ideal 
and successfully opposing it" (76). It is art which invents the untruth that elevated 
falsehood to its highest affirmative power, that transforms the will to deceive into 
something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood For the artist, "appearance" no longer 
implies a negation of the real in the world, but a kind of
selection/correction/redoubling/affirmation"..... truth perhaps takes on a new sense. Truth
is appearance. Truth means bringing of power into effect, raising to the highest power, In 
Nietzsche, "we the artists" - "we the seekers after knowledge or truth" - "we the inventors 
of new possibilities o f life" (Gilles Deleuze) (77).
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TOURS OF THE BLACK CLOCK ( DARK) 
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which is reactive/negative).
At the origin o f values is difference, but there is a division between two distinct possibilities 
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Question o f Interpretation", London: Routledge (1991)).
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with/in addition to a determination of the mode of life that permeates/activates those values. 
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expresses a mode o f life/every interpretation is symptomatic of that particular state of 
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47. In "Ecce Hom o” . "W hy I Write Such Good Books" (Section 1):
"The word "Übermensch” , as the designation of a type of supreme
achievement, as opposed to "modem" men, to "good" men, to Chnstians and
other nihilists - a word that in the mouth o f a Zarathustra, the 
annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word - has been understood 
almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very 
values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent - that is, as an 
"idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half "saint", half "genius"
Other scholarly oxen have suspected me of Darwnem on that account Even 
the "hero worship" o f that unconscious and involuntary conterfeiter,
Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously has been read into it.
Those to whom I said in confidence that they should sooner look even for 
a Cesare Borgia than fo r a Parsifal, did not believe their own ears"
Friedrich Nietzsche - "Ecce Hom o" trans: W alter Kaufmann New York: Vintage (1969)
48 Fnednch Nietzsche - 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra" trans Walter Kaufmann in Kauffman ed The Viking Portable 
Nietzsche New York: The Viking Press (1967).
49 Friedrich Nietzsche - Thus Spoke Zarathustra" "On the Spirit of Gravity" (Section 2).
50. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit. (1962),
51. Friedrich Nietzsche-'The Will to Power" trans Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale New York 
Vintage Books (1968).
52. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968)
53. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968)
54. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968)
55. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968)
56. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968)
57. In "Nietzsche - Seine Philosophie der Gegensatzte und die Gegensatzte seiner Philosophie"
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (1971), M u Iler-Lauter interprets the will to power as atheory of force 
destructing the myth of unitary will to power. Basing his reading of the Wachlass he claims that 
in a way we can perceive "a" will to  power, constantly changing, a "ständig Änderndes 
MachtaufbauendesoderMachtabbauendes'Xcontinuallychanging/augmenting/dimishingofpower).
Similarly Alphonso Lingis in 'The W ill to Power). Similarly Alphonso Lingis in 'The W ill to 
Power" in 'The New Nietzsche" ed David B Allison (New York: Dell (1977)) writes that the will to 
power is the differential element o f time. This difference arises, according to Lingis, "in the 
self-affirmation o f a force exercised against another force". It affirms itself and thereby 
affirms its difference. "For Nietzsche, the feeling o f distinction - the pathos of distance - 
is the fundamental affect of power'’. Accordingly Muller-Lauter argues that Nietzsche does not 
assum e fixed unities (Einheiten") but rather an ever-changing quantum of will to power. 
Furthermore, the will to power is never "singular, isolated, but rather it consists in the 
plurality of opposing wills in relationship with each other'1. (Gegensatzte).
The will to power is according to Muller-Lauter more than simply a human perspective, and more 
than the perspective of Nietzsche (see: Muller-Lauter "Nietzsche's Lehre von Wille zer Macht"
Nietzsche Studien 3 (1974): 10)). It evades the self-negating esssence of perspectivism - 
differentiating itse lf from other systems by not contradicting itself. Viewed from the 
perspective of the truth criteria of his philosophy, it is the only constant "Weltdeutung" 
(interpretation of the world). If we observe merely the formal structure of this thought, then 
"the individual and radical nature o f Nietzsche's interpretation will be hidden from us" 
(M uller-Lauter - "W ille ”) To com prehend its individuality "it is necessary to go after its 
immanent presuppositions" (Muller-Lauter - ’Wille"). Only by reflecting on these can we see how 
N ietzsche's thought fulfills its claim  to be the most basic interpretation of reality 
("grindlegende Deutung de Wirklichkeit"). The constantly evaluing self is the key, according 
to Muller-Lauter, to understand how the will to power escapes the perspectivtsts paradox. Human 
reality, like all o ther reality - both organic/inorganic - consists of an infinite number o f 
unstable forces constantly overcoming one another. The subject has the capacity to have 
reflexive awareness of this process o f flux, that is it has reflexine awareness of its constantly 
changing/adapting nature It collects, via memory, and then internalizes this sifting of 
perspectives that it essentially is. The notion o f reflexive awareness of perspectival 
interpreting ("perspektivischen interpretierens inne W erden") is the focal point of Muller- 
Lauter's interpretation. Muller-Lauter suggests that this memory o f competing forces is no 
longer simply one perspective among many but rather a more direct awareness The consistency of 
Nietzsche's theory stems from the fact that both the world and the subject are constantly
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changing, and hum ans are capable o f having reflexine awareness of this change.
Muller-Lauter contends that the will to power may provide a solution to the perspectivist 
dilemma - providing Nietzsche with a way to argue for the superior nature o f the theory of the 
will to power, even though he does not believe in “truth” Muller-Lauter locates in the will to 
power, an answer to  the question that Nietzsche's rejection o f truth inevitably provokes - the 
criteria he adopts to  perceive interpretation. Muller-Lauter finds a solution by means of the 
"virtue of its consistency". Nietzsche would advocate that the will to power is removed from any 
obvious contradications that he observed in concepts such as the thing-in-itself But Nietzsche 
did not always avoid contradiction. If is characteristic o f philosophic thought to search for 
and value truth, but Nietzsche separates himself from this tradition by placing value in that 
which is appropriate for the moment. Having rejected the conception of a fixed truth, Nietzsche 
adopts/modifies his project to suit the context in which he is writing.Therefore, for Nietzsche, 
conceptual knowledge, once divorced from its pretensions to apprehend truth does not lose its 
functional capacities. For Nietzsche the will to power represents a series o f interpretations 
and not objective knowledge. Nietzsche is convinced that we can never arrive at objective 
knowledge of the worid/definitive explanations, but this does not rule out suggestions offering 
interpretations o f th e  world.
The will to power com prises the single most important doctrine of Nietzsche but it does not 
dominate/dictate his thought nor is it an entirely consistent system. There is consistency to 
Nietzsche but not exactly as Muller-Lauter argues. Although his doctrine represents Nietzsche's 
systematic heights the mechanism by which his thought functions/operates is located elsewhere. 
There is according to  Nietzsche a stylistic imperative to create unities to give one's thought 
a unity of style (See 'T h e  Gay Science" trans W alter Kaufmann - New York: Vintage (1974).
Nietzsche justifies the superiority o f certain tastes without concerning him self with the fact 
that this is directly his perspective. W hile his remarks on taste/style can never be entirely 
systematized, certain trends can be discerned Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes the validity of 
formulating one's ow n values o f creating one's views from  multiple perspectives, and of 
correcting/idealizing the objects of investigation. Neitzsche suggests that in the absence of 
truth there are only pragm atic necessities and aesthetic considerations (that is necessary 
fictions and aesthetic reasoning). In this sense Nietzsche is profoundly un-Hegelian - he rarely 
provides a final synthesis, this does not imply that he negated the attempt but one o f the 
fundamental basis o f his thought is its ability to contain contradictions.
58 Gilles Deleuze - op. c it (1962)
59. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
The world o f becoming is a world of flux/muttiplicity but also of chance/chaos - the affirmation 
o f the eternal return is integral to this supplementary aspect of becoming. Deleuze locates a 
metaphysics of flux in the  Nietzschean image o f the game o f chance.
"(If) ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so 
that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth: 
for the earth is a table o f the gods, and trembling with creative new words 
and the d ice throws o f the gods"
(Friedrich Nietzsche - Thus Spoke Zarathustra - trans R. J. Hollingdale New 
York: Penguin Books (1961)).
Existence should be understood, in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, as radically innocent and as 
just, a game of chance. Consequently if existence is to be perceived as a game of chance, then 
it is also a game entailing serious implications because it is also a game of necessity of chance, 
a game conducted by god s with dice and the earth as their table.
"Above all things stands the heaven of chance, the heaven of innocence,
the heaven of accident, the heaven of wantonness....you are to me a dance
floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice 
and dicers!".
(Friedrich Nietzsche-Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans R.J. Hollingdale New 
York: Penguin (1961).
Chance is played out on two tables, one on earth and one in heaven, yet upon each occasion there 
is only a single dice throw Each dice throw conducted on earth is an "affirmation of becoming" 
and in heaven as an "affirmation of the being o f becoming". Each dice play affirms chance, but 
the actual numbers represented confirm the "necessity" of chance as the being of becoming. The 
necessity of chance is the element contributing to its innocence - it effectively releases all 
things from having a purpose. Therefore, in this respect, the necessity of chance in the play 
of the dice is an affirmation, and force may be comprehended only in terms of an affirmative and 
exemplary nondialectial elem ent. Affirmation in this form is the only mechanism directed 
towords producing chance/multiplicity (the being of becoming), in effect there is only one way
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"Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with 
parts, with chaos: the chaos o f the dice that are shaken and then
thrown....To abolish chance by holding it in the grip o f causality and
finality, to count on the repetition o f throws rather than affirming 
chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity - these are 
all the operations of a bad player*'.
(Gilles Deleuze - "Nietzsche et la philosophic" (1962)).
The skilled dice player affirms all chance in a single throw, accepting each result as the 
desired result. He/She affirms both chance and necessity, the chance of the throw and the 
necessity of the outcome. The player affirms the process, experiences every moment, every dice 
throw as good/valuable - as pleasure. The traditional problem of chance/necessity dissolves for 
the problem only issues via negative desires of controlling chance/escaping necessity. The 
affirmation of chance animates Nietzsche's contention of the greatness in a human being (see: 
"Ecce Homo trans Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage (1969)) and active embracing of fate that 
forces one to will whatever occurs as the necessary product of chance
to unite being and becoming so the resultant circumstances are innocent/necessary/multiple
instead of simply probable.
60 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1962).
61. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
62. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
63. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
64. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
65. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
66. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
67. Pierre Klossowski develops the notion of a selective ontology along different lines in his 
analysis (See: Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux. Mercure de France: Paris (1969) especially 
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"Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with 
parts, with chaos the chaos o f the dice that are shaken and then 
thrown To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and 
finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming 
chance, to anticipate a result instead o f affirming necessity - these are 
all the operations of a bad player*'.
(Gilles Deleuze - "Nietzsche et la philosophic" (1962)).
The skilled dice player affirm s all chance in a single throw, accepting each result as the 
desired result He/She affirms both chance and necessity, the chance of the throw and the 
necessity of the outcome The player affirms the process, experiences every moment, every dice 
throw as good/valuabie - as pleasure The traditional problem of chance/necessity dissolves for 
the problem only issues via negative desires of controlling chance/escaping necessity The 
affirmation of chance animates Nietzsche's contention of the greatness in a human being (see: 
"Ecce Homo trans Walter Kaufmann (New Yorx: Vintage (1969)) and active embracing of fate that 
forces one to will whatever occurs as the necessary product o f chance
to unite being and becoming so the resultant circumstances are innocent/necessary/multiple
instead of simply probable.
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ELECTROLITE (SPIN THE BLACK CIRCLE)
In the 1960's Deleuze developed various aspects of a Nietzschean philosophy of difference, 
presenting a formulation expressed in the works in "Difference et Répétition (1968) (1 ) and 
"Logique du sens" (1969) (2) (3).
"Difference et Repetition" is primarily an abstract and rigorous interrogation of the concept 
of difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself, including a review of numerous major and 
minor Western philosophers, arranged in an apparently traditional interpretative framework, 
but objectively structured in the  style of a topological enigma. Deleuze suggests it is part 
detective story part science fiction - the philosophical analogue of abstract art in its 
elucidation of conceptual concepts and imageless images of thought. With the treatment of 
the history of philosophy is comparable to a collage/eclectic technique in painting. 
"Logique du sens" is equivalently disciplined and stringently instructed, but a much more 
fluid/decentred analysis that connects an exposition of Stoic incorporeals with speculative 
discussions on the works of Lewis Carroll. A  "logical and psychoanalytic novel" (4) organized 
in thirty-four series each concentrating upon the appraisal o f a specific paradox, "Logique 
du sens" accommodates concurrent issues/themes to those located in "Différence et 
Répétition", but injects upon each level new and unexpected perspectives on earlier 
perceptions that counteract e ffortless assimilation.
"Différence et Répétition" and "Logique du sens" in synchronization essentially present an 
eloquent/vigorously inventive representation, but in a certain form they are not entirely 
discordant to a complete Deleuzian scheme - primarily they afford an inclusive/synthetic 
exemplification of themes that characterize his work
"Difference et Repetition" appropriates a Nietzschean programme. In overturning Platonism, 
Deleuze's strategy is not simply to  invert the hierarchy of essence and appearance, but to 
extract from Plato's texts a marginalized category that subverts both models and copies, both 
essence and appearance - that o f the simulacrum In transforming Kant the Deleuzian tactic
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is to propose a disjunctive use of the faculties, through which use the unconscious condition 
of each faculty is revealed, and to disclose a sensible realm of intensities and an ideal 
realm of problems (In two works "La Philosophie Critique de Kant” (1963) (5) and "Difference 
et Repetition" Deleuze presents both an analysis o f Kant's critical programme and the 
function of the faculties within the Kantian scheme together with an inventive articulation 
of the Kantian critique through the philosophy o f difference) (6).
The appropriation by Deleuze of Plato and Kant is fundamentally designed to replace the 
philosophy of identity and representation with a philosophy of difference - both a physics 
and a metaphysics of the similacrum (From Socrates - (Socrates - "Republic" VII: 523)) - 
Deleuze takes the idea that the experiences that catalyzes thought are those of contradictory 
perceptions - however, instead of leading to essences as Socrates would argue, Deleuze offers 
them as evidence of the existence of simulcra, which compel thought towards its correct 
activity - such contradictory experiences facilitate/enable a critical examination of what 
Deleuze describes as a " transcendental empiricism".
What Deleuze ultimately suggests with "transcendental empiricism" is a disjunctive operating 
of the faculties, a determination of the limits of each faculty by itself, under the general 
"dereglement" of common sense. Within each faculty there exists an essential 
element/condition that is unique to it, something that m ay not be experienced under the 
regulation of common sense - this something is revealed in moments of disequilibrium, through 
contradiction/enigma, in the form of signs (exemplified in "Proust et les signes (1972)) (7). 
For instance, the reminiscence of Proust1 s automotive memory is a "memorandum" of memory an 
element only experienced through memory divorced from common sense (a paradoxical element 
tangible not in the present, only the past). The fantasy is an "imaginadum”, that which may 
only be imagined. The intensity is that which may only be apprehended by the senses. The 
examination of the faculties is experimental, their number/constitution may not be 
determined "a priori". Deleuze suggests a faculty of language whose transcendental object 
Is meaning/sense, a faculty of vitality whose transcendental object is the 
animalistic/monstrous, a faculty of the social with a transcendental object o f anarchy.
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Deleuze's method is classified as empiricism because its object is experience (not the  
possible experience of Kant "capable of representation" but real experience 
"subrepresentative") equally it can be transcendental because empirical principles 
inevitably externalize the elements of the ir foundation, and in this respect need a 
transcendental analysis for their implicit conditions/presupposition.
In the overturning of Platonism, Deleuze proposes that one must simply illuminate what is 
latent in Plato: one must "deny the primacy o f an original over the copy, of a model over the  
image" and "glorify the reign of simulacra and reflections" (8). Deleuze initiates the  
advancement of a new conception of philosophy derived from the basis of a rejection o f  
Platonism. In addition he has specifically allied this alternate conception of philosophy 
with current tendencies in modern art.
'T h e  theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from 
representation to abstraction. This is the aim  of a theory of thought without image."
(Gilles Deleuze) (9).
The philosophical equivalent o f abstract art/imageless thought is a non-representational 
conception of thought. Deleuze's interpretation of the task of philosophy, specifically in 
"D ifférence et répétition" is grounded within a critique of the prevalent 
representationalism that has to date defined philosophy. It is possible to conceive o f a  
relational context between the abandonment of representationalism in painting and philosophy 
via Deleuze's discussions regarding Plato and contemporary art in the course of "Différence 
et répétition". The "overturning” of Platonism involves inverting the hierarchy identified 
by Plato between copies and simulacra, a reversal that intrinsically proposes the negation 
of the essential distinction in question (These themes will again be articulated in Chapter 
7).
In "Différence et répétiton" Deleuze announces that "the task of modem philosophy has been 
defined to overturn ("renverser") Platonism" (10). In a manner similar to Nietzsche, Deleuze
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proposes an overcoming that proceeds via an "inversion" of certain aspects of Platonism. 
(11). For Deleuze, the overturning o f Platonism is correspondingly a section and a major 
element in the structural fram ew ork of "Différence et répétition"- the critique of the 
representational conception of thought (12) that has dominated the history/comprehension of 
philosophy since Plato and an explanation of an alternative model of "thought without image". 
Deleuze seeks to advance a notion o f thought as an essentially creative activity: thought as 
the creation of concepts, where the concepts themselves are interpreted as functioning only 
in immediate relations with forces/intensities outside thought. (For Deleuze the domination 
of the prevailing representational m odel of philosophical thought is defined by the implicit 
supression/exclusion of d ifference in favour of a logic based upon 
identity/resemblance/similitude).
In his analysis of Plato Deleuze identifies certain themes that suggest that Plato did not 
always accept the precedence of identity over difference, while he argues that metaphysics 
defined as a theory of conceptual representations should be allied with reference to 
Platonism, Deleuze advocates that Plato provides an incomplete version of the philosophy of 
representation. (The doctrinal basics of representation in Plato are confined to a theory of 
ideas/forms - as such they lack a systematic theory of categories (the conditions of possible 
experience) subsequently developed by Aristotle). Plato's notion o f the theory of ideas does 
not propose a specification of ob jects  in terms of their situation within a differential 
construct of genus/species but by contrast a selection among rival claimants, the separation 
of the true/authentic from the simply apparent/unauthentic by concentrating upon the lines 
of development coming from the initial conception. Therefore with Plato it is possible to 
discern difference/pure difference located in the intervals between founded/unfounded 
claimants or between things them selves and their simulacra
The Deleuzian programme is initiated by the attempt to "think beyond" the terms of the 
dominant metaphysical tradition and incorporates a precise intention to develop a mode of 
thought capable of comprehending pure  difference. Within this process, Deleuze utilizes 
certain elements of anti-Platonism tha t are integrated within the texts of Plato's dialogues
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themselves. Deleuze proposes that the anti-representational motifs located in Plato's 
writing renders it correspondingly inevitable/necessary that the overturning of Platonism 
should remain to a certain degree parasitical towards Plato's project in general (13). To the 
extent that Deleuze's "overturning" of Plato proceeds from a reversal o f sorts between 
conflicting elements present in Plato’s thoughts, the technique is analogous to the strategy 
employed in the Deleuzian scheme in relation to the philosophy of representation.
In the "Sophist" Plato makes the distinction among images, between "likenesses" (copies) and 
"semblances" (simulacra). The former positively resemble the original, the latter only 
appear to be a likeness. The difference between likenesses(copies) and semblances 
(simulacra) is a case of the foundation of resemblance in each instance - identity of 
dimensions/proportions/tones on one instance; superficial/apparent resemblance on the basis 
of difference from the original in the other. Copies represent the Forms because they 
resemble them, they posses an intrinsic affinity/spiritual resemblance with the real entity 
itself In contrast simulacra is based upon a disparity/difference, it incorporates a 
dissimilarity.
Deleuze argues, "the whole of Platonism .. .is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction 
between "the thing itse lf and the simulacra" (14). This then, as opposed to the opposition 
between Forms and imitations/representations is the fundamental motivation of Platonism. 
Deleuze proposes that the primary concern o f Platonism is not simply to discern the true 
claim ant from the false, but to externalize the latter, in such a way as to establish the 
priority of well-founded copies and the disenfranchising of the simulacra. "Platonism as a 
whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra which are 
identified with the Sophist himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always 
disguised and displaced false pretender" (Gilles Deleuze) (15). It is the desire to exorcise 
simulacra that ensures the primacy o f identity and the repression of difference. In Plato's 
model, Deleuze says, "a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate 
simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral. What is condemned in the 
figure o f simulacra is a state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and
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crowned anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and 
that of the copy" (Gilles Deleuze) (16).
Upon this basis the Deleuzian technique in overturning Platonism is on the primary level a 
simplistic reversal: "Overturning Platonism then means denying the primacy of original over 
copy, o f model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections" (G illes 
Deleuze) (17). To promote the sovereignty of the simulacra is to affirm a world in w hich 
difference as opposed to sameness is the primary relation. In such a situation there are  no 
ultimate foundations/original identities - everything assumes the status of a simulacrum. 
Elements are composed/identified by the type/nature of the differential interactions they 
engage in, both internally and in relation to other elements. In this way, Deleuze's 
"overturning" of Platonism prefigures the technique which he employs in producing a 
conception of the world in which the play of difference as opposed to the interaction of 
identity and resemblance articulate the nature of things. Deleuze is careful to distinguish 
the formulation of the difference in nature between simulacrum and copy - it is not the same 
outline of difference in each instance. This notion is based upon the claim that P lato 
himself introduces a qualitative distinction between two types of imitation - good imitations 
(copies) or bad imitations (simulacra). The difference between them is reliant upon the 
nature of the similitude in each instance - for good copies, an exemplary similitude based 
upon a sameness of proportion or "internal resemblance" to the thing itself; for bad copies, 
simulacra, an apparent resemblance based upon difference in proportion, or difference in 
character from the thing itself.
The difference between these types of imitation affects the form of the difference between 
the imitation and the imitated in each instance. With regard to good copies, the difference 
between imitation/copy and original is a difference within resemblance, a difference between 
things that are in essential respects the same. Within the Platonic model of representation, 
difference is operative on a secondary/derived relation, the similarity of the copy to  
original (therefore their similarity or generic identity) being paramount. The difference 
between a similacrum and what it simulates is constituted in an entirely contrasting fashion.
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The simulacrum is not, in essential respects, the same as what it simulates but different. 
Although it does reproduce the appearance of the original, it does so as an effect At this 
point the apparent identity of the tw o is the secondary derived relation, while it is their 
difference that it primary Deleuze adopts this feature of simulacra as the basis for 
identifying another conception of difference, a "free difference" not regulated by the 
structure of representation that determ ines the Platonic model.
In the Preface to "La philosophie critique de Kant" (1963), Deleuze summarizes Kantian 
philosophy in four "poetic formulas", the  first of which is Hamlet's proposition that "The 
time is out of joint". Time becomes "unhinged" in Kant says Deleuze, with the effect o f a 
revolution between time/space and time/movement.
'Time is no longer defined by succession because succession concerns only things and movements 
which are in time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in another time, and 
on to infinity. Things succeed each o ther in various times, but they are also simultaneous in 
the same time, and they remain in an indefinite time. It is no longer a question of defining time 
by succession, nor space by sim ultaneity, nor permanence eternity"
(Gilles Deleuze) (18)
One intrinsic/defining constituent of the Postmodern condition contends that the present 
time is as it were, "out o f joint", a secondary consideration in this relation highlights the 
convergence between many Eighteenth Century controversies and their re- 
emergence/reconsideration in the contemporary situation.
In early works Deleuze identified the virtual realm of ideas with the eternal return (19). 
It is therefore not surprising that he is  in addition concerned with the question o f the 
connection between repetition, the synthesis of time, and ideas (20). "Difference et 
répétition" combines/revises previous conceptual models and constructs a schema of what he 
terms the three passive syntheses o f time. The first passive synthesis is that of the living 
present as a contraction of moments within a transient present, the founding (foundation) of 
tim e The second synthesis (a Bergsonian/Proustian virtual past) is the foundation
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(fondement) o f time The third synthesis that o f the eternal return or Thanatos, a future 
orientated synthesis, the "unfounding" (¿ffondement) o f time a complication of time (like 
the time of Proustian essences) which is "out o f joint".
Deleuze approaches the third synthesis via Kant's reflection on the formula "cogito, ergo 
sum", from the first "Critique". Kant derives from a reading of the Cartesian formula a 
presence of two "I's" and two kinds of existence. The thinking "I" (Cogito) is self-present 
as the thought o f itself, but the self that it knows, the object of its thought (ego sum) may 
only be comprehended as an object within the form of time. Deleuze extracts this moment from 
Kant's "Critique" and identifies it as the fractured "I" and the "pure and empty form of time" 
(events do not unfold with the pure and empty form of time but time itself unfolds and all 
identity self/world/God dissolve). "I is another", (Deleuze from Rimbaud) Kant explains 
that the Ego itself is in time and consequently in constant transition - it is a 
passive/receptive Ego which experiences changes in time. However, the "I" is an act which 
constantly administers a synthesis of time, dividing past/present/future in every 
occurrence The "ITEgo" are therefore divided by the line of time which relates them to each 
other, under the condition of a fundamental difference (I am constituted as a passive ego 
which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought - the "I" as the other which 
affects it - 1 am separated from myself by the form of time, but I am one, because the "I" 
affects this form by acting out its synthesis and also because Ego is subsequently affected 
as content in this form).
“The form  o f the determinable means that the determined ego represents determination as an 
other other. It is like adoube division of he I and he Ego in the time which elates them to 
each other, stitches them together. It is the thread of time” (Gilles Deleuze) (21).
For Kant it is the form of time which is the determining element, separating the act and the 
"I" and the ego to which the act is attributed, an infinite flexibility - time moves into a 
subject to distinguish the Ego and the "I" contained within (the form in which the "I" affects 
the Ego) In this respect time, as immutable form, appears as the form of interiority/inner
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sense and space appears as the form of exteriority. The inferiority of form represents not 
merely the way in which time is internal to us but more complexly that inferiority constantly 
divides us from ourselves - a division with no ultimate conclusion, therefore a constant flux 
that "dramatizes" time
The Deleuzian notion of the pure and empty form of time constitutes the transient form of time 
which catalyzes the foundation of time/virtual past, the founding of time/living present and 
the empirical time/common sense. The pure and empty form of time, is that of the eternal 
return, the time of ideas, the virtual time of co-existing, o f differences without origin 
which is in continual repetition in the dimension of actual intensities.
Deleuze overturns Platonism by instigating the primacy of simulacra, replacing the  
opposition of appearance/essence with one of actual intensities/virtual problems: Kant 
offers Deleuze a framework for a critical examination of simulacra (22). In determining the 
derivation of origin, value plays an important role. Deleuze suggests a pluralistic model, 
the question of a thing's essence is a question of meaning and value A thing has no essence 
apart from the one we give it. Essence is the product of the forces that have an affinity with 
the thing and by the will in infinity ("en affinité") with these forces The production o f 
an essence is a re-production/recovery of the meaning/value that the subject had added
Deleuze illustrates this by comparing Nietzsche's genealogy to Kant's critical thought (the 
Deleuzian version) Deleuze claims that, for Kant, the philosopher is a judge who surveys the 
distribution of domains and the partition of established values. Kant's judge "legislates” 
decisions based upon his interpretation o f the law. Both the transcendental laws of the 
"Critique of Pure Reason" and the universal moral laws of the "Critique of Practical Reason" 
are - by virtue of their universality - the basis upon which the tribunal of reason 
adjudicates disputes. For genealogists thinking is to an extent judging, but judging in this 
case means evaluation and interpretation on the basis of the laws that they themselves create 
The genealogist in contrast declares a Kantian "critical peace" whereby reason adjudicates 
all disputes, foretells wars/conflicts of an intensity as yet unknown
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Nietzsche writes in "Beyond Good and Evil" that philosophers such as Kant and Hegel draw upon 
an extensive factual supply o f evaluations ('Tatbestand van Wertschätzungen") that have 
become dominant over tim e and are therefore regarded as "truths".
"Real philosophers are com m anders and creators of laws"
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (23)
In the Nietzschean design, Kant's concern for universal principles is replaced by the 
genealogist's sensibility fo r difference/distance. For Deleuze-Nietzsche the 
philosopher/genealogist is not simply a recorder of reality but a critic of established 
values and creator of new ones.
Deleuze advocates the existence of ideas, not in the Platonic sense as basic essences, but in 
the Kantian sense of "problems without solutions". Deriving a start point from the work of 
philosopher/mathematidan Albert Lautman (24), Deleuze views problems as immanent within, 
but irreducible to their solutions - they establish "a space" of possible solution while 
maintaining transcendence to those/that solution (Lautman demonstrates this distinction 
through the study of singular points and the curves of differential equations). The problem 
may be illustrated as a disembodied structure o f relations of singular points, and the 
specific values o f the solutions o f various equations as the essences o f that problem (25). 
Only after the regular points o f the curve have been determined can the singular points be 
identified. Despite this problematic character o f ideas, they are not 
nebulous/undifferentiated masses, but the distributions of singular points fully determined 
as distributions. However, these points have no fixed identity/function/location only a 
differential relation to other singular points and a potential for a variety of types of 
embodiment. The realm of problems may be conceptualized as a plane o f scattered points, 
centred around which is a nebulous vortex demarcating "a space" of possible 
actualization/embodiments o f the problem.
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Deleuze's transcendental empiricism subverts the architectural framework o f the Kantian 
Critical programme. Sensibility no longer operates as the passive receiver o f intuition, but 
as an element with the capacity to experience intensities. Departing from the presentation 
of intuitions within the " a priori" form  of space/time, sensibility is confronted with the 
groundless conditions of space/time as the depth of a primal groundless space and the pre and 
empty form of time of the eternal return. The function of the schemata of the imagination as 
dynamic, spatio-temporal determinations is replicated by the internal dynamism of 
intensities (26) related to ideas not concepts, and the imagination locates itself a 
transcendental object in fantasy.
Concepts are discovered through the illusionary subjugations of difference to 
representation, and the understanding no longer legislates in cognition but is virtually 
absent as a faculty. Ideas are elevated, but only as problems experiencing a 
chaotic/perplexing realm of co-existing singular points. Reason comes to be replaced by a 
faculty of thought functioning to think that which is not apprehended by comm on sense. 
Deleuze constructs an anti-Kantian design of thought - a conceptual/non- 
representational/disjunctive/inchoate/unconscious - one that introduces the predominance 
of simulacra, and within itself is a perverse simulacrum of Kant.
In "Difference et repetition", Deleuze defines meaning as the "loguendum" o f the faculty of 
speaking, the contradictory simulacrum within language that projects thought into a 
transcendental examination of the foundational structure of language. In "Logique du sens" 
(27) Deleuze instigates an extensive transcendental investigation of the "loguendum", 
although not via the virtual and actual but in terms of the Stoic dichotomy o f incorporeals 
and bodies. Deleuze employs the Stoic system primarily because Stoic incorporeals are 
similar in identity/function to the simulacra and secondly because the Stoic notion of the 
"lekton" ("expressable") is a productive mechanism through which to interpret the 
relationship of words to things (28).
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In the Deleuzian enterprise the utilization of the Stoic system enables an extensive analysis 
to be conducted of the relationship between surfaces/depths, problems/bodies. In addition 
the theory of the incorporeal allows Deleuze to survey the interaction of language.
The feature that enables a word to be comprehendible to one individual but not to another is 
its meaning, an incorporeal attribute which as a supplement to the word in no way affects the 
word's being as a body. Words and things are bodies upon whose surfaces incorporeal "lekta" 
insist/subsist - the surface effects of words being "meaning", and those of things "events".
Deleuze conceptualizes "events" or the surface effect of things, through the notion o f  
simulacra and problems. The event is characterized in terms of the example o f a military 
battle - the battle although a simple effect in one respect, in another is a vital entity, an 
aggregate of metastable states, a construct focusing the "loci" o f potential energy of the  
possibilities of development. The "event as such", presented in terms of its transcendental 
condition, is a virtual entity, a problem/idea - a verbal infinitive displaying various 
actualizations (not "the battle" but "to battle"). The event is real but not present, ideal 
but not abstract - it is simultaneously a surface-effect and a vital potential energy o f 
individualism "insistingTsubsisting" in the past and future of "aion" (the pure and empty 
form of time).
The incorporeal surface o f words is that o f meaning. Meaning states Deleuze is the "ideal 
matter or "medium" (29). To define the nature of the "ideal matter" one has to proceed via 
indirection, illustrating what it is not in order to conceive what it is. If meaning precedes 
designation/manifestation/signification, therefore it must be independent of the 
determ inations of these relations. It is indifferent to notions of truth/falsity, 
existence/non-existence (designation) it has no fixed/stable objects or subjects 
(designations/manifestation) and does not include any irreversible relations of implication. 
Deleuze throughout "Logique du sens" uses sections from the "nonsense works" of Lewis Carroll 
as examples of the theories of pre-logical meaning/shifting identities/reversible relations 
of causality/temporality, o f contradicting realms in which real/imaginary,
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material/conceptual, possible/impossible objects co-exist and interact. (Carroll's work 
is ordinarily classified as "nonsense", but this does not imply that it is devoid of meaning - 
it has sense but not in a "usual" m ode it delineates and extend notions of meaning that 
include both logical and illogical impulses). However Carroll's work is not the ultimate 
encapsulation of the "ideal m atter" of meaning as it is in itself, but as it insists and 
subsists within propositions, as it appears in language through paradoxes that transgress 
the logical relations of the proposition The "ideal matter” of meaning shares the same 
features as the incorporeal event
Within the fundamental nature o f the  "logique du sens'Vlogic of meaning, words phrase 
meaning, but that which is phrased is an accessory of things (an event). Meaning (the surface 
effects of words) and events (the surface effects o f things) constitute a single surface with 
two sides, events expressed within words, and that which is expressed refers to things. The 
surface of meaning/events forms the surface between words and things as function o f "the 
articulation of their difference" (30).
Deleuze defines meaning as a simulacrum, a paradoxical/contradictory entity that is 
resistant to common sense Meaning is not contained within the genesis of the thing, nor in 
the thought of that origination, nor in the words written/spoken in conjunction with it. It 
is in the process leading from one to  the other Meaning is a correspondence between 
asymptomatic lines of casuality which have no common form or coincidence but are composed of 
the infinity o f forces. What brings these formations into an interaction is the "abstract 
machine".
The abstract machine is interpretation It is the meaning process, from the point o f view of 
a given expression (The abstract m achine behind the order-word, is itself a variable in 
continual variation, changing with each actualization It is inscribed in language, but can 
only be identified by enacting a process of infinite regression. In conjunction there is a 
second type of the expression - the way in which meaning and events form a single surface.
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A transcendental analysis of the condition o f the proposition reveals that meaning is the 
"ideal matter"' of the proposition - an acategorical/pre-individual/alogical "medium" which 
can be thought o f as an assemblage of virtual infinitives with each infinitive demarcating 
a range/group of possible interpretations which might be phrased in language. With the 
transcendental condition of physical occurrences as processes of becoming, events form a set 
o f singular points or "loci" o f possibility/metastable states of potential energy which are 
manifested in various ways, each singular point operating in the way o f an infinitive that 
might locate in a number of embodiments The "ideal matter" o f words is not essentially a 
linguistic element and the singular points are not physical, they are more exactly centres 
o f implicate/virtual difference as actualized before they are expressed/articulated in a 
specific form. Meaning and events, as a nucleus of implicate/virtual differences constitute 
a single transcendental area that may be dualistically interpreted as a plane of 
meaning/plane of events.
The conception of meaning/sense - the rational meaning of logical propositions - is 
essentially common sense/good sense. W hat is termed nonsense - the creative 
paradoxical/contradictory words found in a writer such as Lewis Carroll - may be presented 
as the full and unrestricted dimension of meaning/sense. In "Logique du sens" Deleuze 
promotes the notion of incorporeal nonsense (a chimeric and paradoxical entity that traverses 
the  metaphysical surface of meaning and formulates a structure of singular points.) 
Incorporeal nonsense operates as the structuring influence upon the transcendental scene of 
singular points From Lewis Carroll "Snark" and from Marcel Mauss and Lévi-Strauss "Mana" - 
both instances o f incorporeal nonsense (zero signifiers, words with no established meaning, 
yet opposed to the negation/absence of meaning). (31 ). Deleuze defines them as linguistic 
expressions o f the transcendental power that frames structures around singular points. 
(Deleuze conceives of minimal structures as the heterogeneous series of terms that are set 
in relation by and converge in a paradoxical element) These structures are embodiments of 
a transcendental structure, the two series in an empirical structure corresponding to two 
distnbutions of singular points and the paradoxical element (Snark/Mana) to an aleatory 
point.
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"the "problem" is determined by "singular points" which correspond to series, but the 
"question", by an "aleatory point" which corresponds to the empty slot or the mobile 
element. The question is developed in problems, and problems are enveloped in a fundamental 
question".
(Gilles Deleuze) (32)
The aleatory point builds structures, however these constructions are not intrinsically 
stable. As it ranges through singular points the aleatory point establishes a "nomadic 
distribution" of singular points, the singular point adopting no pre-established/contrived 
configuration but occupying the maximum space, forming structural relationships and then 
proceeding, but without leaving any territorial demarcations or concrete frameworks. (33).
Deleuze conceives a construct as ultimately a composed/tectonic chaotic/chaos-structure - 
a nomadic distribution of singular points, each specific point undetermined within the scope 
of possible expressions, set in differential inter-relations with other points via 
connective conjunctive/disjunctive syntheses by an aleatory point that ranges over entire 
senes in a process of enveloping all problems within a single question Meaning can be shown 
to be produced by nonsense or the aleatory point in three ways; (i) the aleatory point 
produces the structure of the transcendental area of meaning/events, (ii) it creates the 
meaning/effects which shadow the surface of words/things, (iii) it engenders the common sense 
meaning articulated in the linguistic interaction of signifiers to signified, that which 
enables the primary relation of propositions (signifiers) to things (signified) in their 
mutual exemplification within the range of singular points which when expressed 
insist/subsist within the proposition as the formulation of meaning and impends upon/over 
things as surface events.
The schematic architecture of "Logique du sens" explicates the notion of the transcendental 
surface of meaning/events - a zone that fuses mental and physical phenomena without their 
subjugation to a unifying mechanism of a divine Being or transcendental form of 
consciousness Deleuze acknowledges the necessity for the requisite of a transcendental 
grounding of the relation of consciousness to its objects, but however, he refutes the impulse
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to anchor the ground to that w hich it constructs/founds. Alternatively, he depicts 
consciousness and its objects as products generated from an area recalcitrant to God and the 
self, "a World of impersonal and pre-individual singularities (singularities being used
indifferently in "logique du sens" to  refer to singular points and intensities).....of the
will to power, free and unbound energy" (34).
The structural construction of "Logique du sens" allies language both to thought and to 
things, however there appears no intrinsic link between thought and language. Alternatively 
thought is initiated from the compulsion of a sign, a simulacrum that forces thought to 
examine that which resists consciousness/recognition/representation, whether it is the 
metaphysical surface of singular points or the iridescent "Ungrund" of depth. Language 
according to Deleuze is not the orig in  of the form s of thought, but the product of the 
interaction of singular points/intensitles (singularities) and undifferentiated bodies that 
require investigation via the simulacra that shadow its surface and the sonic shards/blocks 
that resound throughout the corporeal depths.
Deleuze ultimately is concerned to stimulate innovation. Language instead of acting as a 
constraining framework around thought, can operate in a positive direction, actively 
functioning in the creation/generation o f meaning and the examination of problems.
Kant divides the aesthetic into a theory o f the sensible and the theory of the beautiful, with 
Deleuze's transcendental empiricism however, "the two senses of the aesthetic merge, at which 
point the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, and the work of art 
simultaneously appears as experimentation. "(35) 'To  think is to create" (36) (Gilles 
Deleuze), and only thought and art can comprehensively affirm difference, the cosmic play of 
chance of the eternal return - "And if one tries to play this game in any way other than in 
thought, nothing takes place, and if one tries to produce anything other than a work of art, 
nothing is produced". (37) (Gilles Deleuze)
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The Deleuzian connective scheme/strategy is presented as a work of art and his thought as a 
nomadic distribution o f singular points. Deleuze is not a systematic philosopher but he does 
construct multiple-system worlds The synthesis of themes that traverse the individual 
projects in conjunction represents a creative propagation, a continuity in the production 
of interconnections as opposed to the establishment of an incorporated whole. Each work is 
an experiment, a mechanism devised to explore/extend/modify/transform ideas by situating 
them reciprocally within a defined conceptual scheme. In each work the structure of a problem 
unfolds, in each following work a metamorphosis of previous elements with an alternative 
problematic occurs, and across all the works in assimilation fluctuates the aleatory point 
o f a single question (38).
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ELECTROLITE (SPIN THE BLACK CIRCLE) 
NOTES
1. Gilles Deleuze - Difference et repetition - Paris: PUF (1968)
2. Gilles Deleuze - Logique du sens - Paris: Minuit (1969).
3. In many respects the Deleuzian concept of difference parallels the deconstructive enterprise 
of Derrida, itself o f Nietzschean derivation although mediated via Heidegger. In similar fashion 
both Deleuze and Derrida question the metaphysical pre-suppositions of traditional philosophy 
and the representational model o f thought - through the employment o f the term  
difference/differancean"aconceptualconcept"/"non-concept"thatfundamentallysubvertsthe 
certainties of Western rationality. In addition Deleuze. like Derrida, maintains an ambiguous 
relationship with the structuralist programme, incorporating the more progressive aspects o f 
the scheme while systematically rejecting its claims to scientific objectivity. (For a coherent 
description o f Deleuze's relationship with/understanding o f structuralism see: "A qui 
reconnAit-on le structuralisme" in "Historie de la philosophie: VoJ 8 Le XXe Siede" ed Francois 
Chatelet (Paris: Hatchette (1973)).
The primary impulse of structuralism was paramount/ definitive in the dethroning of the soverign 
subject/'cogrto" which had predominantely informed French thought from Descartes to Satre and 
Merleau-Ponty. Structuralists such as Claude-Levi-Strauss and Ferdinand de Saussure presented 
the subject not as the origin o r foundation o f knowledge but as a function o f structures - 
social/mythical/linguistic etc - that evaded the subjects determination. Deleuze endorsed the 
attack on the "cogito” but questioned the epistemological status allocated to the impersonal 
structures that regulated subjectivity. Deleuze's reaction to structuralism paralleled 
Derrida's - as Derrida advocated a concordance with the terms of the Saussurian analysis o f 
linguistic structure and then employed them to de-centre the essential notion of structure, co- 
relatively Deleuze integrated a mathematical m odel of structure within his philosophy o f 
difference, but via a theory of "singular pointsVmetastable statesVnomadic distributions" - 
entirely problematizing the basic model. (Deleuze's model o f difference is not grounded in 
Saussurian linguistics, and differences are not created through a system of relations o f 
arbitrary entities - such as the phonemes of language - and the world is not a text in which signs 
only refer to other signs).
4 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit. (1969).
5. Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie critique de Kant. - Paris: PUF (1963).
6. In "La Philosophie Critique de Kant" (1963) Deleuze summarises the essential themes contained 
in Kant’s three critiques and relates a clear and original account o f their interrelation, 
demonstrating how problems that arise with the first two Critiques are recognised by Kant and in 
a manner reconciled in the third Critique. The "Critique of Judgement" is positioned as a 
keystone in the architectural framwork o f Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
The Deleuzian analysis is formulated, as the title of the work suggests, on the faculties and 
their relationships/inter-relationships within Kantian Philosophy. Firstly we approach Kant's 
theory of transcendental idealism. This theory illustrates that the laws of the understanding 
established in the subjective deduction, are correspondent to the "a priori" truths laid down 
in the objective deduction. In essence it characterizes a specific harmony between the 
capacities of the knower and the nature o f the known. This harmony fadlitates/enables the 
possibility of "a priori" knowledge. In consequence the "forms o f thought" governing the 
understanding and the "a priori" nature of reality are baianced/in correspondence (the world is 
as we think it, and we think it as it is). Dependent upon which of the above is emphasized will 
determine the interpretation o f the Kantian scheme.
The central tenets of the Deleuzian conception of "La Phitosophie Critique de Kant" are contained 
within the section entitled "Problem of the Relationship between the Faculties: Common Sense". 
The three active faculties, imagination/reason/understanding engage in certain relations, a 
function of speculative interest. Understanding legislates and judges, under the 
understanding, imagination synthesizes/schematizes, reason reasons and is symbolic in such a 
way that knowledge is afforded maximum systematic unity. Any accord between the faculties 
defines a "common sense" (a subjective condition of communicability). Knowledge has as its 
requisite common sense, without which communication would not function and therefore no daim 
to universality would be possible. When a subject has experience the ground of that experience 
consists in a kind of complicity between what is experienced and the faculty o f the imagination 
through which it is organized. Although the unity has an origin in the subject, it is attributed 
to an independent object In experiencing the unity the subject additionally senses a harmony 
between the rational faculties and the object to which they are applied. The sense of harmony - 
subject/object is additionally an experience of pleasure and also a ground o f universality.
This design, allowing th e  faculties to harmonize with each other and to form harmonious 
proportions in com bination with the idea of a difference in nature bertween the faculties 
constitutes one of the m ost original of Kant's approaches. Common sense in its speculative form 
(sensus communis log tous) expresses the harmony of the faculties in the speculative interest of 
reason, under the legislature o f the understanding From the perspective o f an alternate 
interest of reason the facilties engage in another accord under the legislature o f another 
faculty and as such form another common sense. Kant argues that the accord of the faculties is 
capable of several proportions depending upon which faculty determines the relationship 
(The most complete explication of this system is located in the third "Critique" - T h e  Critique 
of Judgement"). However, in each instance assuming the perspective of a relationship or an 
accord which is pre-determined it is inevitable that the common sense should be manifested as a 
type o f "a priori fact" de fin ing  a boundary In this respect the first two critiques do not 
resolve the problem of the  functioning relationship between the faculties, they merely direct 
us towards it as an ultimate scheme. Each pre-determined accord presupposes that the faculties 
can, at a deeper level, p rom ote a free/indeterminate accord. "It is only at the level o f this 
free and indeterminate accord (sensus communis aestheticus) that we will be able to post the 
problem of a ground of the accord or a genesis of common sense" (Gilles Deteuze-"La Philosophie 
Critique de Kant").
In the first two "Critiques" the  various subjective faculties enter into rigorously regulated 
relationships with each other, to the degree that there is always a dominant/determining faculty 
imposing its rules on the others (e g. in the "Critique o f Pure Reason" understanding dominates 
because it determines inner sense through the intermediary of a synthesis of the imagination, 
and even reason is subsumed and falls into the role assigned to it by understanding). From this, 
however, Kant developed his Critical programme - if the faculties have the capacity to engage in 
relationships which are variable, but regulated by one or other of them it should be possible for 
them to relate together w ith in  the context o f relationships which are unregulated, where each 
defines its own limit but nevertheless displays a harmony with the others.
It is here that Deleuze demonstrates how the problems that arise within the first two Critiques 
are identified and subsequently resolved in the 'Critique of Judgement" (The emphasis is now 
no longer directed towards the 'Critique of Pure Reason" which regards the sensible as a quality 
that may be related to an object in space/time, it is no longer a logic o f sensible nor even a new 
concept of logos which would be time. The emphasis switches to the 'Critique of Judgement" - "It 
is an aesthetic of the Beautiful and of the Sublime, in which the sensible is valid and unfolds 
in a "pathos" beyond all log ic, which will grasp tim e in its surging forth, in every origin of 
it's thread a giddiness. It is  no longer the Affect o f the "Critique of Pure Reason" which 
related the Ego to the I in a relationship which was still regulated by the order of time: it is 
a Pathos which leaves them to  evolve freely in order to form strange combinations as sources of 
time; "arbitrary forms of possib le intuitions’"' (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de 
Kant").
In the "Critique of Judgement"; "the various faculties enter into an accord which is no longer 
determined by any one of them and which is all the deeper because it no longer has any rule, and 
because it demonstrates a spontaneous accord with the Ego and the T  under the conditions of 
a beautiful Nature" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant"). The conclusion of the 
“Crtitque o f Judgement" p roposes - within the Deleuzian reading - that the faculties are 
essentially confrontational, each extended to its limit, discovering an accord within a 
fundamental discord, "a discordant accord is the great discovery of the "Critique of Judgement", 
the final Kantian reversal" (G illes Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant"). Separation 
which re-unites was the initial theme of the first "Critique" but towards the end of his Critical 
philosophy Kant discovers a discord that promoted an accord - an unregulated exercise of all the 
faculties which came to d e fin e  future philosophy.
In "Différence et répétition" Deleuze radicalizes his analysis while at the same time 
"maintaining faith" with the Kantian programme. The common sense of cognition under the 
legislature o f the understanding and the concept, itself presumes a world subject to 
representation whose four elem ents Deleuze describes as "identity in the form o f the 
"undetermined" concept, ana logy in the relation between ultimately "determinable" concepts, 
oppositions in the relations between "determinations" within the concept, resemblance in the 
"determined" object of the concept itse lf (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant).
Difference may only assume an  object of representation, "in relation to a conceived identity, 
a judged analogy, an im agined opposition, a perceived similitude;" (Gilles Deleuze - "La 
Philosophie Critique de Kant"), never in itself, and may be only comprehended via common sense 
in the form of a recognisable identity (Difference in itself escapes recognition of the common 
sense and representation o f concepts) Deleuze advocates being as difference, and in this 
respect, therefore being m ust be manifested in forms other than that of 
recognition/representation.
The Deleuzian conception of multiple faculties might initially appear as a destructive mechanism 
undermining the Kantian m ental programme, however, Deleuze's intention in "Différence et 
repetition" is to operate within Kant's scheme of the mind and subvert Kantianism by presenting
thought, in the nature of ideas (which Kant works to subtract from cognition) and the intensities 
of sense experience (the existence of which Kant dismisses because he conceives of sensibility - 
the faculty interpretating sense experience - as passive determined by the Ma priori" forms 
space/time, which in Deleuzian terms are forms of "representable" experience). Thought, in 
Deleuze's scheme, manifested in terms of the ideal and the sensible on a pnmary level appears 
no m ore than conventional dualism, however, the opposition is situated between the 
virtual/actual not the essential/accidental and on a secondary level the opposition is more 
fundam ental distinguishing between subrepresentative, unconscious and conceptual 
ideas/intensities and the conscious conceptual representations o f common sense.
7. Gilles Deleuze - "Proust et les signes" - Paris: PUF (1970).
8. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1968)
For Deleuze's analysis of the simulacrum in Plato, see "Plato et le simulacre" appearing as an 
appendix to  "Logique du sens".
9. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1968).
10 What this implidty means is dependent firstly on what one understands by Platonism and secondly
what the operation of "overturning" incorporates. "Renverser" includes both a sense of 
"overcoming" as well as that of "overtumingTreversing". Both senses are adopted within the 
Deleuzian versions of the departure from philosophy's Platonic past.
11. For Nietzsche Platonism was both a moral and a metaphysical construct, and something to be 
overcome on both of these planes From the metaphysical perspective Platonism is characterized 
by the distinction between the realm o f ideasAhat which truly is, and the sensuous realm of 
relative non-being/appearance. Platonism is founded upon a hierarchy within reality and a 
parallel hierachy within ourselves which renders even the highest points o f human life as merely 
copies/imitations of the truly real Overturning Platonism at this level cannot simply consist 
of an inversion of the metaphysical order and an affirmation of the reality of the sensuous, for 
this merely involves a changing o f the positions located within the same defining structure. 
W hat is necessary is the demolition o f the structure itself.
The moral framework of Platonism, for Nietzsche, was the principle form of nihilism that had 
dominated Western thought - a devaluation of temporal and corporeal human existence by opposing 
to it a higher spiritual realm, (see: Firedrich Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" trans. Walter 
Kaufmann in "Basic Writings o f Nietzsche" New York: Modem Library (1968) and trans R.J. 
Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1981)),and nihilism defining the nature of human existence 
up until the modem period Overturning Platonism at this level cannot be achieved by a simple 
inversion process because this would produce only a secondary nihilism/loss of faith in the 
supreme values and a profound despair, additionally because what we have become is the outcome 
of centuries o f indoctrination of the human spirit by a Christian education. In "On the 
Genealogy of Morals" (trans Walter Kaufmann, in "Basic Writings of Neitzsche" New York: Modem 
Library (1968) and ’On the Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings" ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson 
trans. Carol Diethe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1994)), Nietzsche argues the 
essential possibility of overcoming nihilism is dependant, at least in part, on the attachment 
to values such as truth, which are in-themselves ingrained within the Christian-Platonic 
tradition Rather than a simplistic inversion o f existing values the overturning of Platonism 
requires the production o f a new conception o f the definition of the state of humanity as 
embodied beings, together with a new evaluation of the life of such beings - a new ontology and 
a new ethics to structure human existence.
If the inversion of Platonism results in the sensuous remaining as that which truly is, then the 
realm o f the true is also the realm of art. Art is promoted by Nietzsche as the supreme 
affirmation o f the sensuous and therefore as a counter-movement to nihilism. In the inversion 
of Platonism both art and truth come to designate our relation to the sensuous. Art and truth 
engage in relation to one another in terms of a single guiding ambition that of re-animating and 
configuring the sensuous This relation is an intrinsic combination/inter-action in the real 
of a new historical existence. However, this alliance is fundamentally unstable - where 
Platonism is inverted we might expect both art and truth to be conceived as a affirmation of the 
sensuous in a conjunction of univocity/concordance. And yet for Nietzsche it remains one of 
discordance
Following the overcoming of Platonism there "is" a discordance in Nietzsche's scheme - 
Nietzche's overcoming entails more than a straightforward reversal - it may not be read in terms 
of the reversal or inversion o f a hierarchy (i.e. Plato asserts "truth is worth more than art" 
but N ietzsche expresses the opposite insight "art is worth more than truth") (Friedrich 
Nietzsche-'The Will to Power" trans Walter Kaufmann and R.J Hollingdale: New York: Vintage 
Books (1968)). Evidently there is a discordance for Nietzsche, for the "Sache" Nietzsche - the 
work itself articulates it - the discordance is concealed in the statement (art is worth more 
than truth).
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Nietzsche went beyond a mere sym m etrica l inversion of Platonism, an inversion in which the 
polarities of the true and the apparent would be exchanged yet precisely maintained as 
polarities. This is a "twisting free" from Platonism, whereby the polarities, and thus the 
oppositionality between them, are themselves abolished.
If, according to Nietzsche, being and truth enter into discordance, then they must primarily 
belong together in one. That one can only be being and our relation to being. Specifically the 
nature of the discordance for Nietzsche will depend upon the way in which negativity is thought 
with respect to being,
Nietzsche writing on the history of Platonism in "How the "true World" at last Became a Myth The 
History of an E rro r  from ’Tw ilight o f the Idols" (trans R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth : 
Penguin (1982)), recounts the development o f Platonism from out of Plato's work, up to the 
abolition o f the "true world" as a useless/superfluous idea. W ith the abolition of the true 
world, what remains is the sensuous - knowledge of which is supposed to be gained via positivism. 
However, Positivism merely represents the inversion of Platonism, in which the polarities o f 
truth versus appearance are maintained and indeed maintained as determinative What is required 
is an "Auseinandersetzung" with positivism in its foundations. What is necessary is a twisting 
away from Platonism.
"6. W e have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent
world perhaps?....But no! "with the real world we have also abolished the
apparant world!"
(Friedrich Nietzsche - 'Tw ilight o f the Idols").
W hat remains when both the 'true" suprasensuous world and the "apparent" sensuous world are 
abolished? Abolition does not imply a total annihilation/dissolution into nothingness, for 
Nietzsche seeks precisely to overcome nihilism in all its forms. The designations ’true" and 
"apparent" merely represent an interpretation of beings as a whole in accordance with Platonism.
It is this interpretation that is to be overcome/abolished, not the sensuous/non-sensuous in 
fact.
The sensuous and its intrinsic negativity still remain following the abolition of the "true" and 
the "apparent" following the first moment in twisting free from Platonism. But what remains also 
is a question (What is the sensuous? How is it to be delimited? What are its parameters? - Where 
does the sensuous end and the nonsensuous begin? - What is the prevailing relationship sensuous 
to non-sensuous? W hat remains is the need for a new interpretation of sensuousness).
The new interpretation of sensuousness is considered from the perspective of being and of 
Nietzsche's understanding of being as will to power Following the abolition of the true and 
apparent worlds the sensuous remains as that which is - as the sole reality. Reality/being/life 
as will to power is displayed/presented as a perspectival shining forth, a coming into appearance 
within the multiple in addition to alternative/transitory perspectives allied to the bodying 
forth of organic life. Whatever appears in such a context - a coming into appearance - appears 
to be/is manifested as whatever it is within a momentary perspective in the flux of appearing.
The being of whatever appears 'to  be" is mere appearance fSchein"). For Nietzsche such mere 
appearance or "error" is integrated with the conception of life as perspectival. Therefore he 
describes truth, being that which appears to be true, that kind of "error" without which a 
certain type of living entity could not exist.
The ambiguous character of the term appearance/"Schein", for Nietzsche, corresponds to what 
remains following the inversion of Platonism - the true workWhe world of being/of permanence 
is no longer to be located in the suprasensuous, but in the sensuous itself. In the 
ambiguity/interpretation of the "logos" we perceive the basis for a "discordance" between truth 
as definitive appearance and that appearing/shining forth that is affirmed in art as the creative 
transformation o f the sensuous into the beautiful.
The discordance between art and truth is one that emerges in Nietzsche's twisting free from 
Platonism  Art and truth are integral to the unity o f being or reality conceived as the 
perspectival appearing/shining forth of the sensuous It is in this same respect that they also 
function to counter-act one another and become dis-joined The discordance which Nietzsche 
identified as prevalent in the relationship between art and truth is located not in the simple 
inversion o f Platonism but in the process of a twisting free.
Existence can now only locate meaning in the creative activity of art (the collapse of any 
positioning of a suprasensuous defined/meaning, the unfolding o f nihilism in which the "true 
world" comes to nothing, there is no longer any meaning/directionality to existence) in which 
the sensuous is affirmed by being transformed/re-conf»gured into its highest possibilities, the 
intensity o f becoming shining forth. This transfiguration ultimately affirms the sensuous as 
what it essentially "is" enabling becoming itself to appear in its highest form. Nietzsche in 
his conception of being as the will to power attempts to assimilate - in a relationship that is 
no longer oppositional but discordant - the traditional opposition between being and becoming.
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For an elaboration o f aspects of this interpretation see: Martin Heidegger "Nietzsche" (trans. 
David Farrell Krell 2 vote London: Routtedge and Kegan Paul (1981)) - Heidegger attempts to read 
what he refers to in the first lecture course as the "trace o f discordance" in Nietzsche's 
telling of being. Throughout Deleuze's discussion of being in 'Difference et repetition" one may 
discern certain themes that could possibly cohere with aspects o f a Heideggerian reading. 
Heidegger claims, in the  first series of lectures (1937), "The w ill to Power as Art" from  
"Nietzsche”, that the will to power leads the way to the overcoming o f conceptual knowledge. 
Heidegger regards the doctnne as propaedeutic to the overcoming o f conceptual thought prepanng 
the way for an experience of being itself. Certainly for both Heidegger and Nietzsche language 
is incapable of invoking true essences But Nietzsche does not attempt the Heideggenan project 
of overcoming conceptual knowledge in order to return to some original preconceptual experience 
of Being. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thought prepares the way for his own project, 
howeverthe Heideggenan "Holzwege" often diverges significantly from Nietzsche's own thought.
Deleuze dearly absorbed Heideggenan insights from woiks not exclusively devoted to Nietzsche, 
and he does cite Heidegger's essay 'The Word of Nietzsche: "God is Dead"" in "Nietzsche et la 
philosophic" However it seems unlikely that Heidegger's work on Nietzsche directly influenced 
Deleuze's reading.
12. Thought presented as a process of representing some external reality is grounded within the 
notion that the distinctions articulated in thought are reflected back onto the object itself - 
an "objective articulation" o f the object(Socrates - Phaedrus). In line with this conception, 
thought, derived from common sense, is presented as a fundam entally genial activity, the 
expression of a universal human faculty that has a natural affin ity with truth. It is founded 
upon simple acts o f recognition which involve the application of existing concepts to sense 
experience. Alternatively Deleuze proposes an image of thought provoked by phenomena that are 
unorthodox or by forces external to the habitual range of experience.
13. Plato's texts provide a conception of the world whose basic structure is that of a system of 
representation. Only the Forms are presented as ultimately/absolutely real. W ith Plato, 
Deleuze argues, we observe a philosophical principle of defin itive significance being 
undertaken, that o f the subordination o f difference to the primary relations o f 
identity/resemblance. However, because Plato was the first to  identify the world o f 
representation, and because he employs only the limited resources o f the theory of Forms, this 
conceptual model does not remain unchallenged within the dialogues. The subordination of 
difference to identify in Platonism, is suggested by Deleuze as sim ilar to the fate of recently 
captivated wild animals, whose resistance testifies to an untamed nature - soon to be the lost - 
better than would its behaviour in a natural state. (Gilles Deleuze - "Différence et 
répétition") The ordered/hierarchical world of representation is persistently undermined by 
figures of another type/nature/state whose essence resides not in resemblance to the real nature 
of things, but in their capacity to simulate such natures.
It is possible to suggest tha t the ambivalence within the Platonic model with regard to 
representation emerges within the concept of imitation ("mimesis"), in terms of which the order 
of representation is defined, threatening the basic coherence o f tha t concept. One could 
therefore proceed to subvert the Platonic order o f representation from  within by stating that 
the essential concept o f imitation/representation is determ ined by a sim ilar 
ambiguity/uncertainty that is apparent in other terms such as "pharmakon".
This analysis is developed by Derrida in his examination o f the conception of imitation in 
"Plato's Pharmacy" (see Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy" in "Dissemination" trans Barbara Johnson, 
Athlone Press: London (1981)). Derrida suggests, not without irony, that writing, which Plato 
terms "a kind of image" of living speech, imitates speech perfectly because it no longer imitates 
at all. Imitation ("Mim esis") is therefore an inherently ambivalent concept, Derrida says, 
structurally similar to "pharmakon".
"Imitation affirm s and sharpens its essence in effacing itself. Its 
esssence is its nonessence And no dialectic can encompass this self­
inadequation. A perfect imitation is no longer an
imitation.... Im itation does not correspond to its essence, is not what
it is - im itation - unless it is in some way at fault or rather in default 
It is bad by nature. Since (de) fault is inscribed within it, it has no 
nature; nothing is properly its own. Ambivalent, playing w ith itself by 
hollowing itself out, good and evil at once - undecidably, "mimesis" is 
akin to the "pharm akon" (Jacques Derrida).
Deleuze. in contrast, however perceives the difference apparent existing between two types of 
im itation/copy only a simplistic/superficial distinction made within the realm of 
representation itself In fact, it is a distinction between the elem ents that trulyyresemble 
what they appear to resemble and those which only on a primary level resemble that of which they 
are images Between copies and simulacra there is no common factor, they are not conceived as 
two species of the same genus but two distinct/separate types of entity. Whereas the Demdean
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strategy towards the primacy of identity within Platonism is to seek to reduce its stable 
elements/structures of opposition to transitory ambivalence/undecidability, the Deleuzian 
expedient contrives to illuminate differences such as that between copies and simulacra to a 
point at which they become generic differences - the generic difference emerges with regard to 
the concept of difference itself.
14 G ilíes Deleuze - op cit (1968).
15. G ilíes Deleuze-ibid (1968)
16 G ilíes Deleuze - ibid (1968)
17. G ilíes Deleuze - ibid (1968).
18 G ilíes Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant" - Paris: PUF (1963).
19. In his analysis of the Nietzschean programme Deleuze employs the image of the dice to illustrate 
the double affirmation of the eternal return - the affirmation of all throws into a single throw 
being the affirmation of the being of becoming. Deleuze subsequently modifies/elaborates this 
conception The world of becoming is that o f intensities, ideas/problems in the process of 
individuation/explication. The being o f this becoming is the virtual area o f co­
existí ng/perplex ideas in corresponednce. Deleuze in addition suggests that the distinction 
between being and beoorrang may be dramatized in Netzschean terms as the distinction between the 
w ill to  power and the eternal return - “the will to power is the scintilating world of
metrmorphoses, of communicating intensities a world of intensive intentionalities, a world
o f sim ulacra and "mysteries", "whereas" the eternal return is to the being o f this world" 
(D ifference et repetition).
20. In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Deleuze describes the eternal return as a synthesis of time, the 
co-existence of past/present/future in a single moment that enables time to pass. In "Proust et 
les signes" Deleuze presents a pure/virtual past, in which all events to co-exist, and a complex 
time of essences. In 'Presentation de Sacher-Masoch" Deleuze indicates that Freudian repetition 
is a synthesis o f time, and finds the condition of the pleasure principle in the living present 
of Eros, below which he situates the groundless time of Thanatos.
21. G illes Deleuze - op. cit. (1963).
22. Socrates states that contradiction forms the basis of thought - Deleuze terms this expenence
as an interaction with the simulacrum, ".... the simulacrum is the true character or form of that
which is - "l'étant" (Heidegger's "das Seiende", or individual existing being, as opposed to 
being in general "das Sein"). (Difference et répétition). The simulacrum has no intrinsic 
identity, it is difference in itself appearing by distinguishing itself. The intensity, the 
potential energetic content of metastable states, the power of individuation is perceptible only 
to the empirical experience of common sense as a masked difference, and is dramatized in a 
d is junctive functioning of the faculties as implicated difference (difference in-itself and 
difference-from-itself). In both these contexts it manifests itself as a simulacrum.
23 Friedrich Nietzsche - "Beyond Good and Evil" trans. W alter Kaufmann, in "Basic Writings of
Nietzsche "New York: Modem Library (1968) and trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
(1981).
24. See especially Lautman's "Essai sur les notions de structure et d’existence en mathématiques" 
(Paris: Hermann (1938)).
25. Problems are structures, but they should not be allied to actual structures - essentially they 
relate to the virtual not the actual and occupy a paradoxical space between existence and non­
existence. Deleuze characterizes the situation in terms of ideas that subsist/insist rather 
than exist and that have extra-being rather than mere being. Additionally he says they have a 
problematic being which is expressed as a "non-being" or "questioned-being". Also problems 
transform  their nature when they are integrated into actual structures.
26. The entity responsible/facilitating the transition of virtual to actual is the "intensity" whose 
basic function is that of individuation. Deleuze's conception of intensity can be interpreted 
as an extension of theories developed by Gilbert Simondon in "L'Individu et sa gerifese physico­
biologique" (Paris: PUF (1964)). -Simondon uses information theory to illustrate individuation 
in physical/biological systems, highlighting that normal distinctions, form/matter, 
mdividual/milieu, animate/inanimate, specification/individuation must be re-worked in terms 
of information to incorporate the reality of the "process" of individuation.
At the primary level, all processes of physical individuation may be conceived of in terms of 
energy, and it is for this reason that Deleuze names that which individuates itself as an 
intensity. The intensity is not perceptible via the common-sense categories o f the
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understanding - it may be experienced from a disjunctive operation of the faculties in moments 
of disequilibrium. (The basic experience o f intensities is that of a adimensional "profondeur'’ 
depth/depths which may be perceived as implicit in the construction of the dimensionality of 
space. (Deleuze cites specifically the work of Jacques Paliard and certain aspects of the work 
of Maurice Pradines and Jean Paget). The intensity is energy as difference-in-itself and 
explicates itself in qualities/quantities, revealing itself in physical systems generally as 
the transition of metastable states to stable states and in biological systems as a dual method 
of specification and individuation. (In Deleuzian terms a metastable substance is a difference 
in itse lf and individuation is a process in which difference differentiates itse lf) The 
intensity is not only a physical force but consists of a cognitive dimension, a dimension of the 
idea - that which within the idea catalyses the motion virtual to actual. The idea is composed 
of three dimensions.
i) singular points embodied in qualtities/parts.
ii) Relations between singular points embodied in quantities/species characteristics.
iii) Intensities effecting the time/space actualization o f singular points and their relations. 
The intensity is alone experienced by the five senses (faculty of sensibility), however the 
idea, generally, is not associated with any distinct faculty. The idea is that which promotes 
a faulty into a disjunctive state communicating its energetic impulse from faculty to faculty. 
The provocation of the idea derives its basis in the intensity/sense experience and then proceeds 
to disrupt the other faculities.
The intensity indicates only a part o f the idea - the form of that which is "das seiendeTthe 
individual being is the intensity, the form of being "das Sein" is the idea as a whole, virtual 
and actual. The intensity is constituted via an integrated difference but a fundemantal order 
structures the idea itself. All problems inter-communicate and may be regarded as expressions 
o f a single proposition. Ideas/problems are located in a continuum/a virtual realm 
groundless/unfounded/chaotic. The virtual is expressed in a chaos o f chance which is 
articulated as an imperative (ideas as the motiviation of thought) in the form o f a question. 
Ideas/questions/the imperative should be conceived of in the terms of the dice game.
27. Gilles Deleuze - "Logique du sens" Paris: Minuit (1969). "Logique du sens" is an extended 
meditation on the separation-connection of "beingTstates of things", thought, and language. 
In the design Deleuze repeatedly expresses the autonomy of these "parallelisms" and their 
sim ultaneous imbrication. The relation between content and expression and 
things/thought/language is really distinct/ in reciprocal presupposition. They are 
overlapping moments of becoming that can be placed in continuity/disjunction depending on the 
point o f view. Meaning is the articulation of their difference. The articulated 
differentiations constitute a meaning that can be multiplied indefinitely. "Language" is 
divisible into the autonomous planes of speech and writing and each of these is divisible, in 
turn, into distinct modes of discourse. Conversely, the planes can be simplified, for example, 
by words into collision with things and modifying the emphasis placed upon thought. What is of 
consequence is not the particular way in which any of these planes are defined, but rather the 
principle o f their structuring as variations to one another and the pragmatic possibility of 
integrating the analysis of their structuring to a definite method/action.
28 The main source for Deleuze reading of the Stoics is Emile Bréhiefs "La Théorie des incorporeal
dans l'ancien stoicien" (Paris. Vrin (1928). Deleuze also uses Victor Goldschmidts "Le Système 
Stoicien et l'idée de temps (Paris: Vrin (1953)) and his remarks on the Stoic theory of time. In 
"Logique du sens" Deleuze writes referring to the Stoics: "Mixtures are in bodies, and in the 
depth o f bodies, a body penetrates another and co-exists with it in all of its parts, like a drop 
of wine in the ocean, or fire in iron. One body withdraws from another, like liquid from a vase. 
Mixtures in general determine the quantative and qualitative sates of affairs; the dimensions 
of an ensemble - the red of iron, the green of a tree". As Deleuze suggests the Stoics are in the 
process of tracing out and forming a frontier where there had not been one before In this sense 
events de-centre the subject and displace reflection. In this passage Deleuze addresses the 
focal point o f the infinite identity o f becoming and the whole question o f loss o f fixed meaning 
operating within the fixed and the possibilities of transformation and expansion, within the 
subject, shrinking and expanding simultaneously.
29. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1969)
30. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1969)
31 Marcel Mauss - "Sociologie et anthropologie" - "Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss" (Paris:
PUF (1950)
32. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1969).
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33 Deleuze utilizes this conceptual opposition of the nomadic to the sedentary, crucial to the 
development of much o f his later work, from E Laroche's "Histocre de la racine NEM - en qrec 
ancien- (Paris: Klincksick (1949))
34. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1969),
35 Gilles Oeleuze - "D ifference et repetition" (1968)
36. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1968).
37 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1969)
38 This aleatory point is the fo rce  o f the unconscious - that which evades consciousness and 
manifests itself as active/positive force (In "Nietzsche et la philosophic" the force is the 
will to power conceptualizes« fundamentally in terms of a physics of becoming, in "Proust et les 
signes", "Difference et repetition" and "Logique du sens" the force is located within a 
metaphysical surface of s ingu la r points).
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WHERE ANGELS PLAY (IN A NETWORK OF LINES THAT INTERSECT)
Deleuze and Guattari's project may prove fruitful for various forms of art analysis/ 
research I would wish to subsequently indicate what these continuities/points of overlap 
may be Primarily however this provisional and schematic overview of the Deleuzo-guattarian 
system, a first attempt to explore and navigate paths through the nomadic routes they 
traverse, is a necessary preliminary to  the extensive examination into their work, in 
relation to contemporary art practice, which follows in the later sections.
The primary impulse o f the Deleuzo-guattarian project is to challenge and displace the 
validity/dominance of the structure of binary logic that has pervaded W estern philosophy 
since the time of Plato. They do not simply wish to advance alternatives with which to 
contest/subvert the metaphysical foundation of Western philosophy ("logocentrism" - the 
necessary presupposition of ''givenness'Ypresence) but seek to re-align traditional 
metaphysical identities/theoretical models in a context that renders them merely 
effects/surface phenomena within a wider/differently constructed ontology/metaphysics.
Deleuze's work on Bergson (1) presents a critique of negative ontology and offers 
alternatively an absolutely positive movement of being that is situated within/derives from 
an efficient/internal notion of causality. To the negative movement of determination, he 
opposes the positive movement of differentiation; to the dialectical unity o f the One and 
Multiple, he opposes the irreducible multiplicity of becoming. Nietzsche enables Deleuze 
to transpose the results o f ontological speculation to an ethical dimension to the field of 
forces, o f sense and value, where the positive movement of being becomes the affirmation of 
being The thematic of power in Nietzsche opens the theoretical passage that establishes a 
relationship between Bergsonian ontology and an ethics of active expression Spinoza affords 
a similar transformative direction and extends it to practice In the way Nietzsche proposes 
the affirmation o f speculation, Spinoza promotes the affirmation o f practice/joy as the focal 
point of an ontology Deleuze suggests that the Spinozian system is an ontological conception 
of practice - Spinoza configurates practice as constitutive of being
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In Deleuze’s project, against a transcendental foundation we might discern an immanent one, 
and against a stable/teleological foundation we encounter a material/open one. Similar 
differentiations should be incorporated into the illustration of causal effect. Deleuze's 
critique of causal effect includes not only a significant/instrumental rejection of the final 
cause/formal cause, but additionally an equally vigorous affirmation of the efficient cause 
as intrinsic to his philosophical project. Deleuzian ontology includes the tradition o f 
casual arguments and evolves conceptions of simultaneously being's "productivity" and its 
"producibility" - that is its capacities to produce and be produced. Efficient casuality is 
the key-point to a coherent reading of Deleuze's complete discourse on difference. The 
distinction in the deployment of the terms "foundation'T'causual effect" may be illuminated 
by the differential between order/organization. The order of being/truth is the structure 
imposed as necessary/etemal from above/outside the material scene of forces. Organization, 
by contrast, designates the co-ordination/assemblage of accidental/non-necessary 
encounters/developments from below/within the immanent field of forces. Organization is not 
a planned model of progression/a proposed vision of an avant garde but instead an immanent 
creation/composition of a pertinent affinity between conslstency/co-ordination. In this 
state organization, the complication of assembled creative forces is always an art.
Deleuzian ontology is based upon the concepts of difference and singularity derived from both 
Bergson and Spinoza.
Bergsonian difference defines primarily the principle of the positive "movement" of being, 
that is essentially the temporal notion of ontological articulation and differentiation, 
(Bergson does not ask what being is but how it moves). Bergson's difference, in contrast to 
the versions proposed by the mechanicists/Plato/Hegel, is defined by a notion of efficient 
casuality. The movement of being is a progression of internal differences in that the cause 
always inheres within its effect. In this way ontological movement is released from any play 
of negations and is posed instead as absolutely positive, as an internal differentiation.
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With Spinoza, the positivity of being is characterized by its singularity and its univocal 
expression. The singularity of Spinoza's being is not defined by its difference from an 
other/from non-being, but alternatively by the fact that being is different in itself. 
"Disassociated from any numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the 
absolute. It becomes capable of expressing the difference in being and consequently it brings 
about the restructuring of other distinctions” . (Gilles Deleuze) (2). Spinozian being is 
different without any external reference, being is singular. Just as being is a cause o f 
itself and therefore supported by an internal casual structure, so too being is different in 
itself and thus sustained through a notion of internal or efficient difference. The 
expression o f this internal difference is precisely the movement of being. Expression is the 
initiation of being that identifies clearly its internal causal structure, its genealogy, 
and thus the expression o f singular being cannot be anything other than univocal - Being is 
expressed always and everywhere in the same way The singular and univocal expression of 
being is in the Spinozian model, the highest possible affirmation of being.
Deleuze displaces the centre of ontological speculation from negation to difference. In 
opposition to the Hegelian dialectical system Deleuze introduces the pre-critical world of 
Spinoza and the Scholastics therein demonstrating the weakness of Hegelian ontology From 
Scholastic arguments regarding the "productivity’T'producibility" o f being - its abilities 
to produce and be produced - a thing cannot be the necessary cause o f something outside 
itself, and an effect cannot have more perfection/reality than its cause. The dignity of being 
is exactly its power/internal production, essentially the efficient causal genealogy that 
is derived from within, the positive singularity that demarcates its singularity. Real being 
is singular/univocal - it is different in itself. It is from this efficient difference 
constituting the central component of being that flows the real multiplicity o f the world. 
In comparison the Hegelian notion that being requires an external support for its difference, 
the being that relies upon negation fo r its principle determinant, is no being at all. 
Hegelian being cannot construct a real unity nor a real multiplicity, it is therefore abstract 
in the sense that it cannot realise e ither its capacity to produce or its capacity to be 
produced.
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It would appear as if materialism is the only adequate method by which to perceive this 
understanding of being. Materialism should be understood within this context as a polemical 
position that refutes any priority afforded to thought over matter/mind over body, not simply 
to invert the relationship and similarly to privilege matter, but instead to establish an 
equality between two realms Deleuzian ontology necessitates a materialist dimension because 
any priority that is accorded to thought would weaken the internal structure of being 
Materialism is not only a refusal to subordinate the corporeal to the mental but principally 
the elevation o f being with respect to both realms Deleuze refutes any idealistic notion that 
via some means subordinates being to thought "The being of Hegelian logic is merely 
"thought" being, pure and empty, which affirms itself by passing into its own opposite.
Hegelian being is pure and simple nothingness; and the becoming that this being forms 
with nothingness, that is to say with itself, is a perfectly nihilistic becoming; and 
affirmation passes through negation here because it is merely the affirmation of the negative 
and its products" (Gilles Deleuze) (3). The terms such as "being-in the world" would have 
no relevance in a Deleuzian design
Deleuze's being is logically prior to/comprehensive of thought and extension equally. In 
Deleuze's ontology being is always already actual, it is always completely expressed in body 
and thought. It is a materialist approach that appears appropriate to account for both a 
superficial quality and its plenitude
In contrast to the "metaphysical mastertine" of speculation drawn out from Plato to Hegel and 
Heidegger, Deleuze suggests the "coherence” of an alternative tradition, from Lucretius and 
Duns Scotus to Spinoza and Bergson To contest an idealist ontological system it is not 
required to move to an extreme opposite, to a de-ontological perspective, but rather to follow 
a materialist ontological tradition as an alternative The desirability o f constructing such 
a model is that it facilitates the promotion of productivity and producibility in nature and 
therefore the power to act and be affected - a positive materialist ontology in essence an 
ontology of power.
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Similarly Deleuzian affirmation contests the Hegelian form of negation/critique.lt does not 
howeverreject negation/critique, completely, butit enfranchises the nuances that constitute 
contrasting conceptions of negation and critique more suitable/expedient to his design 
Affirmation is not opposed to critique, fundamentally it departs from a comprehensive 
critique that takes the forces o f negation to their limit. Affirmation is intrinsically 
linked to antagonism. The basis of the Deleuzian critique is derived from the Scholastic 
philosophical method - an absolute non-dialectical form of the negative moment This is the 
means via which Nietzsche "completes" the Kantian project, according to the Deleuzian 
reading. (4)
Deleuze's affirmative philosophical design does not reject/repudiate the 
dynamism/instrumentality of the negative, but in contrast affords a different concept of 
negation - a negation that advances the field of affirmation The unrestrained destruction 
creates a space for free/original creative forces. The slave logic of the dialectic attempts 
to produce an affirmation from the supersession of the negation, but in this case the 
affirmation is already pre-figured in the negation - it is simply a repudiation of the same. 
In contrast the m aster logic engenders a positive affirmation, this negation involves no 
preservation but an inexorable débâcle, a transmutation. The subsequent affirmation relies 
then singularly on its own power. It is only via a positive utilization of powerful negation 
that a real affirmation may be confirmed The negative o f the total critique, the 
demonstration o f an unrestrained negation is ultimately liberating.
'T o  affirm  is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to realise, 
to set free what lives To affirm  is to unburden: not to load life with the weight o f higher 
values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active." 
(Gilles Deleuze) (5)
For Deleuze affirmation is not the acceptance of being but alternatively is actually the 
creation of being. This conception of affirmation enables Deleuze to position the
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instrumentality of his ontology into the  arena of sense/value.
The Deleuzian scheme concentrates on the problems of practice - how to set in motion creative 
forces, how to make philosophy essentially "practical" Deleuze adopts an investigation of 
power. The transformative conception o f being located in Bergson and Spinoza prepares the 
structural framework for this notion - Deleuzian ontology is based upon the movement of 
being/its genealogy of causal relations/its "productivity" and "producibility". The 
thematic of power and production occupies a crucial formative position. In Nietzsche, 
Deleuze identifies a distinction between two qualities of power - active and reactive, power 
linked to it's capabilities/abilities and power separated from its capabilities/abilities 
In Spinoza the same significant distinction is afforded with a greater resonance with respect 
to the adequate and the inadequate. The adequate is that which 
expresses/envelopes/comprehends its cause; the inadequate is mute Similar to the active, 
the adequate is connected forward to w hat it can achieve/manifest Simultaneously it is also 
connected retroactively to its internal genealogy of affects, the genealogy of its own 
production. The adequate renders a comprehensive perspective to both the productivity and 
producibility o f being. This is the fundamental connection that opens up the field of power 
to Deleuze - correspondingly to the power of being to act/exist is its power to be affected 
This power of producibility initiates the  communicating vector between ontology and 
practice
With Bergson Deleuze develops an ontology, with Nietzsche he sets that ontology in motion to 
constitute an ethics, and with the addition of Spinoza we take a step forward in an evolution 
extending/creating further dimensions in the structural framework of a Bergsonian 
ontology/Nietzschean ethical trajectory Deleuze's progress does not involve exchanging one 
theoretical position/perspective for another, but rather it is a process of accumulation and 
constitution Each move/each new field of investigation is a consolidation and a 
construction that never abandons or negates, but alternatively re-proposes the terms of its 
predecessor
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Throughout "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" we observe that Deleuze approaches the 
Spinozian system as two distinct moments, as two perspectives of thought, one speculative, 
the other practical (6). (This distinction between speculation and practice remains implicit 
in Deleuze's work and forms both a theoretical claim and an interpretative strategy Deleuze 
presents Spinoza's "Ethics" as a double text. The first moment of the "Ethics" 
speculative/analytic proceeds in the centrifugal direction from God to the thing in order to 
discover and express the pnnciples that animate the system of being; the second moment of the 
"Ethics", practice/synthetic, moves in the centripetal direction from the thing to God by 
forming an ethical method and a political line o f action. The two moments are intrinsically 
linked: The moment of investigation "Forschung" prepares the ground for the m oment o f 
presentation/practice "Darstellung" The two moments range over the same constitutive 
ground of being but from divergent perspectives. As opposed to a destructive moment proceeded 
by a constructive moment, Deleuze's Spinoza presents a speculative logical investigation 
followed by an ethical constitution - "Forschung" followed by "Darstellung". The two 
moments, speculation/practice form an essential relationship, but remain autonomous and 
distinct - each with its own method and animating principle. The affirmation of speculation 
and the joy of practice are the two elements that combine to produce the structural design of 
the "Ethics".
Incessantly in Deleuze's view of the "Ethics" we may discern the motivation to progress from 
the first moment to the second, from speculation to practice, from affirmation to joy. The 
catalyst that enables Deleuze to effect this transition is the Spinozian depiction of power. 
In the ontological arena, the analysis of the structure of power takes a fundamental position, 
because the essence of being is its productive/casual dynamic. Causation/causality is the 
primary construction block that supports being, in that being is characterized in its power 
to exist/produce. All questions regarding power/productivity/causality in Deleuze as in 
Spinoza revolve around this ontological foundation. The analysis o f power however, is not 
only an element that returns to basic principles, it is also the passage that facilitates the 
examination to progress to new ground In the reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze found that via 
a recognition of the distinction within power between the active/reactive he was able to
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transform the ontological discussion into an ethics. In the Deleuzian analysis of Spinoza 
the passage through power attains a more extensive function Power is the essence of being 
that presents essence in existence. The intimate nexus in Spinoza that unites 
cause/power/production/essence is the dynamic core that makes his speculative system into 
a dynamic project Here we may locate a complete system of gradations within power - between 
spontaneity/affectivity, between actions/passions, between joy/sadness This analysis 
establishes the conditions/terms for a real conversion within the context/continuity of the 
theoretical framework. The examination o f power forms the "conclusive" point of speculation 
and the initiation of practice. Power is the vital link, the point of "transmutation" from 
speculation to practice The analysis of power operates as a point of conversion in Spinoza - 
it is the occasion upon which we terminate the process of attempting to think the world, and 
begin to  create it.
Systems of thought derived from the centrality o f the subject and the coherence of 
signification can be employed such that they no longer remain privileged/casual terms, but 
effects/consequences o f processes o f sedimentation/the congealing or coagulation of 
processes/interrelations or "machines" of disparate components, operating in provisional 
alignment with each other to constitute a functional assemblage
W e  employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models.
Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualism we had no wish to construct but 
through which we pass".
(G ilíes Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (7)
The Deleuzian philosophical programme emphasizes the necessity to re-define/re-figure/re- 
invent theoretical practice, and philosophy with it, in a mode that is not 
molar/reactive/sedentary but rather molecular/active/nomadic. The central concern that 
connects the project's elements is a crisis of the philosophical logos and the requirement 
to invent new images o f thought to replace the classical/traditional representation of 
theoretical thought Deleuzian analysis concentrates upon a re-definition of thinking, and 
especially o f the theoretical process, as a non-reactive mode that accompanies a new theory 
of subjectivity
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The embodiment of the subject is according to Deleuze a form of bodily materiality, but not 
of the natural biological type. He alternatively presents the body as the complex interplay 
of refined constructed/developed social and symbolic forces The body is not an essence and 
not a biological substance. It is an aggregate of forces, a surface of intensities - pure 
simulacra without originals. The embodied subject is a term in a process of intersecting 
forces/affects/spatio-temporal variables that are characterized by mobility/changeability/a 
transitory temperament.
Thinking for Deleuze is not the expression of in-depth inferiority, or the enactment of 
transcendental models; it is a mechanism to formulate connections among a multiplicity of 
impersonal forces. Deleuze's thought is precisely the attempt to imagine the activity of 
thinking differently.
In his enterprise to re-configurate the Western mode of theoretical thought, Deleuze moves 
beyond the dualistic opposition that inflects the monological discourse of logocentrism. The 
univocity of being - the One/the same, (asserting sameness through a series of hierarchically 
ordained differences) - expressed by the moral discourse of Western metaphysics is inherently 
a normative image of thought Deleuze focuses upon the moment when this image collapses, 
opening the way to alternative forms o f representation.
In defining his conceptual architecture, Deleuze traces a iine of thinking that passes 
through Lucretius, the empiricists, Spinoza and Nietzsche, that highlights/engenders 
activity/joy/affirmation and dynamic becoming. Deleuze rejects the notion of inferiority 
and consequently subverts the foundations of psychoanalytic theory (the idea that desire is 
negative and the consciousness is a neo-metaphysical encapsulation of deep/inner truth) 
proposing in contrast an unconscious conceived in terms of displacement and production, and 
desire as affirmation Deleuze emphasizes the necessity of thinking "difference" not as the 
reactive pole of a binary opposition structured to confirm the power and primacy of the same, 
but as the affirmation of difference in term s of a multiplicity of possible differences - 
difference as the positivity of differences Subsequently Deleuze redefines the unconscious
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not as an inner emblematic symbol of to-be categorized origins, but as demarcating the 
structural non-synchronization of the subject within his/her consciousness This state of 
non-synchronization is a volatile disjunction that divides the thinking subject from the 
illusion o f plenitude and self-transparency, the monolithic image of the self.
The negation of the conception of adequation to/identification with the logocentric image 
of thought is the central tenet of the nomadic vision of subjectivity that Deleuze's advances 
as the new post-metaphysical configuration of the subject. Deleuze stresses that the process 
of thinking should not be reduced to a reactive critique, thinking can be critical - an 
active/assertive practice of inventing new images of thought. Thinking is about conceiving 
new images Thinking is about change and transformation.
The Deleuzian programme points to a re-definition o f the practice of the philosophical 
enterprise, as the search for/convergence of new images of thought relative to a 
nomadic/disjunctive self. One re-configuration focuses upon the notion of an idea as a line 
of intensity, marking a certain degree/variation in intensity. An idea is an active state of 
high intensity that initiates previously unconceived indices of life/action. Deleuze's 
ideas are events, lines that direct thought along new routes. An idea elevates the 
affirmative power of life to a higher level. For Deleuze thought is composed of sense/value 
and it is the force/degree of Intensity that defines the value of an idea. Philosophy 
promoted as a critique of negative/reactive values is in parallel a critique of the dogmatic 
image of thought - it exemplifies the force/the process of the thinking operation via a 
typology of forces (Nietzsche) or an ethnology of passions (Spinoza). Deleuze's model 
illustrates the primacy of the affective fundamental basis o f the thinking actively. Deleuze 
re-defines ideas as nomadic forms of thought. Innovating upon Foucault's notion of the text 
as a toolbox (8), Deleuze regards the philosophical text as the “item” in an intensive 
process of fundamentally extra-textual activity This activity concerns a displacement o f 
the subject via flows of intensities and forces
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In their combined programme Deleuze and Guattari fu rther advance their interest in the 
question of difference - a difference principally capable o f operating and being conceived 
outside the dominance or regime of the One/the Self-same/the structure of binary pairs in 
which what is different can only be projected as a variation/negation of identity. Deleuze 
con ce p tu a lize s  difference beyond the representations of 
identity/opposition/analogy/resemblance In their elucidation of a difference in and of 
itself, a difference that is not an auxiliary to identity or the  same, Deleuze and Guattari 
invoke two forms of energy and alignment - the process of becoming and the notion of 
multiplicity, a becoming that exceeds logic/constraints/ the parameters of being and a 
multiplicity that exceeds the simple doubling or multi-centering of proliferating subjects.
"It is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive "multiplicity", that it 
ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image 
and world... .A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes and 
dimensions that cannot increase in num ber without the m ultip licity changing in nature".
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (9)
A multiplicity is not conceived as a pluralized notion o f identity but in contrast as a 
mutable/uniform/pluralistic collective, an assemblage defined not by its abiding 
identity/principle of sameness over time, but in te rm s of transformations - its 
dimensionality, "multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line 
of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connections 
with other multiplicities " (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (10). The notion of becoming 
functions to provide non-teleological notions of direction/movement/process. In the 
Deleuzian scheme it has definitive associations with the pre-Socratics, Spinoza and 
Nietzsche
The Deleuzo-guattarian programme promotes a conception of the body as a discontinuous/non- 
unified series of processes/organs/flows of energies/corporeal substances/incorporeal 
events/intensities and durations. Deleuze and Guattari provide a diverse alternative notion 
to the body to that which has proliferated in Western thought in terms of a defined connection
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of the human body to other bodies, human/non-human, animate/inanimate In exchange, they link 
organs and biological processes to material objects and social practices while counteracting 
a subordination of the body to a unity/homogeneity from  either the body's submission to 
consciousness or organic arrangement/organization. Following Spinoza the body is defined 
neither as a focal point for a conscious subject nor as an organically conceived object, 
alternatively the body is appraised and judged in term s of its operative possibilities; in 
concrete terms, of the connections it stages, the transformations it effects/endures, the 
machinic links it forms with other bodies, (what it can link with and how it can originate and 
communicate its capacities) - an affirm ative comprehension of the body:
"Spinoza's question "What is a body capable o f7 ' W hat affects is it capable of? Affects are 
becomings: sometimes they weaken us to the extent they diminish our strength o f action and 
decompose our relations (sadness), sometimes Ihey make us stronger through augmenting our force, 
and making us enter into a vaster and higher individual (joy). Spinoza never ceases to  be 
astonished at the body: not having a body, but at what the body is capable of Bodies are not 
defined by their genus and species, nor by their organs and functions, but by what they can do. 
the affects they are capable of, in passion as in action".
(Gilles Deleuze) (11).
In a corresponding approach Deleuze and Guattari have re-interpreted the notion of 
desire in active and affirmative terms. Desire as visualized by Deleuze - again following 
Spinoza and Nietzsche - is immanent/positive/productive a fundamentally complete and fully 
creative entity/relation. Desire is what produces/effects connections/develops 
relations/produces machinic alliances. Desire is what produces the real, an actualization/a 
series of practices/action/production/amalgamation/buildingmachines/constructing reality. 
Deleuze and Guattari focus on the "willing" o f power - desire.
In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Deleuze firs t connects the idea of desire w ith the will to 
power.The notion that desire is productive evolves from this reflection on will to power in 
term s of the productivity of, in conjunction, active and reactive forces. In "L'Anti-Oedipe: 
capitalisme et schizophrenic I" (12), Deleuze and Guattari introduce the desiring machine
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as a machinic functionalist translation of the Nietzschean will to power. A desiring machine 
is a functional assemblage of a desiring will and the object desired (13). The body is 
composed of various desiring machines - parts unrelated to any whole, which are connected to 
other desiring-machines within the body/the natural worid/the social sphere. "Everything 
is a machine", a component combining with a second component, combining with a third component 
etc. in a binary, connective synthesis, constructing chains of machines through which pass 
flows/fluxes. Every machine is related to a continual material flow that cuts into it and 
each associative flow can be regarded as ideal, a continuous flux/universal continuum of 
unceasing production. Deleuze aims to locate desire within a functionalist vocabulary/a 
machinic index in order to by-pass the personification/subjectivation of desire in a 
substantive will/ego/unconscious/self. (14).
Deleuze and Guattari follow Spinoza and Nietzsche inverting the Platonic model - desire is 
primary and given as opposed to a lack; it is not produced, an effect of 
frustration/ontological blank, but primitive and primary, not opposed to or post dating 
reality, but productive of reality. Desire does not adopt a specific object whose adoption 
is necessary; alternatively it seeks nothing in particular in excess of its own 
proliferation/self-expression It assembles elements from singularities, and destructs 
elements, assemblages into their singularities; "If desire produces, its product is real. 
If desire is productive, it can be so in reality, and o f reality". (Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari) (15). As production desire does not elaborate delineated 
strategies/models/ideals/aims, rather it experiments/functions - It is fundamentally 
aleatory
For Deleuze desire forms a component part of an infrastructure, it is constitutive of the 
objects desire as well as the social field in which they are represented Desire like 
Nietzsche's will to power is productive. As Nietzsche aimed to keep the will to power 
multiple, so too Deleuze wants desire to be multiple/polyvocal. Nietzsche emphasized the 
maximizing capacity of a puissant/assertive will to power while acknowledging the 
necessity/inevitability o f the fragile/decadent will to power. Deleuze similarly advocates
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that desire is productive while recognising that desire will sometimes be 
destructive/repressed, and at other times appears to pursue ifs  own repression Analysing 
this occurrence/phenomena of desire seeking its own repression is one of the primary aims of 
Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalysis Indeed there is a structural coincidence between desire 
desiring its own repression and Nietzsche's exemplification in "On the Genealogy of Morals" 
that will would rather will nothingness than no tw ill (16).
Generally we might define the "Nietzsche effect" in the Deleuzo-guattarian scheme as an 
action of appropriation They appropriate Nietzsche's will to power transforming it into a 
desiring machine: Nietzsche's biologism becomes Deleuze's machinism; Nietzsche's 
"everything is will to power" becomes Deleuze's "everything is desire"; Nietzsche's 
affirm ation of the puissant will to power becomes Deleuze's affirmation of desiring - 
production.
The notions of rhizome/assemblage/machine/desire/multiplicity/becoming and the Body without 
Organs are concepts linked together as part o f the Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalytic project 
o f rejecting/displacing prevailing centrisms/unities/rigid strata. In Deleuze and 
Guattari's design the subject is not an "entity'Va thing/a relation between mind(interior) 
and body (exterior), it must be re-configurated as a series of 
flows/energies/movements/capacities, a series of fragments/segments with the aptitude/scope 
o f being linked in ways other than those that form  an identity. "Production" is a 
conglomeration of those processes that generate links between elements/fragments(fragments 
of bodies/objects) and "machines" - heterogeneous/disparate/discontinuous assemblages of 
elements/fragments combined in conjunctions or separated through disjunctions and breaks. 
A "desiring machine" is opposed to the notion o f unity or One - the elements/discontinuities 
that constitute it do not cohere either in an original totality that has been lost, 
(Plato/Freud) or one that finalizes/completes - a telos (Hegel). They are multiplicities of 
provisional alignments of segments. They do not "represent" the real, they "are" the real. 
Desire does not precipitate immutable multiplicities which would create a durability/self- 
identity the same It experiements producing transitory new aligments/conjunctions/linkages
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connections - marshalling rhizomatics/schizoanalysis does not specialize in the alignment 
of entities/ the compilation of diverse flows/intensities, but lines of flow/flight 
trajectories of territorialization/deterritorialization and subsequent 
reterritorializations.
In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Oeleuze comes close to escaping the parameters of the 
traditional philosophical discourse in so far as he develops Nietzsche's affirmation of 
difference as an alternative to the Hegelian paradigm for resolving opposition, the 
"Aufhebung". It is in subsequent works however, that Deleuze moves from the interpretation 
“o f  Nietzsche to an experimentation” with" Nietzsche - operating outside of the "traditional 
language" of philosophy, outside of the organizational rules that determine what can be 
articulated within philosophy.
In Deleuze and Guattari's later works, Nietzsche's texts exemplify a deterritorialization 
strategy in which all texts should aspire to presenting themselves as tools to be used as 
opposed to privileged objects to be understood. Deleuze comes to reject the entire project 
o f "interpretation", opting alternatively for a process of "experimentation". In contrast 
to the hermeneutic project of interpretation which is directed towards a recovery of "sense" 
and the structuralist project which tracks the play of signifiers, Deleuze places an emphasis 
on codes of decoding/recoding. Nietzsche's originality, Deleuze claims is based in part in 
his having produced a new kind of tex t one that resists codification insofar as his aphorisms 
transmit forces rather than signify meanings. (17). Ultimately "Nietzsche" for Deleuze comes 
to function as a metonymy for the possibility of thinking otherwise than logocentrically.
According to his most recent works, Deleuze's concepts allow one to indefinitely create 
others Like the "desiring-machines" o f "Anti-Oedipe" Deleuzian concepts are producers of 
production, they, "liberate the pleat, developing it to the infinite" (18). In doing so, 
these concepts do not produce a closed system but an open one which undergoes a process of 
metamorphosis itself in accordance with its various objects. As Deleuze wrote in "Proust et 
les signes": "One becomes a cabinet maker only through becoming sensitive to wood signs, or
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a doctor, becoming sensitive to the signs o f the disease" (19).
O ne method of illustrating the Deleuzo-guattarian system can derive from an 
explication/understanding of the relationship existing between "Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme 
et schizophrénie II" and "L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie". Primarily Deleuze 
and Guattari set out a "destruction" or more precisely a "schizoanalytic destruction" in the 
second volume of any binary oppositions that remain at the end of the first. (20). The 
connective synthesis produces not a closed binary couple, "this and that" but rather an open-
ended series, "this and then that and then this......" Inclusive disjunction, similarly,
generates not the closed binary alternative "either this or that" but an open ended series o f 
alternatives, "this or that or this..." Deleuze and Guattari defy binary closure by 
multiplying terms. For example the binary pair molar/molecular from "LAnti-Oedipe" is re­
conceived in "Mille Plateaux" in terms of graduating series of segmentarity (from rigid to 
supple) and in connection with another term, the "ligne de fuite" (21 ). Despotic "overcoding" 
and civilized "de-coding" are re-written in terms of "signifying" and "post-signifying" 
regimes which exist in parallel to pre-signifying and counter-signifying regimes. The 
opposition fundamental to "LAnti-Oedipe" - paranoia/schizophrenia is re-located in "Mille 
Plateaux" on the "Body without Organs" (22). Numerous concepts of schizoanalysis are located 
in various fields of inquiry/knowledge such as the physical/social sciences and 
philosophical systems In "Mille Plateaux" these concepts are confronted and placed in 
relation to each other. The original meaning is fractured and re-distributed on a transversal 
line o f reasoning, creating a new coda for thinking (heterogeneous classification). Deleuze 
and Guattari's development of concepts follow two basic procedures, synchronizing notions 
that are superficially foreign to each other, and separating notions that are so integrated 
that their "relations" seem merely metaphorical.
The "Body W ithout Organs" is one of the most intriguing notions of "Capitalizme et 
Schizophrénie" (23) having two parallel definitions "The Body Without Organs is an egg", 
or 'The Body Without Organs is the Spinozist Substance" (the immanent substance "in the most 
Spinozist conception of the word") (24) The juxtaposition of these two notions creates a
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shape that is empty because of an exoess of meanmgfexcess of sense What in "Logique du sens" 
is called a non-sense" - two rigorous but incompatible definitions - in one respect there is 
the concrete definition of "an egg" in what "Logique du sens" calls the "depth of bodies" and 
in another respect there is the abstract conception of "the Spinozist substance" on a 
"metaphysical surface". The concept "Body Without Organs” will therefore be defined "in 
suspension'Vin between" two heterogeneous series, located in a never-ending," to and fro" 
motion between Deleuze's conception of an egg (from Francois Dalcq) (25) and his conception 
of a Spinozist substance. In "Mille Plateaux" the "Body Without Organs" continues to be 
developed on the same transversal line on which it can never be limited to a single 
definition. It is neither one nor the other, but both simultaneously, in their heterogeneity 
itself:
'The "Body W ithout Organs" causes intensities to pass: it produces and distributes them in a 
spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension... It is non-stratified, unformed, insense 
m a tte r, .that is why we treat the Body W ithout Organs as a full egg before the extension o f the 
organism and the organization of the organ, before the formation of a stratum, the intensive egg 
that defines itself through axes and vectors, gradients and thresholds, dynamic tendencies with 
m utation o f energy".
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (26)
Deleuze and Guattari describe the Body Without Organs as a "field of immanence of desire, the 
plane of consistency proper to desire" on which flow pure intensities, free, prephysical and 
pre-vital singularities (i.e. singular points). The "Body W ithout Organs" produces and
distributes intensities.
"... in a "Spatium" itself intensive, unextended It is not space nor in space, but matter which 
will occupy space to this or that degree - to the degree which corresponds to the produced 
intensities. It is intense and non-formed matter, non-stratified, the intensive matrix 
intensity = O"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (27) (28).
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As a concept both "rigorous and inexact" the "Body W ithout Organs" is in constant 
transition/metamorphosis located in the "in-between space" that allows intensities and 
desiring flows to circulate before actualization in different shapes o f thought and living 
organisms on a physical/mental level
Deleuze and Guattari regard the "Body Without Organs” as a limit/a tendency/a becoming that 
resists centralized organisation or meaningful investment/a point or process to which all 
bodies, through their stratifications refer/a becoming that resists the processes of 
overcoding and organization according to  the three great strata or identities it opposes - 
the union of the "organism" , the unification of the "subject" and the structure of 
"significance" (29).
W hile it is neither a place nor a plane, a scene or a fantasy the "Body W ithout Organs" is a 
field for the production/circulation/intensification of desire, the medium o f the immanence 
o f desire. Although it structures a zone for the circulation of intensities and induces 
deterritorializations/lines of flight and initiates movements of becoming, there must remain 
at least a latent potential fo r a minimal level of cohesion and integration in the "Body 
W ithout Organs"- fragments of subjectivity/signification.
Destratification, the dynamic inspiration o f lines of flight, the production o f connections, 
the movement of intensities/flows through and beyond the Body Without Organs are effectively 
trajectories and calculations as opposed to fixed states/final positions. Deleuze and 
Guattari are not suggesting a complete dissolution of identity or a comprehensive 
destabilization and defamiliarization of identity but alternatively micro-destratifications 
(intensifications of selected interactions).
"Slaying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the 
worst that can happen is that you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which 
brings them back down on us heavier than ever*'
(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (30).
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The Body Without Organs may be appreciated as a field of becomings (31). Just as Deleuze and 
Guattari contrast the Body Without Organs against the body's organized/singular/unified 
organic and psychic totality so too they draw the distinction between molar and molecular 
forms of subjectivity. Becomings are always molecular, traversing and re-aligning molar 
unities. Molar unities, the division of class/race/gender attempt to form and stabilize 
concrete systems that function homeostatically encapsulating their component energies and 
intensities, in opposition molecular becomings traverse, create a route, destabilize, 
facilitate energy osmosis within/through molar unities.
The Body W ithout Organs is never specifically co-ordinated to  a subject, nor operates 
distinctly as an object. It is intrinsically a “Body Without Organs". Becomings are always 
defined as "becoming-something", decisive/resolute movements, specified form s of 
motion/rest, speed/slowness, points/flows o f intensity - always multiple, the 
movement/transformation of one "state" to a dis-similar alternative. Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that becomings involve a mediating third term, a relation to something else to which 
the subject relates, and through which relation it enters into connections with that 
something else. Becoming incorporates a series of processes and movements outside/beyond 
a fixed subjectivity, and the structure of stable unities. It is an escape from systems of 
binary polarizations that privilege one element at the expense o f another.
Ultimately "Becoming" involves going beyond identity and subjectivity, fragmenting and 
releasing lines of flight, liberating identity that was subsumed under the One There is a 
kind o f "progression" in becomings a process o f stages towards “becoming-imperceptible”. 
Indiscernibility/imperceptibility/impersonality remain the end points of becoming, their 
immanent direction o r internal motivation, the releasing of absolutely minuscule m icro­
intensities to the nth degree
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form to that o f the Hegelian progression W e can identify Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian 
virtuality with that of Spinozian substance in that both provide singular conceptions of being 
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of the singularity of becoming, Spinoza's conception o f  the attributes emerges as the 
consequential departure and a profound contribution. The real distinction is not a numerical 
distinction, or, in Bergsonian terms that a difference o f nature is not a difference of degree. 
With Spinoza's theory of the attributes Deleuze extends the argument beyond Bergson in order to 
highlight that the real distinction is in addition a formal distinction. Via an examination of 
the formal distinction of the attributes. Deleuze configurates a supplementary dimension to the 
Sponozian principle of ontology - the principle of the univocity of being. The Spinozian 
attributes, according to Deleuze, are the expressions of being. Traditionally the problem of 
the attributes o f God is allied to that o f divine names. Spinoza transforms this notion by 
confirming upon the attribute the active role in divine expression. In this case the attribute 
is no longer attributed, but in a sense "attributive". Each attribute expresses an essence and 
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and from these principles being unfolds.
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valorize the material world, but m ore precisely to preserve the coherence of the ontological 
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Deleuze elaborates upon the d im ensions o f a materialist ontology.
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Guattari: schizoanalysis and literary discourse" . Substance 29(1981). Robert D'Amicao "Marx 
and the Philosophy of Culture (Gainesville : University Press of Florida (1981 )). Jean-Jacques 
Leclercle "Philosophy through the Looking-Glass" (La Salle 111 : Open Court ( 1985)) Vincent 
Leitch "Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction" (New York: Columbia University 
Press (1982))
In "I'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie I" - Deleuze and Guattari argue that all desire 
is social as opposed to familial and that the interpretation of social desire is centred around 
the schizophrenic id not the neurotic ego - a "schizo-analysis" focusing on sub-individual body 
components and their supra-individual social interconnections within a Freudian/Marxist 
theoretical sphere of desiring-production overlaid by a Nietzschean framework, enabling 
ultimately the development of a critique o f an history/politics o f social/libidinal activity.
The most vital elements o f "I'Anti-Oedipe" comprise the Deleuzoguattarian history of 
representation and social desiring production. Within this history, signs are treated as 
integral components of shifting social configurations o f power/desire, configurations that 
radically alter the functioning of signs and the structure of representational systems from one 
m ode o f social organization to another. Deleuze and Guattari present an immediate 
physical/social model of desire and in the longest section of "L'Anti-Oedipe" they advance a 
universal history of social desiring-production concentrating on the relationsip between the 
"socius" and its related network o f desiring  machines.
The Deleuzoguattarian universal history is a history informed by a general tendency, albeit a 
contingent one, towards a concomitant intensification of schizophrenic deterritorialization 
and paranoic reterritorialization in soc ia l desiring production. The history of desiring- 
production may be most significantly, interpreted as a social history o f the interrelationship 
o f desire and power
13 Technical machines, machines in the usual definition of the word are different from desiring - 
machines in that technical machines combine dependent components into a unified whole that 
eitherfunctionsormalfunctions.whereasdesiring-machinesinvoh/eheterogeneous/independent 
parts and function only when they break down and are continually breaking down. Deleuze and 
Guattan propose a "functionalism" but one that does not include aims/efficiency/a systematic 
unity, a cybernetics that promotes equally differences that are dynamic and static.
14 In by-passing the organicist implications o f a discrete subject presented within a realm of 
inferiority in the context o f which desire will be situated, Deleuze can avoid the paradox 
Nietzsche confronted when utilizing the will to power without a subject effecting the willing 
or implying that the will to power was corredpondingly both the producing "agent" and the 
"object" produced. W ith respect to the machinic linguistics o f assemblages connoting 
exteriority (connections with the outside always already being made) to promote desire as a 
component in an assemblage, to refuse to rerfy/ personify desire at the subject pole, recognizes
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that desire and the object desired arise simultaneously Deleuze rejects the account of desire 
as lack which (Plato construed desire in terms of a void in a subject that is filled by the 
acquisition of an object, and most philosophers in the West, the notable exception is Spinoza who 
comments in "Ethics" that we do not endeavour, will seek after or desire because we judge a thing 
to be good, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after 
and desire it"(trans Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett (1982) Pt III Prop.9, Scholium), and 
all psychoanalysts have followed him in treating desire as lack. Plato argues in the "Symposium" 
that one who desires something is necessarily in want o f that thing. (The Deleuzian critique of 
"desire as lack" is discussed in "Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze. Another discourse o f desire" Alan 
D Schrift in Hugh Silverman ed "Philosophy and the Discourse of Desire" New York: Routledge 
( 1995)), and assumes that desire arises in response to the perceived lack of object desired or 
that desire is a state produced in the subject by the lack of the object. In Nietzschean terms, 
such a negative definition of desire is symptomatic o f a reactive slave mentality. Deleuze and 
Guattari, reject this notion o f desire as "an idealistic (dialectical nihilistic) conception" 
(Antt-Oedipe) and replace it with one in which desire is a primary force rather than a secondary 
function o f preliminary requirements/aims
15. Gilles Deleuze and Félix G uattari - op. cit. (1972).
16 Friedrich Nietzsche - "On the Genealogy of Morals" trans Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books
(1969)
17. See Gilles Deleuze "Pensée nomade" in "Nietzsche aujourd 'hui 1" Paris: Union Generate 
d'Editions (1973).
18. Gilles Deleuze - in Libération - Sept 22 1988
19 Gilles Deleuze - “Marcel Proust et les signes" Paris PUF (1964) Rev Edn 1970/1971/1976
“Proust e t les signes”.
20. Deleuze and Guattari are not construcing an analysis grounded wrthin Derridean deconstruction,
"schizoanalytic destruction" derives from the unconscious logic of non-unified connection and 
inclusive disjunction, as elaborated in "L'Anti-Oedipe". (For example compare Deleuze's 
"Difference et répétition" and "Logique du sens" with Derrida's early works "Speech and 
Phenomena", "Of Grammatology, and 'W riting and Difference" )
21 The problem in an oedipalizing world is to discover an exit-point, to discern what Deleuze and
Guattari terni "a line of fight". An over determined expression which, beside bearing the sense 
of "line o f least resistance"/" poin t o f leakage" and "diverging line", is a term for the 
real/imaginary lines which converge on the vanishing point in a perspective drawing.
22. In fact "L'Anti-Oedipe" constructs its own strategy to subvert the binary opposition 
"paranoia'Vschizophrenia" - it performs a mode of discourse that is simultaneously paranoid 
and schizophrenic. Fundamentally paranoia and schizophrenia are located at opposite ends of the 
social/libidinal spectrum in "L'Anti-Oedipe": paranoia designates the despotic over-coding of 
power that imposes its absolute standard of value on individuals/social form s whereas 
schizophrenia designates the release of desire/social production from the confining limits of 
any code, and their release into the affirmative improvisation of "permanent revolution". (In 
capitalism, the paranoic and schizophrenic poles of desire are revealed in their most 
extreme/transparent forms - the intensified despotism of capitalism represents the paranoic, 
tendency of desire to arrange entities in molar aggregates and to impose upon them a centalized, 
unified organization, whereas capitalism's accelerated deterritorialization o f flows 
represents the schizophrenic o r revolutionary tendency o f desire to form molecular/non- 
systematic associations of heterogeneous elements). The "paranoid" tendencies of style in 
"L'Anti-Oedipe" linked Marx and Nietzsche with the data of anthropology and a critique o f Freud 
and Lacan to produce a type of revolutionary unified field theory o f human science white 
correspondinglythe"schizoid"tendenciesofthetext reduced such an apparently comprehensive 
theory to flights of sophisticated imagery and schizophrenic/paraphemalic word kaleidoscopes, 
which resist the contrivance of any definitive conscious (The rote o f style in "L’Anti-Oedipe" 
is discussed in Eugene W  Holland 'T h e  Anti-Oedipus: Postmodernism in Theory, or the post- 
Lacanian historical contextualization of psychoanalysis" Boundary 2 14:1 (1988)).
2 3 The "Body Without Organs" in terms o f "L'Anti-Oedipe" regarded as an entity produced by desiring-
machines emerging in the second stage of desinng-production. (The three syntheses that Deleuze 
introduces in "Logique du sens" to  illustrate the structure of ideas/problems are used in 
"L'Anti-Oedipe" to highlight the functioning of the elements of desiring-production; - 
desiring-machines effecting connective syntheses, the body-without organs disjunctive 
syntheses and the nomadic subject conjunctive syntheses.) Deleuze formulates the notion the 
Body Without Organs in "Logique du sens", identifying partial objects and the body without organs 
as two elements of the schizophrenic depths, a savage realm in which one is constantly in danger
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of being subsumed withm, but whose protection onto the metaphysical surface of thought can be 
contemplated in safety. In the Deleuzoguattarian scheme, the opposition surface/depth is 
negated together with the inherently dangerous characteristics of the body without organs, but 
the basic elements of a transcendental surface of idea/problems re-emerge as traits of the body 
without organs.
24. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit. (1972).
25 Francois Dalcq - "L'Oeuf et son dynamisme organisteur" - Paris: Albin Michel (1941).
26. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op. cit. (1980).
27. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op. cit. (1989)
28 During desinng-production a moment occurs when desiring-machines arrest motion and form "an
enormous undifferentiated object. Everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in 
place” ("L'Anti-Oedipe"). That undifferentiated object is the Body W ithout Organs, the 
desiring-machines at zero degree of intensity, a moment o f anti-production reversed into the 
process o f production (hence desiring machines only function by breaking down.)
'The organs-partial objects (i.e. desiring-machines) and the body without 
organs are at bottom one and the sam e thing, one and the same
m ultiplicity..... Partial objects are the direct powers o f the body
without organs, and the body without organs, the raw material o f the 
partial objects"
("L'Anti-Oedipe).
The 'Body Without Organs" resembles Spnoza's mmanent substance and desinng-machines are its 
ultimate attributes. The "Body Without Organs" is an extra component/element produced in 
conjunction with desiring-machines. The whole in totalized perspective is an organized system 
of production to which the "Body Without Organs" and the organs partial object in sychronization 
oppose. The whole exists at a molar/aggregate level o f arrangement/organization in contrast to 
desiring-m achines and the "Body W ithout Organs" which operate at a molecular level.
Desinng-machines and the "Body Without Organs" are essentially in continuity, two states of the 
same initial origin, an operative multiplicity in one mode and a pure/unextended zeo-intensity 
substance in another, in a constant oscillation such that the two modes are still maintained as 
separate entities. (The quasi-causality of the "Body W ithout Organs" is best interpreted in 
relation to the w ider context of a soda! body without organs, which in a reterritorialized form 
Deleuze and Guattari call the "sodus". Each society produces a "sodus" - the natural/divine 
presupposition of production, the three types of "socius" include the body of the earth of 
pnmitive societies, the body o f the despot of barbaric societies and the body o f capital in 
capitalist societies This "mystical" quasi-casualty Deleuze and Guattari apply to all 
societies and attribute to the "miraculating" relationship existing between desiring-machines 
and the "Body W ithout Organs").
When desinng-machines are "miraculated" they enact an attatchment to the "Body Without Organs" 
as numerous points of disjunction between which a complete/elaborated network of new syntheses 
is now produced, demarcating the surface into co-ordinates like a grid. Each binary chain of 
dual desiring-m achines is a line traversing the plane of the "Body Without Organs", a 
multiplicity of such lines crossing and re-crossing that surface to constitute a grid, which 
inscribes/records the distribution of desiring-machines within a plane. (A desinng-machine can 
operate within a number of distinct binary chains but not in synchronization) A desiring- 
machine can be located at the intersection of various lines on the grid, functioning as a point 
o f disjunction engaged with this, and now with that machine. The "Body Without Organs" in 
contrast enacts a disjunctive synthesis. W hat Deleuze and Guattan suggest is an 
affirmative/non-restrictive/inclusive form of disjunction, a "disjunction that remain* 
disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their 
entire distance, without restricting one by the other o r excluding the other from the one" 
(L 'Anti-Oedipe) - in effect difference that differentiates itself and affirms its difference.
In the Deleuzoguattarian scheme the three agencies o f unconscious desiring-production are 
discemable as a gaint egg covered with intersecting lines and a transient point crossing the 
various routes traced on the egg's surface. The "Body Without Organs" is the worid-egg, a cosmic 
embryo whose zones/gradients/intensities and lines o f potential disruption/dislocation are 
correspondent to the after-image the chains of desiring-machines inscribe on its surface. The 
lines represent the desiring-machines, and the transient point the nomadic subject (It can be 
envisaged that th is is a developed model of the plane of singularities of "Logique du sens" )
The "Body Without Organs" resists any equation with a notion of identity/possession - 'The "Body 
W ithout O rgans" is never yours or mine. It is always a body" (Mille Plateaux). The 
Deleuzoguattarian notion of the "Body Without Organs" constitutes a dual attempt both to de-
97
naturalize the human body and to situated it in direct relations with the flows/elements of other 
bodies/entities. In denving initial inspiration from  the Spinozist conception of the univocity 
of being - all things regardless of type have the same ontological status - the "Body Without 
Organs" designates an indistinguishability between human/animalAextual/social/physical 
bodies As an alternative to psychoanalytic aggregate oedtpalizated organic unity Deleuze and 
Guattari invoke Antonin Artaud's conception o f the "Body Without Organs", a body dis-mvested 
of all fantasy/images/projections. a body w ithout psychical interior/without internal cohesion 
or latent significance.
The "Body Without Organs" is a limitAendency to  which all bodies aspire. Deleuze and Guattari 
evoke the idea of an egg, a surface o f intensities before
stratification/organization/hierarchy. It is w ithou t depth/internal logical arrangement, and 
in contrast be conceived of as a flow/anesting a flow of intensities. The 'Body Without Organs" 
opposes the structure/organization o f the body as it is stratified/regulated/ordered and 
functional, in that it is subordinated to possession, it is a notion of the body before and in 
excess of the coalescence o f its  intensities and their fixture into
meaningful/arranged/transcendent totalities which forni the unification of the subject and of 
signification.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit. (1980).
If social codes are scrambled/deterritorialized an inclusive investment o f the "Body Without 
Organs" is possible - the nomadic subject, (th e  third component o f desiring-production is 
produced) is manifested as a point o f pure intensity travelling over the grid of the "Body 
Without Organs", a transitory locus of becoming/co-present/assembled identities migrating from 
one desiring-machine to another. The nom adic subject traces a process of becoming other, 
becoming plant/animal/minerat'woman - becoming "races, cultures and their gods" (L'Antr-Oedipe) 
becoming all the names of history as it traverses the natural/social/historical "Body Without 
Organs" o f the world
NOT TO TOUCH THE EARTH (ELEPHANT STONE)
Perhaps the clearest characterization of Deleuze and Guattari's project comes from the 
introductory "plateau" of "Mille Plateaux" called "Rhizome” . The rhizome is defined via the 
principles of connection, heterogeneity, non-signifying rupture, cartography and 
decalcomania. In "Rhizome: Introduction" (1), an introductory volume which would later 
reappear in "Mille Plateaux" as its opening chapter, Deleuze and Guattari produce an 
extensive elaboration of their conceptual scheme.
The rhizomic process is the production of the multiple, a production occurring "not by always 
adding a further dimension, but on the contrary, in the simplest way possible, by force of 
moderation, at the level o f the dimensions at our disposal, always n minus one (it is only in 
this manner that the one forms part of the multiple, through being always subtracted)" (2). 
The principle characteristics of a rhizome are developed at length and the authors then make 
reference to Gregory Bateson's "Steps to the Ecology of Mind" to introduce a key term: "A 
plateau is always in the middle, not beginning or end. A  rhizome is made of plateaux. Gregory 
Bateson uses the word "plateau" to designate something very special: a continuous region of 
intensities, vibrating on itself, which is developed by avoiding any orientation on a 
culm inating point or towards an exterior end" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (3 ). 
Deleuze and Guattari define their use of "plateau" as "every multiplicity connectable with 
other by superficial underground stems, in such a way as to form and extend a rhizome" (4). 
Since "the multiple demands a method which actually creates it", Deleuze and Guattari reject 
typographical/lexical/syntatic creations but use words "which, in their turn, function as 
a plateaux RHIZOMAT1CS=SOUZQANALYSIS=PRAGMATICS=MICROPOUriCS These wads ae 
concepts, but concepts are lines, that is to say number systems attatched to a particular 
dimension of multiplicities" (5). This concentrated statement summarizes the strategic 
options which Deleuze and Guattari can access in the rhizomatic project: each of the terms 
serves as one of many modes of approach to  produce assemblages.
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In this section the point o f departure of the operation is to initially enact a 
process/activate a line o f flight casting contemporary painting as an exemplary mode to 
demonstrate systems of machinic functioning - how painting/tfie artwork operates in terms of 
such functioning - in term s following a trail suggested, leading from the "rhizomatic" 
analysis presented in "Mille Plateaux"
Deleuzo-guattarian philosophy criticizes the notions of contradiction and opposition of 
depth and organic unity within classical thought, in order to develop an open system based on 
multiplicity, simultaneity and surfaces. It is no longer appropriate to interpret what a text 
means but to ask what it does and how it connects with other things Rhizomatics opposes 
itself to what Deleuze and Guattari call the tree image and the root image In opposition to 
both these models of a text Deleuze and Guattari adopt the metaphor of the rhizome, an 
underground - but perfectly manifest - network of multiple branching roots and shoots with 
no central axis, no unified point of origin, and no fixed direction of development - a 
proliferating/chaotic/diversified system of growths.
'The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple ...It is  not a multiple derived 
from the One, or to which the One is added (n +1). It is composed not o f units but of dimensions,
or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle.... from
which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear m ultip licities with n dimensions 
being neither subject nor object.. .and from which the One is always substrated (n -1)....Unlike 
a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with b ina ry  relations between 
points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizom e is made only o f lines: 
lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions. The rhizom e operates by variation, 
expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots... The rhizome is acentered, non-hierarchical, non­
signifying system".
(Gilles Deleuze and F^lix  Guattari) (6)
Each of the fifteen chapters of "Mille Plateaux" is a "plateau", "a  plane of consistency" or 
"level of intensities" which traverse any number of traditional disciplines and levels of 
analysis. Each plateau has its own themes and concepts which are interrelated with those of 
other plateaux and which appear in other plateaux, but which ultimately are not reducible to
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any abstract system or totalizing unified structure. In "Mille Plateaux" the various 
plateaux trace open trajectories rather than systematic boundaries, and the works multiple 
concepts, although rigorously delineated and closely aligned constitute loose resonating 
aggregates rather than finite structures, aggregates whose principle of formation is 
explicitly progressively supplementary and open-ended
The aim  of a plateau is not simply to multiply terminology, but to maintain a constant 
"destructuring/multiplying" of a given set o f terms until a point is reached at which they 
in tersect with terms coming from destructuring processes occurring on other plateaux, 
w ithout ever collapsing into or becoming identical with them. Such intersections will form 
a rhizome, something that develops "au millieu": in the middle/in between. Conceptual 
a rgum en t is eschewed in favour of images/non-concepts that are strategically "under­
determined" so that their understanding and extension to other domains requires the invention 
o f new  connections rather than the simple application o f a pre-established rule. (In a 
perspective informed, like Jean-François Lyotard's, by a reading of Kant Deleuze emphasizes 
the division/distribution between free aesthetic and rule-bound rational judgement) (7).
Equally striking is the conscious alinearity of the text - Deleuze and Guattari have 
suggested that their writing is founded within short term as opposed to long-term memory which 
may contribute to the non-linearity of "Mille Plateaux" - and here we may define a link 
between short-term memory and the discourse of postmodernity. This procedure is what 
patterns"Mille Plateaux".
From the rhizomatic perspective "Mille Plateaux" has neither subject nor object, constituted 
only by lines of articulation (segmentarity/strata/territorialities) in one respect and in 
another, by lines of flight (movements of deterritorialization and destratification). These 
lines and their measurable speeds, constitute a "machine assemblage", "orientated towards 
those strata which doubtless made it into a sort o f organism, or else a signifying totality, 
or else a determination attributable to a subject; but it is orientated equally towards a 
"Body W ithout Organs", which endlessly breaks down the organism, frees and circulates
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asignifying particles, pure intensities, and creates subjects to whom it allows no more than 
a name, as the trace of an intensity". (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari)(8).
'W e shall never ask what a book, a signifier and signified means, we shall not look for anything 
to understand in a book; instead, we shall wonder with what it functions, in connection with what 
it transmits intensifies or doesn't, into what multiplicities it introduces and metamorphoses 
its own, with what body without organs it makes its own converge A book only exists by means of 
an outside, a beyond. Thus, a book being itself a little machine, what measurable relationship 
does this literary machine have in turn with a war machine, a love machine, a revolutionary 
machine etc"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (9).
Writing suggest Deleuze and Guattari, has "nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with 
surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come" (10). The necessity of map-making 
exists not only as an underlying principle of the rhizomatic system, it is presented 
explicitly as an essential element for understanding the role of writing, which "should be
quantified"
In "Mille Plateaux", the earlier schizo-analytic analysis in terms of types of desiring 
process is largely superseded by a cartographic analysis.
'The rhizome is altogether different, a "map and not a tracing". The orchid does not reproduce 
the tracings of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map 
from the tracing is that it is entirely orientated towards an experimentation in contact with 
the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the 
unconscious The map is open and connectable in all o f its dimensions; it is detachable 
reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be tom, reversed, adapted to any kind 
of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social formation... A map has multiple 
entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same". The map has to do 
with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged "competence"... The tracing 
should always be put back on the map".
(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (11)
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The complete terminology introduced in the schizo-analytic project, "multiplicities, strata, 
and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machine assemblages and their plane of 
consistence (are) units of measure in each case ...(which not only form a quantification of 
writing, but define writing as always the measure of something else”) (Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari) (12).
Rhizomatics is the term for a strategy and an objective: it constitutes a de-centered series 
o f linkages between elements/relations/processes/intensities/speeds (velocities)/flows - 
proliferations of surface connections. Rhizomatics opposes
hermeneutics/psychoanalysis/semiotics, it is a form of pragmatics focusing upon what can be 
achieved: methods by which texts/concepts/subjects can be made to work/produce/effect new 
linkages. The rhizome works effectively when applied to a variety of experimental fields - 
philosophy/art/science or even everyday life. It is inseparable from its numerous/possible 
but concrete applications, each of which will slightly modify its definition. As Deleuze 
describes in “La Pensée mise en plis", it is this space "in between" two specific definitions 
that the rhizome will in its turn "gain ground while varying, branching off, metamorphosing 
its e lf  (13)
Deleuze and Guattari denounce any universal semiotics which seeks to explain all of reality 
in terms of signs. In Plateau 3 "10,000 B.C. - The geology of morals (who does the earth think 
it is?") they conduct an analysis of the physio-chemical, organic and anthromorphic "strata" 
of reality in terms of the linguistic categories of content and expression These linguistic 
te rm s are drawn in an extremely broad fashion, ceasing to function linguistically and 
becoming physical concepts, categories for understanding the articulation/arrangement of 
matter, (in combination with the quasi-geological terminology - strata/epistrata/para- 
strata). The result is not on a one dimensional longitude to  convert the world into signs, 
but to  ultimately situate material signs within a plenum of matter.
In adopting the terms "content" and "expression" Deleuze and Guattari follow the model 
developed by the linguist Louis Hjelmslev (14). Hjelmslev's scheme subverts the
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traditional opposition of form and content and renders arbitrary the designation of levels 
as either expression or content, and poists a material substrate which precedes the formation 
of the planes of expression and content The substrate or Hjelmslevian "matter" Deleuze and 
Guattari identify as the plane of consistency or “the Body Without Organs", that is the non- 
formed/non-organized/non-stratified or destratified body. The level o f content and the 
level o f expression are formed on this plane o f consistency and, "between content and 
expression, there is no correspondence, no cause-effect relationship, no signified-signifier 
relationship: there is a real distinction, reciprocal presupposition, and only isomorphism" 
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (15).
Deleuze and Guattari propose three basic models o f content/expression relationships which 
correspond to the physio-chemical/organic/anthropomorphic strata of reality (the great 
stratum or physio-chemical entities/the organic stratum/the anthropomorphic stratum). This 
model o f analysis insists that by content one must not simply understand the hand and tools, 
but a social technological machine which pre-exists them, and constitutes states o f force or 
formations of power ("puissance") Similarly "by expression, one must not simply understand 
the face and language, or languages, but a collective semiotic machine which pre-exists them, 
and constitutes regimes of signs" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (16)
In the anthropomorphic stratum expression and content take on a new configuration:
“ the form becomes "alloplastic” , and no longer "homoplastic" that it effects modifications in 
the external world. The form of expression becomes linguistic and no longer genetic, that is 
it operates, through symbols that are comprehensible, transmissible and m odifiable from 
w ithout."
(G illes Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (17)
A tool or invention alters in function and consequently in nature, when it transfers from one 
social milieu to another. The social machine as Deleuze says in "Dialogues" is "a collection 
of proximate elements (un ensemble de voisinage) man - tool - animal - thing"; that collection
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"is prim ary in relation to  (the individual elements that comprise it).....The history o f
technology shows that a tool is nothing outside the variable machmic arrangement which gives 
it a specific relation of proximity with man, animals and things. The (social) machine makes 
the tool, and not the reverse”
(Gilles Deleuze) (18)
Irt a similar way words alternate in function and meaning within the contexts of different 
social orders, according to the specific arrangements of inextricably inter-related 
practices and signs which form a regime of signs. In the anthropomorphic stratum content and 
expression correspond to two machines, a social/technological machine (technological 
"machinic arrangement") and a collective semiotic machine ("collective arrangement of 
enunciation"/"regime of signs"). Such machines penetrate all strata and organize 
humans/animals/organisms in heterogeneous functioning circuits that combine man/nature, 
organic/inorganic, mechanical/non-mechanical in one sphere of interaction. In this extended 
sphere of anthropomorphic stratum, a new form of life is evolved, a mechanic "phylum" of non- 
organic life whose realm is the "mechanosphere'Vrhizosphere". This "mechanosphere" 
incorporates not only the machinic arrangements of content/expression but also "abstract 
machines".
The concept of the  "abstract machine" features significantly in "Mille Plateaux" as the 
necessary complement to the mechanic arrangements of content and expression. Hjelmslev made 
the distinction between unformed matter and the substances fashioned by the forms of 
expression and content. Deleuze and Guattari in a similar way develop an unformed plane of 
consistency “Body without Organs" from which expression and content are extracted each with 
its individual form and co-present substance The plane of consistency is occupied/traced 
by the abstract machine the machinic arrangements, or "concrete machines" (in the 
anthropomorphic stratum, both the social technological machines of content and the regimes 
of signs of expression) "put into effect the abstract machine" (19).
The relationship between the plane of consistency and the stratum of content expression, 
between the abstract machine, which tracks the plane of consistency and the machinic
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arrangements, which determine the abstract machine in a defined organizational framework of 
content/expression, may be perceived metaphorically in terms of a dual action of force - one 
moving from the abstract machine to the machinic arrangements and the other moving from the 
machinic arrangements to the abstract machine
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the abstract machine "operates via "matter'1 and not 
substance; via "function" and not form".(20). An abstract machine may be defined partly by 
its m atter - the configuration of its plane of consistency. A plane of consistency is 
destratified/decoded/deterritorialized however it has its own internal organization whose 
principles Deleuze and Guattari derive from Spinoza. (21).
The Spinozist design of longitude and latitude, of differential speeds between non-formed 
elements and the intensive affects of anonymous forces is employed extensively throughout 
"Mille Plateaux" to define planes of consistency and their characteristic modes of 
individuation An abstract machine is characterized by its matter - its haecceities 
relations of speeds/affects (22) and also by its function. This function is neither semiotic 
nor physical, neither expression nor content, but an abstract function that informs both the 
expression-form and the content-form. In an abstract machine, content and expression yield 
to "a content-matter which presents only degrees of intensity, resistance, conductivity, 
heatability, stretchability, speed or slowness; an expression-function which presents only 
"tensors", as in a mathematical or musical notation" (23).
Language is a vital component in the construction of the anthropomorphic stratum, it is an 
integral element contained within a regime of signs ("regime de signes") (24). With the 
production o f the concept of a regime of signs, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned to 
subordinate language to pragmatics.
The primary function of language, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not to transmit 
information/ enable communication but to issue "mots d’ordre" ("words of order'1) Language 
categorises the world and in using a language one, to an extent, must accept the codes
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inherent in that language. Deleuze and Guattari contend that the basic function of language, 
its essential condition, is to transmit the discourse of others and impose a collective order. 
"Mots d'ordre" are not associated with any single category of statements but alternatively 
all language acts are regarded as acts of power. Deleuze and Guattari define the function of 
"m ots d'ordre" by relating them to the Sto ic theory of incorporeals. Language can be 
perceived as a mechanism via which an incorporeal attribute is allied to a thing, as the 
catalyst o f an incorporeal transformation. T he  operation of "mots d'ordre" and the basic 
function of language is therefore to produce such incorporeal transformation. Although 
individuals may articulate transformations, the transformations themselves, the "mots 
d'ordre" are social in origin. They form a constituent part o f a collective organization of 
enunciation/"regime signs” which can be defined as "the set of incorporeal transformations 
which are in effect in a given society, and which are attributed to the bodies o f that society" 
(25).
In "Mille Plateaux" - Plateau 5 "587 B C. - 70 A.D. - On a Few Regimes of Signs" Deleuze and 
Guattari produces a concentrated classification of regimes of signs, identifying a "pre­
signifying" regime indicative of primitive societies (firstly elaborated in "L'Anti-Oedipe") 
a "counter signifying regime" characteristic o f nomadic warrior tribes (see Plateau 12), a 
"signifying regime" situated within despotic societies, and a "post-signifying" regime, 
elaborated via authoritarian "passionate" social formations. The notion of a regime of signs 
is most accurately defined in the context/terms o f the signifying and post-signifying regimes 
of Plateau 5.
In "Mille Plateaux" the opposition between deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
no longer registers as the interaction of social forces as it did in "L'Anti-Oedipe". 
Instead, reterritorialization involves a "double-becoming", where one deterritorialized 
element serves as a new territory for another deterritorialized element (and the "least" 
deterritorialized element reterritorializes the "most" deterritorialized). De/re- 
territorialization is therefore regarded as im m anent to the diverse semiotic processes 
themselves The opposition between one-coding/paranoia and de-coding/schizophrenia are re­
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configured in "Mille Plateaux" as the difference between two regimes of signs, the signifying 
and the post-signifying, and two regimes of "faciality" (two distinct white wall/black-hole 
systems) the full face and the averted face
The signifying regime retains in many respects the order of despotic representation 
exemplified in "L-Anti-Oedipe" The over-coding/paranoia of despotism is now characterized 
as a regime of "full faciality", wherein the face o f the despot over-codes the primitive body 
(26). The despot's body is above all a "face" "which is itself a complete body: it is like the 
body o f the centre of signification, on which are attached all the deterritorialized signs, 
and it marks the limit o f the ir deterritorialization" (27). The post-signifying regime, by 
contrast, is characterized not by de-coding and schizophrenia, but by 
"subjectification'7'subjection" and the "averted face". Whereas the transcendental 
signifier of the despot imposes stable meaning from the centre of a signifying regime, meaning 
in post-signifying regimes is instead constantly open to subjective interpretation - the 
centre no longer holds, no transcendental signifier reigns supreme. Without the existence 
of a completion point as an acentred fully-signifying regime, interpretation becomes 
pointless - but nevertheless it continues "ad infinitum" - post-signifying regimes, 
paraphrasing Deleuze and Guattari, promote endless "interpretosis" in a vacuum.
The despotic regime is depicted as a pattern generated by a relative deterritorialization of 
signs and a reterritorialization of signs within ever increasing/proliferating circles of 
signification/interpretation rationalized by a centralized/totalizing/transcendent power. 
The post-signifying regime, in contrast, is initiated from a point o f subjectivication which 
completely deterritorializes all signs, acting as a focal point for a passionate/delirious 
fixation, those signs, however, are reterritorialized through the immanent self-subjugation 
of the speaking subject to the subject o f speech
The post-signifying regime o f subjectification still interacts within an after-image of the 
regime of significance in the illusion of some type of guarantee of stable meaning, its only
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resource is the delusion of an individual subjectivity. Desire may be apprehended by 
meaninglessness deflected by the blank wall onto a desolate subject or fall into the black 
hole of subjectivity - or it can reject both extremes within this exclusive disjunctive that 
promotes them as the only alternatives and emerge from the black-hole of subjectivity to 
inscribe/split the blank wall of social existence, form a rhizome of collective enunciation, 
and traverse the deterritorialized plane in a constant process of exploration/discovery.
"Mille Plateaux" defines three degrees of deterritorialization in the context of regimes of 
signs/faciality: (1). Signifying regimes identified by a simple "relative" 
deterritorialization, for although discourse can be constantly produced, it can only derive 
meaning by the despot, affixed to the White W all of the despots face. (2). 
Deterritorialization becomes absolute in post-signifying regimes - with an averted face. 
There is no common factor to compare/judge subjective interpretation - it therefore is 
rendered negative, interpretation leads to a "black hole'Vsubjective opinion (3). 
Deterritorialization becomes absolute and positive when the search for meaning is negated 
in favour of a process of experimentation and when such experiments intersect/connect with 
the experiments of others in a de-personalized collective form of enunciation.
In "Kafka": pour une littérature mineure" (28), Deleuze and Guattari locate within Kafka's 
writing an eminent formulation of the operation and inter-relation of two types of machinic 
systems - the expression-arrangements of regimes of signs and the content-arrangements of 
social technological machines In the contingent of the Deleuzoguattarian analysis Kafka 
is regarded as a writer who experiments/creates with and through the “Real", without 
representing it. In order to interpret the process/possibility of such 
experimentation/creation within language, one must situate language not simply in the 
immanent pragmatics of regimes of signs but also in terms of the immanent yet virtual force 
of abstract machines
Deleuze and Guattari propose that language should not be conceived in terms of constraints 
and homogeneity, but alternatively by a multiformity which can be represented as
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immanent/continuous in a specified condition. It is the combination of the diverse "lines 
of variation" constituting the composition of a word that form the "abstract machine" of a 
language, and subsequently it is the assimilation of the “concrete machines" of a regime of 
signs that will determine which variables will be maintained and which will not. To regard 
a language as a single/totality entity is a mis-conception, for in effect every language is 
constructed via a plurality of languages/a multiplicity of semantic worlds. Meaning is an 
encounter between force fields Specifically, it is the "essence" (diagram/abstract 
machine) of that encounter. The abstract machine is itself in continual variation, changing 
with each actualization.
The artist and writers that feature prominently within the Deleuzoguattarian design utilize 
language atypically, not simply to deviate from  the standard, but explicitly to engage the 
virtual line of variation which is immanent w ithin linguistic variables.
When an artist or writer invents he/she simultaneously experiments with something which is 
already actual and additionally creates something new, for he/she invents at the level o f the" 
abstract machine", which is present but also m ust be constructed. 'The lines of change or 
creation" in language "are part of the abstract machine, fully and directly" (29) and in a 
basic technique artists/writers simply experiment/extend the lines of variation existing 
within collective assemblages o f presentation/annunciation. The lines of variation are, 
however, virtual and potential as opposed to  actual - that is they do not direct one 
determinate route/course of development, but a multiplicity of possible directions o f 
metamorphosis.
An abstract machine
"is not an infrastructure in the last instance, any m ore than it is a transcendent idea in a 
supreme instance. Rather, it has a pilot role. An abstract or diagrammatic machine does not 
function in order to represent something, even something real, but it constructs a real to come, 
a new type of reality. It is this not outside history, but rather always "ahead" of history, at 
each moment that it constitutes points of creation or potentiality"
(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (30)
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In a paradoxical mode artists/writers correspondingly, in synchronization proceed via the 
lines of variation of the abstract machine immanent within a continuous/assembled discourse 
and "create" the abstract machine, actualizing a definite line o f flight, a single "real to 
come". However at the level o f the abstract machine it is incorrect to simply propose an 
inventive/experimentative design, because the abstract machine is a compilation of the 
unformed matter and anonymous forces o f a plane of consistency - there is no longer any 
specific distinction between content and expression Deleuze and Guattari use the notion of 
the abstract machine to stand as the figure from which to derive the primary, transformative 
processes The abstract machine can serve as a transcendent model against which other 
abstract assemblages may be judged In general, an assemblage has greater affinity with an 
abstract machine the more it embodies lines without contours (abstract lines) which pass 
between things (lines of absolute deterritorialization), and the more it possesses a power 
of metamorphosis. The more an assemblage opens up and multiplies connections, the more it 
traces a plane of consistence with its quantifiers of intensity and consolidation, the closer 
it is to the abstract machine.
Essentially there is the ultimate phase of the plane of consistency, the plane o f unformed 
matter/anonymous forces from  which the various strata o f content and expression are 
constituted In the anthropomorphic stratum content and expression correspond to regimes 
of signs and social-technological machines and throughout the stratum one locates an immanent 
plane of consistency. The plane of consistency is a plane of absolute deterritorialization, 
the various strata defined by their degree of relative deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. Immanent within every regime of signs/every language one locates 
lines of continuous variation from  the abstract machine and the plane of consistency. It is 
on this plane that invention/experimentation/creation occurs. An artist uses images, a 
writer words, a philosopher concepts - all persue and produce the lines of variation of the 
plane of consistency. Contained in the anthropomorphic stratum, the plane of consistency 
appears as a mechanosphere/a compound or intermixture of physical/mental and 
natural/artificial The unformed matter of this plane of consistency includes an eclectic 
variation of fluxes o f words/images/ideas/dreams/animals/minerals/ plants. On this plane
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non-organic life develops, the life of the abstract/immanent/virtual lines of variation of 
experiment/creation/becoming.
In the terms of "Mille Plateaux" a line of flight, a line without segments/a collapse of all 
segmentarity, is the line along which structures constituted in terms of the preceding lines 
(molar lines/molecular lines) break down and are transformed into something else - it is a 
line of absolute deterritorialization In any assemblage, the lines of flight are primary, 
an assemblage is defined by its abstract line - assemblages do not have a causal infra- 
structure/sub-structure but an abstract line of specific/creative causality, a line of 
flight/deterritorialization which is effective in relation to other, general causalities, 
but which may not simply be explained in terms of these.
The line of flight is always privileged because "it is always on a line of flight that one 
creates" (Gilles Deleuze). (31). Throughout "Mille Plateaux" preference is accorded to those 
processes/modes of existence which display the maximum degree of creativity - absolute 
deterritorialization/continuous variation/becoming minor are some of these processes and 
rhizome/body without organs/plane of consistency/nomadism are some of the modes of existence 
exhibiting these creative processes.
The fundamentally affirmative character of the Deleuzian metaphysic is expressed in the 
coincidence of life and abstraction, and this is manifest in the line of flight:
'T he  notion o f abstraction is very complicated: a line can represent nothing, be purely 
geometric, but still not be truly abstract so long as it traces a contour. The abstract line is
the one which does not trace a contour, which passes "between" things, a mutant line.... the
abstract line is not geometric, it is the most living, the most creative lin e "
(Gilles Deleuze) (32).
At the level of lines of flight, the assemblage which outlines this process is of a "painting- 
machine type" The process refers back to this machine, whose objective function is the 
emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passing of mutant flows - all creation in this 
sense passes through the painting machine.
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Nothing in "Mille Plateaux” is unambiguously one thing or another; everything is both/and, 
and the line of flight is no exception If it can be both the line of maximum creative 
potential and the line of greatest "danger” As well as being creative lines, lines of flight 
may posses a dimension of negative annihilation From this two lines may be identified, lines 
o f mutation and lines of abolition. The danger is that having broken away from the limits 
imposed by the molar forms of segmentarity/subjectivity, a line may fail to connect with the 
necessary conditions of creative development or be incapable of so connecting and turn 
instead into a line of destruction/abolition Because one never knows in advance how a line 
will turn out, painting is therefore always an experimental activity.
Artists/Philosophers/critics who utilize Deleuzo-guattarian concepts must metamorphose the 
"tools" they borrow. The problem is not to vow allegiance to a given vocabulary but to connect 
oneself to a "thought" that "develops" through a virtually unending creation of concepts. 
As Deleuze explained in 1988: "To create concepts is to build a region of the plane( of 
immanence), to add a region to the previous ones, to explore a new region, to fill in the gap" 
(33)
The articulation of the Deleuzo-guattarian enterprise involves the "capture" of 
schizoanalytic concepts in different areas of knowledge - these concepts are therefore 
confronted and placed in relation to each other. Their original meanings are fractured, and 
redistributed on a transversal line of reasoning, creating a new background for thinking. 
Deleuze himself often insisted on the importance o f heterogeneous classifications in his 
work, as in Borges's or Foucault's.
"Borges offered a Chinese classification on animals tha t Foucault enjoyed: belonging to the
Emperor, embalmed, tamed, piglets, mermaids, e tc ....... In a classification, the matter is
always to bring closer things that are apparently very different, and to separate others that are 
very close It is the formation of concepts"
(Gilles Deleuze) (34)
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The entire terminology introduced in the schizo-analytic project - multiplicities, strata 
and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machine assemblages and their different 
types, bodies w ithout organs and their construction, their selection, the plane of 
consistence - are units o f measure in each case which not only form a quantification of 
art/the artwork, but define painting as always the measure of something else. Painting in 
this instance isn't to do with signifying, but with surveying, the cartography - even of 
worlds yet to come. This line o f cartographic analysis, the relationship between the 
painting-machine and other specific machines, as well as the abstract machine, provides a 
particular angle from which one can approach and work through the enterprise of "Mille 
Plateaux" and the strategy of cartography itself, to examine the role of painting as the 
function of the Art Machine.
The analysis of painting in "Mille Plateaux" can be approached from two axes of map- 
reading/cartography.
"On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other 
of expression On the one hand it is a "machinic assemblage" of bodies, of actions and passions, 
an intermingling o f bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a "collective 
assemblage o f enunciation" of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed 
to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both "territorial sides", or 
reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and "cutting edges o f deterritorialization", which 
carry it away".
(Gilles Deleuze and F il ix  Guattari) (35)
The primary function o f the analysis of painting on the horizontal axis is "exemplary", it 
reveals more clearly the abstract concepts suggested by the rhizomatic system, while 
substantiating the avant-garde role of painting through its machine and collectively 
enunciated assemblages
On the vertical axis of the Assemblage, from the territorial/reterritorialized side to points 
of deterritorialization, the function of an analysis of painting is "demonstrative" beyond
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the exemplary function, certain types of pamting/artworks can be chosen to demonstrate the
operation of the rhizomatic oscillation between territoriality and deterritorialization.
Utilizing "captured" Deleuzoguattarian concepts it is possible to conduct an experimental 
process/operation upon the paintings of David Salle, to reveal the essential rhizomatic 
traits of the lines which trace the map o f painting and beyond. The line of hard 
segmentarity/molar line, the line of supple segmentation/molecular line and the line of 
flight of deterritorialization or abstract line are not simply terms of art analysis, because 
for Deleuze and Guattari these lines conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines which bring 
about the variation of the line of painting itself, lines which are between the lines 
represented
What is aimed at is here to demonstrate that the pamting/artwork may be defined as a function 
o f living lines, "lines of flesh". These are the lines which crisscross and traced upon the 
map, lines which the painting process may follow, lines of the hardest of which a signifier 
emerges and into the lowest of which the "subject" emerges, lines inscribed on a Body Without 
Organs, where everything is traced and flees, the abstract line itself, with neither 
imaginary figures nor symbolic functions - the "real" of the Body Without Organs. 'This body
is the only practical object o f schizoanalysis......the lines it brings out could equally
be the lines of a life, a work of literature or art, or a society, depending on which system 
o f co-ordinates is chosen" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (36).
In Plateau 6 : November 28 1 947" How do you Make Yourself a Body Without Organs'?" Deleuze 
and Guattari return to the "practice" of the Body Without Organs - "It is not at all a notion 
or a concept but a practice, a net of practices You never reach the Body Without Organs, you 
can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit, "on which" we sleep, live our 
waking lives, fight - fight and are fought - seek our place, experience untold happiness and 
fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love" (Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari) (37).
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Deleuze and Guattari make certain distinctions between types/genres/substanial attributes 
of the Body Without Organs (hypochondriac body, paranoid body, schizo body, drugged body, 
masochist body), between two phases of the Body Without Organs ("one phase is for the 
fabrication o f the Body Without Organs, the other to make something circulate on it or pass 
across it”) between an individual Body Without Organs and an eventual ensemble of Body Without 
Organs, its uninterrupted continuum, "the field o f immanence of desire, the plane of 
consistency specific to desire with desire defined as a process of production without 
reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that 
fills it" (G illes Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (38).
To exemplify these aspects/types/phases of the Body Without Organs, Deleuze and Guattari 
utilize Artaud's essay "To be done with the judgement of God" November 28 1947, and William 
Burroughs's "Naked Lunch" and cite Spinoza's "Ethics" as "the great book of the Body Without 
Organs" Also in Chinese Taoist treatises we can see the formation o f circuits of intensities 
and multiplicities, "an intensive body without organs, Tao, a field of immanence in which 
desire lacks nothing and therefore cannot be linked to any external or transcendent 
criterion" (39).This region of continuous intensity or plateau, of which the Body W ithout 
Organs is made, occurs in Artaud's "Heliogabale" and "Les Tarahumaras", which expresses:
"the  m ultiplicity of fusion, fusionability as infinite zero, the plane of consistency. Matter 
w h ere  no gods go; principles as forces, essences, substances, elements, remissions, 
productions; manners of being or modalities as produced intensities, vibrations, breaths.
Numbers"
(G illes Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (40)
These two works by Artaud also introduce another problem, "... the difficulty o f reaching
this world of crowned Anarchy if you go no farther than the organs....and if you stay locked
into the organism, or into a stratum that blocks the flows and anchors us in this, our world." 
Deleuze and Guattan suggest that the Body Without Organs "is opposed not to the organs but 
to that organization of the organs called organism" which for Artaud was the system o f God's 
judgement, "precisely the operation of He who makes an organism”. They maintain that the
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organism is but one of three great strata which bind us m ost directly, the others being 
significance and subjectivation: "the surface of the organism, the angle of significance and 
interpretation, and the point o f subjectification or subjection" . And to these strata the 
Body Without Organs opposes "disarticulation (or n articulations) as the property of the 
plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never 
interpret!), and nomadism as the movement" And it is in this situation that we observe the 
tension and movement along the vertical axis between stratification (in organisms 
"significance" and subjectivation) and destratification (by disarticulation, 
expenmentation, and nomadism) Additionally this process of disarticulation summarizes the 
key methodology o f the Deleuzoguattarian project:
"Lodge yourself on a stratum, expenment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous 
p lace on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, 
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times It is through a meticulous 
relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows 
to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BW O( connect, conjugate, 
continue: a whole "diagram", as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. W e are in 
a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; 
then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the 
assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that 
the BWO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction o f flows, continuum of 
intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into 
other collective machines"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (41)
For Deleuze and Guattari Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation. 'Tales of 
Power" seeks a "site" finding "allies" then progressively renouncing interpretation "to 
construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of expenmentation, becoming-animal, 
becoming-molecular, etc For the BWO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a 
Plane, necessarily a collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, 
people, powers, and fragments all of these; for it is not "my" body without organs, instead 
the "me" (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing 
thresholds)" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (42)
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"Tales o f Power” represents the example of the liberation of lines of flight, of flows and the 
unleashing of continuous intensities on the Body Without Organs, while distinguishing the 
"island" o f the tonal (organism "significance", the subject, God, and his/her judgement, 
stratification) and the "nagual" (the freeing of flows of intensity on the Body Without 
Organs, o f animal and molecular - becoming, destratification). Deleuze and Guattari 
concentrate upon this description of the levels of disarticulation/deterrirorialization in 
order to counter the move towards the consequences of the 
restratification/reterritorialization of organisms, "significance", or subjects onto a 
"cancerous" Body Without Organs The cartography of Deleuze and Guattari aims to delimit 
territories and then deterritorialize, to discern strata and then destratisfy, to define 
articulations and then disarticulate. Their use of art/literary elements is the crucial 
strategy o f rhizomatics/cartography: to reveal the nature of the intensities traced on a 
plane of consistence, or the Body Without Organs defined diversely as "the egg But the egg 
is not regressive; on the contrary, it is perfectly contemporary, you always carry it with you 
as your own millieu of experimentation, your associated millieu. The egg is the millieu of 
pure intensity, spatium not extension, Zero intensity as principle of production" (43) as one 
body "not at all a question of a fragmented splintered body of organs without the body (OWB).
The BWO is exactly the opposite.... a distribution of intensive principles of organs, with
their positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or multiplicity, inside an 
assemblage, and according to machinic connections operating on a BWO is desire, it is
that which one desires and by which one desires.... desiring one's own annihilation, or
desiring the power to annihilate" (44). It is here we can identify the 
"param eters'Vdim ensions" of cartography: "the identity of effects, the continuity of 
genera, the totality of all BWO's can be obtained on the plane of consistency only by means 
of an abstract machine capable of covering and even creating i t  by assemblages capable of 
plugging into desires, o f assuring their continuous connections and transversal tie-ins" 
(45), perform ed by the activity of the art/literary elements. As Deleuze and Guattari 
construct a rhizome from the fabric and conjunction "and., and and..." in which there is 
enough force to disrupt the verb "to be" certain artworks/paintings/literary works serve to 
reveal this rhizomatic direction by moving between things, initiating a logic of AND,
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reversing ontology displacing the foundation, cancelling end and beginning, providing the 
tools for map-making, developing a constant flow of intensities travelling between plateaux 
and the construction of the semiotic pragmatic constituting of an "architectural" strategy 
of rhizomatics.
In the term s of the Deleuzoguattarian programme applied to the analysis of this project the 
oeuvre/art production of the artist David Salle may be conceptualized in the first stages of 
the investigative framework as a rhizome - an uncentred and complex progression, a convoluted 
aleatory network of tracings In the paintings one can map the disseminating rhizome of 
David Salles images and propose an interpretation/ questioning not what the/that rhizome 
means or whether it is a great or unified art, but how it functions and where it goes. When 
examining Salle's oeuvre in terms of its active functioning one may treat it as an "image 
machine" (46) (a rhizomatic machine - a typically Deleuzoguattarian conjunction of the 
natural and artificial whose elements/components are derived in an equal and 
undifferentiated forms from art and life, and whose operation consists o f a 
successive/repetitive construction of "machinic arrangements" "agencements machiniques", 
collections o f heterogeneous elements that somehow function together) (47)
The Deleuzian strategy advocates a form of thought that is defined by its essential 
exteriority - its potential for multiple and polyvalent relations with an outside. This 
constitutes one of the most important characteristics of rhizomes: rhizomes being a certain 
type of assemblage/multiplicity and as such being defined by their outside" by the abstract 
line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and 
connect with the other multiplicities" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari). (48). 
Additionally rhizomatic thought implies a process which displays immediate connections with 
the outside It can be suggested that David Salle's painting process will never be carried 
out enough in the name of an outside The outside has no image/no meaning/no subjectivity - 
the painting assemblage with the outside, against the painting-image of the world, a 
painting-rhizome Following this Deleuzian process paintings are "animated" by a movement
119
which comes from without, an external force/intensity such that something jum ps from the 
painting, entering into contact with a pure outside.
At the level of a text, the effect of the dislocation between principle and example is to 
render explicit the character of the book as artifice/as an assemblage. David Salle (in a 
similar way to Jean-Luc Godard is films (see analysis in Section 7)), achieves a corresponding 
result in a relation to painting by means of a disjunctive assemblage of images. Such is the 
nature of a rhizome: an assemblage in constant connection with an outside, "une pensee du 
dehors” .
Considered as a concept, the painting machine has no stable identity. It is more like a 
conceptual "haecceite" a certain configuration of qualities which seems to make certain 
distinctions/register certain oppositions, only to disperse upon closer examination into the 
multiple determinations o f which it is constructed.
The characteristics of the painting- machine can correspond to the difference Deleuze and 
Guattari describe between state sciences which proceed via the search for invariants, and 
nomadic sciences, which typically discover a process of continuous variation. The concept 
of the "state-form", by virtue of the unity of composition of its object is an invariant, 
whereas the concept of the painting-machine is like a line of continuous conceptual 
variation, a path traced across several conceptual domains. There is no essential end to 
this procedure, no point at which the concept may be declared fully defined, without the need 
for further specification. Each particular specification is like an im age in a film, 
dissolving into those which succeed it.
Adopting the Deleuzoguattarian concept in "une litterature mineure" (primarily exemplified 
in the work "Kafka pour une litterature mineure" (49) and transferring its referential 
direction into the image based design of art production one can proceed along an 
inventive/explorative course. A  minor usage of language entails linguistic 
deterritorialization and the liberation of a-signifying sounds, but not a reduction of
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language to a state o f meaninglessness Rather than negating the relationship between 
content and expression, a minor usage reverses the traditional relationship between dominant 
forms of content and dominated forms of expression A  minor literature employs 
detemtorialized sound to disrupt conventional content, and then re-asssemble the elements 
of that content in new ways
"... expression must shatter forms, mari< new ruptures and functions. O nce a form is shattered, 
the content, which will necessarily have broken with the order of things, must be reconstructed"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (50).
In a corresponding contingent, within a painting the deterritorialized image/element 
disrupts a conventional totalic/unified mimetic interpretation. The ''minor'' writer/artist 
engages a "machine of expression" capable of disorganizing its own forms and of disorganizing 
the forms content, in order to liberate pure contents which mingle with expression in a single 
intense matter.
The details of how this radical process actually functions is not explicitly delineated in 
"Kafka", for Deleuze and Guattari provide no substantial analysis o f the operative scheme in 
action. However some insight is afforded of the Deleuzoguattarian practice via a 
consideration of Deleuze's approach to Francis Bacon’s painting in "Francis Bacon: Logique 
de la Sensation" (51 ). Deleuze suggest that for modem artists the  blank canvas is not a 
"tabula rasa", but the space of unconscious visual pre-conceptions and received conventions 
of representation, which the artist brings to the painting and which he/she contests/attempts 
to oppose/subvert/expugnate/evade
For Francis Bacon, the instance of the subversion occurs during the process of painting when 
the chance stroke of the brush introduces a small locus of chaos, a restricted/qualified 
catastrophe that Bacon terms "a diagram" 'The diagram" says Deleuze "is indeed a chaos, a 
catastrophe, but also a seed of order or of rhythm" (52). Bacon traces the suggested 
form/colour/line of this diagram and employs it as a generative mechanism to
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develop/construct an intensive set o f relations within the painting itself, which in a 
parallel way transforms the image he started with and forms a new image/set of images derived 
from the initial image.
Deleuze contrasts Francis Bacon's method/technique to that o f the Abstract Formalists 
(Mondrain/Kandinsky) and the Abstract Expressionists (Pollock) The problem/difficulty with 
Abstract Formalism is that the constraints of representation may simply be replaced with 
those o f an abstract code, in which case the diagrammatic potentialities of chaos/chance are 
excluded from the canvas. The dilemma for Abstract Expressionism is that the diagram may 
cover the entire canvas and produce nothing but a undifferentiated complexity. Alternatively 
Bacon's strategy is to paint portraits and studies of human figures, therefore remaining to 
an extent within the parameters of representation, but to allow the diagram in each painting 
to deterritorialize the human subject, to induce/engender "a zone of Sahara into the head" 
(53).
It would seem that the functioning of deterritorialized images in a David Salle painting is 
to a degree analogous to that of "the diagram" in Bacon's. An a-signifying, disruptive image 
appears within the painting/is located in the painting, a localized catastrophe sets 
expression and content into a resonating dis-equilibrium An intensive nexus of 
metamorphosis opens up, a process of becoming that operates as an active force of deformation 
and re-combination within the representations of content and the forms of expression. An 
intrinsic logic of relations of images and representations suggests itself, and the 
composition takes form as the implications of these relations are developed/enacted
For exam ple  via a shaping of Deleuzo-guattarian concepts it becomes possible to 
conceive/perceive a painting-machine/image-machine, an example of the painting as an 
assemblage, as a connection with other assemblages, in relation to other "bodies without 
organs" existing only by virtue of what is outside and beyond it. The painting-machine 
concept exemplifies the conceptual strategy of Deleuzian thought outlined throughout this 
section Its elaboration is the exercise in nomadic thought which only functions in
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connection with an outside The painting-machine is a concept in exteriority, it is the 
successive points along a conceptual trajectory giving the concept its suggestive power, it 
is a concept whose mode of definition functions in constant connection with domains beyond 
the limited parameters of the painting. In principle the painting-machine can be specified 
in quite abstract/theoretical terms.
Additionally through the construction o f the painting as an "open ring" as "a broken chain of 
affects" with variable speeds, precipitations and transformations, always in relation to the 
exterior, David Salle's paintings are opposed to the Modernist model constituted by the 
inferiority o f a substance/subject. Furthermore against such a closed system, from Deleuze 
and Guattari, we may opt for "Nomadology".
NOT TO TOUCH THE EARTH (ELEPHANT STONE) 
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ACROSS (OUT OF TIME)
Fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari's programme Is a Nietzschean conception of the cosmos as 
the ceaseless becoming of a multiplicity o f Interconnected forces. This multiplicity admits 
no stable entities but only a "dynamic quanta" and therefore must be evaluated/interpreted 
in terms of difference rather than identity.
In Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative design the Nietzschean model of the cosmos remains 
but with the emphasis translated to forces. In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari identify 
the plane of consistency with the time of "aion," and an unextended intensive "spatium". The 
plane of consistency, they suggest, is criss-crossed by lines o f continuous variation, which 
are similar in character to a series of singular points, abstract lines of virtual 
possibilities that are manifested in a variety of machinic arrangements. Each machinic 
amalgamation is "un ensemble de voisinage" an assemblage of heterogeneous terms composed in 
a topological relation o f "proxim ityVvicinity", and it is the abstract line that traverses 
the terms and facilitates their interaction. This virtual, abstract line o f continuous 
variation is effectively something like the will to power - a self delineating difference that 
creates relations o f proximity/difference between terms. Additionally the plane of 
consistency as well as sharing many of the features of stoic incorporeals remains a plane of 
forces/bodies, each body characterized by the longitude o f its relations o f motion and 
velocity/slowness/latitude of the intensive affects of which it is capable, according to its 
internal power or degree of force. The longitude of relations of motion and rest involves 
non-formed elements and the latitude of affective powers involves the intensive states o f an 
anonymous force Therefore the plane of consistency is, in many respects, an articulation 
of a Nietzschean physics, which depicts the cosmos as the becoming of a multiplicity of 
forces, differentiated in terms of dynamic quanta as opposed to stable objects. Furthermore, 
the plane of consistency is the "virtual" dimension of difference and the will to power.
128
The Deleuzoguattarian scheme Is essentially a juxtaposition o f difference and unity - 
multiplicities/haecceities/disjunctions/irreducible - intersecting series are 
synchronious/co-present with a univocity/of being and a non-transcendent plane of immanence 
Deleuze cannot coherently maintain the primacy of difference over unity without falling back 
on a form o f transcendentalism that his entire philosophical system appears poised to 
denounce, reducing language to non-comprehension and allowing the surfaces upon which 
thought is supposed to occur to shatter into a collection of operating unrelated/individuated 
molecules. Therefore in order to be effective difference must be conceived as running in 
parallel to unity (1).
In order to harmonize this dichotomy it is necessary primarily to examine the role that 
Deleuze designates for philosophy - the creation of concepts - in order to subsequently 
decide how a typical Deleuzian philosophical proposition is constituted, given that the 
principle aim of philosophy is normative Philosophy in this mode/design is a practice that 
can only be conceived upon the basis of the effects it initiates, and this conception can have 
no grounding in any transcendental position. From such a consideration about the nature of 
philosophy it can be concluded that the correct approach to the Deleuzian concept of 
difference is an analysis of how it functions, and not of how one might perceive its 
metaphysical priority. Difference intrinsically operates as a concept that resists 
transcendence - positive in maintaining the irreducibility and contingency of singularity, 
and disruptive in rejecting principles of unification. Deleuzian difference is not situated 
in opposition to unity, but simply against the transcendental principles of unification that 
exclude difference rendering it negative For Deleuze Spinoza's expressionism is the model 
for the compatability o f difference and unity, provided that (as in Spinoza’s work) 
expressionism is in accord with univocity In the conception o f the rhizome one can locate 
a univocity of being, the affirmation neither o f difference nor unity, but the surface which 
is the fusion of the two
The Deleuzian project of philosophy is one of creating/organizing/re-configuring 
perspectives - "the discipline that consists in creating concepts" (2). To engage in
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philosophy is to develop a perspective, via concepts, within which or by means of which the 
world is revealed/emerges. In collaboration with Félix Guattari, Deleuze defines three 
central concordant traits that form concepts: (A) a concept is composed of intersections 
within other concepts both in its particular area of concern and in related surroundings/ 
areas - Deleuze writes, "philosophical theory is itself a practice, as much as its
objects.....It is a practice o f concepts, and it must be judged in the light o f other
practices with which it interfaces” (3). (B) a concept is defined by the unity it articulates 
among its constituent parts - the "consistence" of the concept (4), it occurs when 
heterogeneous elements accord as a whole that is at once unique and inseparable from those 
composing elements (C) a concept is "an intensive trait an intensive arrangement which must 
be taken as neither general nor particular but as a pure and sim ple singularity" (5). A  
concept is a productive force that resonates across a conceptual field, creating effects as 
it traverses through and by the elements/concepts contained within that location. A  concept 
is not a representation in the traditional sense, but a point in a field - on a "plane" - that 
is immanently logical/political/aesthetic. It is comprehended/valued not by the status of 
its truth/accuracy of its reference, but by the effects it produced within and outside of the 
plane on which it is situated. The concept, according to Deleuze and Guattari, "does not have 
reference: it is autoreferential, it poses itself and its object at the sam e time that it is 
created" (6).
Philosophy as the creation of concepts may be regarded not simply as an 
articulation/demonstration but more precisely as an operation. Philosophy 
combines/initiates new points into planes that it is concentrating upon, and within this 
process rearranges that plane - produces a new plane or effects the interaction of that plane 
with others To understand philosophy then, is to evaluate its operation/understand the 
effects it introduces rather than merely assess its truth
Another composite part of philosophy's operation is "Philosophical constructivism" - 
"Philosophy is a constructivism, and its constructivism, possess two complementary aspects 
which differ in nature: creating concepts and tracing a plane" (7). Deleuze and Guattari
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elaborate that the plane traced by the concepts that produce it is not reducible to those 
concepts, but in contrast the concepts delineate a plane that is necessarily perceived as an 
open system - (a unity but not a totality) - a unity in the sense that there is a 
relation/context among the concepts located on/withm it open in the sense that the concepts 
do not exhaust the interpretative meaning of the plane but enable development/re- 
configuration. Deleuze terms the planes traced by philosophy "planes of immanence" 
indicating that there is no origin beyond the plane that may be regarded as a structuring 
principle The Deleuzian scheme rejects all forms of the illusion of transcendence in 
describing how philosophy functions (8).
'W e do not have the least reason to think that the modes of existence need transcendent values 
which would compare, select, and decide which among them is "better" than another. On the 
contrary, there are only im manent criteria, and one possibility o f life is valued in itself by 
the m ovem ents it traces and the intensities it creates on the plane o f immanence”
(Gilles D e leuze and Felix Guattari) (9)
The Deleuzoguattarian philosophical project is a "practice", a practice whose operations are 
evaluated by the effects they initiate. Thus there is a place for "truth" in philosophy, but 
it is in a secondary/derivative capacity - the primary design of philosophy is orientated 
towards the normative The place o f "truth" within the context o f this interpretation resides 
in the assessment o f effects Such a move privileges normative planes in relation to other 
planes by making them the axes around which evaluation revolves. This Deleuzian view of 
philosophy, perceives philosophy as a creation rather than a reflection, and theory as 
practice rather than basic speculation.
Philosophy is a project of creation, the generation/fabrication of concepts that define new 
perspectives It is principally a normative procedure, a discipline whose effects should be 
judged normatively. It is within this context that we can now assess the Deleuzian concept 
of difference Deleuze essentially privileges difference.
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".... in the essence, difference is the object of affirmation, affirmation itself. In its 
essence, affirmation is itself difference".
(Gilles Deleuze) (10)
When Deleuze privileges difference, he engages in the practice he calls philosophy. He is 
creating a concept that will contribute to shape a perspective from which to view a situation 
within a new dimension. The function of the concept of difference is synchronically to 
subvert the unifying forces that structure philosophical discourse and to replace such forces 
with an alternative perspective via which one may continue to think philosophically. Deleuze 
sta tes," It is necessary that a system is constituted on the basis of two or three series, 
each series being identified by the differences between the terms which compose it" (11). 
Systems should not be regarded as unities but instead as compositions of series, each of which 
is initself defined on the basis of difference. The thought of such difference at the level 
o f compositions of series Deleuze terms "singularities". Deleuze conceives difference as 
intrinsically constitutive and unity as the product of the play of difference.
The concept of difference is both positive and disruptive - positive in taking series 
(singularities/desire/active forces/rhizomatic configurations etc), as 
irreducible/contingent forces and disruptive in rejecting all narratives o f these 
constituting forces that would place them under the governance of a unifying principle that 
would render them and/or the phenomena they constitute as mere derivations from/reflections 
of one true wortd/origin. These two characteristics converge to structure the basic impulse 
of the concept of difference - that is to resist transcendence. To acknowledge the Deleuzian 
form of difference is to reject the illusion of transcendence, and to conduct philosophical 
exercises from the surface. To think in terms of difference is to affirm surfaces, which 
occurs when one realizes that those surfaces are not derivative/secondary to an external 
component but constitutions of series that come to form them and, in some sense, define them. 
Philosophy is a practice of difference which is correspondingly an art o f surfaces.
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The Deleuzian concept o f difference, however, requires the additional supplementation of the 
Spinozist notion of “univocity o f being" in order for it to function effectively (12). 
Deleuze's notion o f difference is essentially anti-transcendental, it preserves the 
integrity of surfaces o f difference from any reductive unifying principle that exists outside 
planes of immanence. The attraction of Spinoza, for Deleuze, is that in his system there is 
no transcendental principle of explanation precisely because there is no transcendence. The 
philosophical question posed by Spinoza focuses upon developing a perspective within which 
an anti-transcendental position can be effectively established. For Deleuze the central 
concept is "expression". Expression is the relation among substance/essence/modes that 
allows each of these elements to be determined as distinct from and yet constituent of 
others. For Spinoza it is this concept that, by substituting itself fo r emanation and 
displaying all forms of dualism, introduces into philosophy the anti-transcendental notion 
of the univocity of being. Expression is thus a concept that removes the possibility of 
transcendence from the philosophical field. Throughout all its expressions, being remains 
univocal. It is however vital to recognise that being univocal is not contemporarious with 
being identical:
'The significance o f Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees 
expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no 
longer enamates, no longer resembles anything And such a result can be obtained only wihin a 
perspective o f univocity '.
(Gilles Deleuze) (13).
The significance of univocity is not that everything is the same nor that there is a principle 
of the same that is a basis for everything, but alternatively that w ith  univocity comes 
difference.
If there is nothing outside of the surface and all there is is surface, then what demarcates 
the surface is quintessent/inherent. There is no other realm  which may be 
discovered/revealed to understand the world/worlds This notion is concurrently Spinozist 
and Nietzschean returning us to the complexity and irreducibility that defines surfaces, but
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with the affirmation that such complexity/irreducibility are exactly the characteristics of 
a surface. The crucial point is that Deleuzian difference can only function as such in 
relation to surfaces, which are non-transcendent, on the basis o f an ontological univocity. 
In this respect difference can be at once promoted and affirmed. It is promoted as the result 
of a perspective - the creation of concepts - that negates transcendence and returns to 
surfaces and their differences. It is affirmed because those surfaces and differences are 
no longer conceived as being derivative from/parasitic upon a unifying transcendental 
origin/principle.
Within the Deleuzian view of the philosophical project a perspective is interpreted not as 
the product of difference but the product simultaneously of unity and difference. The dual 
necessity of unity and difference in the formation of any perspective is the circumstantial 
parameters within which the Deleuzoguattarian concept of the rhizome should be understood. 
The rhizome embodies neither pure unity nor pure difference, it is reducible neither to some 
central point that constitutes its origin of evolution/situation of development. The rhizome 
is the play o f the unity of its complimentary parts and their contained difference, and it is 
only because o f this play that it proposes a view of difference as a positive rather than a 
negative phenomena The rhizome is principally the univocity of being, a univocity that, 
correctly manifested, is the affirmation neither o f difference nor unity but of the surface 
that is the interface/interpolation of the two.
From this a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly while at a certain level o f generality 
Deleuzian philosophy may be "philosophy in the traditional sense" (14) the kinds of concepts 
invented and their rhizomatic assemblage result in a far from traditional 
enterprise/process. Deleuze creates untimely concepts, calculated to produce critical 
effects on the established forms of understanding: "The philosopher creates concepts that 
are neither eternal nor historical but untimely and not present" (Gilles Deleuze) (15). 
Secondly, an understanding of the formation/composition of the book/text-rhizome has 
implications for how we should read/interpret it. "Mille Plateaux" cannot be read as a series 
of stages in an unfolding exposition/argument Without any fixed/delineated territory, a
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conceptual rhizome has no beginning and no end, it is entirely "middle", composed of plateaux 
which are themselves always in-between- each plateau can be read in no matter what order, and 
related in any way to another corresponding plateaux. Different plateaux may overlap, 
sometimes deploying the same concepts, although not in the same manner, but they remain self- 
sufficient trajectories.
Despite the notable presence of a metaphysical tendency, (a system-constructing impulse 
evident in the proliferation of concepts/distinctions), it would be futile to attempt to 
reconstitute a system from Deleuzoguattarian philosophy or "Mille Plateaux". Such an 
architectonic analysis would suppose the existence o f a stable conceptual inferiority which 
their project or works do not posses. The appropriate way to proceed would appear to be to 
choose a particular conceptual line and track it: exegesis should follow a route/path, rather 
than reproduce a system.
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ACROSS (OUT OF TIME) 
NOTES
1. This is not the deny that there is a tendency in Deleuzian thought towards pure difference and 
its resounding affirmation but there is also the presence in it o f an opposite tendency that 
makes Deleuze appeal constantly throughout his work to writers whose work is unitary/monistic 
such as Scotus/Spinoza/Bergson.
2. Gilles Deleuze - "Différence et répétition" Paris: PUF (1968).
3. Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 2, L'image temps" Paris: Minuit (1985).
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" Paris: Les Editions de Minuit
(1991).
5. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid
6. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid.
7. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid.
8 The illusion consists of the notion that there is some unifying principle/set o f principles
outside the planes on which discourse occurs that engenders an order and sense, and the major 
task o f philosophy is to discover that principle/set o f principles.
9 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit (1991).
10. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1968).
11. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1968).
12. If d ifference is offered as the single directive concept then it is difficult to interpret how 
there could be planes or surfaces. W hat prindple/What reason enables a collection o f points to 
be regarded as a series, or several set o f series, the articulation of a plane, if a ll there is 
is pure difference. Also how can surfaces be developed without their becoming a new principle 
of transcendence? Initially it would appear that any principle of unity that is prom oted to 
explain surfaces must be transcendent, at least to the differences it balances. It is only with 
the addition o f Spinoza's thought of the univocity o f being that the above problems m ight be 
resolved. T h e  philosophy of immanence appears from all viewpoints as the theory o f unitary 
Being, equal Being, common and univocal Being" (Gilles Deleuze "Spinoza et le problèm e de 
l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968)).) This claim is vital if one is to understand how a 
Deleuzian philosophy of surfaces and differences is to operate coherently. An argument with this 
structure is suggested and elaborated by Todd May (See "Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze" 
in Eds Constantin V Boundas and Dorothea Ofcowski ’Giles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy'' 
London: Routledge (1994)).
13. Gilles Deleuze - "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968).
14 Gilles Deleuze - Interview with Catherine Clement "Entretien 1980" L'Arc (rev. edn, 1980)
15. Gilles Deleuze - "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Paris. PUF (1962).
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BECOMING X (IMPACT)
Using Deleuzian concepts is not like interpreting a plan or utilizing a static definition in 
another field o f thought. In order to employ Deleuzian concepts it is necessary to 
metamorphose the tools that are adopted. The premise suggested is not to embrace a given 
vocabulary but to connect with a thought that develops through a virtual unending creation 
of concepts. Consequently Deleuzoguattarian concepts are at once 
fascinating/provoking/transient, they ultimately resist any attempt at replication - Deleuze 
and Guattari's thought constantly creates other rhizomes without establishing the concrete 
foundations for a systematic/static structure of thought.
The process of creation and transformation extends concept to the fringes of other areas of 
thought, to which they are then connected. As Deleuze explained: "To create concepts is to 
build a region o f the  plane (of immanence), to add a region to the previous ones, to explore 
a new region, to fill in the gap” (1).
Deleuzian philosophy concentrates on the quite specific activity of conceptual creation -to 
philosophize is to invent new concepts. These are described as “singularities", elsewhere 
as lines or intensities, which react upon the flow of thought, forming relays between 
artistic, literary or other practices. Concepts function in assemblages with non-conceptual 
modes of thought, forming rhizomes. Informing this viewpoint is an ideal of conceptual 
thought and a corresponding choice: the Deleuzian view of concepts implies a commitment to 
a certain notion o f conceptual form. It is a matter of different styles or modes of conceptual 
functioning Specifically, the choice is between a mode o f thought governed by figures of 
inferiority and one whose essence is exteriority: “une pense dehors".
The classical im age of thought, as it is presented in the history of philosophy, is of 
conceptual systems whose relationship to the outside is always mediated by some form of 
inferiority (consciousness/concepts) These are centered and hierarchial systems. Precisely 
the primary characteristic o f arborescent thought is its organization around a principle of 
unity/interiority - this constitutes the underlying structure/axis in terms of which the
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object in question (language/the unconscious) and its relation to other things must be 
understood.
In contrast to this image, Deleuze defends a form of thought defined by its essential 
exteriority. Its potential for multiple and polyvalent relations with an outside. This 
Deleuzian alternative is not simply a matter of another image of thought an alternative model 
for the elaboration of concepts. For what would imply a constant form which could then be 
reproduced in different domains, whereas exterior thought is characterized primarily by its 
inconsistency/variability - interiorized thought/aborescent thought does provide a model, 
but there is a fundamental dis-symmetry between the opposing poles in this case - the former 
resides completely outside the domain of the reproducible of representation, belonging 
instead to the world o f the simulacra, where repetition implies essential difference. “La 
pensee du dehors” is a matter of the force which destroys the image and its copies, the model 
and its reproductions, all possibilities of subordinating thought to a model of the True/the 
Fight/the Law (Cartesian taith/Kantian right/Hegelian law). What is recommended is not the 
repetition o f some Other Form of conceptual assemblage, but a process - the opreration of 
putting thought into an immediate relation with outside forces.
Thought is essentially nomadic, a thought which refuses any universal subject, attributing 
itself instead to a particular multiplicity which does not locate itself within some 
englobing totality, but is rather deployed in a milieu without horizon, occupying a smooth 
space
In “Francis Bacon: Logique la de sensation" Deleuze regards Bacon as engaged in a process to 
make visible invisible forces, and in this he is addressing a problem common to all the arts, 
“il ne s ’agit pas de reproduire au d'inventer des formes, main de capter des forces”. In the 
proceeding sections of this project a consideration of Deleuze's views on 
painting/cinema/literature may suggest how Deleuze extends the problematics offeree in 
relation to various modes of art production
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This “process” of force might in some sense be termed as experimental affective physics, the 
individual arts painting/cinema/literature, delineating broad areas of research into the 
nature and use of force.
In Francis Bacon's painting for example, forces of isolation/deformation/dissipation connect 
field and figure, force of coupling bring figures and objects together, and forces of 
separation convert triptychs into expanses of light infused with the rhythms o f an ametrical 
time. Also in modern cinema the forces that structure the visible and the sayable are 
isolated and intensified, sound and image diverging into separate strats.
In the "critical postmodern" paintings of David Salle we observe a mode of operation that 
stresses the invention of new roles and new configurations/assmeblages of form  for painting 
in a pictorial/artistic/philosophical game. It asks the question “What is painting?" in a 
direct/uncompromising manner. This mode of experimentation is one which no longer adheres 
to the classical aesthetic rules of beautiful/of form /of what pleases, but asks itself 
constantly through its practice and its relation to tradition, what the rules o f art/painting 
are. Subsequently the very notion of the aesthetic and its pbject are placed in question by 
the postmodern avant garde art.
Each are mode experiemtns with itself, testing its limits by making visible the  invisible, 
audible the inaudible, sayable the unsayable. Each art experiements with forces, the various 
works of a given art as much inventing as discovering the forces they capture. Each art 
experiments with the body of sensation, which for Deleuze is the body without organs, the 
unorganzised body-world of non-formed-elements and anonymous affective forces.
At this point it would appear appropriate to introduce Deleuze's later work, w ithout Felix 
Guattari, to consider how this “perpetuum mobile" (2) developed without a negative effect, 
in constant re-configuration/re-reference to the becomings/metamorphoses of the preceding 
books.
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Firstly neither "Cinéma 1 : I'lmage-Movement" or “Cinéma 2: l'Image - Temps" (3) can be 
regarded as direct applications/illustrations o f previous work. In these two books Deleuze 
does not use directly the concepts he produced with Guattari but creates many others. The 
works on cinema never constrain his previous work in a closed system, the two books open 
Deleuze's former work onto new becomings.
“The configuration of my concepts as I was handling them pushed me towards cinema. For me, at 
that point, a time had oome when my wort< was revolving around the problems of space and time, 
thanks to Bergson, and I told myself: cinema people have already understood this in their own 
ways“
(Gilles Oeleuze) (4)
Accordingly, all of Deleuze’s  works produced after “Mille Plateaux" can be interpreted as 
different unfoldings of som e “becomings" of previous designs in the areas of 
painting/cinema/literature/philosophy. In spite of this variety of subject, Deleuze 
develops the fundamental lines of work characterized by his preeceding programme. To 
summarize the point made previously concening “Mille Plateaux" concepts are in constant 
metamporphosis.
“Concepts are not stagnant one must perpetually modifythem and the more one remodifies them 
the more they become coherent. One must invalidate the concepts, confirm them, refute them....“
(Gilles Deleuze) (5)
Both o f the works on cim em a illustrate Deleuze's project for inventing classifications of 
images, signs and concepts.
“The question of signs always preoccupied me. I have always envisioned the problem of signs as 
being non-linguistic For m e  signs have always been an indication that there is a discourse 
different from the “Logos" It's my deep hatred fo r too rational a discourse Signs exist and 
this is a mark of violence and of the involuntary. I believe that we only do things pushed by 
violence and involuntarily"
(Gilles Deleuze) (6)
All of Deleuze's concepts in recent works elucidate or “unfold" signs. He demonstrates how
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signs act, how they connect to each other - producing/cutting/capturing or circulating pre­
individual flows These flows (light/desire/un-formed matter) attract or repel each other 
inducing the power of what Deleuze terms a “Chaosmos"(7). From and through these various 
inter-relations of forces, configurations are introduced whcih structure/shape a 
fragile/temporary stable representation of reality - with its shaped matter and signifying 
forms - from which various inerpretations can be constructed.
Deleuze utilizes the Bergsonian notion o f "duration” to define the “time” in which desiring 
flows/"the pleatTimages-tim e/” images-movement7”the figural" will evolve Deleuzian 
thought develops with Bergsonian duration (internal succession without exteriority) as the 
background (8). The Deleuzian project can be conceived as Bergsonian in two fundamental ways: 
in his notion of time and movement, and his consistent linking of science and the necessity 
for a new representation of reality in its perpetual metamorphosis.
In consequence the most recent additions to the Deleuzian programme are not closed systems, 
like “Mille Plateaux” they offer multiple possibilities/contingencies.
Regarding the various interpretations o f “Le Pli" (“the pleat") (9), there are at least four 
available readings: a book about the Leibnizian system/an analysis of the baroque/an 
explanation of the concept of “Le Pli" as integrated within Liebniz's work/an elaboration of 
a general theory of “Le Pli” (10). From “Mille Plateaux”, through a reflection on time and 
cinema, Deleuze was led to an investigation of Foucault’s work and to various systems of signs 
arranged within the three areas of knowledge/power/desire. (11). This process of analysis 
confronted Deleuze with a new conception of what Foucault and Blanchot considered as the 
thought of the “outside" In the final section of “Foucault”Deleuze exemplifies how the “line 
of the outside” folds itself, creating a “zone of subjectivation" which allows for what the 
poet Henri Michaux called “la vie dans les plis". In this way “Le Pli” is the first stage of 
a new thought process that examines/re-defines life/humanity/thought itself, based on a 
dynamic representation of reality progressively revealed by the totality of Deleuze's
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programme In a sense Deleuze wrote “Le Pli" within a Leibnizian framework in order to unfold 
into the infinite pleats of his own project.
The themes articulated by Deleuze in the late sections of his design highlights an 
encompassing technique that traces a continuation of lines of conception instigated by 
“Mille Plateaux". Deleuze’s later work remains consistent with both a unique and multiple 
pretext. While "Mille Plateaux" centralized notions of space/time/the sign, “Logique de la 
sensation", “l'Image - Movement”, “l'Image - Temps" analyse how painting and cinema enable 
us to re-think/re-concieve these notions by creating the concepts of “the figurai” o f “ image­
time" and “image-movement'. Deleuze describes various systems of signs while keeping his 
work independent from linguistics/psychoanalysis.
With "Foucault', Deleuze develops his research about time and signs while characterizing 
various "régimes de visibilité" and "regimes d'énonciabilité", organized around three axes. 
This study brings him to the limits of the classical representation of reality, tow ards a 
"thought of the outside" and new modes of subjectivation in the pleats formed by the  line of 
the "outside",
"Le Pli" affords the beginnings of a general conception of the pleat that requires a re­
reading of "Mille Plateaux" in order to consider how it is possible to re-invent a  "Life in 
pleats" through redefining the concepts of signs/space/time.
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BECOMING X (IMPACT) 
NOTES
1 Gilles Deleuze - "Sur le philosophie" Pourparlers Pahs: Minuit (1990) (Interview with Raymond
Bellour and Francois Ew ald originally published in "Le magazine littéraire 257" Sept (1988)).
A concept, for Deleuze, has three determinations: it is a fold on a plane of immanence; it is a 
multiplicity o f elements; and it is embodied in a conceptual person/personae.
The concept "significant form " recurs frequently throughout the discussion of aesthetics - the 
task of philosophy in art is  to  create aesthetic concepts. The concept may be described as a 
specific fold on a plane o f  immanence, as an event on a horizon - (a particularly appropriate 
characterization for a concept based on the opposition between figure and background). The word 
"form" is the term for the plane of immanence, folded in various ways in the course of a venerable 
philosophical tradition. T h e  word "significant" in the concept is the term for the multiplicity 
of elements that make it up and which may be summarized along three oppositions: 
emotional/expressive/ intellect/expression/impression and form/representation. Significant 
form is emotional/expressive and non-representative. The concept, additionally, is embodied 
in the two conceptual personae of the artist whose emotions are translated into form, and the 
audience which re-creates the emotion out of the form - two personae engaged in what could be 
described as a pragmatic exchange. Thus reconfigured, the phrase "significant form" is a 
concept, reorganizing the plane o f immanence producing effects of knowledge and truth. This 
illustrative model demonstrates that in a Deleuzo-guattarian scheme a concept is the pedagogy 
o f terrirorialization: triangulating the field through a network o f oppositions that will end 
in a correlation - Deleuze's philosophical style is based on the exploitation of correlations, 
e g. a series of parallel oppositions, both within philosophy and outside of it. Ultimately, 
however, one cannot triangulate Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise - the text deterritorializes 
itself according to its own lines o f flight. The other of the concept is called the "figure", and 
with this another corre lation is produced (figure/concept, transcendent/immanent, 
deterritorialization etc.)
2 On the concept of "perpetuum mobile" and its use by Deleuze, see "Logique du sens" Paris: Minuit
(1969).
3. Gilles Deleuze - "Cinema 1 : l'Image - Movement" Paris: Minuit (1983). "Cinéma 2: l'Image -
Temps" Paris: Minuit (1985).
4 Gilles Deleuze - Interview in "Libération" 3 October (1983).
5. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1983).
6. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1983).
7. For an elaboration of the "Chaosmos" concept see: André Pierre Colombat "Deleuze et la 
littérature" Paris : Peter L an g  (1990).
8. Gilles Deleuze - "La duree  comme donnée immédiate" in "Le Bergonisme" Paris: PUF (1966).
9. Gilles Deleuze - "Le Pli : Le ibniz et le Baroque" Paris : Minuit (1993)
10. See Roger-Pol Droit "La création des concepts" in "Le Monde" 13 Sept 1991 - "Leibniz selon 
Deleuze" in "Le Monde" 9  Sept 1988
11. Gilles Deleuze - "Foucault" Paris : Minuit (1986)
ANIMAL NITRATE (THE IMAGE OF CHANCE)
PART 1
Deleuze in "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" (1981) reads Francis Bacon's painting 
technique as a "pedagogy of the image" conducted for the sake of a painterly practice that 
deforms the world in order to make it visible again "How to make visible forces that are 
invisible?' is the question which Bacon confronts and on account of which Deleuze renders him 
the object o f his analysis, in an attempt to construct a general logic of sensation.
In this section I wish to invoke certain parallel analogies and points of convergence between 
a Deleuzian conception/process of art articulated through the interpretation of the works 
of Francis Bacon and a more general investigative/lnnovative framework (which will integrate 
an extensive Deleuzian analysis) within which we might subsequently initiate an inquiry into 
the paintings of David Salle.
Deleuze exemplifies Bacon as a painter who de-figures representation in the search for a 
sensation that would give itself, In itself and for itself. This practice constitutes a major 
revision of the type of subjectivity that comprises the background of phenomenology. In 
Bacon's and Salle's work subjectivity is disintegrated, traversed by Intensities and 
"hystencized" Deleuze views sensation as emerging from an interaction between a perceiving 
subject and a fractured/disintegrated figure in the painting Deleuze envisages/describes 
a painterly technique/method that is correspondingly directed against the organic 
representation of classical art and against the kind of abstraction that moves towards 
geometric shapes/forms. Between these two positions, Deleuze highlights within Bacon's 
imagery, a modulation and gradation of signification, the measured 
distortion/obscuration/disjunction of the corporeal elements, as principle examples of a 
technique of modulation.
According to Deleuze, the elementary rhythms of a Bacon painting are those that pass between 
the uniform tones of the background field and the human figure surrounded by that field. A 
systolic force moves from the field to the figure, enclosing and constricting the figure, and
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a diastolic force passes from the figure to the field as the body undergoes an intensive 
deformation. The encircling force of the field isolates the figure, disconnects it from  all 
narrative and therein evacuates any figurative/representational content. The expanding 
force that is emitted from the figure in turn induces a contorted athleticism in w hich the 
body is seized by a convulsive action in order to escape itself. 'Tout la serie des spasmes 
chez Bacon est de ce type, amour, vomissement, excrement, toujours le corps qui tente de
s'echapper par un de ses organes, pour rejoindre I'aplat, la structure materielle.....Et le
cri, le cri de Bacon, c'est I'operation par laquelle le corps tout entier s’echappe par la 
bouche" (Gilles Deleuze). (1)
The Body in a Bacon canvas is in the process of a becoming substantively plural - multiple 
"bodies" - via an integrated technique of escape The initial moment of this escape is a force 
of dislocation. Bacon multiplies dislocations, never allowing a stable form to be reinvested 
in the canvas/painting. This is achieved via continuous punctuations of 
splitting/disruption. Bacon's framing/highlighting techniques consist o f a paradoxical 
character of displacement - containing a form only to consequently/ultimately void that space 
into an exposure of its forces. Elements - circles/ellipses/syringes/circular 
beds/tubes/basins/pipes/curved contours and cylinder forms of furniture, function as 
figurative elements but also highlight the figural elaboration of the body which Deleuze 
views as trapezes for acrobatics. Apart from the circular beds the elliptical contours do not 
usually complete themselves in the frame, but create a horizontal movement in tension with 
the downward movement - both carry on beyond the frame Dislocation releases the forces and 
spaces incarcerated. Deleuze articulates this strategy when he sees the depiction o f the 
mouth as acquiring a capability o f illocalization, it is no longer a particular organ but an 
aperture through which the entire body escapes, and via which the flesh descends.
The complexity o f Bacon's pictorial space opens-out molar entities, particularly the planar 
multiplication and material modulation of planes, creating zones of intensity which 
disrupt/deform a traversing body This space acquires an increased level of intensity as 
Bacon's work develops towards the non-rational elements/marks and the tonal variation of the
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flesh that Deleuze concentrates upon/engages in a process o f mutation. The effect is not 
however limited to the body, the ground plane and arrow effects in certain late works indicate 
the extreme exacerbation of earlier techniques - the molecularisation of variation 
manifested in the dispersal of the brushstroke and the adaption of the aerosol - the paints 
fragmentation/it's nom adic distribution.
A  Francis Bacon painting constitutes its own life, a new reality, repleat with resonant 
energy. Instead of illustrating an image, an oblique allusion or an appropriately 
symmetrical pattern, the feature of a Bacon canvas which is immediately apprehended and 
asserts itself unequivocally and independently, whatever elements are brought into play, and 
even when the theme of the  work puts it on a level with mythology, is a kind of "real presence" 
to which his figure/figures attain. Through these figures, the viewer with no preconceived 
ideas gains access to a flesh and blood reality.
"I want very much to do  the thing that Valéry said - to give the sensation without the boredom of 
its conveyance. And th e  moment the story enters, the boredom comes upon you.”
(Francis Bacon)
Bacon's work transcends superficial excitement and picturesque effect - it continues in a 
calculated way to provoke/disturb, charged with a searing impact. What Bacon aims at is not 
so much to produce a p icture as to utilize the canvas to assert certain "realities", about 
perception/movement/paint. He wants the painting to operate primarily through sensation.
"(A rt is) a method o f opening up areas of feeling rather than merely an illustration o f an
object".
(Francis Bacon)
In this strategic/technically contrived modulation, Bacon uniquely concentrates, in certain 
works, on a destruction of the  face and on a subsequent re-configuration/re-emergence of the 
head beneath the face. T h is  would not be possible, if sensation was defined as a mere 
representation of the interaction of an eye and an object. However, sensation is a reaction
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not to a form, but rather to a force and Bacon's paintings attempt to encapsulate and 
illustrate that force W hat Bacon searches for in his paintings is an essence/method of 
painting which would be as remarkable and personal to himself, as the thing painted. More 
precisely the paint should not lag behind the idea, nor was it to seem supplementary to it. 
The paint and the idea should be one, indissoluble and indistinguishable. It is crucial that 
force itself should exist on a body for there to be sensation. Force is the necessary 
condition of sensation provided that sensation is not demarcated as representating force. 
Deleuze terms the logic o f sensation that he identifies in Bacon's work "haptic" in order to 
emphasize its dualistic predominance over eye and hand in a singular logic of sensation (not 
sensations - sensations are contiguous and extensive as opposed to sensation which is 
intensive).
In a 1987 interview David Salle describes his painting as linking two traditions. 'There has 
been painting for hundreds of years that wanted to see the interior or workings o f human 
beings, in a physical sense, and there has been painting that wanted to examine the exterior 
mannerisms of human society. Both kinds of painting have existed side by side for hundreds 
of years and I think my paintings have something of both" (2). Thus in one respect the surface 
o f the picture acts as the location for the images of society's projected desires and the 
numerous resultant mannerisms Salle's unrelenting/uncompromising representations of the 
inane/banal/kitsch ephemera of modem culture belong in this category He introduces them, 
exposes them, yet only to re-position and re-present them again by means of his particular 
composition. This disjunctive eclecticism has a magnetic effect of attraction and repulsion 
upon the viewer Similarly Salle suggests superficial relationships between images, 
redolent with meaning, which he simultaneously exposes as negative/non-sustainable. In this 
charlatanic/dissonant exercise of meaning (lessness) he continuously produces and dismantles 
ambiguous undirected references - he plays upon the structures of signification and visually 
invalidates the pictorial fragments of our ersatz culture. In another respect there is a 
formalization of human traits, reflecting the periodic counterplay of humanity's inward and 
outward nature To this purpose Salle uses the (female) body as the centripetal correlation 
fo r an optical investigation of human nature.
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"I think that there is an idea about the body being the location of human inquiry that one finds 
in m y work, that makes it som ehow resonant with much earlier kinds of painting "
(David Salle) (3)
In choosing the body as the location of human inquiry, Salle concentrates upon surfaces and 
their composition, the emphatically visible. This utilization of the "pomographic-like" 
female nude-model is the most potent and intractable of Salle's strategic techniques. Salle 
deploys the nude, in a similar way to his employment of a large canvas, as a given 
inexhaustible site of interest, a proliferating intersection of connections. In addition 
to being grounded in contemporary culture the "pomographic-like" nude - the body as the focus 
o f desire - presents Salle with a virtual aesthetic theory, a theory of painting as in itself 
determ inantly exciting/energizing/active - "a body" - a figure/entity that intensifies life. 
In the paint that constitutes the skin of the nude and literally the skin of the painting, 
Salle's art delineates its crux. This essentially comprises an exemplary/rigorously 
developed proposition of the irreducibility o f the essence of painting. To comprehend the 
mechanics of Salle's painting it is crucial to advance the vicissitudes of the nude. Salle 's 
nudes although of a sexually provocative type are not arousing when encountered on the canvas 
(thus "pornographic-like" rather than "pornographic"). He uses the association of arousal 
but not the consequent response, which ultimately would shatter the unity of the painting - 
a unity he wants to question, to render paradoxical/ephemeral, to suspend/defer, but which 
must imperatively finally be affirmed. Salle's distinctive innovation is a way of composing 
stimulating images: compositing intensities using formal devices to construct paintings that 
are visually disjunctive but, by that very means take on a poised coherence
As can be seen in overview, most precisely in "Foucault" (4), Deleuze's strategic 
interpretative mechanisms concern an active engagement with the theoretical question of what 
it means to describe in one medium the practices of another medium. Whilst maintaining the 
presupposition that all acts o f translation are essentially a betrayal, Deleuze, 
expenmentally traces those instances in which the verbal may invoke the visual In Deleuze's
148
writing there is a constant reference to the establishment of "tableaus" - verbal exemplary 
illuminations of scenes that in their inherent stylistic quality and depth manifest the 
complete intensity of a visual presence. Additionally the language that Deleuze 
adopts/utilizes to elaborate the operations of force/intensity is a vivid and materialized 
one that renders even the most chimerical concepts substantively present. Although he 
describes the arts as primarily conceptual, Deleuze produces concepts that are quite physical 
in operation, as opposed to  ideal abstractions. The Deleuzian philosophical narrative is one 
of mappings/cartographies/lines of flight/vanishing points/rhizomatic and crystalline 
networks.
As Deleuze indicates in "Dialogues" the arts in his view are by no means unreleated to one 
another: "So what is it then, to paint, to compose or to write? It's all a question of the 
line; there is no considerable difference between painting, music and writing. These 
activities are distinguished by their respective substances, codes and territorialities, but 
not by the abstract line they trace, which passes between them and carries them toward a 
common destiny" (Gilles Deleuze). (5).
And Deleuze observes in "Francis Bacon: logique de la sensation", "Car il y a une communaute 
des arts, un probleme common. En art, et en peinture commence en musique, il ne s'agit pas de 
reproduire ou d'inventer des formes, main de capter des forces" (Gilles Deleuze) (6)
The Deleuzian project is directed towards an experimental operation that goes beyond the 
surface fixities of an art m edium  to find the forces and energies, the fluxes and sensations 
that a specific socio-historical examination has missed.
Deleuze's volume "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" can be viewed as articulating a 
Deleuzian conception/process for art. It is this concept o f art that I wish to elaborate and 
investigate in the follow ing section by tracing a line of trajectory, working through a 
selection of the components and stating/outlining the pattern o f its hypothesis. In addition 
I will continue to highlight points of intersection with a reading o f the practice o f David
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Salle which will subsequently be expanded upon in greater detail in forthcoming sections. (7)
For Deleuze, as for many critics of twentieth-century art, Cezanne is one of the founding 
figures of modem painting. It is through Cezanne that Deleuze approaches Francis Bacon, and 
it is within a specific tradition of Cezanne criticism that Deleuze develops his analysis. 
In "Logique de la sensation" Deleuze cites two works that situate his argument within that 
tradition - Henri M aldine/s "Regard Parole Espace" (1973)(8) and Jean-Franjois Lyotard's 
"Discours, Figure" (1971).(9)
Deleuze's strategy in "Logique de la sensation" is to combine the analysis o f Maldiney and 
Lyotard, to inter-articulate the space of Lyotard's figure matrix (the space of the 
invisible, o f the possible is an invented space traversed by unconscious forces that render 
visual what Lyotard terms the "figurai" a domain of Dionysian anti-form that can play through 
the images of figurative and abstract). The ground of painting is a "figure-matrix" of 
fantasy, the scene of the invisible pulsations of the Id) but negating the Freudian apparatus 
that Lyotard adopts, and the Strausian space (10) of sensation within a single plane of 
consistency. Deleuze argues with Maldiney that Cezanne is a painter of sensation, and it is 
the Figure that "la forme sensible rapportée a la sensation". It is the fusional world-body 
of sensation that Cézanne paints, and it is by entering into the painting's world-body that 
the viewer comes to experience the canvas as sensation. However, what Cézanne ultimately 
attempts to do, according to Deleuze, is to go beyond sensation and paint the invisible forces 
that are inculcated within it. Turn sensation back on itself, extend/contract it,to utilize 
that which sensation renders the forces that are not given, to make sensate the forces that 
are non-sensate. In Deleuze's view the quality of Cézanne is to "avoir subordonne tousles 
moyens de la peinture a cette tache: rendre visibles la force de plissement des montagnes, la
force de germination de la pomme, la force thermique d'un paysage.....etc?" (Gilles
Deleuze).(11).
"Logique de la sensation" has a structural arrangement founded upon a framework of rubrics, 
each dealing with an aspect of Francis Bacon's painting. When the rubrics are compiled and
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viewed in total they are intended to construct a general "logic of sensation". Deleuze's 
discussion begins fairly internally - analysing Bacon's specific painterly practices - then 
moves from a formal analysis of the tableaux to the wider art-historical implications of 
Bacon's method.
Rubic One "Le rond, La piste” describes the techniques that Bacon uses frequently to delimit 
the central figure through the effect o f encapsulating that figure within a type o f oval 
shape However, in parallel, Deleuze structures the narrative such that the division form al 
investigation/socio-historical inquiry is revealed to be no more than an expedient 
heuristic: (The formal and historical are brought into convergence). For example, the basic 
technique of delineation with an oval is re-conceived by Deleuze as only one component in a 
higher logic or series o f logics. In the first rubic Deleuze offers a number of instances of 
this re-conception. Initially Deleuze states that the delimitation with the oval is in itself 
an open-ended systematic procedure o f experimentation, it makes "sensible une sorte  de 
cheminement; d'exploration de la Figure dans le lieu, ou sur elle-même. C'est un cham p 
opératoire" (Gilles Deleuze) (12). Next, Deleuze says that the delimitation of the single 
figures will have to be perceived in the context o f the later more inclusive study of Bacon's 
supplementary method of "linking" several figures in a triptych format. Thirdly the 
isolation of the figure, resisting any definite narrative associations is not m erely a 
process of defiguration (although this does comprise a fundamental tenet of Bacon's scheme). 
Deleuze argues, "Des lors elle a comme deux voies possibles pour échapper au figuratif vers 
la forme pure, par abstraction: ou bien vers le pur figurai, par extraction ou isolation". 
(Gilles Deleuze) (13). If Bacon decides upon the second option, other practitioners have 
opted for the former, and consequently much of "Logique de la sensation" contrasts the option 
o f abstraction with the technique of "de-narrativizing isolation”. This attention to  the 
multiple possibilities of art history by Deleuze is another means by which the first rubic may 
be situated within a higher logic. From the outset then it can be seen that Deleuze digresses 
from a pure analysis of Bacon extending the parameters of the study to incorporate a more 
comprehensive study of a whole area of a rt experimentation
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In his depiction/deployment o f the female nude/sections of the female anatomy, David Salle 
constantly engages in a process of modifying their impact and re-focusing their charge. He 
uses a series of effects to  achieve this end, from the subtle grisaille technique to the 
idiosyncratic arrangement o f posture or from the refusal to reveal facial expressions to the 
frequent quotations from Art History via the components he appropriates Salle has observed 
that, "eroticism is this generation's word for authenticity", and what fascinates him about 
this view of "authenticity" is the way it focuses upon something that becomes more extensively 
distorted the closer you get to  it. This perverse exchange of identities between the 
authentic and the distorted image intrigues Salle and allows us to understand why he regards 
eroticism as "an integral part o f understanding the aesthetic" (14). It is the impulse, a 
perceptual catalyst, “ it is about how you know to single something out"(15).
Taking a more specific look a t Salle's models we might identify a number of different types 
presented - the catatonic or mute woman, the burlesque dancer, the wistful day dreamer, the 
melancholic waif, the self-possessed dancer and a variety of anatomical nudes in classical 
"studio poses". The most memorable however are the "pomographic-like" ones: women depicted 
in a range of vulnerable/ compromised positions/in bizarre costuming/ in characterisation. 
Usually viewed from behind o r with clothes pulled up over the head, these women seem 
unaware/unconcemed with being looked at. Their faces and distinguishing features often 
obscured/undifferentiated/cropped out.
It is here that I wish to introduce the proposition that the way Salle uses inserts in his 
pictures ("Sextant in Dogtown" (1987) and "Marking Through Webern" (1987)) is similar in 
practice and implication, to Bacon's employment of the oval Salle uses the inserts in his 
pictures, in an erotic sense, as mirrors of the female body. They convey a series o f 
metaphysical and metaphorical implications that complicate Salle's field of references. The 
inserts can be seen as "windows" with faces peering out at us as we peer through them. The 
images/subjects of the inserts also tend to mirror the body's configuration - (the ornaments 
and vases with their tapered lips, the wrinkled Giacometti-type heads) - they contribute to 
establish the evocation of atmosphere underlying the works, from the grinning mockery of the
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face in "Marking through Webern" (1987) to the more theatrical impact of the images super­
imposed onto "Yellow Bread" (1987)/"Satori Three Inches Within Your Heart" (1988). Salle is 
then both representing the body through images and actualizing it through the collocation of 
the inserts. These works establish their own "reality" and never exist as simply descriptive. 
They are actual corporated bodies rather than works about bodies It is here that we have the 
"real reality" o f the painting, revealed appropriately enough through the skin o f the paint 
that is the surface. The inserts serve to consequently energize/animate the w ork  - they 
literally transform it. Salle has suggested that the motivation behind this strategy is "to 
get inside o f things, inside the thing, and also to see from the outside, simultaneously, to 
be director and directed". (16).
'•......there are things in my paintings and there are things in the world and the two things are
not the same - even though one might look like the other. Nudes in paintings are not the same as 
nudes in the world. It is the ir relationship that is interesting “
(David Salle) (17)
In "Epaulettes for W alt Kuhn" (1987) the implication is obvious that any traditional erotic 
interpretation is repudiated by the placement o f the image of the dead fish (a Flemish still 
life) stretching across the entire upper section of the picture. The small inserts of two 
Fifties style light-fittings and the mule (all common items from Salles visual vocabulary) 
activate the surface creating a three-dimensional effect, illuminating the ground and 
cancelling out relationships. The portion of dripping paint is a "quote'Va piece of 
calculated artifice that leads to the lower frieze where it finds an echo in the epaulettes 
o f the female-figure's costume.
Salle's female nude-models are contemporary readings of the body, where the body itself, 
rather than simply provoking an imaginative reaction, is the scene of action and the vehicle 
for a more complex communication.
In a sim ilar vein to the method whereby Bacon's oval is a generative factor that 
leads/connects to other Baconian methods, so too the first rubic of "Logique de la sensation"
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contains the principle components for the complete Deleuzian scheme. In rubic 2 we can 
observe the expérimental/discursive style of Deleuze's design - he moves quickly beyond the 
concerns initially indicated (Bacon's defigurative tactics) to  general art historical 
concerns, but he proceeds to move in a way that allows/requires supplementary annotation 
in/via later rubies.
The main focus in rubic 2 "Note sur les rapports de la peinture ancienne avec la figuration" 
concentrates upon the impact o f the photographic image. It is suggested that the photograph's 
chemical reproduction of im ages gives it a realism that releases other art forms from the 
desire for realism. Deleuze adm its that advances in photography have extensively re­
directed the impulse of painting, there is a kind of anxiety o f influence in which the painter 
begins his/her work with the sense that the work is being conducted in a world already of the 
photograph. " .. . la peinture moderne est envahie, assiégée par les photos et les cliches qui 
s'installent déjà sur la toile avant même que le peintre ait commence' sont travail. En 
effect, ce serait une erreur de croireque le peintre travaille sur une surface blanche et 
vierge. La surface est déjà tout entière investie virtuellement par toutes sortes de clichés 
avec lesquels il foudra rom pre" (Gilles Deleuze) (18). However, whereas traditional 
interpretations have tended to  regard the release of painting as a natural development 
wherein a non-visual art easily locates its correct direction, Deleuze states that this 
process has nothing natural/spontaneous/inevitable about it. The prevailing condition of 
the cliche is a threat/pressure to the artist, and only a concentrated strategy can enable 
painting to negate this cliche. (This notion of art as a practice o f defined effort, Deleuze 
is keen to emphasize, is complementary to the method of the 
scientist/experimenter/engineer): " Ainsi, ayant renonce au sentiment religieux, mais 
assiégée par la photo, la peinture moderne est dans une situation beaucoup plus difficile, 
quoi qu'on dise, pour rompre avec la figuration, qui semblerait son miserable domaine 
reserve. (Gilles Deleuze) (19). One form of painterly practice would be that of abstraction: 
"il a fallu l'extraordinaire travail de la peinture abstraite pout arracher l'art modem a 
la figuration" (Gilles Deleuze) (20), however, the break with figuration can also be a direct 
confrontation with figuration - a working through it/a “defiguration".
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In rubic 3 "Athlétisme" Deleuze returns to a formal analysis, to an engagement with the 
internal dynamic scheme of Bacon's design. Indeed the first word of this rubic is "Revenons" 
More than this though we might note a process of Deleuzian rhizomatic functioning where one 
section of a formation connects with a multitude of others. Rubic 1 discussed the im pact of 
the figure and its surrounding oval, rubic 3 extends the format and introduces a third 
element " Revenons aux trois éléments picturaux de Bacon: les grands aplats comme structure 
matérielle spatialisante - la Figure, les Figures et leur fait - le lieu, c'est-à-dire le 
rond, la piste ou le contour, qui est la limite commence de la Figure et de l'aplat" (G illes 
Deleuze) (21 ). Deleuze treats the three elements of the flat tableaus - space/figure/oval - 
as complementary mechanisms from which various painterly combinations can be derived.
There are two discernable strands of narrative discussion contained here. Firstly, a re­
capitulation of rubic 1 notes how the relation of oval to figure can construct the Bacon 
painting as an activity o f "witnessing" in which the figure is delimited from an action by 
virtue of it's appearing to be "l'attente ou de l'effort" (22). In this context the figure 
is primarily a stable entity around which the open space of the tableau is engaged in a 
galvanized motion. "Dans beaucoup de tableaux, l'aplat est précisément pris dans un movement 
par lequel il forme un cylindre; il s'enroute autour du contour du lieu; et il enveloppe, il 
emprisonne la Figure" (23). Secondly in many of Bacon's paintings it is the figure itse lf 
which is involved in energetic motion. (24). As Deleuze notes the Baconian figure is that of 
a body in the process o f a veherment becoming. In this case the oval works not simply as a 
delimiting factor that directs the figure inwards towards itself so that it might complete 
a self-sufficient systematicity, but in direct contrast the oval becomes an aperture to  a 
state of openness to which the figure positions itself, as if it had located a "point de 
fuite". Deleuze here is reading Bacon's technique as a process of infinite 
mutation/transformation. In Rubic 4 "Le corps, la viande et l'esprit, le devenir-animal" 
Deleuze extends the initial premise of his narrative. Where the figure was primarily regarded 
as a complete element able to inter-connect with larger processes, but not apparently 
divisible in itself, now in contrast the figure itself is in the process o f a 
“becoming'/mutation in which it is not only the relation to the outside that is in
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transformation but also the figure itself in its internal (dis)organization. The human 
figure is promoted as internally divided in two procreative ways. Firstly the human body is 
conditioned by a tension between "heads and faces"
"Portraitiste. Bacon est peintre de têtes et non de visages. Il y a une grande difference entre 
les deux. Car le visage est une organisation spatiale strutcurée qui recouvre la tete, tandis que 
la tete est une dépendance du corps, meme si elle en est la pointe. Ce n'est pas qu'elle manque 
d'esprit, mais c'est un esprit qu i est corps, souffle corporel e t vital, un esprit animal, c'est 
l'esprit animal de l'homme: un esprit-porc, un esprit-boffle, un esprit-chien, un esprit-
chauve-souris......Cest d o n c  un project très spécial que Bacon poursuit en tant que
portraitiste: défaire le visage, retrouver ou faire surgir la te te  sous le visage" (Gilles 
Oeleuze) (25).
Spasmodic deformations are patent in Bacon's portraits - for the face is the most heavily 
coded zone of the body and hence the point at which the effects of diastolic forces are most 
pronounced. As a portraitist, Bacon's project is to paint the head beneath the face, the body 
o f sensation as opposed to the figurative body of convential representation. In many of 
Bacon's portraits animal traits seem to emerge from the human forms, and Deleuze regards these 
traits as a general "becoming animal" of the body. He is not saying there is a mimetic 
relationship between human and animal but that there is a "zone d'indiscernabilité^ 
d'indecidabilité", between humanity and the animalistic. W hat is important about meat is 
that it "est la zone commune de l'homme et de la bete, leur zone d'indiscernabilité". 
Ultimately, the head and meat taking on incipient traits of the head, the head instantiating 
"la puissance illocalisee de la viande"
This connects to the secondary thread of Deleuze's narrative in this section - a tension 
between flesh ("chair") meat ("viande") and bone.
Deleuze's narrative is directed towards promoting Bacon as a painter who de-figures 
representation and divorces the figure from any kind of stable representation with the 
principle ambition of communicating sensation in and o f itself Rubic 6 "Peinture et
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Sensation" is an explicit elaboration of this, however to reach this stage of development 
Deleuze announces that an additional phase of review should be undertaken, a "Note 
Recapitulative: Périodes et Aspects de Bacon" Rubric 5. The fifth rubric initiates a process 
of review and re-consideration of Bacon's techniques, borrowing extensively from and 
acknowledging the relevance of David Sylvester’s analysis(26) while correspondingly 
questioning the assumed possibility o f any totalizing summarization of the career.
Sylvester identifies three distinct periods in Bacon's career, Deleuze summarizes these as 
"la premiere qui confronte la Figure precise et l'aplat vif et dur; la seconde qui traite la 
forme "malerish" sur un fond tonal a rideaux: la troisième enfin qui réunit "les deux 
conventions opposées" et qui revient au fond vif a plat, tout en réinventant localement les 
effects de flou par rayage et brossage" (Gilles Deleuze) (27). Deleuze re-defines this 
chronology in two ways. Frist he suggests that the three practices are simultaneous and not 
successive, and secondly, any recapitulation is made redundant by the fact that Bacon's 
career is in effect open-ended and moving towards a more complex level in a fourth phase where 
a complete breakdown of representation might be attained, "la zone de brouillage ou de 
nettoyage, qui faisait surgir la Figure, va maintenant valoir pour elle-même, indépendamment 
de toute forme définie, apparâitre comme pure Force sans objet, vague de tempête, jet d'eau 
ou de vapeur, oeil de cyclone.....La Figure s'est dissipée ..."(Gilles Deleuze) (28)
In the sixth rubric "Peinture et Sensation" Deleuze suggests that it is the operation of 
defiguration to attain/to obtain pure force that essentially constitutes the logic of 
sensation. Recalling the notable phenomenological reading o f Cezanne by Merleau-Ponty 
Deleuze perceives sensation as the result of an encounter of apprehending subject with the 
disintegration o f the figure of the painting. " Ce qui est peint dans le tableau, c'est le 
corps, non pas en tant qu'il est représente comme object mais en tant qu'il est reçu comme 
éprouvant telle sensation"(29). In accordance with Valéry, we may suggest that sensation is 
that which is transmitted directly avoiding the constraints of a defined narrative. 
"Flistorie" has a twin meaning - "story" and "history" and Deleuze highlights this ambiguity 
to argue that the sensation of Bacon's defiguration is also in addition a
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concerted attempt to negate narrative and historical reference. Exceeding the parameters of 
figuration and representation, pure power "qui déborde tous le domaines et les traverse 
Cette puissance, c'est le Rythme, plus profond que la vision, l'audition etc", "logique des 
sens" Cézanne said "non rationnelle, non cérébrale" (30). "Logique de la sensation" may be 
regarded as contributing to a full-scale revision of phenomenology's emphasis on 
subjectivity, (a subjectivity conceived as that of a fully centered/fully composed/fully 
integrated being). Oeleuze's scheme still maintains a type of "subjectivity" but it is now 
a subjectivity that is fragmented, traversed by intensities, suffused with energies - 
"hystericized"
Deleuze sees Francis Bacon as a successor to Cézanne as a painter of sensations and forces 
However Bacon's canvases also highlight an experience of the body that is only latent in 
Cezanne, an experience that leads beyond the phenomenological "lived body" to a chaotic "body 
without organs" The body in Bacon's works is always in a process of becoming other - becoming 
animal/molecular/imperceptible - and the systolic and diastolic rhythms that play through 
the compositions are those of a "non-organic life", "une Puissance plus profande et presque 
invivable". (Gilles Deleuze). (31)
If Bacon is to be regarded as a painter of sensations, it is in the general sense of a painter 
of the incoherent/disorganized and non-organic sensations of the body without organs The 
body without organs "s'oppose moins aux organes qu'a cette organisation des organes qu'on 
appelle organisme C'est un corps intense intensif. Il est parcouru d'une onde qui trace dans 
le corps des niveaux ou des seuils d'apres les variions de son amplitude" (Gilles Deleuze) 
(32)
The body without organs is the body of sensation, for sensation is "la recontre de l'onde avec 
des Force agissant sur le corps" (Gilles Deleuze).(33)
The body without organs does have "organs” in a certain sense, but only provisionally, they 
emerge and disappear or are unspecified with multiple/contradictory functions The organs 
of sensation are more exactly the location where forces interconnect with the undulating body
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without organs: "A la recontre de l'onde a tel niveau et de forces extérieures, une sensation 
apparait. Un organe sera donc determine par cette rencontre, mais un organe provisoire, qui 
ne dure que ce que durent le passage del'onde et l'action de la force, et qui se déplacera pour 
se poser ailleurs" (Gilles Deleuze).(34)
The various organs through which the body escapes are all such provisional organs, loci of 
sensations on the body without organs.
Ultimately, what the body without organs discloses is an affective dimension of becoming, one 
in which no entities as such can be discemed/specified, but only vectors of force/matter and 
currents of affects. If the body w ithout organs is a body in any defined sense, it is as it 
appears and is developed in "Spinoza: Philosophie pratique" (35) where he characterizes the 
body as a particular configuration o f relations of swiftness/slowness, o f rest/motion 
between "non-formed" elements, and a specfic level o f affective intensity of an anonymous 
force. Deleuze in this situation approaches the body without organs through Bacons images 
of the human form, for the experience o f the body without organs does have a corporeal 
dimension and Bacon does provide numerousTdramatic" visualzations of the body undergoing 
a process of becoming. However, the body without organs is primarily the body of sensation, 
and sensation occurs at a pre-subjective level in which body/world cannot be differentiated. 
The fundamental rtiymns of a Bacon canvas, those of the systolic compression of the field and 
the diastolic deformation of the figure , bringing figure and field into a necessary 
relationship and promoting the formation o f a common body without organs that includes both 
field and figure. In Bacon’s art, the human form finally is not itself the body without 
organs, the canvas is.
"L'hystérie", rubic 7 situates Bacon's artistic practice in the context o f the writings of 
Antonin Artaud, to illustrate the im plications of a post-phenomenological operation of 
modern aesthetics upon subjectivity - not a subjectivity of the "organism" but of the "body 
w ithout organs". The body escaping through one of its organs and the face becoming 
bestial/meat-like are two examples of a general process whereby the human form becomes a
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Figure, which, says Deleuze, “c'est précisément le corps sans organes". The body without 
organs "s'oppose moins aux organes qu'a cette organisation des organes qu'on appelle 
organisme. C'est un corps intense, intensif. Il est parcouru d'une onde qui trace dans le 
corps des niveaux ou des seuils d'apres les variations de son amplitude".(36)
The body without organs is the body o f sensation, for sensation is "la rencontre de l'onde 
avec des Forces agissant sur le corps". (37)
In addition Deleuze wishes to highlight/distinguish the unique direction of Bacon's scheme, 
the tradition from which it develops/ in which it can be located, together with the 
subseqeuent relations it engenders. Deleuze, adopting W orringer's interpretation of a 
specificity o f the Gothic tradition of art, suggests that Bacon's practice is dualistically 
confrontational, directed equally against the "organic representation of classical art" and 
a process of abstraction that transforms representations into "geometric form s" (38). 
Bacon's Gothicism in contrast proposes " C'est un géométrie qui n'est plus au service de 
l'essentiel et de l'etemel, c'est une géométrie mise au service des "problèmes" ou des 
"accidents", ablation, adjonction, projection, intersection" (Gilles Deleuze) (39). And just 
as certain art-historians have advocated that there is a substantiated link between the 
Gothic tradition and the sense o f an intensified religiosity (e g. Erwin Panofsky) (40), 
Deleuze acknowledges a spiritual dimension to the search for intensity that is neither 
abstract nor representational. Bacon's geometry gives witness "d’une haute "spiritualité" 
puisque c'est une volonté spirituelle qui la même hors de l'organique, a la recherche des 
forces élémentaires" (41). Also contained in this rubic are the fragm ents/basis of a 
Deleuzian "art-process", that distinguishes the various aims of different aesthetic 
practices. Deleuze suggests that there is a distinctive force to painting, a special 
connection of painting to hysteria - a hysteria of the medium itself integrating the direct 
effect of lines/colours etc on the eye of the viewer. There is, as Deleuze continues, an 
optical specificity to painting that means regardless of the prevalent psychological 
condition o f the painter, that psychological impulse is transferred/translated into a 
separate/different energy band when appearing through the painted image.
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L'abjection devient splendeur, l'horreur de le vie devient vie très pure et très 
intense. ..C'est le pessimisme cérébral que la peinture transmue en optisisme
nerveux......C'est la double définition de la peinture: subjectivement elle investit notre
oeil, qui cesse d'être organique pour devenir organe poivraient et transitoire; objectivement, 
elle dresse devant nous la réalité"d'un corps, lignes et couleurs libérées de la representation 
organique" (Gilles Deleuze) (42).
The dialectical relationship of the visible to the invisible is the main contention in rubic 
eight, "Peindre les forces” Deleuze concentrates upon the specific inherent features of 
painting within a broader context of the project of modern/contemporary art practice, and 
more precisely on the contribution of Bacon's scheme to that enterprise "Il semble que, dans 
l'histoire de la peinture, les Figures de Bacon soient une des réponses le plus merveilleuses 
a la question; comment rendre visibles des forces invisibles?" (43).
At this point it seems appropriate to introduce David Salle's highly individualistic 
treatment of similar "forces" that we have hitherto been surveying within the discourse on 
Francis Bacon's practice. Salle's images of the female body depict sensations in a condition 
similar to Bacon, however they now attain incarnation within a negative mode. The forces are 
still rendered immanently present although they lack a direct intensified resonance. Salle 
traces the disappearance of physical sensation/presence- ultimately nothing remains but an 
apprehensive/chimerical image, but equally this echoes a compelling violence In its 
depiction. The sense of animation may have faded but the impact is retained. The image in 
fact emphazises a double shock, functioning on two levels, there is the primary fascination 
of the "pornographic-like" figure/figures and a secondary more mesmeric agitation derived 
from its debasement and then a gradual realization of its consequent petrified 
insubstantiality. The viewer experiences a controlled hysteria/a muted sensuality, dark 
spectres materialize as elegant balletic/cinematographic postures of the female figure or 
sections of female anatomy The emphasis is on subject matter/content not narrative, and a 
heightened awareness of a presence, difficult to identify The work raises questions 
regarding our appreciation/comprehension of the presence and absence of others, it
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highlights, as in Bacon, the isolation of the human condition and is a memorable addition to 
the tradition of works of a rt that reflect upon the transience of existence/presence.
Salle's anomic rendering o f the nude might indeed serve as a metaphor for the relentless 
obliteration of the human subject The chilling banality o f pornography is preserved through 
Salle's repertoire o f gesture and pose. Salle's nude models are rendered in a manner of 
generalized classical abstraction, ranging from a quick sketch/grisaille wash to the smooth 
clean-contoured colossal figures recalling the supercool impersonal scale of billboard 
advertising. Concurrently in Salle's paintings the face is often obscured, we are denied 
access to the female's sensation/perception of her own nudity. Obscured by other elements, 
overlayed with different images or floating vacantly on the surface, we are never entirely 
allowed to enter the model's space Through this representation the fragility o f presence 
is revealed. The end-game scenario is replayed to infinity with no beginning/end, no 
past/future - only the perpetual continuum of the present. Salle's nudes are ubiquitous and 
insinuate themselves into the paintings They frequently appear as multiple within a single 
work or occur as glimmering after-images, concealed by more pnominent/substantially modeled 
forms By design - via distance and reiteration - they are invariably consigned to the realm 
o f the artificial, representations manipulated and controlled. There is little attempt to 
simulate a naturalistic situation - the visible signs of production correspond in their own 
mechanistic way to Salle's technique and engender concomitantly a psychic distancing of the 
viewer from the object viewed.
Salle's paintings compose discarnate/inert sensation This applies equally to his attitude 
toward sexuality, and to his sense of the possibilities of contemporary painting. At one 
level Salle addresses the fraying of psychic health, the shattering of sexuality into 
simulation and one-dimensional spectacular imitated rituals. Yet more significantly the 
paintings reveal a condition, that Salle has constructed within his work, o f an emptiness at 
the core o f being.
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Salle paints sensations that are evasive and that he intuitively recognises as being carried 
in the diverse fragments that make up the work. The vision that underlies his work is the 
sense that life holds us but is unknowable The fragments that structure the contemporary 
condition present an open field of narrative possibilities but refer finally only back to 
themselves. Salle moves in and out o f sensations feehng/expressing them from different 
perspectives. The paintings "participate in meaninglessness" (44), however equally they 
are a testament to multiple possibilities and with the death of meaning we are left with the 
power and beauty of images as things in-themselves. This is the liberating force in Salle's 
work: his paintings are energized even as they refer to a consequent recognition of loss. 
Thus the paintings are inevitable presences even as they expose us to the experience of 
absence. (45).
Persuing such a line of flight it is possible to read Bacon's painterly strategy as a reaction 
against forces o f pessimistic representation In contrast to initially adopting a state of 
painterly optimism, Bacon's superficial evocation of intimidating/violent subject-matter 
is the site of a prolonged struggle of such optimism against the pressures that would relegate 
it to a level o f banality.
Having situated Bacon within a broader context of art history, Deleuze in rubric 9 and 10 now 
returns attention to the particularities of Baconian form, with the task of demonstrating 
that each strategy/technique is an option among a range of possible endeavours open to the 
artist. Deleuze began "Logique de la sensation" with a direct formal examination of the 
principle elements that comprise Bacon's practice, in the course of the investigation Deleuze 
subsequently diversifies/enriches the initial givens.
"Il appartient donc à la sensation de passer par différents niveaux, sous l'action de forces. 
Mais il arrive aussi que deux sensation se confrontent, chacune ayant un niveau ou une zone, et 
faisant communiquer leurs niveaux respectifs Nouse ne sommes plus dans le domaine de la stnple 
vibration, m ais dans celui de la résonance"
(Gilles Deleuze) (46).
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In rubric 9 "Couples et Triptyques" the discussion takes two themes One suggests that the 
primary emphasis placed on the single figure may have to be supplemented, in that even the 
isolated figure engages in an interactive process with other figures with which it is in an 
integral and necessary resonance The second strand of discourse aims to describe the 
function of the triptych in Bacon's oeuvre, which Deleuze translates as a type of dialectical 
overcoming o f the vibratory impulse of the figure/coupled figures. Deleuze suggests that the 
logic o f sensation of the figure has only a limited capacity in the fact that it can only 
attain a qualified level of defiguration: wherein the figure constitutes a given point by 
which permutations can be graded, there is always the possibility that representation may 
return and encompass the figure within the parameters of a closed static meaning.
In the triptych format, however, no single figure exists in isolation, no figure is regarded 
as having significant priority (not even the figure located in the central panel) the triptych 
organization of material could be seen as increasing the difficulty of the project towards 
defiguration - in that the introduction of more figures would presumably encourage a 
narrative connection to develop/be developed. - but in actuality the relations between 
elements appears to be enhanced- more vibratory/more mobile. Three panels containing 
information leads to an increase in the potentialities/indeterminances/transmigrational 
resonances among the panels.
Deleuze acknowledges John Russell's summary of the multiple condition of the Bacon triptych 
(47) In the case of a number of figures being presented, various readings can be derived but 
there is never anything to ground/privilege any single interpretation over another. This 
strategy depends upon what may be termed "abortive mimesis". Possible narratives are 
projected at different and incompatible ontological levels, so that when an element appears 
within two possible/different narratives it is rendered "unreadable" Mimesis stops and 
starts and the viewer is forced/obliged to re-frame and may never achieve a coherent and 
stable solution. W hat remains is ultimately a sheer vibratory facticity, a quality of 
"thereness" or to adopt the term that Deleuze quotes from Bacon (in English) the "matter of
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fact" nature o f the painting wherein things are simply painted and no final meaning can be 
directly assigned to them The interconnecting relations between the elements within the 
separate panels may simply be determined as active/passive witnessing, but even this 
rationalization is not to be regarded as having narrative significance, more directly it 
produces a combinatory force that gives the painting a rhythmic power
"Peindre la sensation, qui est essentiellement rythme...... Mais dans la sensation simple, le
rythme depend encore de la Figure, il se présente comme la vibration qui parcourt le corps sans 
organes, il est le vecteur de la sensation, ce qui la fait passer d'un niveau à un autre. Dans 
l'accouplem ent de sensation, le rythme se libere déjà, parce qu'il confronte et reunit les 
niveaux divers de sensations differentes: il est maintenant resonance, mais il se confond encore 
avec les lignes mélodiques, points et contrepoints. Avec le triptyque enfin, le rythme prend une 
amplitude extraordinaire, dans un movem ent forcé  qui lui donne l'autonomie, et fait naître en 
nous impression de Temps: les Imites de la sensation sont débordées, excédées dans toutes les 
directions."
(G illes Deleuze) (48)
Rubric 10 "Note : Qu'est-ce qu'un triptyque7' extends and develops the Deleuzian analysis of 
the Implication of Bacon’s most prominent strategic device. Previously Deleuze had said that 
the rhythmic force of the triptych was the result of its presenting multiple elements that can 
reach an accord in unstable relationships. Deleuze now suggest that this process takes place 
at levels of increasing abstraction/defiguration in which the painterly specificity o f the 
work is gradually diminished and a purer non-medium specific rhythm is issued On a primary 
level the triptychs work figuratively via the interaction of a witnessing figure with an 
acting one. However and in direct contrast, upon an alternative level, the action of these 
figures can be re-worked/reversed in the situation where the dynamic is no longer in the 
representative mode of horizontal-vertical. Deleuze elaborating upon this new direction, 
argues that the existence of the figures contained in the triptychs are not dependent to any 
definite extent upon an identity based reading. To act and to witness might appear to be the 
characteristics of personifiable entities, but the connection of these two forces is only one 
dimension within a broader framework o f possible interconnections that has little to do with 
characterization at all Therefore, as rubric 10 exemplifies them we may locate in the
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triptychs the interactions of vertical-horizontal/descent-rise/diastole-systole/naked- 
clothed/augmentation-diminution etc. Deleuze continues with the premise that the 
transformations that the body endures throughout Bacon's work are more accurately 
interpreted as elements that facilitate variations within the painting with the ensuing 
consequence that the incarnate figure possesses a latent quality of perpetual transition even 
in its shape and revelation/materialization.
It is the triptych that Deleuze finds the most complete development of Bacon's "logic of 
sensation" The essence of sensation is rhythm, and the elementary rhythm of a Bacon painting 
is the systolic and diastolic vibration that passes between field and figure. Bacon paints 
configurations of bodies and objects complex relations, the multiple vibrations of the 
several forms interacting with one another and creating diverse patterns o f resonance. In 
the triptychs the individual vibrations/pattems of resonance experience a compulsory 
movement that dis-engages rhythm from specific figures and gives it an autonomous form. 
Deleuze identifies in the triptychs three types of rhythm - active rhythms of diastolic 
movement descent/augmentation; passive rhythms of systolic movement, assert/diminution; 
"witness rhythms" of horizontal forms that act as constants against which active/passive 
rhythms can be measured These rhythms are co-ordinated in a triptych painting via an
"logique irrationnelle.....cette logique de la sensation qui constitue la peinture" (Gilles
Deleuze)(49) with the result that "c'est le rhythme lui-meme qui devient sensation, c'est lui 
devient Figure, d'apres ses propres directions separees, l'actif, le passif et le témoin.. ." 
(Gilles Deleuze). (50)
The rhythms of primary sensation, the vibrations that pass between field and figure, develop 
"forces d'isolation, de deformation et de dissipation". The rhythms of resonant combinations 
of figures adopt "forces d'accouplement", but the rhythms of the triptych employ a new force 
"une force de separation" which is distinct from the force of isolation.
In most of Bacon's triptych paintings each of the three canvases has a background field of 
bright/raw colour In the individual canvas the tension between the systolic field and the
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diastolic figure enacts the field and the figure into relation with one another, in the 
triptych the field of the three canvases forms a single luminous/chromatic element within 
which the figures are suspended like "des trapezistes qui n'ont plus pour milieu que la 
lumiere ou la cou leuf The background fields of the three canvases interact with one another 
via the unifying force of light/colour which correspondingly imposes a rigid separation of 
the figures located in the individual canvases. From this separation o f the figures, the 
rhythms of the triptych no longer determined by particular bodies themselves becomes 
figures, relational movements in a field o f 'Tuniverselle lumiere” and "I'universelle 
couleur” , light and cotour creating ”un immense espace-temps qui reunit toutes choses, m ais  
en  in trodu isan t en tre  elles les  distances d'un Sahara, les  siecles d'un A io n " . In the 
triptych arrangement, the unifying and separating forces of light and colour are identified 
as autonomous principles, and the disengaged rhythms generated by the various forms become 
figures of a floating, non-pulsed time of pure becoming, the time of the Stoic Aion.
The Deleuzian analysis of Bacon is framed in terms of sensation, systolic/disatolic 
movements, the force of colour /light and the rhythms of time However, the sensation that 
Deleuze identifies in Bacon is not that o f a "lived” body, but that o f the body without organs 
and the forces of systole and diastole of colour and light and the process of transformation, 
are not simply the organic forces of the auto-genesis of forms, but also the 
mutating/deforming forces of a chaotic dimension o f affective becoming. The invisible forces 
that Deleuze finds in Bacon are forces of disruption/transgression, affective forces 
immanent within the real, forces which in the triptychs are disclosed through the pure 
vectors of light and the rhythms of an ametrical time
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PART II
’There 's  no narrative. There really is none; there isn't one" 
(David Salle) (51)
In the example of the organizatlon/arrangement and effect/scope of the triptych format one 
may discuss significantly corresponding patterns o f strategic technique in works o f Bacon 
and Salle The impulse of David Salle's work has come from an exploration of fragmentation 
as a means of concomitantly giving the image a renewed potency and yet synchronically 
rendering it inconsequential/distanced. Salle favours multiple canvasses, the diptych and 
also the triptych format with its echoes of the altarpeice or, in Twentieth century terms, the 
loaded menace of Francis Bacon or Max Beckmann The medium becomes not only a means of 
communication but also a point of reference.
The diptych (two-panel composition) or triptych (three-panel composition) as distinct from 
the undivided canvas surface, allows Salle to re-inforce the theme o f separateness and 
fragmentation that is central to his work. Both formats open the possibility of ambiguity, 
and yet also allow for not one but several “narrative” solutions. (In the classical 
Renaissance tradition the diptych/triptych organization depicted two or more episodes in a 
narrative shared with the audience. While in the majority of cases maintaining a consistent 
style, the painter depended upon myth/tradition to provide continuity for seemingly 
unrelated episodes, their contiguity, however, implied that they were contained in the same 
story/the same temporal art. In contemporary art, Jasper Johns provides, for example, 
contiguity implied both in similarity and difference In such binary images, the banality 
o f repetition is partially avoided and abruptly closed At the other extreme, the conjunction 
o f  two/three dis-similar images, the broken language o f dislocation, becomes a way of 
blocking false assumptions and preserving the capacity of disposable images.)
As an example we might look to David Salle's "How to use Words as a Powerful Aphrodisiac"
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(1982) this is an uneven triptych, the large central panel o f which superimposes one of 
Picasso's Analytic Cubist heads of 1909 (52) over a vehemently illustrated painting of a Coney 
Island carnival by Reginald Marsh (53). The small, displaced panel on the right is composed 
of colourful/gestural marks, a homage to the gestural abstraction of the 1950's. The triptych 
is about the practice o f making art, about coming to term s with the traditions of picture­
making in the Twentieth century. The experimental/studio-study/cerebral analysis are 
maintained in an accord with the journalistic/urban/dynamic, while in addition abstract 
pattern-making is not discounted. The prominent red-tinted emblematic raised fist and 
forearm on the left is a reference to corporeal power/force. "Abandoned Shells" (1984) is 
based on a three-times repeated well-known still photograph of George Balanchine rehearsing 
a dancer, a distinctly ambiguous motif in itself,(54) for it corresponds less to the graceful 
rhythms of ballet than the erratic stagger of the walking wounded, it reads almost like a 
Descent from the Cross. Over this triptych are overlayed pasted "globules" of tacky check 
material and a daubed caricatural portrait of an army officer, an unidentifiable fruit and 
a Janus-like figure. Often Salle jarringly offsets his imagery of culture with incongruous 
motifs, with the imagery of consumer society - domestic utensils/food/sections of female 
anatomy, packaged as objects of desire. (55)
No homogeneous value system can be externally imposed to unify/totalize all the possibilities 
of vibration/rhythm/transformation inherent in the works o f Salle and Bacon. The Deleuzian 
approach is not a form o f Derridean deconstruction in which a hierarchy of terms would be 
disrupted by parodic inversion. It is not a question, for example, of demonstrating that the 
passive is in fact the active and vice-versa, more but precisely of illustrating that the 
essential description of either to these two options according to pre-emptory valuations is 
inaccurate Although Deleuze must acknowledge the constraints of the parameters of language 
to define two poles of relation, he is principally concerned to emphasize that all such 
namings are in actuality arbitrarily impositions whose fictional quality must be continually 
stressed
However, despite the high level of freedom that is indicated by this open/non-hierarchical
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combination o f elements within the space of the painting, the artist himself/herself is not 
able to approach the canvas in a mode of pure-spontaneous creative latrtude/immunity Rubric 
11, "La Peinture avant de Peindre. . .", discusses how even the apparently vacant space of the 
untreated canvas is, to a certain extent already imagistically/compositionally pre­
determined before the artist sets to work On a simplistic level, as elaborated in preceding 
rubrics, no artist is ever entirely detached from tradition/heritage/influence. On a more 
complex, and perhaps negative level, it is suggested that the painter/artist is working in 
a world that is information saturated/dominated by images/representations/figurations and 
therefore there can never be any means by which the artist can hope to address the work in the 
pure/innocent act o f creation. At this point the Deleuzian analysis becomes orientated in 
a directly sociological form addressing the modem/post-modem contemporary condition of the 
dynamic proliferation o f media communications - a society dominated by insecure signs and 
im ages sliding past one another, dissociated and de-contextualized, failing to link into any 
defined sequence.
"Nous sommes assiégés de photos qui sont des illustrations, de journaux qui sont des narrations,
d'image - cinema, d'images - télé.... Il ya a la une expérience très importante pour le peintre:
toute une catégorie de choses qu'on peut appeler "clichés" occupe déjà la toile, avant le 
commencement c'est dramatique".
(Gilles Deleuze) (56).
Deleuze plays upon the double meaning of "cliché" which in French means both a kind of 
stereotypical thinking and a snapshot (the linking of the two is in the interpretation of both 
procedures as instant acts that require a minimum of effort and result in the depiction of 
rea lity  as a static refined image) Deleuze, attending to the relationship between the 
photographic image and the painted image, views the photographic as a dangerous kind of 
"short-c ircu it thinking'Vrepresentation since its apparent realism creates a sense of 
authenticity/of innocent directness that maintains its stereo-typing.
Equally Bacon regards the photograph as both a problem and a challenge Bacon's painting 
starts always, already with the realization that painting has to exist in a world pervaded by
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photographic cliches. While Bacon's practice does not presume to offer a universal solution, 
his sense that the photograph's danger lies in a freezing of the image that occurs 
automatically, leads him to a distinctive painterly technique. (57). This strategy, notes 
Deleuze, is that of the introduction of "chance"("hazard") into the act o f painting.
Salle's attitude towards objects/styles/media is highly sophisticated. W e are able to 
discern a technique that takes nothing as a given - that with considered force renders any 
positive statement against an equal and opposing energy. The aims are high - a work of art is 
presented as a group of representations each separated and clarified and then brought 
together in such a way that makes content flicker on and off as perception generates friction 
among chains of association. Emotion is delivered, but it circulates through sets of images 
that exist in a refractive numinous index. Salle is concerned that, irrespective of the 
nature of the emotion, whatever the overtones of vulgarity/coldness/carnality that might be 
implicated via the fragmentary process, that the image should be elegantly stated and 
maintain the classical order of a highly-cultivated style. His paintings 
"manifest"/"narrate" themselves on many levels/strata. Salle acknowledges/accepts 
intuition/improvisation/risk, but submits them to an ultimate control. He demonstrates, 
that perhaps the "truth" of the human condition, or o f a visual order lies in the itinerary 
of not being able to find it.
Rubric 12 "Le Diagramme": abstraction and action painting", aims to specify Bacon's tactics 
of defiguration by contrasting his practice with the processes of geometric abstraction - 
Mondrain/Kandinsky where the technique of painting is subordinated to a higher ulterior 
meaning. By utilizing the effects of various binary codes that dominate the painting 
(horizontal lines against vertical lines) the painting is regarded as a mechanism to promote 
a spiritual energy/force. The modulated exercise of painting is reinscribed in 
defined/rational terms (sharp lines/rectangles), "... les formes abstraites appartiennent 
a un nouvel espace purement optique qui n'a meme plus a se subordonner des elements manuels
ou tactiles.....la peinture abstraite elabore molns un diagramme qu'un code symbolique,
suivant de grandes oppositions formelles" (58) - and abstract expressionism/action painting,
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where, although the emphasis rests on the manual process of the artist at work on the surface 
o f the canvas the rendering tactile of the painted plane is so total/extreme that 
paradoxically the optical sensation is diffused/lost.
Between these two options a third alternative m ay be identified, neither a rationalized 
coding nor a contourless discordance but a technique of deformation/transformation via 
zonalized operations.
Michel Leiris traces back to its origin in Baudelaire the notion of an ideal beauty that is 
quintessential^ modem in that it refuses to fall back on "the emptiness of a beauty that is 
absolute and cannot be defined". That notion has integrated within it an element which is 
timeless/immutable, but also has an indispensable/circumstantial element that is in a 
continual state o f transition. "For Baudelaire" wrote Leiris, "beauty cannot come into being 
without the intervention o f something accidental (a misfortune, or the contingence of 
modernity) which drags the beautiful clear from its glacial stagnation; it is at the price of 
degradation that the mummified One turns into the  living Many".
'The current idea of beauty as something that arises from a static mixture of opposites is, 
therefore, obsolete", Leins continued, "Beauty m ust have within it an element that plays 
the motor-role of the first sin. W hat constitutes beauty is not the confrontation of 
opposites but the mutual antagonism of those opposites, and the active and vigorous manner 
in which they invade one another and emerge from the conflict marked as if by a wound or a 
depredation", and 'W e can call "beautiful" only that which suggests the existence of an ideal 
order - supraterrestial, harmonious and logical - and yet bears within itself, like the brand 
of an original sin, the drop of poison, the rogue element of incoherence, the grain of sand 
that will foul up the entire system"
Leins saw both stable and unstable forces essential to beauty. Ideally there should be a 
balance/perfect polarization between these two mutually indispensable elements of beauty 
"On the right-hand side, a beauty that is immortal, sovereign, sculptural; facing it, the
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elem ent of the left, sinister in the strict sense, since the left stands for misfortune, and 
for accident, and for sin". Beauty resulted not from the interaction/synergy of opposites, 
but from an equivocal struggle between them, an ambiguous accord or preferably a tangential 
coherence of the straight line and the curved line, a conjunction of the rule and its 
exception. "And yet", as Leiris continued, "we shall see that even this image of tangential 
meeting is an ideal almost never attained. Our aesthetic emotion - or approximation to beauty 
- depends in the last resort on that lacuna which represents the left handedness of beauty in 
its highest form: an obligatory incompleteness, an abyss that we can never traverse, a breach 
that opens on to our perdition".
Bacon's paintings are what Leiris calls "mythic translations of our inward structure which 
move us to the extent to which they throw light on ourselves while at the same time resolving 
our contradictions in a harmony not to be found elsewhere".(59)
In the paintings of David Salle one can observe a full-scale vision of what a contemporary 
notion of "reality" m ight be about. Conjured up as if by free-association, a myriad of 
apparently disconnected fragments from art and life are maintained in an 
enigmatic/insubstantial/fragile accord that operates in a transient condition between 
tangible matter and filmic ethereal images, between the codified languages of abstraction 
and those of figurative art.
In the later rubrics of "Logique de la sensation" the Deleuzian process of art concepts is 
elevated to a more generalized level, offering new insights into the possibilities of art in 
the contemporary condition. Deleuze produces an outline of a taxonomy of languages, more 
precisely, of artistic languages. Rubric 13, "L'Analogie", contains many of the central 
tenets of the Deleuzian "philosophy of art". Deleuze intends this sections title to refer not 
to a specified type of correspondence theory of art but more accurately to the linguistic 
distinction of digital and analogical communication (60).
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W hile not opting for a entire Structuralist framework o f interpretation Deleuze nonetheless 
aim s to produce a theory of communication that would acknowledge "gradations" of 
signification, but that would not restrict meaning to the defined limits of the oppositions 
of entirely differentiated elements of language. This method is elaborated comprehensively 
in the two works on cinema, where Deleuze replaces the dominant semiotics of film (a Metzian 
semiotic system - a structural semiotics that focuses upon broad and narrow unities of film) 
with a fluid semiotics that concentrates less upon distinctive isolated elements than upon 
signifying tonalities/graduations of shift. For example, according to a standard semiotic 
interpretation of film theory, there is, in film, a basic dilemma in the attempt to depict a 
quality of tense because an image is located in the present even if it is essentially designed 
to refer directly to the past, and can only achieve a representation of temporality with 
defined oppositions of image - the cut to a flashback that juxtaposes one image against 
another producing a binavism of past and present. Deleuze, in contrast, in "Cinema 2: 
L'image-temps" suggests that the image in itself can vibrate with layers of temporality, the 
image itself is not an isolated/singular element, but a graded richness, encompassing the 
modulations of past/present/future "Modulation" is the central device that Deleuze employs 
to create a semiotic method based upon indiscrete variation/the tonal shift/the variable 
gradation. (A more extensive study of Deleuzian film theory is contained in the proceeding 
section).
David Salle's attraction to the images he uses lies in the fact that they work aesthetically 
and that he can literally make them alter their function by giving them a different 
weight/tone/context. Salle develops the ability to organize complex images and construct 
spontaneous variations which reflect the contours of a theme. Salle's images are concerned 
predominantly with the process of transformation and possibilities of continuous additional 
readings Similarly Bacon's paintings, states Deleuze, in the tradition of Cézanne, are not 
encoders of reality - in the sense of a linguistic code as meticulous structuring - but 
modulations of it.
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Rubric 15, "La traversée de Bacon", initially identifies Bacon as a qualified/modifted 
inheritor of an Egyptian haptic aesthetic but continues primarily to examine specifically 
Bacon's treatment of the traditions of colourfrom Van Gogh/Gauguin/Cezanne. This tradition 
locates its sensations in modulations of colour - colour not as a distinct opposition, but as 
a convoluted oscillation/graduation or analogical (as opposed to  digital) variation. "C'est 
la couleur, ce sont les rapports de la couleur qui constituent un monde et un sens haptiques, 
en fonction du chaud et du froid, de l'expansion et de la contraction" (61). In the remaining 
segments of this rubic Deleuze produces a more comprehensive definition of the particular 
colourist strategy that Bacon develops. Firstly the colourist approach is distinguished from 
those in which the modulation of light is the dominant practice. "On appelle coloristes les 
peintres qui tendent à substituer aux rapports de valeur des rapports de tonalité, et a 
"rendre" non seulement la forme, mais l'ombre et la lumière, e t le temps, par ces purs 
rapports de la couleur" (62).
Within colourism itself, however, there are several subdivisions that may be discerned. 
Firstly there is the Cezanne tradition: "La modulation par touches distinetes pures et 
suivant l'ordre au spectre, c'était l’invention proprement cezanienne pour atteindre au sens 
haptique de la couleur" (63). However, Deleuze extends this scheme defining another possible 
different colourist modulation that separates itself from the Cezanne option; in this case 
the division of flat background and foreground figure is contrasted in the respect by a vivid 
tone and saturation in the background that renders it not only a quality of "passage" from one 
colour to another, but a complete sense of movement/transformation/modulation and in a 
secondary capacity, broken tones for the foreground form which construct another type of 
“passage" in which the colour appears to be animated. It is this post-Cezanne mode that is 
attributable to Bacon's practice.
Rubric 16 "Note sur la couleur"' suggests that colour is the ultimate transformative force, 
the principle modulator in Bacon's artistic design. In previous sections, Deleuze identified 
the motivating elements of Bacon's strategic technique of permutation as 
structure/figure/contour. This analysis is now amended as Deleuze situates these elements
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as composite entities in a more extensive permutational/modulatory assemblage 
influenced/administered by the vibratory power of colour: "tous les trois convergent vers 
la couleur dans la couleur." (64) In Bacon's paintings colour modulates the background 
surface and additionally operates its effects on the foreground figure - colour is clearly 
the generative nexus o f Bacon's art. In the paintings of David Salle we travel across a 
changing space that is filled with reverberations, qualifying encounters, partial 
resolutions and restless confrontations. Salle creates this climate by, like Bacon assigning 
a major role to colour: warm red/lurid orange/brilliant white and hesitant grisaille. Salle 
uses colours as significant, individuated genres in which the image is reflected.
Appropriating a term from Alois Riegl, Deleuze treats Bacon's logic of sensation as "haptic", 
in order to  demonstrate that it is correspondingly optical and manual, an art that surpasses 
the spiritual and material.(65) Rubric 17 "L'Oeil et la main" states:
"P our qualifier le rapport de l'oeil et de la main, et les valeurs par les quelles ce rapport 
passe, il ne suffit certes pas de dire que l'oeil juge et que les mains opèrent. Le rapport de 
la main et de l'oeil est infinim ent plus riche, et passe par des tensions dynamiques, des
reneversement logiques, des échanges et vicariances organiques....Enfin on pariera d'haptique
chaque fois qu'il n'y aura subordination étroite dans un sens ou dans l'autre,..... mais quand
la vue elle-même découvrira en soi une fonction de touche qui lui est propre, et n'appartient 
qu 'a  elle, distincte de sa fonction optique"
(G illes Deleuze) (66).
In Bacon's art-practice Deleuze identifies Bacon's individual technique for inserting the 
manual into the optical as being ascribed to a process of considered/relative injection, 
apparent in the sweep of the hand/the stroke/the smear that eventuates the disfiguration 
phase o f the figure and accesses analogically a series of alternative/precipitant 
representations. Thus the haptic, as Deleuze relates in the concluding lines of "Logique de 
la sensation", is the overcoming surpassing ("dépassement" - the French word introduced to 
translate the Hegelian "Aufhebung") o f hand and eye into a superior logic - that o f the haptic 
a singular logic not strictly o f sensations but precisely of sensation, o f an in-itself.
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In his work on film-theory, Deleuze interprets the attention o f Jean-Luc Godard to the 
cinematic-signifier as a "pedagogy of the image" (This filmic-analysis will be elaborated 
more extensively in the proceeding section).
Extending this analysis it is possible to interpret the practice of David Salle in a 
concomitant style - the simplification of the image, or, conversely, the rendering complex 
of the image, affords an instruction in viewing things and their representations alike in new 
ways (67). Salle is, as Deleuze figures Bacon, almost a "scientist" of the visual arts, an 
inventor/operator of a great picture-making machine - using the space of the picture for 
operative experiments - ("opératoire" occurs recurrently throughout "Logique de la 
sensation") - paintings become virtual laboratory experiments relating to the power and 
function of images Deleuze, in general, characterizes artists as workers (figures of 
production in the sense of "L'Anti-Oedipe") or as conceptualist/thinkers similar to 
philosophers "Logique de la sensation" may be seen to initiate Deleuze's unique "pedagogy 
of the image", constructing examples of a painterly practice that deforms/transforms the 
world to regain the intensity of perception and in order to enable us to achieve a 
new/innovative perspective.
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NOTES
1 Gilíes Deleuze - Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation 2 vols. Paris: Edition de la diffie'rence
(1981).
2. David Salle - in "David Salle, An Interview with David Salle" by Peter Schjeldahl, New York: 
V intage Contemporary Artists, Elizabeth Avedon - Editions (1987).
3. David Salle - ibid (1987).
W ith in  the  context o f the history o f painting, the female nude has featured as an object 
surveyed/displayed for the privileged male gaze of spectator/owner. (As a category of 
representation this category hasemblamatized conventional projections of male desire). Women 
are not presented as essentially themselves but rather as objectifications of a presumed male 
subjectivity. This objectification was primarily justified by the elevation o f the nude to the 
"h igh-art" status o f the classical academic tradition. Traditionally one of the exemplarly 
exam ples o f artistic expression, the nude was integrated into mythological/biblical/historical 
themes that generated drverse/dramatic effects. The genre functioned to reconcile the conflict 
between propriety and sexual pleasure. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the genre began 
to disin tegrate. In terms o f artistic convention, it was no longer incontrovertible that the 
presentation of the nude should appear within a thematic context. The resultant consequence was 
realized by the progressive development of the nude depicted prominently in unidealized modes 
o f depiction. Given its principle status within the classical canon it was therefore inevitable 
that the nude would come to adopt a central role within the iconoclastic force of modernism - the 
nude that transgressed/inverted the erotic ideal, (e.g. Edouard Manet "Olympia" (1863)/Pablo 
Picasso "Daemoiselles d Avignon" (1907)/Willem de Kooning 'W om en 1" (1950/52)). Manet's 
"Olympia", frequently acknowledged as the first modem masterpiece, is a radical departure from 
previous approaches to the nude, and at the time was highly controversial.
No longer a submissive and seductive ephemeral offering, "Olympia" is self-confident and 
confrontational - fixing her eyes on the viewer in a matter-of-fact defiant directness. She 
appears to know, as a prostitute, her position as a perfect/complete commodity. (See: Walter 
Benjamin "Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century Reflections", trans Edmund Jephcott, New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1978)).
"O lympia's" declaration of independence and self-awareness is a metaphorical correlative of 
modernism's formal position - its imperative tone and self-prodaimed autonomy Modem painting 
asserted its autonomy/its "objectness" by emphasizing the process o f picture-making itself - 
its own internal "languages" of colour/line/shape/surface. (This will be treated more 
extensively in proceeding sections). David Salle takes this modernist self-reflexivity a stage 
further. The process of representation is understood to include not only the disposition of 
lines/colours/ shapes on a flat plane, but additionally the cultural/sociological forces that 
s tructure the interactions between the artist/the viewer/the work. In contrast to the 
declarative mode of the modernist painting - "Look at me!"/"l am a real object" - Salle's address 
is interrogative - "Are you looking at m eTTW hyTW hat am I?" The ubiquitous female nude model 
constitutes the principle articulating agent o f Salle address.
Salle is not the only artist to bring into question the function of sexuality in contemporary art 
and culture. Kitaj/Dine/Rosenquist/Fischl/Clemente/Freud among others have also engaged with 
such issues, recognizing them  as a motivating force in the re-assertion of "figurative 
painting". Using similar means, Rosenquist confronted analogous themes with 'Playgirf' (1966), 
yet Salle goes beyond Rosenquisfs unequivocal equation of the woman's body with consumer and 
disposable production, his cross-referencing of high-art and "pornography", the imagery of 
taste and desire, addresses m ore subtly the fabrication/reception o f works of art. These 
pictures concern female sexuality as well as male. Salle's images do not share the explicit 
voyeurism of, for example, Francesco Clemente's "Four Winds" (1981). They often imply the 
complicity o f the woman, for example 'T he  School Room" (1985), has been linked to the 
confrontational/hard-edged female eroticism found in the works of Kathy Acker, with whom Salle 
has worked. (February 1984-Salle  designs sets for the Richard Forman directed/Kathy Acker 
written play "Birth of a Poet"). (In 1979 Salle read Juliet Mitchell's 'The Sadian W om an", a 
feminist interpretation of de Sade. Subsequently he adapted phrases from this as titles for 
paintings, such as "Rob Him o f Pleasure").
The force o f Salle's nude-models does not lie in angst-ridden narratives neither is it generated 
principally by direct references to past art or to pornographic type material. His posed 
figures, tensed or twisted/offering or constrained are derived from photographs staged by Salle 
himself; they may have a generic relationship to the historical nude or to the nude o f the 
pornographic magazine but they are distanced/removed - yet not rendered entirely neutral - by 
m ediated decisions/the evidence of artistic selection/arrangements
4. Gilles Deleuze - "Foucault" Paris: Minuit (1986).
5. Gilles Deleuze - "D ialogues" with Claire Parnet Paris: Flammanon (1977).
6 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
7. In "Logique de la sensation" an art historical argument emerges, but here, in contrast to the
works on cinema, the history never appears to be even partially totalized. It develops only in 
fragments and contrived digressions that slowly reveals glimpses of a narrative that is never 
entirely completed/articulated.
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24 Bacon's practice concentrating upon the transformative and the transforming of shapes appears,
at this point o f contact, precisely correspondent to a generalized Deleuzian interpretative
scheme.
25. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
"La viande est cet état du corps où la chair et les os se confrontent 
localement, au lieu de se composer structuralement".
Deleuze euphonizes the important function in Bacon's compositional strategy of the vertebral 
column - it is not that it essentially provides the body with a solid/stable support structure 
but in contrast it operates virtually as a measure/marker against which the deviations of the 
flesh can be measured. Deleuze suggests that we may discern here some of the reaons for Bacon's 
fascination with scenes of the crucifixion - the sublime religiosity of the crucifixion shows 
an attempt to counter the body upright towards the radiance of the heavens and altenatively all 
transcendental elevation is counteracted by the weight pulling the flesh downwards towards its
own animalistic base condition. As Deleuze states " ..... la viande a une tête par laquelle elle
fuit et descend de la croix". Bacon uses the animal form in such a way that returns the observer 
to human form and renders therein a heightened understanding of it. 'Three Studies for a 
Crucifixion" (1962) "A Crucifixion" here and elsewhere in Bacon's oeuvre is not a descriptive 
title and less a reference to an actual event. It is, rather, a generic term for an environment 
in which bodily abuse is dispensed to one or more persons and one or more other persons gather to 
bear witness. "It may be unsatisfactory" Bacon said to David Sylvester in 1963, "but I haven't 
found another subject so  far that has been as satisfactory for covering certain areas of human 
feeling and behaviour" He also added on this occasion: "One of the things about the cruicfixion 
is the very fact that the central figure o f Christ is raised into a very pronounced and isolated 
position, which gives it, from a formal point of view, greater possibilities from  having all the 
different figures placed on the same level The alteration of level is from my point of view very 
important".
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Rubric 15, "La traversée de Bacon", initially identifies Bacon as a qualified/modified 
inheritor of an Egyptian haptic aesthetic but continues primarily to examine specifically 
Bacon's treatment of the traditions of colour from Van Gogh/Gauguin/Cezanne. This tradition 
locates its sensations in modulations of colour - colour not as a distinct opposition, but as 
a convoluted oscillation/graduation or analogical (as opposed to digital) variation. "C'est 
la couleur, ce sont les rapports de la couleur qui constituent un monde et un sens haptiques, 
en fonction du chaud et du froid, de l'expansion et de la contraction" (61 ). In the remaining 
segments of this rubic Deleuze produces a more comprehensive definition of the particular 
colourist strategy that Bacon develops. Firstly the colourist approach is distinguished from 
those in which the modulation of light is the dominant practice. "On appelle coloristes les 
peintres qui tendent à substituer aux rapports de valeur des rapports de tonalité, et a 
"rendre" non seulement la form e, mais l'ombre et la lumière, et le temps, par ces purs 
rapports de la couleur" (62).
Within colourism itself, however, there are several subdivisions that m ay be discerned. 
Firstly there is the Cezanne tradition: "La modulation par touches distinetes pures et 
suivant l’ordre au spectre, c'était l'invention proprement cezanienne pour atteindre au sens 
haptique de la couleur" (63). However, Deleuze extends this scheme defining another possible 
different colourist modulation that separates itself from the Cezanne option; in this case 
the division of flat background and foreground figure is contrasted in the respect by a vivid 
tone and saturation in the background that renders it not only a quality of "passage" from one 
colour to another, but a complete sense o f movement/transformation/modulation and in a 
secondary capacity, broken tones for the foreground form which construct another type of 
“passage" in which the colour appears to be animated. It is this post-Cezanne mode that is 
attributable to Bacon's practice.
Rubric 16 "Note sur la couleur" suggests that colour is the ultimate transformative force, 
the principle modulator in Bacon's artistic design. In previous sections, Deleuze identified 
the motivating elements o f Bacon's strategic technique of permutation as 
stnjcture/figure/contour. This analysis is now amended as Deleuze situates these elements
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as composite entities in a more extensive permutational/modulatory assemblage 
influenced/administered by the vibratory power o f colour: "tous les trois convergent vers 
la couleur dans la couleur." (64) In Bacon's paintings colour modulates the background 
surface and additionally operates its effects on the foreground figure - colour is clearly 
the generative nexus of Bacon's art. In the paintings of David Salle we travel across a 
changing space that is filled with reverberations, qualifying encounters, partial 
resolutions and restless confrontations Salle creates this climate by, like Bacon assigning 
a major role to colour: warm red/lurid orange/brilliant white and hesitant grisaille. Salle 
uses colours as significant, individuated genres in which the image is reflected.
Appropriating a term  from Alois Riegl, Deleuze treats Bacon's logic of sensation as "haptic", 
in order to demonstrate that it is correspondingly optical and manual, an art that surpasses 
the spiritual and m aterial.(65) Rubric 17 "L'Oeil et la main" states:
"Pour qua lifie r le rapport de l'oeil e t de la main, et les valeurs par les quelles ce rapport 
passe, il ne suffit certes pas de dire que l'oeil juge et que les mains opèrent. Le rapport de 
la main et d e  l'oeil est infiniment plus riche, et passe par des tensions dynamiques, des
reneversement logiques, des échanges et vicariances organiques....Enfin on parlera d'haptique
chaque fois qu'il n'y aura subordination étroite dans un sens ou dans rautre..... mais quand
la vue elle-m êm e découvrira en soi une fonction de touche qui lui est propre, et n'appartient 
qu'a elle, d is tincte  de sa fonction optique"
(Gilles Oeleuze) (66).
In Bacon's art-practice Deleuze identifies Bacon's individual technique for inserting the 
manual into the optical as being ascribed to a process of considered/relative injection, 
apparent in the sweep of the hand/the stroke/the smear that eventuates the disfiguration 
phase of the figure  and accesses analogically a series of alternative/precipitant 
representations. Thus the haptic, as Deleuze relates in the concluding lines of "Logique de 
la sensation", is the overcoming surpassing ("dépassement' - the French word introduced to 
translate the Hegelian "Aufhebung") of hand and eye into a superior logic - that of the haptic 
a singular logic not strictly of sensations but precisely of sensation, o f an in-itself.
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In his work on film-theory, Deleuze interprets the attention of Jean-Luc Godard to the 
cinematic-signifier as a "pedagogy of the image" (This filmic-analysis will be elaborated 
more extensively in the proceeding section).
Extending this analysis it is possible to  interpret the practice of David Salle in a 
concomitant style - the simplification of the image, or, conversely, the rendering complex 
of the image, affords an instruction in viewing things and their representations alike in new 
ways (67). Salle is, as Deleuze figures Bacon, almost a "scientist" o f the visual arts, an 
inventor/operator of a great picture-making machine - using the space of the picture for 
operative experiments - ("opératoire" occurs recurrently throughout "Logique de la 
sensation") - paintings become virtual laboratory experiments relating to the power and 
function of images Deleuze, in general, characterizes artists as workers (figures of 
production in the sense of "L'Anti-Oedipe") or as conceptualist/thinkers sim ilar to 
philosophers "Logique de la sensation" may be seen to initiate Deleuze's unique "pedagogy 
o f the image", constructing examples of a painterly practice that deforms/transforms the 
world to regain the intensity of perception and in order to enable us to achieve a 
new/innovative perspective.
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1 Gilles Deleuze - Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation 2 vols Paris: Edition de la diffie'rence
(1981).
2. David Salle - in "David Salle, An Interview with David Salle" by Peter Schjeldahl, New York: 
Vintage Contemporary Artists, Elizabeth Avedon - Editions (1987).
3. David Salle - ibid (1987).
W ith in  the context o f the history o f painting, the female nude has featured as an object 
surveyed/displayed for the privileged male gaze of spectator/owner (As a category of 
representation this category has emblamatized conventional projections of male desire) Women 
are not presented as essentially themselves but rather as objectifications of a presumed male 
subjectivity. This objectification was primarily justified by the elevation of the nude to the 
"high-art" status o f the classical academic tradition. Traditionally one of the exemplarly 
examples of artistic expression, the nude was integrated into mythological/biblical/historical 
themes that generated diverse/dramatic effects. The genre functioned to reconcile the conflict 
between propriety and sexual pleasure. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the genre began 
to  disintegrate. In terms o f a rtistic  convention, it was no longer incontrovertible that the 
presentation of the nude should appear within a thematic context The resultant consequence was 
realized by the progressive development of the nude depicted prominently in unidealized modes 
o f depiction. Given its principle status within the classical canon it was therefore inevitable 
that the nude would come to adopt a central role within the iconoclastic force of modernism - the 
nude that transgressed/inverted the erotic ideal, (e g  Edouard Manet"Olympia"(1863)/Pablo 
Picasso "Daemoiselles d’Avignon" (1907)/Willem de Kooning *Women 1" (1950/52)). M anef s 
"Olympia", frequently acknowledged as the first modem masterpiece, is a radical departure from 
previous approaches to the nude, and at the time was highly controversial.
No longer a submissive and seductive ephemeral offering, "Olympia" is self-confident and 
confrontational - fixing her eyes on the viewer in a matter-of-fact defiant directness. She 
appears to know, as a prostitute, her position as a perfect/complete commodity. (See: W alter 
Benjamin "Paris: Capital o f the Nineteenth Century Reflections", trans Edmund Jephcott, New 
York. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1978)).
"Olympia's" declaration o f independence and self-awareness is a metaphorical correlative o f 
modernism's formal position - its imperative tone and self-prodaimed autonomy. Modem painting 
asserted its autonomy/its "objectness" by emphasizing the process o f picture-making itself - 
its own internal "languages" o f colour/line/shape/surface. (This will be treated more 
extensively in proceeding sections). David Salle takes this modernist self-reflexivity a stage 
further. The process of representation is understood to include not only the disposition o f 
lines/colours/ shapes on a flat plane, but additionally the cultural/sociological forces that 
structure the interactions between the artistAhe viewer/the work. In contrast to the 
declarative mode of the modernist painting - "Look at m e!TI am a real object" - Salle's address 
is interrogative - "Are you looking at m e?7W hy?"W hat am I?" The ubiquitous female nude model 
constitutes the principle articulating agent o f Salle address.
Salle is not the only artist to bring into question the function of sexuality in contemporary art 
and culture. Kitaj/Dine/Rosenquist/Fischl/Clemente/Freud among others have also engaged with 
such issues, recognizing them as a motivating force in the re-assertion of "figurative 
painting". Using similar means, Rosenquist confronted analogous themes with "Playgirf" (1966), 
yet Salle goes beyond Rosenquisfs unequivocal equation of the woman's body with consumer and 
disposable production, his cross-referencing of high-art and "pornography", the imagery o f 
taste and desire, addresses m ore subtly the fabrication/reception o f works of art. These 
pictures concern female sexuality as well as male. Salle's images do not share the explicit 
voyeurism of, for example, Francesco Clemente's "Four W inds" (1981). They often imply the 
complicity of the woman, for exam ple 'The School Room" (1985), has been linked to the 
confrontational/hard-edged female eroticism found in the works of Kathy Acker, with whom Salle 
has worked (February 1984 - Salle designs sets for the Richard Forman directed/Kathy Acker 
written play "Birth of a Poet"). (In 1979 Salle re3d Juliet Mitchell's 'The Sadian W oman", a 
feminist interpretation of de Sade. Subsequently he adapted phrases from this as titles for 
paintings, such as "Rob Him o f Pleasure").
The force of Salle's nude-models does not lie in angst-ridden narratives neither is it generated 
principally by direct references to  past art or to pornographic type material His posed 
figures, tensed or twisted/offering o r constrained are derived from photographs staged by Salle 
himself; they m ay have a generic relationship to the historical nude or to the nude o f the 
pornographic magazine but they are distanced/removed - yet not rendered entirely neutral - by 
mediated decisions/the evidence o f artistic selection/arrangements
4 Gilles Deleuze - "Foucault" Paris: Minuit (1986).
5. Gilles Deleuze - "Dialogues" with Claire Parnet Paris: Flammarion (1977).
6 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
7. In "Logique de la sensation" an art historical argument emerges, but here, in contrast to the
works on cinema, the history never appears to be even partially totalized. It develops only in 
fragments and contrived digressions that slowty reveals glimpses of a narrative that is never 
entirely completed/articulated.
8 Henri Maldiney "Regard Parole Espace" Lausanne: Editions I’Age d'Homm e (1973).
9 Jean-François Lyotard "Discours Figure" Paris: Klincksieck (1971).
10. Erwin Straus "The Primary World of the Senses" (A Vindication of Sensory Experience) (trans Jacob
Needleman (1963). New York Free Press.
11 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
12. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981).
13. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981).
14 Peter Schjedahl - "Conversation with David Salle" Arts Journal 30 Sept Oct. (1981).
15 Peter Schjedahl - ibid. (1981).
16. David Salle - op.cit (1987)
17. David Salle - ibid. (1987).
18. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981).
19 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981).
20 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981)
21. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981).
22 Gilles D e le u ze -ib id  (1981).
23 Gilles D e le u ze -ib id  (1981).
24 Bacon's practice concentrating upon the transformative and the transforming of shapes appears, 
at this point of contact, precisely correspondent to a generalized Deleuzian interpretative
scheme
25 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
"La viande est cet état du corps où la chair et les os se confrontent 
localement, au lieu de se composer structuralement".
Deleuze euphonizes the important function in Bacon's compositional strategy of the vertebral 
column - it is not that it essentially provides the body with a solid/stable support structure 
but in contrast it operates virtually as a measure/marker against which the deviations of the 
flesh can be measured. Deleuze suggests that we may discern here some of the reaons for Bacon's 
fascination with scenes of the crucifixion - the sublime religiosity o f the crucifixion shows 
an attempt to counter the body upright towards the radiance of the heavens and altenatively all 
transcendental elevation is counteracted by the weight pulling the flesh downwards towards its
own animalistic base condition. As Deleuze states "..... la viande a une tête par laquelle elle
fuit et descend de la croix". Bacon uses the animal form in such a way that returns the observer 
to human form and renders therein a heightened understanding of it. 'Three Studies for a 
Crucifixion" (1962) "A Crucifixion" here and elsewhere in Bacon's oeuvre is not a descriptive 
title and less a reference to an actual event. It is, rather, a generic term for an environment 
in which bodily abuse is dispensed to one or more persons and one or more other persons gather to 
bear witness. "It m ay be unsatisfactory" Bacon said to David Sylvester in 1963, "but I haven't 
found another subject so far that has been as satisfactory for covering certain areas of human 
feeling and behaviour'' He also added on this occasion: "One of the things about the cruicfixion 
is the very fact that the central figure of Christ is raised into a very pronounced and isolated 
position, which gives it, from a formal point of view, greater possibilities from  having all the 
different figures placed on the same level. The alteration of level is from my point of view very 
important"
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26. David Sylvester - Interviews with Francis Bacon - Thames & Hudson London 1975.
In the interviews with David Sylvester, Bacon tends to fram e his statements dialectically, 
opposing will and intuition, chance and judgement, the organic and artificial, indeed all o f his 
strategies are enriched by a conscious play of psychological and philosophical metaphors 
addressing some of the most fertile paradoxes of modem thought. What seems essential is a 
friction between opposites, unless an issue has a fundamental contradictory basis then it has 
no vitality. W hat Bacon achieves through these unyielding contrasts is elliptical - His answer, 
perhaps the only answer - "nothing"
"I'm just trying to make images as accurately off my nervous system as I can. I don't even know 
what half o f them mean. I’m not saying anything. Whether one’s saying anything for other people,
I don't know'1. (Franas Bacon) See: Dawn Ades "Franas Bacon" London: Thames and Hudson (1985) 
with essays from Andrew Forge and Andrew Duncan (published on the occasion of exhb at The Tate 
G allery 1985). also see: Michel Leiris "Francis Bacon" London. Thames & Hudson (1988).
27. G illes Deleuze - op.cit (1981).
28. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981).
29. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981).
30. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981).
31. G illes Deleuze ibid (1981)
32. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981)
33. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981)
34. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981)
35. Gilles Deleuze - "Spinoza: Philosophic pratique" Pans: Minuit 1970.2nd expanded edition 1981.
36. G illes Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
37. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981)
38. Wilhelm Worringer "Abstraction and Empathy: A  contnbution to the Psychology of Style" trans 
M ichael Bullock, New York: International Universities Press (1963).
39. G illes Deleuze - op. cit (1981).
40. See: Erwin Panofsky "Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism" Latrobe P.A.: Archabbey Press
(1951).
41. G illes Deleuze - op. cit. (1981).
42 G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981).
43. G illes Deleuze - ibid (1981).
44 David Salle - in "Blasted Allegories" ed. Wallis B. New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art
(1987)
'The paintings have to be dead; that is, from life but not a part of it, in order to show how a painting can 
be said to have anything to do with life in the first place"
David Salle "Cover" May 1979.
45 Thomas Lawson in his widely quoted "Last Exit Painting" (Artfbrum 20 No.2 Oct 1981) acknowledges 
David Salle's elegance and high fashion, and the diptych format so characteristic o f his early 
eigh ties paintings, and notes that "meaning is intimated but tantalizingly withheld". It 
disappears as you approach it. He continues to suggest that Salle "makes paintings that are 
dead, inert representations o f the impossibility o f passion in a culture that has 
institu tionalized self-expression. They take the m ost compelling sign for personal 
authenticity that our culture can provide, and attempt to stop it, to reveal its falseness. The 
paintings look real, but they are fake. They operate by stealth, insinuating a crippling doubt 
into the faith that supports and binds our ideological institutions” .
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Rene Ricard also uses Salle’s remark m "Cover'* (May 1979) as a support for his argument that The 
paintings have to be dead, that is, from life but not a part of it, in order to show how a painting 
can be said to have anything to do with life in the first place."
46  Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981).
47. John Russell "Francis Bacon" Thames & Hudson: London (1989)
"As the decade went on, Baoon began to attach more and more mportance to the idea of the tnptych
-partly, perhaps because the gamble was on so much larger a scale, partly because it was possible 
in a triptych to give a compartmented view of life. Bacon lives his own life on many levels and 
takes care to keep them apart from one another; and in the tnptych's As in life, there are those 
who do (or are done to), there are those who look on, and there are those who pass by in the street 
below, or on the far side o f the open window".
See: (’Triptych - Studies from  the Human Body*' (1970), Triptych" (1971), Three  Studies of 
Figures on beds" (1972), T r ip ty c h " (1976))
48. Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1981)
49. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981)
50. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981)
51 David Salle - (1985) Quoted in Denis Alan Nawrocki "Approaching the Paintings of David Salle"
in Gallery Guide Exhib. Inst, o f Contemporary Art, University o f Pennsylvania.
52. P. Picasso "Head o f a W om an" (1909) Gouache New York, Acquavella Galeries.
53. R. Marsh "Chicken Ride" (1 9 4 0 ). W atercolour, New York, Mrs. Reginald Marsh. 
Reginald Marsh's work appears as impulsive/agitatedly swirlingly baroque - in some ways 
"journalistic". Salle's attraction to Marsh concerns the visual control on the part o f the artist 
in calling attention to how he felt about the subject matter without there being any apparent 
intrusion o f interpretive m orality into the context. There is a sense of life, vivacity and 
movement in Marsh's extrovert scenes of soldiers and sailors with their girls in train stations 
or on piers, or in the crowds jostling along the broadrwalk at Coney Island in the heat o f summer 
("Coney Island" (1936yPicnic at the Beach" (1939)). Marsh a splendid draughtsman loved crowds 
the profusion and chaos of street life. In one sense both Marsh and Salle represent "American 
entertainment" at its best, their works have a scale/ambition/impetuous/rhythm yet at the same 
time include a lightness/elegance and will to structuring.
54. It is possible to acknowledge that there exists a correspondence/connection of influence in 
material/thematics, Throughout David Salle's aesthetic, derived from E.J. Bellocq, the 
shadowy.photographic chronicler of New Orleans at the turn of the century with his now faded but 
remarkable photographs of the nameless women of Storyville, the red-light district o f the jazz 
age
In 1970 a selection o f ingeniously developed superb prints by photographer Lee Friedlander, 
recovered from original Betocq glass negatives, was published by the Museum of Modem Art in New 
York - the subsequent book became, deservedly, an instant classic. So much about Bellocq's 
photographs affirms current taste: the low-life material; the near mythic provenance 
(Storyville); the informal, anti-art look, which accords with the virtual anonymity o f the 
photographer and the real ananymity of his sitters.
Most o f Bellocq's photographs are individual portraits. That is, there is a single subject per 
picture - he photographs his subjects in full figure, though sometimes a seated figure will be 
cut off at the knees. Central to the impression the pictures effect is that there are a large 
number of them with the same setting/cast in a variety of poses, from the most natural to the most 
self conscious/and degress of dress/undress. That they are part of a series is what gives the 
photographs their integrity/depth/meanmg. Each individual picture is informed by the meaning 
that attaches it to the whole group
Notably, it could not be detected, from at least a third of his collection of pictures that the 
women are "inmates" of a brothel. Some are fully clothed, others are in their underwear, one 
poses in a chair, her hands dasped behind her head. Many are photographed naked - with an 
unpretentious candour about, mostly, unpretentious bodies. Some just stand there as if they were 
unsure how to a d  once they have removed their dothes for the camera, only a few offer a 
"voluptuous" pose - liked the long-tressed adolescent odalisque on a wicker divan, probably 
Belloq's best known picture Two pictures show women wearing masks In some pictures, in which 
the subjeds adopt a genteely pensive look, the emotion is hard to read. But in others there is 
little doubt that posing is a game, and fun - a woman in a shawl and vivid stripped stockings sits 
beside a bottle of "Raleigh Rye", appreciatively eyeing her raised glass. Clearly no one was 
being speid upon, everyone was a willing subjed.
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(See "Belloq Photographs from Storyvie, the Red-Light Distnct of New Orleans" Jonathan Cape
(1996))
55. Here we might locate David Salle's singular link to a certain type of high-art 
"pornographic/erotic" prose ('the Story of "0")/Bataille 's "Voyage of the Eye") in which scenes 
are repeatedly established and suspense is created primarily by means of heavily 
motrvated/descnptive ornamentation. Salle's paintings seduce the viewer into a panoramic but 
amorphous realm of memories/subjectivity/projection/aesthetic déjà vu.
56. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit. (1981).
57. Discussing the use of photographs Bacon said: "I think of myself as a kind of pulverizing machine 
into which everything I look at and feel is fed. I believe that I am different from the mixed- 
media jackdaws who use photographs etc. more or less literally or cut them up and rearrange them. 
The literalness of photographs so used - even if they are only fragments - will prevent the 
emergence of real images, because the literalness of the appearance has not been suffoentty 
digested and transformed. In my case the photographs became a sort ofoompost out of which images 
emerge from tme to time. Those images may be partly conditioned by the mood of the malenal whch 
has gone into the pulveriser* (Francis Bacon - Quoted in T rends Bacon" John Russell - London: 
Thames and Hudson).
In the first instance, Bacon does not so much use a photograph as attack it, questioning its 
status as a record of fact (Bacon was fasdnated by colour-photography, or more precisely, 
reproductions of colour-photography. Osdllating as he does in his paintings between calm 
neutral colour and dramatic/violent colour, he discovered in the heightened/falsified colour 
of photography a potent stimulus). The photograph, ready-made and not essentially subject to 
aesthetic convention, captures a moment in chance and accident Bacon used both the restricted 
and the non-aesthetic fact o f the photograph, and the "free-marks" he uses/makes by 
acddent/chance are derived from this and establish a "graph" within the painting. Additionally 
the photograph occasionally records a curious disjunction from reality, and this has provided 
Bacon with a key to unlock further possibilities.
58. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981).
59. See: Michel Leiris prefaces to exhb. cats. - Galerie Maeght, Paris (1966)/ Marlborough Fine Art, 
London (1967)/Kunstalle Dusseldorf (1971-2)/Galerie Claude Bernard, Paris (1977). 
also
Michael Leiris - "Francis Bacon, ou la vérité cviante": Paris (1974) and "Francis Bacon: face et 
profil" : Paris (1983).
60. This is the case in Bateson, whose sense that certain forms of communication, for example, that 
of the schizophrenic, do not follow the precise digital distinctions o f officialized languages.
61. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1981)
62. Gilles Deleuze - ibid. (1981).
63 Gilles D e leuze-ib id . (1981).
64. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981).
65. Alois Riegl "Die Spatrom ische Kunstindustrie Vienna: Staatdruckerie (1927)
66. Gilles Deleuze op.cit (1981)
67. See: Sandford Schwartz - "David Salle": The A rt W orld: 'The New Yorker" (April 30 
1984) and "Polka's Dots" or "A Generation Com es into Focus" (1986).
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TIME AND AGAIN (NEW DAMAGE)
In the conclusion to "Cinéma 2" Deleuze states; "A theory of the cinema is not "about" cinema, 
but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other 
concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no 
privilege over others, any more than one object has over others" (1 ). Deleuzian “film-theory” 
is not an enclosed system but projects obliquely the concepts that cinema has contributed to 
establish. It is not a question o f applying philosophical theory to cinema nor o f producing 
another theory o f the cinema but alternatively of thinking/working with this object, 
operating synchronically in and outside of this field. Deleuze's project is philosophically 
orientated Philosophy itself is not a reflection on an autonomous object, but a practice of 
the creation of concepts, a constructive pragmatism. It is the primary basis of this section 
to present a summary account of Deleuze’s work on film in order to subsequently, in 
proceeding sections, promote an analysis of its implications in relation to the art-practice 
of David Salle. Ultimately specifically via the incorporation/capture of Deleuzian 
operative mechanisms, focusing directly on the texts "Cinéma 2 L'image tem psVLe Pli: 
Liebniz et le BaroqueVQ u'est ce que la philosophie?", the fundamental intention is to 
ultimately produce an innovative account o f David Salle's oeuvre.
For Deleuze, the philosopher works in conjunction with the cinema producing a classification 
of its images/signs but re-configurating them in order to employ them in new areas. W hat 
makes the cinema o f special interest is that, as with painting, it generates new dimensions 
of conceptual construction. "Affect, percept and concept are three inseparable powers, going 
from art to philosophy and the reverse" (2). Cinema and philosophy converge in a continuous 
process of intercutting - philosophy as asssemblage, a type of induced becoming of thinking.
Positioning himself between philosophy and cinema, Deleuze constructs two parameters for the 
filmic image - movement and time, or more exactly time through movement - but only in order 
to read them through Bergson, while simultaneously re-reading Bergson co-presently. 
Deleuze's reflection on cinem a is an attempt to demonstrate that cinema corroborates
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Bergson's pluralistic vision and that it facilitates the intuition of "duree" according to 
spatial and temporal flows that are no longer static surfaces/immobile points. Despite 
Bergson's scepticism, Deleuzian cinem a allows the possibility of the ascent to the non- 
human/super-human moving image-duress. In a concomitant condition to that of the world, the 
cinema is Bergsonian because it reactivates the concept of duration, matter (image-moment) 
transforms into memory (image-time), and the present, never correspondent to itself, is 
twinned with the virtual image o f the past it will become. The cinema is time, the image is 
simply a movement - image; the cinematic present essentially does not exist initself. Deleuze 
articulates these basic formulations in the terms of a specifically philosophical design, 
he tracks the project beyond Bergson and purposefully in the direction of Nietzsche. Again, 
like the world, the cinema is Nietzschean because in both, the circular becoming o f time 
precipitates - as it does in modern cinem a - short-circuits/bifurcations/detours/irrational 
divisions w here the notion of intensity is substituted for that of the truth.
The modem cinema re-configures the concepts of modern philosophy in a new scheme. 
Specifically, fo r example, the cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement 
recapitulates a philosophical move which transpired over the course of several centuries. 
Deleuze highlights a variety of conclusions, emanating from this cinematic reversal. The 
analysis is initiated with the surpassing of the classical notion of the image which was 
defined in relation to the external world and self-aware subject. In contrast the modern 
world and the modem image exist in a condition of "incommensurability". Modem films are no 
longer subordinate to the world or the subject The modem image cannot be integrated into 
a totality, it is connected via "irrational cuts", between the non-aligned, a confrontation 
occurs between "outside" and inside". It is through this confrontational relation/inter- 
action that thought is engendered. Deleuze conceives modern cinema as investigating a 
thought external to itself. It is "thought" which remains central to the programme 
throughout The foundation/configuration of concepts is precipitated by an enigmatic "image 
of thought" which inspires its developments divergences and transformations, the necessity 
of perpetually creating new concepts, not as a process of external determinism, but as a 
process of a becoming which integrates and motivates the problems themselves. The production
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of concepts in the cinema is determined by a forceful "image" of thought which is 
intrinsically linked to our"present". Cinema does not operate only with connections by 
rational cuts, but via re-connections on "irrational cuts", this is not the same image of 
thought This image of thought perceived via re-connection by "irrational cuts" inspires 
Deleuze's constructive pluralism - the immanent creation and re-creation of a philosophy of 
immanence, a constructive pragmatism
Deleuzian “film-theory" utilizes the notion of an open totality, correspondingly transient 
and un-defined, in which the temporality in which we are located presents itself in its 
synchronistically contradictory condition - incessant flux and instantaneous disjunction. 
By "cinematically" fusing Nietzsche with Bergson, Deleuze animates a new connection in his 
own project That paradoxical time which may be discerned in the cinema of "modernity" - 
(incommensurable moments/undecidablememories/serializedinstants/crystallineamnesia-) 
returns to the "logique du sens", the logic of paradox Sense corroborates/vindicates itself 
only in the experience of nonsense, because it expresses itself only in a language that, while 
operating, simultaneously attem pts to recognise the sense of what it is characterizing.
Deleuze seems to apply this notion of the paradoxical constitution of sense in connection to 
another mode of expression - the image replaces the sign, and time is serialized upon the 
model of the “narrative” o f the "White Knight" (3).
Deleuze's concentration upon time and his illustration of the multiple forms of 
disassociation that time motivates projects a composite analysis, where the heterogeneity 
o f the cinema - the complexity of its signifying process produces a general theoretical 
investigation For Deleuze to operate with the cinematic means essentially a re-capitulation 
of the pre-linguistic, the adoption of a material which carries, without expressing it, that 
which a language has the ability to express ("sans I'enoncer I'enoncable d'une langue") prior 
to all process of signification. Additionally, however, in deciding to counter the plenitude 
of the image asignifying/asyntatic to every functioning o f a signifying nature, Deleuze 
traces-out a further option Principally aesthetic the Deleuzian scheme may only become
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analytic by relying on a semiotic model where all signs are formulated/conceptualized on the 
basis of the image in-itself. Deleuze employs a Peirceian design as opposed to a Metzian one, 
and this makes concessions to the attraction of sight which dominates the emanation of filmic 
signals (4), however correspondingly he has recourse to affirm the exigencies of 
classification, where the aim is not to question the multiple connections of the linguistic 
and visual, but alternatively to assemble/categorize/totalize under the sign of the image, 
even if it is an ambiguous one, the assemblage of film ic figures by inscribing there the 
assemblage of films. The combination of the Peirceian logic of extensive categorization and 
the Nietzschean logic of unlimited paradox is achieved only with difficulty, A  double 
expedient - categorization and displacement, inscribes Deleuzian thought in a contradictory 
condition which is represented by the division of his film-theory into two volumes (5).
Deleuze identifies a situation of "catholicity" in cinema, a type o f universality that 
accepts, arranges and reconciles everything inside an open-ended whole, the plane of 
consistency, therefore, which allows differences to resonate together without diminishing 
the defined nature of their boundaries, is being modelled in/on the cinema. In fact one may 
suggest that there is a conciliation, in cinema, that would enable a negotiated exchange 
between the image and the "real” Such a conciliation occurs in the realm of belief, rather 
than certainty, there is an adumbration o f redemption where the wholeness f ie  tout") o f the 
aesthetic would respond to the nothingness of the ethical.
Deleuze's film-work and the method by which it is conceived and presented testifies to 
Deleuze's preoccupation to break with the empire of the sign and with the exact correspondence 
of signifier and signified. Much more than in previous works Deleuze consciously employs the 
complete systems of analysis from other researchers, and despite his unfailing recognition 
of his debts, to mix and inter-connect them until they become fully inscribed within his own 
design o f thought, as if he aims this process of inscription to produce perspectives/ 
theories/notions, to negate their initial sense/origin and to circulate rhizomatically 
Manipulating fragments that already have an established meaning, Deleuze enacts the 
possibility to set them in motion, to make their meanings circulate, and ultimately to break
186
their initial meanings by inscribing them within his own thought system. The signifieds he 
utilizes transform into the signifiers of an other argument, which, without subverting the 
core of their basic composition, allocates them a new place/function because of the way he 
“opens up" cinema to philosophy.
In order to achieve a consolidation of his “film-theory" Deleuze locates his project in a 
"synthetic" image of cinema (“ l'image d'un cinéma synthétiseur"). A veritable "spiritual 
automation", connecting man and machine, harmonizing contradictory im pulses and 
materializing a fantasy world where disjunctions communicate and where fusion operates 
within a recognition o f fracture. (At this point it is necessary to recall the conclusions in 
"Logique du sens"). Beyond paradox the univocity of sense instantly emerges from a poetry 
individuated from figures, maintaining the trace of the prime resonant sonorities, primary 
and parallel to language. This deliquescent occurrence, when sense and being attain a 
correlativity, is related to the cinema as an art o f the figure, in that cinema re-animates 
the possibility o f making this occurrence/instant exist in a co-present state with the 
awareness of paradox. Via the constructed impossible taxonomy of cinema; it is the integer 
("intégrale") o f these fragments that emerges - a synthesis of occurrences/instants 
transformed into essences
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TIME AND AGAIN (NEW DAMAGE) 
NOTES
1. Gilles Deleuze - "C inem a 2, L'Image temps" Paris: Minuit (1985).
2. Gilles Deleuze - "S ignes et événements" - Magazine littéraire No. 257. Sept. 1988.
3. In "Logique du sens" (fifth series) in order to comment on the paradoxical nature of regression 
to Infinity, Deleuze refers to a discourse enacted between Alice and a Knight about the name of 
a song in 'Through the Looking Glass".
4 See 'Cinema 2, L’Image temps" - "Recapitulation of Images and Signs" - Deleuze explains his
choice 'Peirce's strength, when he invented semiotics, was to conceive of signs on the basis of 
images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which were already linguistic" 
(Gilles Deleuze) D e leuze uses a collection of Peirce's writings presented by Gérard Deledalle 
"Charles S. Peirce, Écrits sur le signe" Paris: Seuil (1978).
5. A consequent divergence (both aesthetic and historic) in cinema is observed around 1950 into an
"Organic cinema" (whose temporality remains dictated by the movement of actions and the linear 
development of narrative) and a "Crystalline cinema" (Where time is open directly to thought in 
the form of multiplication and serialization) (See "Cinéma 2, L'Image Temps" Chapter 6 "The 
powers o f the fa lse" on the opposition o f the two regimes).
The first volume proceeds by means o f categories leading to traditional divisions in the history 
o f cinema, while the  second proceeds by operations that negate the traditionally 
constructed/founded typologies. Deleuze relies predominantly on Peirce for his reading of 
classical cinema in "Cinéma 1" and then on Nietzsche for his discussions of modem cinema in 
"Cinéma 2". Deleuze allows/enables the two temporalities to co-exist, without accounting for 
the contradiction betw een them or coping with the aporias that the contradiction generates.
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“New York was an inexhaustib le space, a labyrinth o f endless 
steps, and no m atter how far he walked, no matter how w ell he 
cam e to know its neighbourhoods and streets, it always left him  
w ith the feeling o f being lost. Lost, not only in the city, but w ithin  
h im self as well. Each tim e he took a walk, he felt as though he 
w ere leaving h im self behind, and by giving him self up to the 
m ovem ent of the streets, by reducing him self to a seeing eye, he 
w as able to escape the obligation to think, and this, more than 
anything else, brought him a measure of peace, a salutary  
em ptiness w ithin”
Paul Auster - The New York Trilogy
THE FOUNTAINHEAD (VISION MACHINES)
"M y work is a confluence of fleeting things. It's about grasping a moment, a feeling, and making 
it manifest"
(David Salle)
The art o f David Salle is one o f eruptive forces, where disparity, dissonance and distance 
constitute significance His deliberate/contrived fragmentation and individuation of forms 
concentrates upon what an image is, how it is constructed and how it functions - on the process 
o f representation itself. In the paintings there is no fixed centre of meaning, only the 
discursive action of the painting.
Salle's use of the image is characteristic of the postmodern discourse, in that it reveals how 
versions of reality are formulated. He foregrounds both the constructions and their 
necessity, emphasising the contexts in which the images are produced and their inherent 
multiple possibilities of interpretation. He questions centralized/totalized/hierarchized 
closed systems. The predetermined heterogeneous discrepancies in Salle's work, the 
combination of utterly dis-sim ilar stylistic elements, reveal an attitude o f mistrust 
towards absolute truths Salle's concern is always with transformation, additional 
readings, and never mere appropriation. The contemporary condition reflected in the 
paintings is a situation dependant on randomness/contingency and multiplicity. Through his 
work Salle constantly recognises discontinuity and difference
The discourse forming the basis o f Salle's work, the way he questions the world, his stance 
towards ''reality", is never "e ith e r/o f but always "both/and" There is a consistant 
overlapping of philosophical/critical/pictorial narratives. What Salle so accutely 
questions are the assumptions o f how meaning is produced and how it is put together.
Salle's paintings deliberately resist conventional readings, and any attempt to  contrive a 
linear connection between the disparate elements inevitably proves impracticable There is
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an absence of a clear narrative or hierarchical arrangement. This lack o f standards, of a 
unified theory of value, is Salle's point of departure as he oscillates between value-laden 
and the valueless, between stylishness and stylessness. Salle understands representation, 
its insufficient/unsatisfactory meaning and its current status as the locus of the 
"real'V'reality effect" - it is in this situation that he must work, fully cognizant of his 
complicity with the prevailing conditions of contemporary culture and the 
necessity/possibility o f operating within it.
Salle acknowledges the promiscuity of images, utilizing m any types of 
representation/sources/styles. Images are not an order ot appearance, his paintings insist; 
they are their own reality. The heterogeneous array of images is rich and evocative, yet 
resolutely resistant to any satisfactory reconciliation. Replete with fam iliar and not-so- 
familiar images derived both from the everyday world and the world of art, the paintings seems 
to promise meaning, but as Salle asserts, no narrative or story-line is likely to be 
discovered. His work is about the traffic of imagery, about selection and making references. 
The constant assertion and denial o f every kind of priority - the chimerically erotic verses 
the flatly decorative, the figurative and the abstract, the opaque and the transparent - 
resulting in an enigmatic conditionality that negates all hierarchies and leaves us in a state 
of suspension. The viewer's eye fluctuates in a painting between would-be realism with 
exchangeable signs o f reality and an attempted constellation of (un)real fragments of 
pictorial worlds.
"L'art n’est pasle chaos mais un composition du chaos qui donne la vision ou sensation, si bien
qu'il constitue un chaosmos un chaos compose - non pas prevu ni préconçu. L'art transforme
la variabilité chaotique en variété chaoide.... "
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1)
From the ouset Salle does not attempt to blend the elements of the painting into a pseudo­
unity but instead lines them  up with all their disparity.The disparate elements come to form 
an “integrated unity" a concept of pictorial and compositional space with a history - the 
space of time. What enpowers the postmodern work of art is a prindpalled oscillation between
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presence and absence, between experience and its memory traces. Salle's phrasing of 
experience and his pushing things towards a limit is a dazzling exhibition of calculated 
tension and control - working in contradictory ways, but also with complete visual harmony. 
W hat this aims at is to construct a broken entity, a unity of non-unifiable phenomena, by 
means of a dramaturgy o f fascinating paradoxes he alternates between the representation of 
forms of presence between valuable and worthless objects, between "pornography" and vision, 
between absence and exaltation, between psychological desolation and mathematical poetry. 
(The silences and pseudocontradictions, sudden vulgarities and high-art quotations in 
Salle's work are related to the elisions and discontinuities of signification structures)
W hat we require to establish is the distinction between traditional ideas o f representation, 
which are dictated by the ideal of transparent meaning and the contemporary idea of original 
representation, which denies all forms of transparency and asserts multiple meanings that 
require a process of ongoing interpretation It is necessary to examine the implications of 
the move away from interpreting art works as originating from the individual subject to a 
conception that regards them as appropriations of pre-existing texts/elements/materials. 
W hereas Modernism conceives artists as expressing individual perspectives through their 
work, postmodern thought views artists as aiming to achieve "personal identity" via the play 
of textual interpretations.
Like Warhol and Rauschenberg, Salle in his paintings indicates his understanding of the role 
of images and signs within experience (2). Salle renders explicit priority to signs and texts 
making it dear that viewers must engage with the painting in a type of "cultural archaeology" 
to create their own interpretation.
Fragmentation appears to  be one of the most convincing representations of the way 
contemporary consciousness accumulates and understands experience Salle admits that a 
willingness to live adm ist uncertainty/ diversity/incongruity are signs of his 
individuality He is interested neither in assimilation nor appropriation but the necessity 
that derives from contingency - an art that insists on the significance of an integrated
191
continuous questioning. Salle does not negate nor confirm the duality but simply shows it for 
what it is, a paradox - in a presentation of extremes thatintersect. Through his a rt he 
proposes a new syntax, that includes the circulation of losses, parataxis and the 
introduction of a new meaning across a discontinuous hiatus. There is no amalgamated 
harmonious accord and the opposites are not resolved, exclusive images confront each other, 
images interact via/despite of their disparity In its entirety a David Salle painting can 
be called a non-synthesis, the result is a logic of non-enity - it is the logic of disjunction.
It was from the German artist Sigmar Polke that Salle learnt the technique of transparent 
painting: the painter paints subjects from totally different origins, one on top of the other. 
These layers yield disjunctive spatial formations in which the subject o f the painting itse lf 
clashes with the transparent surface, so that there is no unity whatsoever Polke had adapted 
this technique from Francis Picabia's work of the thirties, and Salle has obviously mastered 
it completely. Superimposed upon the human contours of his female nudes, often in provocative 
postures, Salle's heterogeneous paintings are both in an abstract vein and include 
naturalistic photo-painting techniques, with the occasional hint of the social realism that 
prevailed during the American Depression. Salle's representation of humanity is 
capricious/fleeting even destructive. Salle's juxtaposed images insinuate a metaphorical 
interpretation, as does the frequent diptych format, but in the end the metaphors fail to 
cohere Meaning appears on the surface, as soon as it is approached it vanishes, provoking 
the viewer into a more extensive realisation of the themes inculcated within the conventional 
representation that express them. The structure of these paintings are incoherent - a 
reflection of incoherent appearances in the contemporary world - ideas and mental images, 
once they have become visual, are considered to be just as "real" the phenomena which are 
physically tangible or can be experienced psychologically.(3)
Numerous devices have come to characterize Salle's work, the ecclectic mix of fact and 
illusion, o f multiple visual languages, irrational shifts in scale, the deadpan collisions 
of artifice and nature, the "Popart-like" inclusion of the tacky, artificial world, the  
billboard scale, crass commercial facture, and cinematic split-screen constructions, ve ils
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“Monday arrives on schedule. You sleep through the first ten hours. God 
only knows what happened to Sunday.
At the subway station you w ait fifteen minutes on the platform for a train. 
Finally a local, enervated by graffiti shuffles into the station. You get a 
seat and hoist a copy of the New York Post. The Post is the most shameful 
of your several addictions. You hate to support this kind of trash with 
your thirty cents, but you are a secret fan of K iller Bees, Hero Cops, Sex 
Friends, Lottery W inners, Teenage Terrorists, Liz Taylor, Tough Tots, 
Sicko Creeps, Living Nightm ares, Life on Other Planets, Spontaneous 
Human Combustion, Miracle D iets and Coma Babies. The Coma Baby is 
on page two: COMMA BABY SIS PLEADS: SAVE MY LITTLE BROTHER. 
There is a picture of a four-or-flve year old girl with a dazed expression. 
She is the living daughter o f a pregnant woman who, after an automobile 
accident has been lying in a com a for a week. The question that has 
confronted Post readers for d ays is whether or not the Coma Baby will 
ever see the light o f the delivery room”
Jay Mclnerney - Bright Lights, B ig City
and transparencies, the submission of space to a bombardment of images, the use of block 
prints or silhouettes that serve as highlights of "narrative" or points of emotional 
attention, the consistent attraction to images/textures/materials that seem removed by one 
or two degrees from any absolute reality, all the fragments belong to a world o f complete 
artifice, o f reproduction, o f frozen and incomplete "narrative" sequences - they are all 
consequences of a complex engagement with the nature of meaning and with the appropriateness 
o f submitting a visual culture to a charged visual questioning. (4) (5).
Each image within a painting engenders a series of associations with our visual perceptions 
and its innate history. Dislocated from its principle context (the screen/the magazine/the 
book/art history) an image is re-configured within a different context but one that still 
preserves some aspects of its content. (6). Comment is rendered on that content via the mode 
of depiction. It is characteristic of this process that the paintings combine numerous styles 
and periods, eliminating time and style fo r the purpose of establishing new co-efficients of 
association. The intermeshing of tim e and space, of different levels of "reality", of 
imagination and actuality is a general pre-condition o f Salle's pictorial method. Salle's 
paintings acknowledge that the consequence of thought about signification, with its 
rejection of primary origin and such founding principles of history and causuality and 
sufficient reason, has been to evacuate history from discourse - and with this evacuation the 
very idea of reference and representation has become/been rendered problematic. This 
recognition is apparent in Salle's use of images - which are not debased but are unanchored, 
yet their presence, instead of being weakened through a separation from context becomes 
increasingly more assertive.
The fundamental question of modem painting becomes a matter of how to paint the affirmation 
o f the "other" or "the outside" Deleuze identifies an "abstraction" in 
painting/writing/thought that is quite different from the self-purifying kind - that o f 
"abstract machines", that force art forms beyond and beside themselves, causing the basic 
structures of their languages, as thought possessed with the force of external entities, to 
start stuttering (7). Deleuze connects th is stuttering abstraction with an enigmatic an­
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organic vitality able to perceive in inert/terminal moments other/new ways of continuing. 
Consequently Deleuze suggests that the canvas is never empty For before the artist interacts 
with the canvas, there is the "avant-coup" of an extensive preparatory work which aims towards 
negating the ambient clichés - the canvas thus is approached as already a site of too m any 
givens/too many possibilities from which the painter must extract a singular space th a t 
releases the chance of an "après-coup" of unusual new "virtualities" unpredictable and 
unforeseen. This is why Deleuze terms the act o f painting "hysterical". To paint one m ust 
perceive the surface not as an empty blank, but in contrast as "intense", w here 
"intensity"implies filled with the invisible virtuality of alternative possibilities - one 
m ust become sensitive to the surface as "mixedTassembled" in a particular 
transformable/indeterminable vein, as opposed to merely "fia r. One can then identify 
abstraction as an invention of other spaces with original clusters of mixtures/assemblages
David Salle's play with veils or transparencies serves him as a means of both affirming and 
denying the presence of other images, just as his skilful manipulations of changes of scale 
and pictorial language produce conceptual tensions/modifications in tone, passages o f 
development, or sub-themes. The exploitation o f these effects leads to a definition not so  
much of a specific "meaning" as a condition that is ambiguously and perversely alive. For 
Salle the surface is a place where disparity assembles.
Deleuzian philosophy is founded upon the conception of thought as experimentation This 
practice does not take place "in" but is an experimentation " o f  the transcendental field 
which is constitutive of all experience - in effect it composes this field. To experiment is 
to investigate/to question, and painting conceived as thought is directed not only to access 
the transcendental field, to render tangible the forces that comprise molar existence, it 
is also to experiment with it - that is correspondingly to generate new affects
Deleuze articulates an analysis of art within the context o f an explication of Francis 
Bacon's painting and the production of a haptic space As stated in the previous section, 
Bacon's painting does not simply invert the figurative's tactile-optical space into abstract
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expressionism's non-figurative mantel space, neither does it subordinate the tactile-optical 
difference into the pure optical space of abstraction (where figuration is internalized) - 
it operates "figurally" within the figurative to produce a haptic space which is when, "sight 
itself discovers in itself a tactile function ("fonction de toucher") which is proper to it, 
and belongs only to it, distinct from its optical function" (Gilles Deleuze).(8)
In the concluding section of "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" Deleuze states that the 
passage from the hand to haptic eye "is the great moment in the act of painting", since "it is 
there that painting discovers at its base and in its own way the problem of a pure logic: to 
pass from the possibility o f fact to the fact". It is Bacon's painting which involves "the 
creation of original relations substituted for the form" - a site is produced for the inherent 
forces via the integration of disequilibrium in a deformation. This, however, is not a 
reintegration into a form but a new type of integrity - the rhythm of the Figure. The 
constitution of this new configuration of forces is determined by the contours different 
functions. This rhythm/tension of expansion/contraction functions across the contour which 
in this situation no longer delimits a form but becomes a per porous layer/intercurrent 
enabling a communication between w hat the colour models and the ground. Yet this different 
contour is itself an effect/function o f  the new constitutive operation of colour in modern 
painting. In the Deleuzian scheme colourism is essentially haptic - colour for Deleuze is 
intrinsically haptic, it is not abstracted to a code of primary colours and its power is not 
reduced by an external overcoding W hat Deleuze's analysis elaborates is that the modulation 
of colour itself in Bacon's work produces a shallow depth or proximity between two planes, 
which is principally the displacement o f a narrative function with the contour acting as the 
communicating factor between the two planes.
In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari formulate the structural mechanism that enables 
Deleuze to use the term "haptic" in "Logique de la sensation". This effectively involves the 
extraction of the term from its traditional usage in art history, where its properties were 
determ ined by the empirical study o f  a proposed original occurrence, so that it can be 
deployed trans-historically as an effect, a function of vision.
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Deieuze proposes that there are different types of abstraction and different kinds of 
figurability in painting, and these differences are the constitutive elements of its "logic" 
(negating the plain opposition of abstract to representational). It is this "logic of 
sensation" in painting which Deieuze attempts to clarify.
Usually pictorial space has been regarded as constructed from distinct simple elements or 
else held together by expressive wholes, or by figure/ ground "gestalten". Deleuze's logic 
however envisages another contingency prior to, or existing concurrently with these 
possibilities Deieuze thinks pictorial space can become "ungrounded" (effondé) and 
disparated in its composition, a force of indistinctions/in-between spaces/ "leakages" 
("fuites"). In this case, pictorial space attains an uncentred and formless condition, it 
discovers the workings of non-probabilistic chance in its composition: and it departs from 
the predominance of purely "optical" frontal vision to discover more "haptic" types of 
spatialization, which have multiple entrances and exits rather than simply a single 
perspective (9) Painting experiences the collapse of visual co-ordinates, as a condition 
of materializing other singular visual sensations. Such is the state of sensibility that 
allows the painter to perceive and register the latent unseen. Deieuze terms painting 
inherently "hysterical" in his examination of Francis Bacon.A “catastrophe" is depicted in 
the working together of an assemblage of a-signifying elements which Bacon calls the 
"diagram"
In "Mille Plateaux" Deieuze and Guattari ask directly the question, "What should be termed 
abstract in modem art?" In composing an answer Deieuze and Guattari trace the emergence and 
development of the abstract line - "a line of variable direction, that describes no contour 
and delimits no form" (10). This formulation requires that which is termed abstract to be 
itself re-thought along several lines concomitantly, to sense the larger change in the 
conceptual terrain, to re-think abstraction in Its logic. Firstly the simplistic 
oppositional model of figurative to abstract loses its centrality to be replaced by types of 
pictorial space and the kinds of figuration that this engenders Images/figures are not 
generated from a vacuum to co-ordinate with external examples, but come into being, as it were
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from a compositional space that always diverges from visual points, producing new sensations. 
Abstraction, is therefore not defined as an evacuation of the illusionist space of figures 
and narratives, it is, in contrast, a form of sensation of an-other more extensive abstract 
space which exists before and ultimately exceeds them. Secondly this in turn necessitates 
a reconfiguration of the perceived orientation of abstraction Thus the procedure is not to 
strip everything down in self-referenial abnegation, but to track the sensations of elements 
that come from the experience of the collapse of the visual- the "blindness" of painting - 
what one paints is always invisible abstract forces. Thirdly the "space" of abstraction is 
not essentially geometric; "The abstract line cannot be defined as geometrical and 
rectilinear". (11). Geometric form is superseded in favour of more tactile/dispersed/de- 
centred/unlimited forms of space. Deleuze and Guattari propose that we recognise the 
classical Athenian preoccupation with geometric/rectilinear form as only one possible scheme 
preceded, according to Riegel (12) by an Egyptian one and followed accordingly to Worringer 
(13) by a Gothic one - one may then conceive the classical space of perspectival distance in 
term s o f an optical/haptical distinction rather than in terms of form/content.
Additionally extending this analysis Deleuze and Guattari highlight an argument proposed 
by Leroi Gourham (14) that: "Primitive art begins with the abstract, and even the
prefigurative..........Art is abstract from the outset, and at its origin could not have been
otherwise" (15). In such a case Classical European illusionism is therefore only a later 
development in the abstract art continuum Deleuze and Guattari thus suggest that far from 
being the result of a stripping down of illusionist space abstraction exists as something 
prior to it.
The haptic is required to locate its definition following a process of derivation from a pair, 
the smooth and the striated, whose essence is determined by the division between them being 
produced in accord with the mode of spatialization where the haptic and optic exist in 
relative combinations, the smooth and straited operate in theory as abstract poles. This 
distinction can be characterized as the opposition of composition/immanence to 
orgamzation/transcendence.
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Smooth space is defined in "Mille Plateaux" as "filled by events or necessities, far more than 
formed and perceived things. It is a space o f affects, more than one of properties. It is 
haptic rather than optical perception" (16). 'The haptic function and dose vision presuppose 
the smooth, which has no background, plane or contour, but rather changes in direction and 
local linkages between parts" (17). Here Deleuze and Guattari recondle the haptic with the 
abstract line, 'The haptic-optical, near-distant distinction must be subordinated to the 
distinction between the abstract line and the organic line; they must find their principle 
in a general confrontation of spaces". (18). W hen Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Wilhelm 
W orringers notion of a "Kunstwollen" - (a w ill to art), as being a will to abstraction, they 
include the qualification that their "nomad art" extrads the non-organic/abstract line from 
Worringers geometric Egyptian based art. Therefore the immanent-affective abstract line 
is disassodated from the “transcendent - objective abstract/geometric line". Instead the 
originality of the Deleuzoguattarian aesthetic is located in the conception of life as non- 
organic force ("puissance") (19).This renders impradicable any redudive impulse o f their 
aesthetic-theory to a “pure* modernism. (20).
A  more indsive/spedfic definition of the haptic is produced by tracing the analysis through 
"Frands Bacon: Logique de la sensation" - the haptic emerges not as an exdusive property but 
a variable affed. The "great moment in the a d  of painting" says Deleuze (21), is precisely, 
not the passage to the haptic but the “ad ion” o f the passage itself to whatever affect the 
painting invents. It is the passage and the composition/formulated strudure of the passage 
which provides the criteria in process - not the haptic but the control/demarcation of the 
diagram.
One of David Salle's quintessential strategies involves the posing of visual questions 
through the display of the emblematic origins of the images. The accumulated images thus call 
attention to the multiplidty of their various/ecletic sources as they are re-formulated/re- 
defined according to the relevant prevailing context - the question o f postmodemism/the 
void/a breakdown. Salle's careful ennundation of myriadically derived imagery subverts 
initial/recognisable meaning, questioning recognition in the presence of
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the virtual experience offered by the painting A liberation of meaning is produced via the 
heterogeneous interaction of meaning against meaning.
A primary encounter with "meaning" occurs with the interaction between a text and a painting. 
In "Mille Plateaux" the Deleuzoguattarian conception of nomadic art, cited below, is 
analogous to and radiates throughtout the principle techniques of Salle's image orientation
'T h e re  exists a nomadic absolute, as a local integration moving from part to  part and 
constituting smooth space in an infinite succession of linkages and changes in direction. It is 
an absolute that is one with becoming itself, with process It is the absolute of passage, which 
in nomad art merges with its manifestation Here the absolute is local, precisely because place 
is not delimited"
(G illes Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (22).
Such Insight connects the relation of David Salle's paintings to the texts of Deleuze and
Guattari
"Nomad thoughf'/a nomadic conception of art is located within the edifice of an ordered 
inferiority, it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not attain an identity, it 
is a process of difference. It does not recognise the artificial division between the three 
domains of representation, subject/concept/being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a 
conductivity that knows no bounds. The concepts created do not simply reflect the eternal 
form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which 
their subject, to an extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. Rather than 
reflecting the world, they are immersed in a changing state of things. "W hat interests us are 
the circumstances" (Gilles Deleuze) (23) because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a 
set of circum stances at a volatile junction. It is a vector; the point o f application of a 
force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction, the concept has no 
subject or object other than itself It is an act It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements 
without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future re-arrangment. 
The modus operandi of the nomadic is affirmation, even when its apparent object is negative.
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Nomad space is "smooth" or open-ended It can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its
mode of distribution is the "nomos" an arrangement in an open space. Both volumes of
S _
"Capitaliafme et Schizophrenie" construct a smooth space of thought.
In relation to the nomadic connection to space, it is the journey that matters, points along 
the way being merely relay stations between successive stages. Nomadic life is essentially 
en route, distributing being across an open, indefinite space. Nomads are essentially 
deterritorialized - a special relationship to territory renders the nomad deterritorialized: 
it is a pure surface for mobile existence, without enclosures or fixed patterns of 
distribution. (24). Movement across it is open-ended/fluid, comprising alternately motion 
and rest This is the primary characteristic of the nomad, occupying and maintaining smooth 
space - it is under this aspect that one may determine the nomad.(25).
In the final plateau of "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari provide a detailed 
specification of the opposition between "smooth" and "striated" space via several examples.
In relatively formal terms, the difference can be expressed in terms of an inversion in the 
relationship between points and lines: straited space treats the line as something between 
two points, as in geometry Smooth space in contrast, gives priority to the line, points 
being simply relays between successive lines. Additionally, the lines themselves are 
different in each case. They are locally directional with open intervals in the case of 
smooth space, whereas in straited space they are subordinate to a global dimensionality and 
have closed intervals. Straited space closes a surface, divides it into determinate 
intervals constructing breaks, whereas a smooth space involves distribution across a 
surface, by frequency or along paths
However, it should not be perceived that the nomad is simply the product of such a space. The 
relationship between the two is active in both directions, a matter of assemblage, each 
working on the other. The nomad not only inhabits a smooth space, but develops and extends 
it: "The nomads inhabit these spaces; they remain in them, and they themselves make them
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grow, for it has been established that the nomads make the desert no less than they are made 
by it. They are vectors of deterritorialization" (26).
The practical significance of the enterprise lies in the criteria it provides for the 
evaluation of the process/processes that constitute a project, specific in each case It is 
a m atter of assessing a given situation, the nature of a given process. Smooth spaces are 
im portant as are lines of flight because it is here that the transformation occurs/is 
displaced/reconstructed/confronts new obstacles/invents/modifies etc.
....... the cinema perhaps has the great advantage, just because it lacks a centre of anchorage
and of horizon, the sections which it makes could not prevent it from going back up the path that 
natural perception comes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred 
perception, it could go back up towards the acentred state of things and get closer to it 
Broadly speaking, this would be the opposite o f what phenomenology put forward". (Gilles 
Deleuze) (27)
If we accept this Deleuzian proposition of the reversibility o f the trajectory, this might 
initiate a move away from a reductive notion of abstraction in painting - hence a painting 
that is contingent and conditional.This type of painting does not regard itself as 
definitive, but proposes an inexact combination of event and structure, o f change and the 
duration/execution and idea , consequently presenting a diagram of the possible. (28)
In contrast to the classical/orthodox notion o f the abstract in the philosophical tradition 
Deleuze produces the notion of an abstract logical space anterior to the divisions up/down, 
high/low moments within the Platonic tree (29), a space that includes a force/potentially 
which constantly submits its branches to unpredictable and convulsive variations. Deleuze 
effectively reverses Platonism to see Forms/Conditions/Totalities as associated/connected 
to an unlimited abstract space which precedes and evades them (a space that exceeds the 
highest genera and has components that are smaller/more mininal than the lowest species - in 
the term s of Duns Scotus this would be the indifference o f Being and the existence of 
"haecceities”) (30).
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In "Logique du sens" Deleuze characterizes variations as "series" composed of indistinct 
"singularities" a hybrid of impure mixtures that complicates and diverts from the pure 
lineages of a given. "Logique du sens" attempts to describe how the possibility o f such 
deviations and variations/ramifications forms an ineliminable anonymous layer/surface 
o f meaning, prior to sense/reference/articulation. In "Différence et Répétition" there is 
the attempt to define how when "difference" is removed from the position of making 
distinctions/opposition, within/among the rigid elements of the tree it emerges as a 
complex repetition, a complete and intricate scheme of time and movement that includes 
a non-probabilistic "nomadic" chance which no play of the categorical dice can ever 
negate
One may identify two types of abstraction in the Deleuzian programme, two notions of 
what it is to abstract and to be abstract. Firstly there is the Platonic type of abstract 
Form. It is the object o f the "critique of abstractions” , which Deleuze formulates when he 
describes himself as an empiricist, saying: "the abstract does not explain, but must itself 
be explained" (31). To explain "by" abstraction involves taking abstract Forms and 
examining the means/conditions via which they appear in the world or are derived from 
it. However to interpret the abstractions themselves is to re-contextualize them in a 
larger/smaller "pluralistic" world which includes "multiplicities" that are inherent to Form s 
and produce variation within them, changing their connections - in this vein one 
demonstrates that they are abstract in the manner by which they do not have the capacity 
of intricacy/involvement/movement - such is the "critique". Therefore one achieves an 
indicated condition in things prior to Forms which "does not go from one point to another, 
but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging" (32)
The Second type of Deleuzo-guattarian abstraction proposes another question: not the 
procedure via which Forms are derived/appear in things, but the circumstances under 
which something new/singular result from an external source. The "abstract
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machine"knows nothing of forms and substances, this is what makes them abstract, and 
also defines the concept of the machine in the strict sense. They surpass any kind of 
mechanics. They are opposed to the abstract in the ordinary sense Abstract machines 
consist o f "unformed matters and nonformal functions". Every abstract machine is a 
consolidated aggregate of matter/ functions ("phylum" and "diagram")" (33) the “And" 
which operates externally. To m ove from the first critical type o f the abstract to this 
second "affirmative" kind is to alter the basic notion o f the "abs-tractus" - the process of 
extrication/ moving away
The primary conception is to regard the "abs-tratus" as Form derived from Matter, 
actualized in terms of "possibilities" and their "realisations" (the transcendental/dialectical 
conditions of possibilities). A  straightforward notion views the world as logically 
congruent with possibilities rendered by abstractions, even if in fac t all the possibilities 
are not substantiated/initiated, or all the categories under which they come are not fully 
understood/manifested. However, in the situation where the world  is re-defined on the 
term s of dis-unification and incongruity, composed o f multiple divergent 
opportunities/contingencies, one can conceptualize the abstract via "virtualities" which 
in contrast to abstract "possibilities" are real even if not "actualized". One can begin to 
perceive the force/potential o f entities for which no synonymous abstract co-equivalent 
exists, since their "effectuation" would coincidentally d iverge in too many 
directions/senses (34). In fact "effectivity" appears to be deployed as the single criterion 
in Deleuze's conscious requirement to  locate a practice effectuating the diagram of the 
plane of immanence
Deleuze terms such viabilities "virtual" in a manner that is in opposition with the "possible" 
offered by Bergson in his critique o f abstraction(35). In this way the virtual can be said 
to be abstract in a different sense from  the possible Abstract m achines are said to be 
"Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet 
noneffectuated.. ." (36), comprising o f a kind of "real virtuality" in things. They integrate 
an abstraction of immanent force rather than transcendental form - the abstract
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"virtuality" latent in entities of alternative entities, o f other accessible worlds within the 
present world, other histories within our history. They are
"rhizomatic'Vserial/differential/intricate as opposed to  inclusive/simplifying/purifying, and 
elucidated by an abstract diagram not an abstract code.
From this analysis it is apparent that the two types of abstraction do not exist 
individuated/in isolation. They are in fact two concentric forces operating in a 
counteracting discord within any logical space. The reversal o f Platonism is a contingent 
in which one is placed in priority, and in what therefore the implication o f being prior to 
illustrates: (priority of immanent condition to that o f transcendental form). The 
transmigration from one type of abstraction to the o ther centres upon a change in seeing, 
one m ust become attuned to the prior immanent condition that exemplifies multiple 
external directions/levels, continuously bifurcating and deviating.
It is the second type of Deleuzian abstraction that is appropriate, and which I should like 
to concentrate upon in this discussion of contemporary postmodern art. At this point the 
analogy with cinema appears to be appropriate. In the paintings of David Salle concepts 
proliferate in and through the work, singular elements from past and present are re- 
assembled/mixed-up in a form of non-narrative continuity - a sort of "abstract machine". 
This, in turn is entirely consistent within a Deleuzian analysis of cinema. (From this point 
o f view  a certain caution may be required in the construction o f interdisciplinary 
analogies. It m ight be sufficient to state/recognise that the arguments of abstraction have 
been more extensively rehearsed in painting and that painting is a more comprehensively 
developed discursive practice, but a counterpoised reading may yet prove valuable.)
Deleuze states "the whole is outside and what counts is the "interstice" between images, 
between two images: a spacing which means that each image is plucked from  the void 
and falls back into it"(37). Deleuze sees the films o f Jean-Luc Godard as "abstract" not 
because they remove all "narrative" or "diegesis" and retreat to pure film ic self-reference, 
but because they take singular elements from all over, past and present, and re­
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assemble them mixing them up in the strange non-narrative continuity of a type of 
"abstract machine". The motivation is not the removal/absence of narrative but an 
attempt to attain an "outside" of other heterogeneous connections via a free and abstract 
"And" (38) (39) "Godard's strength is not just in using this mode of construction in all his 
work but in making it a method which cinema must ponder at the same time as it used 
it" (40).
Film  is not a "code" of which abstraction would be the self-reference; it is an "abstract 
m achine" that has movement and time as specific abstract "virtualities” which are then 
in turn "effectuated" in particular conditions. "Narrative" comprises only one limited 
possibility.. Therefore what Deieuze confers upon film Is most specific to it -  the forces 
o f its time/movement/lmages which are reciprocal with achieving innovative connections 
w ith other mediums.(41).
"Film ceases to be "images in a chain.....an uninterrupted chain of images each one the
slave of the next", and whose slave we are ("Ice et ailleurs"). It is the method of 
BETWEEN, "between two images", and which does away with all cinema of the One. It 
is the method of AND, "this and then that", which does away with all the cinema of Being- 
is" (Gilles Deieuze) (42).
As narrative in film depends on the abstract "virtualities" o f movement and time, so 
figuration/image in painting may be said to depend on how pictorial space is held together 
and com es apart - on the way it achieves an "order out of chaos". There are thus 
d ifferen t kinds of abstraction and different types of "figurability" in painting, and these 
differences are more important to its logic than the simple opposition between abstract 
and representational. It is the "logic of sensation" in painting that Deieuze attempts to 
articulate. (43).
The whole undergoes transition, because it ceases to be One-Being, in order to become 
the constitutive "and" o f things, the constitutive "between-two" of images. The whole 
transmutes with the force o f "dispersal o f the outside" or "the vertigo of spacing" (44), that 
void is the questioning of the image, therefore "false continuity" takes on a new meaning
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And you may ask yourself
What is that beautiful house?
And you may ask yourself 
Where does that highway lead to?
And you may ask yourself 
Am I right, Am I wrong?
And you may say to you rself  
My God what have I done!
Letting the days go by 
Let the water hold me down  
Letting the days go by 
Water flowing underground  
Into the blue again, after the m oney’s gone 
Once in a life time 
Water flowing underground......
Talking Heads - Once in a Lifetim e.
at the same time as it becomes a law. This analysis is synonymous with the question of 
abstraction in painting. In this medium we also perceive an abstraction o f the "And" 
rather than the is, o f the "outside" rather than of the absence of figuration and narration; 
and here too the problem is to see such abstraction as primary/foremost.
Extending this model we could examine the topographical complex spaces of David 
Sa lle 's paintings - spaces illustrated by promiscuous relations of transparency and 
opacity, which m ight function as examples to complicate/enrich the previously 
oppositional concepts o f literal and phenomenal transparencies. Negating the either/or 
Modernist dogma, these paintings are capable of holding multiple concepts in uncanny 
suspension, implying both baroque theatricality and cinematic illusions. The space of 
Salle's painting is not simple/homogeneous, there are rifts and inexplicable transitions, 
abrupt appearances and disappearances.
One o f Salle's common techniques is to produce a narrative block, making the 
com position go "blank" at the m oment when conventional composition would dictate 
some kind of resolution. His successive re-elaborations, like stories within stories that 
never fully end or are resolved, are reminiscent of the compulsive/inexhaustible 
space/tim e ambiguities elaborated by writers such as Kafka or Lewis Carroll.
The appearances/disappearances in Salle's paintings could perhaps be more accurately 
described using the language of film. David Salle makes use of numerous cinematic 
devices - the zoom/panning/close-up/splicing/montage etc. Individual paintings may 
d isp lay several overlapped images, as though one were seeing one image through 
another. Such a technique suggests the range and ubiquity of images encountered in 
the contemporary condition. The sources of the subject-matter are familiar or obscure, 
as wide-ranging as the images themselves - cartoons/Old Master paintings/modern 
sculpturefpornography'Vgeometric o r biomorphic shapes - Salle combines these 
eclectic annexations in arrangements that are frequently startling and unsettling The 
metaphor o f the "screen" may be suggested as a powerfully evocative image with which
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w e may conceptualize David Salle's paintings. It effectively defines the ground onto 
which Salle projects layers of images. It is not a mirror which would carry resonances of 
”narrative"/history, but literally a "screen" which registers deep-focus and new 
perspectival effects.(45).
The  painting "Rob Him of Pleasure" (1979) is an example of one of the first occasions 
where Salle uses images which are overlaid - an elemental strategy in virtually all o f his 
subsequent paintings. Salle's aesthetics of superimposition and transparency 
substantially extended the expressive range available to him. The picture plane, in this 
instance is re-enforced metaphorically in the manner o f a sheet of glass, behind which 
deep space extends into abrupt/unexpected vistas. On this hypothetical glass layer, line 
drawings inscribe figures and incidents in another order of depiction. To lateral 
contiguities, often extended across a diptych/triptych format, this add another theme of 
discourse. These two co-ordinates, along the surface and internal from it, produce a 
space that requires an immensely sophisticated treatment. In addition this technique 
engenders the possibility of multiple readings - the images release narrative strands of 
period/style/source in a variety of sequences. Ultimately narrative is encouraged but 
forestalled, the possibility is indicated but not sustained. It is this double movement 
concurrently towards a resolution and then away from it that mobilizes the image into the 
kind of temporal zone more usually found in film.
Salle introduces doubt into the function of systems of everyday visual communication. 
There is no defined centre of meaning only the discursive action of the painting. Images 
collide and short-circuit in Salle's work The way things look in the world is dependent 
upon speed/position/memories and therefore maybe by constructing a scene from 
independent elements a more realisticTintimate" state can be attained.
W e observe multiple enigmatic pseudo-historical references all appearing in the present - 
Abraham  Lincoln's post-classical profile/primitive sculpture/Goya/Reginald Marsh/ 
G iacometti/Seventeenth century landscapes/ Eighteenth century cartoons/Watteau
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figures,/1950's style furniture. However Salle does not select images unconsciously or 
indiscriminately. He selects/re-combines and composes images methodically for 
presentation There is a rigid intelligent structural framework, sophisticated and pre­
ordained, constructed to support the images directing their intersections and increasing 
their penetration Certain forms of imagery consistently appear - vernacular objects and 
generic images - (Eames chairs/ targets/light bulbs/shoes/sentimental objects 
reminiscent of a self-conscious clichéd idea of history). Images/objects are included as 
perceptual triggers - musical instruments/table cutlery/socially marginal characters/ 
(clowns/jesters/fools)/and of course there is the one category that recurs most 
prominently as a paradigm of representation, the ceaseless depiction of female models.
Salle's images frequently seem to be directed away from  the viewer For example the 
nude models often present their backs to the audience. The picture plane, to which Salle 
places an extraordinary formal and metaphorical valence, can facilitate a refraction 
attention. This method may be termed "tangential/detatched content", a content that 
m ight be “revealed” if the work were less sensitive to the contradictions inherent in 
painting and the world it so problematically represents. The emotional tone of the 
paintings range from intricate self-consciousness to lyrical vulnerability, from nervous 
cynicism to a swirling, permeating sense of loss.(46). Regret/hope/pessimism indicate 
the possibility of experience rather than experience itself; the paintings aspire to a 
closure/completion but are unwilling to reconcile the necessary illusions for this to be 
achieved In Salle's work one is consistently aware o f his seeing through systems and 
conventions of expression.
In Salle's work distance is principally achieved by severing the image from its referent 
through such cinematic devices as the splice/jump-cuts/dissolve/zoom/split frame/soft 
focus. The diptych format predominates throughout the oeuvre, corresponding to the 
splice, dislocations in scale and subject to the jum p-cut and lap dissolve, the multiple 
overlays and "expressionist" washes correspond to the montage technique. These 
techniques, for Salle, are mechanisms designed to rupture naturalism and separate
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images from their referents As Deleuze states in relation to Godard, ” ..... the interaction
of two images engenders or traces a frontier which belongs to neither one nor the other" 
(47). In Godard's films the montage adopts a new function, determining relations in the 
direct time-image, and reconciling the cut-up with the sequence shot.
“ Unexpectedly I Missed Cousin Jasper" (1980) Is one of the first diptychs to appear In 
Salle's work. In the centre a woman smoking a cigarette is outlined in red, her eyes 
meditatively unfocused, her face divided by the two sections of the diptych, (a woman 
smiling is a classic image of reflection -virtually a cultural icon). Smoke here is analogous 
with introspection/contemplation. In this case the smoke works to represent a group of 
other images which signifies a past more immediate to the image of the outlined woman 
than her present. The temporal subtleties of the work start to resonate. The diptych 
format is essential to the cut-up/jump cut “narrative”, psychologically/temporally/formally. 
On the left panel two women rendered in blue - the same woman in different temporal 
zones and poses - listens to a telephone and reacts. The body language is astutely 
described and the drawing technique perfectly captures the implicit content. (48). On the 
right panel, the blue ground seems to indicate a later chronological moment in which the 
woman, probably the same one, plays a violin. Both action and reaction, described in 
blue, underline the present, with the face outlined in red - the temporal zones of memory 
and present co-relate. Other images subsequently divert our attention The dogs, mute 
witnesses to the "drama" echo the double memory, alert on the left, patient on the right. 
The two grisaille women, running in deep space continue the discordant flow of 
"narratives". The woman on the left moves forward in a gesture of anticipation, the 
wom an on the right seems to be directed away in an action of evasion The poses, 
although similar, are taken at different angles, this re-enforces the division o f the canvas 
emphasizing it within our attention. However, consistent to Salle's complete strategic 
programm e the interpretative narrative breaks down. Although this painting is one of 
Salle's most accessible works, the "narrative" continues inviting assumptions that begin 
to negate the primary reading, obtruding on the first scenario on many ambiguous levels, 
spatially and temporally. Alternative scenarios emerge and thus the work reconditions
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“In th is  area near 34th Street there were far too many people, shops filled  
w ith  tawdry m erchandise, hawkers of Ethiopian incense, illic it wrist- 
watches, and flim sy bangles o f  pressed gold tin. There were days w hen - 
perhaps due to the atmosphere, or lack of sunspots - traffic seemed to flow  
sm oothly on the streets, people sm iled and apologized, but today w as not 
one o f  them. The bees were w ingless, marched with heads drooping 
elbow s poised to jab. The w orkers here meted out an existence under 
flourescent lights, long windowless hours, in rubber gloves and face masks 
behind whirring whippets o f equipment, as dental hygienists and sewing- 
m achine operators, and cashiers ringing up to ilet paper and hair spray.” 
Tama Janowitz - The Male Cross-Dresser Support Group
“In this area near 34th Street there w ere far too many people, shops filled  
w ith tawdry m erchandise, hawkers o f Ethiopian incense, illic it  wrist- 
watches, and flim sy bangles o f pressed gold tin. There were days when - 
perhaps due to the atmosphere, or lack of sunspots - traffic seemed to flow  
sm oothly on the streets, people sm iled and apologized, but today was not 
one o f  them. The bees were w ingless, marched with heads drooping 
elbow s poised to jab. The workers here meted out an existence under 
flourescent lights, long windowless hours, in rubber gloves and face masks 
behind whirring whippets o f equipment, as dental hygienists and sewing- 
machine operators, and cashiers ringing up toilet paper and hair spray.” 
Tama Janowitz - The M ale Cross-Dresser Support Group
itself for numerous readings. W e move from image to image across a real or Implied 
space that is filled with "something" whether paint/fabric/canvas Such spatial journeys 
are the medium of a "narrative" subtext, in which the temporal delays and spatial 
disjunctions are brought into the orbit of various meanings and semi-meanings. In Salle's 
paintings there is continually this pulsation of images that expand only to fall part.
Similarly "We'll Shake the Bag" (1980) is another diptych composition that involves a 
number of Salle's basic characteristic techniques. Though composed of two separate 
panels, it depicts one continuous scene of a couple lying aw ake in bed. Each smokes 
a cigarette, isolated/lost in his/her own thoughts. Superimposed on their figures is 
another scene (taken from an Olive Fife photograph - "Hallowe'en Contest') outlined in 
orange, of boys in Halloween masks biting at apples suspended from a string. This 
scene of childhood pleasure and its attendant nostalgia contrasts with the cool, detached 
expression of the couple. Their alienation from one another is heightened by the clashing 
blue and red hues o f the two panels.
Salle's simple outline drawings or line sketches, which allow one figure to be seen 
underneath another, suggests not only the multiplicity of im ages but also the tentative 
and ephemeral nature o f vision/perceptions of the world. Additionally the 
naturalistically/defined/modeled figures recede in space (as in traditional/illusionistlc 
painting) and contrast formally with the images rendered in a flat, outlined drawing style.
One senses clearly that any given painting w ith in Salle's work is 
conceptualized/plotted/assessed, as it progresses, and continually modified as it nears 
completion. His paintings are replete with images and devices that speak of 
disconnection Salle's foremost signature device (after the nudes) is the layering and 
juxtaposition of images, employed in incompatible modes o f representation, Salle 
overtly - and with a certain degree of sardonic humour - challenges the viewer to read the 
images represented as occupants of the same world. In the resulting clash, and our 
acceptance/non-acceptance of it lies his largest subject area
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In "Brother Animal" (1983) a diptych like "Unexpectedly I Missed Cousin Jasper, the 
imagery is again complex and dense. The left hand panel is dominated by a bifurcated 
organ, perhaps a heart or a fruit, may be a pomegranate The bilateral symmetry o f this 
shape is rhymed at the right by the rounded contours o f a pair o f legless Eames chairs 
attached to a deep blue panel on which a man seated on a bed and a standing woman, 
dressing or undressing, are shown in a hotel room. The exterior o f the hotel appears at 
the right drawn in pink superimposed over the woman's figure. Another older couple are 
located within a white "triangular-like cone" shape towards the bottom left. Amputated 
chairs, a split organic substance, and a couple's personal drama suggest themselves as 
the active constructive elements of this work
"B.A.M.F.V" (1983) has been described as "epically sardonic” ; on the right below an 
impasted "punctuation" of paint, is a blue-toned off-white surface on which an ethereal 
figurative motif - the motions of a matador's exercises with his cape, based on a 
fabric/wallpaper series - has been sketchily rendered The rhythm/continuity o f this right 
panel is disrupted by a dark grisaille insert - the painting o f a characteristically wistful but 
pensively contemplative nude. The left-panel consists o f a broader/larger acrid field of 
a yellow/green satin colour, to which a combine element has been attached, (constructed 
of cement and chicken wire). Additionally there is a loose/sketchy layer of underdrawing, 
a widely-gauged motif o f hastily executed partial nudes in acrobatic positions. Also in the 
upper left section, Salle positions a pink-and-white painting-within-a-painting of a 
toothbrush However, it is the other more prominent figures that command attention. On 
a background gash o f white paint, Salle depicts a pair o f garishly costumed party-goers, 
and most notably located above this couple is the cartoon-image of a depraved-looking 
duck, painted as if in Technicolor - an absinthe drinker in the context o f a Disney feature.
"King Kong" (1983) could be read as a concurring aesthetic experience and about the 
nature of aesthetic satisfaction. The letters of “King Kong” create a characteristic 
chiaroscuro effect, the blue figure establishes a shallow depth and an optical tension with 
the lettering. The addition of the light and the table is totally effective as it echoes and
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concentrates the dominant colours, and in the boldly aggressive way it produces a friction 
in the relationship between the lettering and the naked light- bulb. It can also be taken 
as an exaggerated bodily metaphor, a twisting away from any form o f simple affirmation
"Tennyson" (1983) is clearly related to the above painting. In this instance Salle's 
"quoting system" refers to Jasper Johns - the title of one of his works, the heavy 
pigmented brush-strokes, and the wooden/plaster replica ear from one of his targets. A 
nude figure resides on a sandy beach with the name of the Victorian poet forcefully 
presented in a central position. It is once again a question of aesthetic balance, of 
elements locating their place, an echoing of tones, a locking in of horizontal and vertical 
readings, a slight but effective framing, and a play between surface and a plunging 
diagonal perspective. Salle always maintains a momentum balanced on the edge of 
transition.
David Salle's work has consistently exhibited "postmodern" characteristics, for example, 
quotational practice. More precisely however, in relation to the above paintings one can 
discern the wish to develop/articulate the area between painting and sculpture, and yet 
these works still consequently maintain a defined relationship/a close affiliation to 
modernist aesthetics via a positive commitment to the heritage of Picasso and the 
American Abstract Expressionists.
The question that is positioned here in relation to the work both of David Salle and Jasper 
Johns, concerns the extent to which the canvases they present may be automatically 
identified as paintings or as sculptures.
"I'm interested in things which suggest things which are, rather than in judgements. The 
most conventional things, the most ordinary thing - it seems to me that those things can 
be dealt with without having to judge them; they seem to one to exist as clear facts, not 
involving aesthetic hierarchy" (Jasper Johns) (49)
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"I think one works and makes what one makes and then one looks at it and sees what one
sees. A n d  I think that the picture isn’t pre-formed - 1 think it is formed as it is m ade........ "
(Jasper Johns) (50).
In Johns' work primarily the division painting/sculpture is addressed. Jasper Johns, 
"White Target" (1957) is a work to be looked at rather than into. Johns appears to take 
the background out of the painting and isolate the thing. Johns' flag works ("Flag") (1954- 
1955)) owe their quality as physical objects to three factors - the co-existence o f the 
image with the field, the representation of a solid object and the physical presence o f the 
paint crust that transforms the painting into a low relief. John's radical discovery was 
that, presented in conjunction, these three aspects add up to a slab. (51). In a 1965
interview Johns said that what interested him w a s"..... the particular object encountered
at any m om ent.....the one object which is being examined is what is important". (52).
This statement would seem to promote objectivity and the specific over the general, not 
objecthood, it refers to restraint/withdrawal/straightforward emotionality and to the use 
o f the object as an image in art.
W ith the construction of works such as these, with Johns and Salle, there emerges an 
extension into space, a re-construction of the traditional picture space, that while it may 
be conceived in term s of the sculptural is not sculptural. That is they function within the 
defined parameters of sculpture while correspondingly maintaining a distance from it. 
The space that their works investigate is not the internal representation of the painted 
space, but o f space as an integral component of the paintings construction, and therefore 
o f paintings relation to sculpture - an investigation that operates within the question of the 
eminence o f painting as painting In effect the implication is that the work operates/exists 
in a location at once between painting and sculpture, similarly reliant upon but never fully 
integrated within the conditions applicable to either The work presents the superficial 
appearance o f a painting but the development of space means that it remains somewhat 
distanced from that definition and consequently forms the possibility o f a relation to 
sculpture.
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Painting becomes the pre-condition for a questioning from within painting of painting, in 
opposition to Greenbergian Modernism and subsequently of the relation to the sculptural 
and with that to the external nature of space. Essentially what this duplicity indicates is 
the effective presence of an irreducible origin. (53).
The exploration o f paintings relationship to sculpture promotes a questioning of the unity 
of the work. A  consequent recognition of the impossibility o f a founding purity This 
derives from the internal function of the painting itself, and towards the crucial moment 
in the painting, in which the painting within its practice/activity, being a painting explores 
as an essential part o f its construction its relation to sculpture.
The implications o f this analysis serves to illuminate the internal fragility o f the Modernist 
programme, causing Modernism to be re-worked/re-opened to other interpretative 
possibilities, that is another autonomy. W hat is apparent is the presentation of a painting 
that resists the limited determinations of autonomy and therefore of an initial purity.
The identification o f the presence of a symmetry of unsolved elements in the paintings 
of David Salle, forces a constant questioning of painting from within, allowing for a space 
o f interpretation/an affirmed irreducibility to be unfolded. (The painting is always 
incomplete, in the process of becoming "a painting'Van art-work" - a transient ontology - 
facilitating the capacity for a contrived/continual re-interpretation and re-positioning of 
painting itself beyond the determinations of tradition).
Salle's paintings send out conflicting signals, compounding the problem of reading them 
accurately. They register an ambivalence between accepting a belief and subsequently 
distancing oneself from it, between emotional attachment and emotional involvement, 
between wanting to break with a tradition and wanting to remain connected to it. Salle's 
radically irreverent treatment o f images, his sophisticated disruption of "narrative" is 
principally a method of emphasising painting as a "means towards" rather than an end­
point - the work becomes a situation replete with suggestive potentialities, rather than a
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determined and final self-contained whole. His work registers the re-conceptualization 
o f the paintings compositional space.
These practices, detailed above, negotiate some form of compromise with the implicit 
historical dilemma of what it means to work in the area of painting today, in the conditions 
"after Modernism”. With the demise of the exclusivist Modernist criteria, which following 
Clement Greenberg, seemed to mandate an ever narrower field of investigation for the 
visual arts, the present is characterized by a formal diversity in art. The orderly divisions 
of the Modernist epoch have been replaced/supplanted by a fragmented and shifting way 
o f ordering the world. The basic presuppositions/boundaries of the judgem ent o f the 
aesthetic of Modernism have been rendered problematic to the extent that the enduring 
validity of this aesthetic as an historically specific manifestation of the aesthetic theory of 
Modernity, and moreover the essential notion of the idea "aesthetics" itself as an 
independent/autonomous sphere, appear inherently unstable. (54).
The contemporary postmodern situation projects a scenario that is structurally and 
prodigiously complex The volume and vivid quality of information and data proliferates 
to such an extent that the existing/familiar categories/classifications of experience rapidly 
immaterialize into overlapping/shifting complexities. "Reality" potentially becomes 
"immaterialized" into labyrinthine systems of intensive complexity.
It is primarily in opposition to Clement Greenberg's conception of Modernism that the 
theories of the postmodern have originated/evolved within the visual arts. The basis of 
the issues in debate focus on Greenberg's insistence on the traditional specificity of the 
aesthetic object, his instruction to artist to develop a work from the immanent formal 
properties of the medium, and the subsequent self-enclosed/self-referenial autonomous 
quality of the "high-Modernist" work itself.
A belief in the autonomy of the conditions of production of art has worked to establish a 
certain limit o f inquiry within the modernist definition of art-historical theory The concept
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of autonomy variously utilized in the Modernist tradition appears to operate as to produce 
consistent sets o f hermeneutic circles: sets of reciprocal restrictions which effectively 
draw into a single scheme of thought/sensibility what should be accounted for/accredited 
and what is relevant in interpretation/explanation. (55). In Greenberg's account the 
question of autonomy is essentially a question of the extent to which a work o f  art is 
"purified” of any degree o f aesthetic content extraneous to the basic formal properties of 
its particular physical medium, (Greenberg conceives the autonomy of the art work solely 
at the level of its meaning). Greenberg's conception of autonomy is concentrated around 
the notion of specifically/definite aesthetic "values" - a "pure" expression of the irreducible 
elements o f experience via the reduction o f the "meaning" of the work to the fundamental 
formal constituents o f its physical medium. Autonomy becomes intricately linked, within 
Greenberg’s analysis, to that of self-referentiality - (For example: with the question of 
abstraction, Greenberg advocates that it is an essential formal component o f autonomy, 
the mechanism via which the medium may be purified of any excess aesthetic content). 
Modernism defines/locates its interest within containable and in terms of, verifiable 
limited criteria.
In "Towards a Newer Laocoon" (1940) (56) Greenberg presents a defence of abstract 
punsm/abstract/non-objective painting which rejects literature as a model for the plastic 
arts and therefore subsequently eschews overt subject matter The basic premise was 
to simultaneously establish the quality of a certain abstract art and legitimate abstraction 
as the culmination o f an inexorable historical linear progression
"Guiding themselves, whether consciously o r unconsciously by a notion of purity derived 
from the exam ple o f music, the avant-garde arts have in the last fifty years achieved a 
purity and a radical delineation o f their fie lds of activity for which there is no previous
example in the history of culture......Purity in art consists in the acceptance, willing
acceptance of the limitations of the medium o f the specific art".
"...... the purely plastic or abstract qualities of the work of art are the only ones that count".
(Clement G reenberg) (1940) (57).
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In "Modernist Painting (1961) (58) Greenberg states
each art would be rendered "pure", and in its "purity" find the guarantee o f its standards 
of quality as well as of its independence".
W hat Greenberg is principally concerned to promote is an art that stands out 
from/against its general context o f production, that is Greenberg's notion that kitsch is 
apparent/prevalent in contemporary society. For Greenberg the value of Modernist art 
is the "capacityTambition" to remain "self-critical" "Modernism" therefore is not only a 
practice/set of practices, but a principled/coherent enterprise or project o f self-criticism - 
a self-criticism, Greenberg believes, operating in a variety o f methods that are 
unique/irreducible (painting being the practice specific to Greenberg's own concerns). 
Greenberg traces the evolution o f this tendency in what he terms "W estern Civilization" 
to Kant and the Enlightenment, proposing that the Kantian critique of logic - which 
attempts to establish the defined nature of limits/the extent of logical reasoning - is the 
model/framework of all authentic Modernist projects - to establish/maintain the intrinsic 
capacities/closure of particular practices (59).
Greenberg's avowed Kantianism withstanding there would appear to also be a definite 
Hegelian dimension to his historiographic presuppositions. (60). He conceives o f the 
complete history of Western Art from  the Renaissance onwards in terms of a strictly 
defined formal evaluation/development.
"The path ef which Cézanne said he was a primitive, and by which he hoped to rescue 
Western tradition's pledge to the three-dimensional led straight, within five or six years 
of his death, to a kind of painting as flat as any the W est had seen since the Middle Ages.
The Cubism of Picasso, Braque and Leger completed what Cézanne had begun"
(Clement Greenberg) (61).
This statement evidently constitutes the basis of Greenberg’s claim that Modernism 
should be identified with the "self-critical tendency" initiated by Kant. It also suggests that
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Greenberg constructs the framework of a highly generalized theory o f linear artistic 
progression. Greenbergian Modernism is not only a definition of the development of a 
style of painting, but a proposition that a specified consciousness of art history dictates 
the form of the art o f the contemporary
The significance of artistic continuity constitutes the central component o f  Greenberg's 
1955 essay "American Type Painting" (62.) It essentially argued that Am erican post-war 
artists had absorbed and subsequently surpassed earlier European work. Read in 
conjunction the two essays "Modernist Painting" and "American Type Painting" can be 
viewed as a theoretical validation of more specific judgements regarding particular artists 
and their continuities with previous art/artists
Greenberg's dictum in the later essay is that "visual art should confine itse lf exclusively 
to that which is given in visual experience and make no reference to anything given in 
other orders o f experience". By "visual experience" Greenberg m eans" Modernist formal 
judgement". This specialization may be read as a reduction of both interests/values that 
Greenberg codifies in "Modernist Painting" as the self-critical process o f Modernist 
painting-practice. It is a process that Greenberg argues is based on the cumulative 
"narrowing" or concentration of artists on the unique constituents of their chosen medium, 
which is, in painting, the two-dimensional surface and the space of the canvas together 
with its enclosing frame. This is what he means by the phrase "the ineluctable flatness 
of the support".
In contrast Deleuze by-passes conceptions of "aesthetic purity" and alternatively locates 
in the "folds" of Neo-Platonic "complicado" the source of abstraction. Here Deleuze 
identifies something that cannot possibly conform to the purity of Forms and to  the types 
of abstraction that pertain to them. Deleuze offers another "minor" tradition of abstract 
"complication" - in Prout's signs/Leibniz's "minimalist" monads/Spinoza's treatment of 
divine names where it is linked to "the problem of expression" - which inform s his own 
view of abstraction. Deleuze's rendering of the "space" of abstraction is not based on the
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absence of figure/image/narrative. Rather than absence and negation, abstraction is 
concerned with the affirm ation of the "outside". Thus "Modernity" does not concentrate 
upon a simplistic purification of the means o f representation, turning within to proclaim 
an enclosed autonomy, but by contrast, it is about untimely forces which prefigure other 
new "outside" possibilities, and so introduce a certain "heteronomy" in mediums. For 
Deleuze the basic question becomes how to think/paint/write such "other'T'outside" 
forces.
The question of abstraction in painting according to  Deleuze, is an abstraction of the 
"AND" rather than of the  "IS", of "the outside" rather than the deposition of figuration and 
narration, and of the problem  to regard such abstraction as first. As with Metz in film - 
theory, the contrast is drawn against Clement Greenberg's attempt to see in abstraction 
an apotheosis of autonom y and "opticality".
Following Lessing's classical division of the arts C lem ent Greenberg argued, in effect, 
that abstraction in each artform, for which abstract painting takes the lead and indicates 
the way, would achieve an absolute separation w here each would remain in place, and 
appeared principally to one sense organ. Painting would be freed from "theatricality" and 
concentrate on what w as purely "optical". Greenberg's design attempts to combine all the 
arts and senses together in a totality. Essentially the  problem with formalism revolves 
around the failure to  distinguish between classical representation and figuration. 
Formalism deploys the  term "optical" against the  imaginary tactile markers of 
representative space w h ils t the Deleuzian term "manual" is deployed against both the 
pure optical space of abstraction and the relative subordination o f hand to eye (tactile to 
optic) in classical representation. For if abstraction breaks with classical representation 
it remains figurative, "s ince its line still delimited a contour" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari) (63). Thus for Deleuze the violence of this new  abstract art is primarily ocular, 
collapsing optical organization and debasing the optical horizon to  a tactile ground. The 
new painting selects/abstracts from the constraints o f painting and isolates the "abstract
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line" in its operation, where its autonomy/non-subordination to form operates a 
"decomposition” of matter.
Deleuze is concerned to subvert this formalist project. In the Deleuzian programme the 
provision is articulated for things to be inseparably connected while remaining singular 
and non-totalized, and so remain undisturbed by paradoxical objects which fall in- 
between the supposed parameters o f specific mediums, mixing them up in new 
configurations, thus sanctioning a more Nietzschean trajectory.
The impetus informing the Deleuzian view  of abstraction becomes clear if we consider 
that the programme o f his philosophy, one where aesthetics clearly cannot fill a derivative 
role, is Nietzsche's "reversal o f Platonism", which he describes as follows:
"G ive me a body then- that's the form ula of the philosophical reversal. The body is no 
longer the obstacle which separates thought from itself, that which must overcome in order 
to think. On the contrary the body is that in which thought plunges or ought to plunge, in
order to arrive at the unthought-like, that is .......No longer will life be subpoenaed (faire
comparaître) before the categories o f thought - thought will be flung into the categories of 
life"
(Gilles Deleuze) (64)
Rather than setting out from abstract concepts to which the world must confirm thought 
m ust actively extract from the world Such a procedure aims "to find the conditions under 
w hich something new is produced ("creativeness")" (Gilles Deleuze) (65). Both a 
philosophical approach which takes the world as the concretion of the abstract and an 
a rtis tic  practice which merely validates that claim by giving form to the abstract is an 
anathema to Deleuze - painting cannot have a merely epithetic existence. Thus just as 
he acknowledges Hegel's and Kant's reversals of Platonism but describes them only as 
"abstract" (Logique du sens), so he recognizes the radicality o f the break with classical 
representation performed by pure abstraction, but seeks a painting that breaks with the 
figurative in a "more direct and sensuous (sensible) way" (66).
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The concept of "abstract" which Deleuze brings to the discussion of Modern A rt is 
developed along with Guattari, through the notion of "abstract machines". Is is the "And" 
which moves outside, which allows for a world that is disunified/incongruous/composed 
of multiple divergent paths, in which one can think in terms of abstract "virtualities" that 
are quite real even thought they may not be "actualized"." (67).
Deleuze finds an abstraction concerned with discovering/developing within things the 
fragile intricate "abstract' virtualities of other things inherent in materials, it supposes the 
subsistence of connections which exceed the messages of the medium, and ourselves 
as senders and receivers of them. Thus the "abstract' use of the medium is not when
it itself becomes the message, but when it starts to stutter "and....and..... and" prio r to
message and transmission.
If the language system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium. If the system bifurcates 
and involves terms each one of which traverses a zone o f continuous variation, language 
itself will begin to vibrate and to stutter Artists sensitive to this method, "invent a "m inor 
use" for the major language within which they express themselves completely: they 
"minorize" language, as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations 
in a state o f perpetual disequilibrium. They are big by virtue of minorization; they cause 
language to flee, they make it run along a witch's course, they place it endlessly in a state 
of disequilibrium, they cause it to bifurcate and to vary in each one of its terms, according 
to a ceaseless modulation" (Gilles Deleuze) (68).
Each state o f a variable is a position on a "crest line" which bifurcates and extends itself 
in other lines It is a syntactic line, whereby syntax is constituted by means o f 
curves/links/bends/deviations of this dynamic line as it passes by positions with a double 
perspective on disjunctions and on connections. It is no longer the formal or superficial 
syntax that presides over the equilibrium o f language, but a syntax in the process o f 
becoming, a veritable creation of a syntax that produces a "foreign language" w ithin 
language and a grammar of disequilibrium. And, "just as the new language is not
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external to the system, the asyntactic limit is not external to language either; it is "the
outside" of language, not outside of it.... to cause language to stutter, and at the same
time bring language to its limit, to its outside" (Gilles Deleuze) (69).
In David Salle's painting "His Brain" (1984) the diptych format is again utilized, although 
on this occasion it is an asymmetric one. The images on the larger right-hand panel are 
four layers deep. The basic image features the drawing of a naked woman who forces 
her behind towards the viewer. Superimposed upon her body are silhouette portraits of 
Abraham Lincoln and Monet's studio boat, (from v/hich he made many of his most 
famous Impressionist riverscapes during the 1870's), like the model's rear they also 
appear to be moving towards the spectator. The third layer is a sketch o f a woman in a 
contemplative/reflective pose. The left narrow panel is covered with a garish pattern of 
vibrant biomorphic shapes partially interrupted by a long, black bar-like split.
The central idiomorphic essence of David Salle's work manifests itself in the extreme 
diversities of adopted subjects/methods/techniques -"anti-composition". The array of 
images/figures/objects within a Salle painting may be rendered in very different and 
contradictory styles. Paradoxically, it is this combination of divergent styles that makes 
a Salle painting distinctive and immediately recognizable. A single work may display a 
stylistic diversity ranging from commercial illustrations to Old Master paintings and exhibit 
both thick and thin, abstract and descriptive passage o f paint.
Salle's technique can be integrated within a Nietzschean scheme, whose critique of the 
assumptions o f Modernity establishes the foundations for developments within 
postmodern thought. Nietzsche defined the essential transition that is integral to 
postmodern thought when he attacked the distinction that characterizes discussions of 
truth and reality - the distinction between appearance and reality. (Without this division, 
the notion of accurate/defined representational images would never have formed the 
basis of Classical-age thought). Classical-age thinkers attempted to validate 
representations directly by reconciling appearances against a prior/stable reality. In
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contrast Nietzsche states:
'T o  divide the world into a "real" and an "apparent" world.....is only a suggestion o f
decadence - a symptom o f declining life .....That the artist places a higher value on
appearance than on reality constitutes no objection to this proposition For "appearance" 
here signifies reality once more, only selected, strengthened, corrected"
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (70)
Nietzsche views the artist's willingness to lim it him/her-self to fragments of the real as a 
positive sign of engagement with life. Additionally, it reflects a genuinely historical point 
o f view, since reality may only manifest itse lf via available perspectives/categories. 
Nietzsche also suggests that far from rendering the artists productions useless for 
interpreting reality, the concrete grounding o f their work in appearances has the effect o f 
presenting "reality once more". The temporal encounter with reality through art, although 
comprising no guarantee as to Its representative character, nevertheless may provide 
appropriate perspectives that make It less likely that we will take some form of abstractive 
network as transparently real.
This issue is vital for understanding postmodern forms of representation, since they 
contrast with the rejection of representational practices exercised by modernists, who 
suggested the capacity of penetrating the veil between appearance and reality by turning 
inwards - however when we substitute the image o f historical humanity for the reflection 
of nature by the rational mind such an inwardly directed move proves less than credible. 
Alternatively we should adopt existing images to formulate an interpretation This implies 
that Nietzsche's elimination o f the "appearance - reality" distinction might foreshadow our 
febrile creation of the postmodern condition, producing/reproducing things and 
formulating and reformulating images, without purpose/grounding beyond the productive 
activity itself
Deleuze's analysis formulates this notion exactly W e have had to confront the loss o f the
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distinction between iconic copy and simulacrum. Therefore in recognising David Salle's 
resistance to the equivalency valuation that images receive, it is not in order to reject the 
simulacrum problem. In contrast Salle's attitude, expressed through his own simulation 
practices, is that we can call upon resources/material from any place/location, yet not 
randomly/indifferently - the ir original role may well have a part to  play. This means that 
Salle can make use of a variety of attitudes/perspectives to confront the limitations o f our 
own methods of thinking.
Salle's frequently bizarre conjunction o f images, such as the positioning of the brashly 
painted Santa Claus over a sunbathing woman in "Wild Locusts Ride" (1985) excludes 
deep involvement in any single image. The vulgar and synthetic joviality of the Santa 
negates the relaxed summ er drift of the figure resting in the sun. The dominating fact of 
the Santa appearing on the surface articulates, through the unlikely medium o f kitsch 
vulgarity incarnate, that the  picture plane is the paintings ultimate reality. Clashing 
violently against it we are cajoled into acknowledging the Active nature of the woman on 
the porch. The dialectic between the painted and the replicated, between the grisaille 
and the colourful banality, between social privilege and cheap disposable image is all 
counterpoised by the panel on the right. On this section the clamour and rush of a 
political meeting are gridded in and out o f a fabric that simultaneously conceals and adds 
to its impact.
Any degree o f seductive impact registered in a Salle painting is ultimately rendered 
artificial - all seductiveness is fake, for Salle, a sign of unfulfilled promise (as the rope­
skipping nudes reveal in "Muscular Paper" (1985)).
Object-relational interplay is problematized in Salle's work; it is the source of the inner 
discontinuity o f his "narrative" line, which is composed of multiple divergences and is thus 
all the more engaging There is an acerbic bitter quality about Salle's sensibility which 
gives his art an undeniable force.
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Salle fabricates a system of references made of sex and design - a system that destroys 
itself only to be replaced immediately by another pictorial effect. It is indeed a central 
compositional strategy of David Salle's to interlock visual construction and destruction 
processes. An enchanting art o f disenchantment
"Fooling With Your Hair' 1 (1985) has been described as "a kind of personal essay or 
manifesto, the artists heart laid bare, that reads like a mathematical equation" (71). Many 
of the foremost aspects of Salle's aesthetic are contained in concentrated form in one 
work. On one hand we have the gaudy quality and design o f the 1950's in the upper 
section of the painting and on the right Salle nonchalantly plays with quotations from the 
European tradition in the form o f two Giacometti sculptures and on the left with the vague 
paraphrase of a Watteau drawing, ("The Shoeshine Boy"). In W atteau’s original the boy 
is shown as an amiable, if evidently dim-witted urchin, adapted by Salle as an alter-ego, 
he is conferred with a sexual elegance, the haunted shrewdity of a young Pierrot. The 
character's abstruse quality is exemplified and revealed by two equated pairs of images - 
a pair o f intensely biomorphic 50's - Italian style light fixtures and two Giacometti 
sculptures, the first a noble bust and the second a "tragic-faced", full-breasted nude. The 
co-presence of the hyper-artificial lamps with the Giacometti pieces engender a 
sententious atmosphere of subdued eroticism expressed through visual forms. The 
strikingly "pure" lurid colours o f the upper panel contrast distinctively with the three 
sections forming the lower panel, in variously tinted shades of grisaille Also in the lower 
section a Salle model described with "manneristic" artificiality exercises a sequence of 
three contorted poses.
Both sections of this painting present objurgated simulated formulations , whether in the 
quotations of the upper part or the unnatural poses of the model in the lower part. 
Everything is phrased hollow and false, empty/vacant ciphers devoid of life - a 
denvative/imitative "reality" that has superseded "real" life. A muted sensuality, a 
delicately toned play of light moves horizontally across the whole surface of the painting, 
time is thus introduced as Salle paces the "reading" and directs attentions. We follow the
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rhythms o f the contorted grey/negative figure, engaged in "sub-sadomasochistic-like 
games". W e focus on the central metal chair that forces itself off o f the surface. The 
tonal values of the upper external panels direct us back down to the lower frieze, but the 
rhythm is alternated with the first of the 50's style lamps providing the colour chord for the 
series of separate panels that" flash" off from it in harsh/quick/angular idioms. It is the 
rhythmical structure rather than the significance o f the images that creates the overall 
disposition. The chair is the central/ crucial feature, the "focal point" from which the 
organization of the pictures composition departs and is subsequently arranged, it 
prohibits a reading that would seek to distinguish o f the two sections as separate since 
it seems as close to the surface o f the work as the images on the top line.
"The School Room" (1985) serves as an exemplification of the main tenets current 
throughout Salle's work. One of Valenciennes's sketches is re-worked into the 
composition (72), its measured Neo-Classical spacing intact but its subtle greys and tans 
crudely rendered in lurid yellows and oranges The right-hand panel is devoted to a 
"close-up shot" of a foot rammed between a female model's buttocks, as she lifts her 
skirt to permit it. On the left panel the image of a prone nude in gauzy grisaille and 
dream-like/"surreal" background colour, (echoing an earlier phase of Salle's work when 
the nudes often seemed tinged with melancholy), is overlayed by the head of a negro( 
derived from a Géricault portrait (73)) who looks dispassionately away. This is a 
disturbing image. Salle, as usual, stops immediate reality short, so that it becomes 
frustratingly remote. The close-up confrontation w ith the model's nude bottom painted 
in grisaille, like Ingress's later variants upon his "Grande Odalisque" immediately cools 
and desexes it somewhat, and this defusing continues via more elaborate devices.
'The point about the poses in my work is that they are the  body in extremes - often seen 
from strange points o f view and spatial organization. It has more to do with the abstract 
choreography and angles o f vision than with pornographic narrative. They are not 
voyeuristic in the sense that Eric (Fischl)'s depictions of intimate family scenes are 
voyeuristic, because they're not candid - i.e., they're specifically posed in order to be seen 
that way"
(David Salle) (74)
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“ M idnight. I ’m sitting in a booth at N e ll’ s with Craig M cDermott and Alex 
Taylor - who has just passed out - and three models from Elite: Libby, Daisy and 
Caron. Its nearing Summer, m id-M ay, but the club is air-conditioned and cool, 
the music from  the light jazz band drifts through the half-empty room, ceiling 
fans are whirring, a crowd twenty d eep  waits outside in the rain, a surging mass. 
L ibby  is blonde and waring b lack  grosgrain high-heeled shoes with 
exaggeratedly pointed toes and red satin bows by Tves Saint Laurent. Daisy is 
blonder and wearing black satin tapered-toed pumps set ofT by splattered-silver 
sheer black stockings by Betsey Johnson. Caron is platinum blonde and 
wearing stack-heeled leather boots w ith a pointed patent-leather tow and wool 
tw eed  turned-over ca lf by Karl Lan gerfie ld  for Chanel. A ll three o f them  have
on skimpy black wool-knit dresses by  G iorgio di Sant ‘Angelo..... Last night I
had dreams that were lit like pornography and in them I fucked girls m ade of 
cardboard. The “ Patty Winters Show”  this morning was about Aerobic Exercise. 
Bret Easton Ellis - American Psycho
Such a painting brings into play a manifold complex of associations. However, the 
atmosphere of erotic tension conjured up is reminiscent of one of Degas' rehearsal room 
interiors - erotic tension generated by distanced control. (Degas urbanity, detached mood 
o f observation, close tonal values, incipient montage and troupe I'oeil effects and 
decisively the chilly eroticism o f his ballet themes suggest their likelihood as models for 
Salle). Salle's eroticism has more to do with work/design/effectiveness than with either 
pain or pleasure.
Salle's paintings can appear "brutal", violent and broken, more and more unreserved in 
their confrontations with the spectator. The images coalesce because they occur through 
some tangential need, (through a series of original- formal structural methods 
techniques/strategies. Salle creates a situation where images seem visually and 
emotionally to require each other) some rhymical instance that corresponds to the 
constantly qualified/qualifying currents that underlie the flows o f emotion and atmosphere
Salle's nude female bodies are frequently blandly modelled monochrome images 
saturated with a translucent field of colour recalling the haunted quality of faded back- 
and-white photographs.(75). In Salle's paintings the objects and images that frequently 
are most prominent are the “ cultural icons" - the Santa head in "Wild Locusts Ride" 
(1985) or the mutant Donald Duck in "B.A.M.F.V." (1983) or inanimate objects whether 
painted, the numerous full-colour vases, or appended in actuality to the paintings surface, 
furniture in particular. The nude models in contrast, seem ultimately untouchable, their 
apparent availability contradicted - or at least given levels of complexity by their visual 
remove.
Grounded in the tradition o f the New York School, Salle insists upon the possibility or 
necessity of an "absolute specificity". He explicitly views his art as a further extension of, 
for example, Frank Stella's formalism, but using and adapted to contemporary conditions. 
Salle considers aspects of formalism in the interpretation o f the significance of an art 
work not as a compendium o f items rendering a meaning, but more precisely the
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appreciation of the totality of the images within a complete painting for what they are He 
has stepped "outside" Modernist aesthetics into a negation o f it, and yet preserved 
something of its aesthetic values - stretching the limits of the aesthetic - this further 
critical dimension is not a nihilistic negation o f Modernism, but rather a challenge to the 
legitimate discourse of high art and the previous borderlines established for painting. It 
does not matter what a particular panting stands for but what in fact it is. For Salle, 
formalism is the consequence of the inter-changeable nature of images that have lost 
the ir initial significance. It is an attempt to create forms that would deflect from the 
im m anence of the prevailing technical pictorial environment - media/advertising - that 
dominates the contemporary experience.
Salle's chosen images - the girl with her legs spread apart, the Giacometti sculpture, the 
Negro portrait, the Picasso-type heads - are all applied in a highly calculated manner. 
The images function as remote/detached "factors". By reducing the aesthetic impact of 
single images and signs, he reworks the original images so that they become more or 
less "abstract" elements o f pictorial material, which he then organizes/arranges in the 
complete picture These devalued but simultaneously highly charged images serve as 
the constructive elements of a "new non-objective painting".Salle's scepticism towards 
established truths leads to a method of unmeditated artificiality. The only clear/defined 
thing about the paintings is the technical execution, the conceptual lucidity and the artistic 
gesture. The heterogeneous array of images is multiple and evocative yet intractably 
resistant to any satisfactory reconciliation.
"Coral Made" (1985) consists of two large sections, clearly divided in form as well as in 
content. The left panel painted in hues of green/grey/black, depicts a mysterious group 
of figures derived from a staged photograph by Renee Magritte. They stand in curious 
relationship to one another - the man on the left engaging in some form of disputation, 
the woman in the centre pointing at him accusingly, and the woman in the foreground 
turning away defensively and fearfully In front o f the group appears a target in the 
manner of Frank Stella. On the right panel an irregular, abstract stain/form overlays three
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of the screen prints of photos of an elegant nude. Supplementing this section we see a 
sketch in a stylish spiky "expressionist" vein and a pasted on/inserted antique picture of 
a dog in the mode of Edwin Landseer. The interrelationship between the elements is 
barely discernable Salle's sceptical attitude towards established truths leads to a 
method of unmeditated artificiality The only clear/precise thing about these paintings is 
the technical execution, the conceptual lucidity and the artistic gesture. The 
heterogeneous array of images is rich and evocative, yet stubbornly resistant to any 
satisfactory reconciliation.
"The Cold Child" (For George Trow) (1985) includes a frontal view o f a woman arching 
her back (inspired to some extent by a 1949 Picabia Acrobat), so that her open legs form 
an inviting entry-point. The figure is softly modeled as a three-dimensional form. Painted 
over the model in outline is a thin sketchy drawing of café diners, (a scene based on a 
photograph of Picasso and other artists hunched over drinks at a café table) Standing 
over the diners, a waiter holds aloft a tray of drinks arranged so that it directly 
collides/coincides with the model's vagina. (One interpretation of the image is clear - the 
woman is being served on a platter - but however at the same time the implied oral 
gratification, whatever its degree of mutuality, will never be achieved because the dual 
mise-en-scene allows only a coincidental, purely optical, intersection o f worlds.)
On the left hand panel o f the diptych is a greyish field of upholstery fabric with metallic 
glints Against this tactile but disfigured field are numerous painted biomorphic shapes, 
either chalky/liverish/green in colour. From the centre o f this dull ground an actual but 
legless fiberglass chair juts forward.
"Muscular Paper" (1985) is a majestic triptych. On the left is a Picasso sculpture of a 
woman (taken from a Brassaori photograph) which appears like a malformed bone, laid 
over this is a naked woman outlined in red. Eight blue pegs look into and out of this dark 
section. In the central panel two naked women skip on a rope, covering their behinds are 
two painted heads, blue/green heads of vulgar cheapness, taken from a reproduction of
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a de Ribera painting (76). Between the women and the heads is a complex sketchy 
structure - a phallus/cervix/fountain - from which a head might or might not be emerging. 
The mood is of sombre imprisonment, which the initial sculpture's conventions have 
established, the huddled naked woman, in a posture of clinging despair and the brisk 
images of the twin runners to the right are concealed by the sardonic positioning of the 
two heads. Just as the im ages become unsettling, but decipherable in a strategy that 
Salle frequently adopts, any internal consistency is broken by the right-hand panel which 
illustrates a bridge - a Max Beckmann derived structure in w hat seems to be a central- 
European town, below are tug-boats and an odd structure that would appear to refer back 
to the quasi-fountain-like object between the two exercising women.
The dislocated quality o f Salle's imagery is imbued with a style o f the tragically vaudeville 
echoing in an atmosphere o f dark humour/discomfiture/sense o f the “Becklettian" absurd 
- his search for resonant incongruity.
Within the theatrical what would seem to be happening in Salle's painting is what Deleuze 
term s ''a dislocation o f the internal monologue" (77).
" ...... the internal m onologue gives way to sequences of images, each sequence being
independent, and each image in the sequence standing for itse lf in relation to the 
preceding and follow ing ones: a different descriptive material. There are no longer any 
perfect and "resolved" harmonies, but only dissonant tonings or irra tional cuts, because 
there are no more harm onics o f the image, but only "unlinked" tones form ing the series".
(Gilles Deleuze) (78).
Deleuze's description o f Godard's film technique concentrates upon the use o f the 
"unlinked” image. Deleuze confers upon Godard a recrudescent quality. In Godard's 
films the "unlinked" image becomes both serial and atonal The question of the relation 
between images is no longer of knowing if it works/doesn't w ork "si 9a va ou si 9 a va 
pas", according to the harmonics/the resolved tunings, but o f knowing "How its going" 
("Com m ent 9 a va"). "Like this or like that, how its going" ("com m ent f a  va") is the
230
constitution of series of their irrational cuts, of their dissonant turnings, of their unlinked 
terms" (Gilles Deleuze)(79). In this situation each series refers to a way of 
seemg/speaking intrinsic to itself, a way which could be that of current opinion expressed 
through slogans, but also that o f class/sort/typical character functioning through 
thesis/hypothesis/paradox/imagined acuteness/abrupt change of subject. Each series 
is the method an artist uses to articulate him/her self indirectly in a sequence of images 
attributable to another, or alternatively, the method by which something/someone 
articulates indirectly in the vision of the artist perceived as other. There is no longer the 
stability/unity of the artist/images/elements/world that was sanctioned by the internal 
monologue. "There is the formation o f free indirect discourse" of a "free indirect vision 
which goes from one to the other"' (80). The stability of the internal monologue is broken 
to be replaced by the diversity/deformity, the otherness of a free indirect discourse.
As Salle's oeuvre develops each painting becomes a more com plex and finely tuned 
performance, this further underlines the centrality of film-technique and musical structure 
as analogous modes for discussing the way he constructs a work and the kinds of 
"meanings" it can communicate.
There are two works in the "Symphony Concertante" series. Additionally "Yellow Bread”
(1987) and "Kelly Bag" (1987), also show obvious associations. "Symphony Concertante 
II" (1987) presents a military officer with a Victorian waxed m oustache (another image 
derived from Magritte). He is flanked by two female "musicians", one nude the other 
clothed, both holding musical instruments behind their backs. The officer appears, 
isolated/insulated to be looking through the two figures, he seems caughtTfreeze-framed" 
on a screen, almost as if the two females were watching a televisual image Behind the 
officer, just to the right of his head is a Belocq-style photo-insert o f a young girl. The 
officer seems trapped in the convolutions of a Borges-like enigma Attention is equally 
focused on the secondary details of the composition. The m usical instruments 
awkwardly positioned behind the girls backs, the colourfully strident futurist ceramic piece 
that deflects concentration from the central "characters" echoing yet reversing the colours
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of his uniform. The atmosphere is conjured up via the modulated rhythms and cinematic 
postures of the female figures that speak eloquently of fear/repulsion/rejection and 
secrecy. The dominant tone is one o f an assured performance, of typical exhibitionism 
with an undercurrent of repressed lasciviousness, and of imperative needs expressed in 
restrained delicately controlled passages There is a comprehensive subjugation of 
narrative in favour of elegant imagery.
"Marking through Webern" (1987) is clearly related to these works. On this occasion the 
lower panel depicts four stark, almost repetitive images of a partially clothed figure in a 
foreshortened plunging baroque posture. The second and third images o f the series are 
connected by a small insert o f a 1950's-style sketch. These divisions are echoed in the 
upper panel where the wooden board and the blue oval enact a sim ilar bridging-effect 
between the first and second image and the third and fourth image respectively. (81) The 
m ateria ls and the surface of the painting are hyper-raw and kitschy, the imagery is 
equally provocative/minatory - inflated and hyper dramatic. Fragments o f "histories" 
collide side by side, themeatizing the reciprocity between visible and invisible, oscillating 
in a series of turbulent sequences. On the extreme right the two frieze panels are united 
by a sequence of direct/brutal devices that include a superimposed, crudely drawn and 
incomplete insert, some loose dripping, and an overwritten figure This is an assertive 
almost aggressive work consolidated in the pierced chair that literally abuses the space 
and the ch u n ky f crude" folk art ceramics. It is a condition of intensified presence and self 
aw areness that Salle attempts to recount/convey in this work, an refined/aggravated 
vehem ence articulated through the work. The totality of the painting disseminates an 
im pression of artifice/seduction manipulation
Throughout the process of painting Salle concentrates upon the focused selection and 
m anipulation of imagery. A gramarye chimeric mood often co-exists with a hyper- 
hysterical cartoon-like awkwardness Critical postmodern art emphasizes the reality of 
art as a form  of production, impelled to attend to the contingencies of a life within history. 
The m em ory trace is ultimately what Salle's sources of imagery are reducible to, and at
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a secondary remove, the derivation of sources becomes less consequential W hat is at ^  
stake is how elements are deployed to make the paintings appear effective. (82). Salle 
seeks, through a plethora of information, which dominates the viewer to force a 
recognition. (If the "narrative"/formal/"expressive" properties of the work cohere in a 
strikingly original way, the work can present a mode of engagement with the visual world 
that engenders an emphatic relationship to it.)
In a similar fashion Godard in his films according to Deleuze's analysis utilizes every 
method of a free and indirect discourse. He does not merely confine himself to a process 
of adopting and renewing, but on the contrary he creates an original method which allows 
him to make a new synthesis. "Godard's films are syllogisms, which simultaneously 
integrate degrees of probability and paradoxes of logic" (83). Godard's method operates 
upon the constitution o f series, each demarcated by a category - every sequence of 
images is a series, insofar as it is reflected in a genre Therefore this reflective status of 
the genre implies that instead of a genre subsuming images which naturally belong to it, 
it constitutes the limit o f images which do not belong to it but are reflected in it. Replacing 
its capacities for subsuming/constituting in favour o f a free power of reflection, genre can 
be said to become purer for delineating the direction of pre-established/existing images, 
more than the character o f the present images more than the challenge o f the present 
images Godard's reflexive genres are, in the Deleuzian sense, genuine categories 
through which the film passes. Throughout his films Godard is constantly creating 
categories, which are not definitely fixed but re-distributed/re-shaped/re-invented for each 
film
"A montage of categories, which is new each time, corresponds to a cutting o f categories. 
The categories must, each time, surprise us, and yet not be arbitrary, must be well 
founded, and must have strong, indirect relations between themselves: they m ust not be
derived from each other, so that their relation is of the "And.... " type, th is "and" must
achieve necessity" (84). (Gilles Deleuze)
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Categories therefore are never complete answers but categories of problems which 
introduce reflection into the image itself, they are problematic/propositional functions. 
One of th e  most notable devices that Salle adopts from film-technique is the way he 
treats surface and the attention he gives to light and colour. Deleuze identifies in Godard 
a consistent method of supreme Colourism. He uses colours as significant/individuated 
genres in which the image is reflected. Colours in themselves can fulfil the function of 
categories, that is, not only do they affect objects/people/written words, but they form 
categories in themselves.
"The Wig Shop" (1987) is suffused with a melancholic recognition that something is being 
lost and tha t all we may hope for is to remember it, but subsequently then we realise that 
not even th a t will have any degree o f certainty. There is a bitter sweet ironic tone 
prevalent in the atmosphere. W hat concerns Salle is the latent mood of something that 
having once been present is now irredeemably captivated in the desperate process of 
slippage/loss. The main female figure, upon which attention is first focuses, is 
surrounded by busts and models that appear sinisterly more like decapitated heads. This 
intuition is echoed in her gaunt, angular features and a gaze hypnotized in reverie. The 
insertion o f the Giacometti bust seems both to reflect and mock her internal distorted 
projections. The right hand panel serves as a literal accompaniment, phrasing the same 
mood. The dominating, active female figure appears to be tuning a musical instrument 
apparently in search of the correct sound. Any excessive "narrative" dependency relating 
to the interaction of the two central female "characters is fractured by the insertion o f an 
incongruous element - a found still-life, directly/prominently incorporated into the 
com position As a purely visual element, within Salle's scheme it functions perfectly 
introducing both optically and psychologically a tension that energizes the design. A  work 
by Salle invites/frustrates/instructs/shocks the inquiring consciousness, and yet 
continuously pronounces that it is in itself simply a work and "a fiction". It offers a 
knowledge that is never complete. "The Wig Shop" highlights the development of Salle's 
aesthetic
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The paintings of this period still include vi ntage Salle motifs - the sinister costumed 
dolls, the Giacometti heads, the vases and musical instruments but there is an increased 
emphasis of the isolation of the grisaille female figures, even as they become more 
prominent overall from the brightly painted dogs "Jar of Spirits" (1987), the still lifes, 
"Epaulettes for W alt Kuhn” (1987) and the figurines "Sextant in Dogtown" (1987). 
Though still deprived of colour, these female figures are painted in a more fully rounded 
manner and appear in each painting as the central article around which the other 
elements revolve. The female figures are now less overtly sexual and more completely 
fetishized.
Another main feature o f this collection of works is that the layering technique now 
appears less prominent. Instead Salle disrupts the picture-plane primarily by juxtaposed 
and inserted images. Occupying gaudy grounds they are distinctly separated from each 
other, and the general composition, by clean-edged borders. The result is a more static 
surface that moves decisively in the direction of disengagement and paralysis but while 
still maintaining the vital components producing the tense equilibrium between orders of 
reality and degrees of tangibility.
"Pattern Cutter" (1989) is an evenly-divided vertical diptych, the left section comprises of 
the head of a charging boar set against a verdant fem-and leaf background, and the right 
section depicts a close-up o f a woman holding a sheet of printed fabric, rendered in 
black-and-white monochrome with a highlighted tinge of pink. Two medium/large panels 
are inserted: a Negro lawn jockey in a red and white outfit transposed against a blue field 
of colour, and a Picasso-type clown head sculpture piece in bronze and orange. A 
prominent drip of white paint just above the boar's snout melts down into a brown patch 
below on which is scribbled a mirrored "Art Brut" type head. Along the middle horizontal, 
to the right o f centre Salle placed a cartoon-sketch of a scowling woman in light-blue and 
a mannequin-like figure cut by a thin green vertical stripe.
Deleuze remarks: "Cinema ceased to be narrative, but it is with Godard that it becomes
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the most "novelesque" (85). Godard gives the cinema the particular powers of the novel 
He uses reflexive types as so many interceders through whom I is always another It is 
the fractured line/zig-zag line, which combines the author, the characters and the world, 
and which interacts between them
M odern cinema develops new relations with thought from  three points o f view the 
obliteration o f a whole or of a totalization o f images, in favour o f an outside which is 
inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, in 
favour o f  a free indirect discourse and vision, the erasure o f the unity o f man and the 
world, in favour o f a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world."
(Gilles Deleuze) (86)
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THE FOUNTAIN HEAD (VISION MACHINES) 
NOTES
1. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - "Qu 'est-ce que la philosophie" Paris: Minuit (1991)
Although Rosalind Krauss (see: 'The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist 
Myths" Cambridge Mass. MIT Press (1985)), credits Picasso with having created "the first 
instance within the pictorial arts of anything like a systematic exploration o f the conditions 
of representability entailed by the sign", Picasso remained essentially within the tradition 
of modern painting, where visual presence takes priority over other considerations.
2 Leo S teinberg has argued that an artist like Robert Rauschenberg, with whom Anselm 
Kiefer shares much in common, has moved away from giving privilege to the upright visual 
plane, turning instead to what Steinberg terms the "flatbed picture plane". Rauschenberg's 
complex overlapping images, many of which are reproduced from existing cultural images, 
create a sense of ambiguity for the viewer. In this respect they are similar to Salle's 
images. Steinberg continues:
"Rauschenberg's picture plane had become a surface to which 
anything reachable - thinkable would adhere. It has to be whatever 
a billboard o r dashboard is, and everything a projection screen is, 
with further affinities for anything that is flat and worked over - 
palimpsest, concealed plate, printer’s proof, trial blank, chart, map 
aerial view. Any flat documentary surface that tabulates information 
is a relevant analogue for his picture plane - radically different from 
the transparent projection plane with its optical correspondence to 
man's visual field"
(Leo Steinberg - "Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth 
Century Art" (New York: Oxford University Press (1972)).
The "flat bed” concerns the plane of action, rather than a purely visual plane, it is any kind 
of surface on which the artist "tabulates information" or produces transformations. Salle's 
overlapped/transposed images, in particular, seem to be such work surfaces. The subject 
supposedly located behind the Modernist picture surface is now transformed into an artist 
in the world, working/-re-working surfaces to produce im ages whose significance is 
complex, as is a text. Steinberg's analysis converges with the ideas of Victor Burgin (See: 
'The End o f Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity" London: MacMillan (1986)). when 
he writes
"Rauschenberg's work surface stood for the m ind itself - dump, 
reservoirs, switching center, abundent with concrete references freely 
associated as in an internal monologue - the outward symbol of the 
mind as a running transformer o f the external world, constantly 
infesting incoming unprocessed data to be mapped in an 
overcharged field" (Leo Steinberg - ibid (1972)).
Salle's work surface, similarly, seems to portray the mind o f an artist as "abundant with 
concrete references" and as "a running transformer of the external world" rather than 
something confined to its own intentional space.
3. Salle adroitly manipulates the equivalence in principle of styles and themes, a mixture of
sophistication intellegence, naivete and wit, the lack of respect for the revered great 
cultural figures of history, the brazen treatment o f sacrosanct myths and traditions, the 
proxim ity of calculation and perversion, along with a simultaneous melodramatic 
undertone
Salle's polarities have their formal origin in his foundation in the realm of conceptual 
colour-field painting associated with Richard Diebenkom. Additionally Salle's initial basics 
are comparable to the early work of Sigmar Polke with whom he is linked by an intellectual 
kinship to Dada and the surrealism of Francis Picabia. W ith Salle, what is surprising and 
new, as with Picabia, does not lieprincipally in the style, but in the substance and manner 
of the presentation.
In the Postmodern condition reality has lost its uniform character and has disintegrated into 
numerous intricate sections which in turn, can be divided and duplicated. In these different 
realities the human subject is confronted with itself both as a stranger and as an alien. In 
this phase o f profound extensive social/historical change art has ceased to persue its 
utopian dream of any substantial human identity, the union o f mind/body, the notion that
a relationship between humanity and the world could proceed harmoniously. This blatant 
absence of continuity in life comes to light particularly clearly in works o f art.
Sigmar Polke's painted pictures/photographs/sculptures/spatial arrangements are a formal 
mixture of different v isua l worlds. It is an amalgamation of the artistic and the trivial, the 
manual and the industria lly manufactured, Dada, Surrealism, curiosity and experiment.
Polke's definition o f art, although thoroughly serious, contains a playful/risk associated 
perspective Being ironical, Polke perceives the contemporary condition as 
unreal/grotesque/incongruous/deceptive/contradictory. With his ironical distance however, 
even Polke is inextricably involved in the world, with an odd kind of complicity. W hat 
makes his position so relevant is the fact that he is constantly attempting to  com e to terms 
with the postmodern condition, rather than denying it or seeking refuge in the soothing 
haven of a halcyon world .
Polke's art has been ascribed to numerous different movements. In his early paintings the 
world is reflected/projected in a confusing variety and on several levels/layers, so that the 
reality o f the orig ina l pictures constitute a distorted image of em pirical reality - 
confused/glaring/inverted/tightly packed, as if everything were simultaneously on the point 
o f collapse. Everyday experience is distorted beyond primary recognition, but in such a 
manner that we subsequently arrive at a more clearly comprehension. H is  paintings of 
the 80’s confront the v iew er with a "cosmos" o f colours, iridescent and dangerous. (See: 
'The Computer M oves In (1983)/("Alice in Wonderland" (1987)). Under the  influence of 
light and atm osphere they upon occasion transform entirely and even  apparently 
"disintegrate". The e ffec t o f his paintings is always compelling. It is an a rt o f perpetual 
change. Nothing is fixed, everything is fluid and interlinked, with only very few fixed 
lines/contours that m igh t lend support. One is engaged in a visual field w ith  only a few 
familiar landmarks o f reference. It is a version of reality that reveals itself v ia  perceptions 
of seeing/feeling. It is ultimately intangible, though paradoxically constructed with 
conjuring tricks. It is a situation that negates the divide good/evil, beauty/horror. Polke is 
certainly prepared to take  risks in order to realize his visions artistically and sensitize his 
addressee's warped powers o f perception.
Polke adroitly m anipulates all types of visual media. He is, it might be said, a visual 
"maniac". In fact there is not a visual medium which he has not addressed/incorporated 
and whose capacity to  trigger off new experiences he has not explored. Polke is widely 
regarded as a key figure in contemporary art, his art and artistic stand-point have type-cast 
him into this role. The confident use of all the possibilities/opportunities afforded by the 
visual arts, both pop u la r and serious/manual and technological, his extraordinary ability 
to combine these options, his profound inventiveness as well as the ironical distance he 
maintains, together with his undisguised subjectiveness - make Polke one o f  the foremost 
initiators o f post-avant-qarde art.
Polke's studio farm  in W illich in the lower Rhine area has been described literally as a 
"laboratory" (Peter Schjedhal) in which many o f the elements were concocted which were 
to transform the artistic  climate of the contemporary situation. Notably from  time to time 
he has been joined by Achim Duchow, W alter Dahn, Julian Schnabel and David Salle, 
among others.
4 It is interesting that in his catalogue introduction to Jack Goldstein (New York: Hallwalls
(1978)). Salle talks o f "a  clouded pool o f personal symbols". Frequently w h en  one artist 
writes about another he/she responds to qualities that are relevant to their ow n work. This 
sense of something be ing  clouded over, either in terms of its original purpose or its 
immediate possib ilities is highly appropriate to Salle. Meaning is som ething hazy but 
persistent It can be abandoned momentarily but remains constant in som e form.
5. "If world is in painting and  you are imposing other worlds on top of world in painting, that 
is perhaps surrealism. But if there is literally no world in the painting, but there are just 
"worlds" and you are  superimposing that in a way that becomes the painting, that's 
coceptually different. M y work is about "no world" in painting"
(David Salle) Quoted in Rosetta Brooks, "From the Night of Consumerism to the Dawn 
of Simulation" "A rtfo rum " February 1985.
6. In 1984 Salle read G eorge W.S. TroWs 'W ith in the Context o f No Context" (1981) and in 
1985 he dedicated a painting to this author titled 'The Cold Child" (for G eorge Trow)", 
after passages that a pp ear under that heading in the writer's best known work. Lisa 
Liebmann describing T row 's book writes "Adrift in seas of psychosocial melancholia, 
W ithin the Context o f N o Context" bobs along fitfully, in small blurts and large meditations, 
leaving a freighted trail o f period leitmotifs" (See: Lisa Liebmann T h e  Magic Lantern: lost 
visions o f adulthood" in "David Salle" ed David Whitney Rizzoli: New York (1994).)
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7. See: Gilles Deleuze "He Stuttered” in "Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre o f Philosophy*' eds.
Constantin V Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski - New York/London Routledge (1994).
8 G illes Deleuze - "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" - Paris: Edition de la difference
(1981).
9 In "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation", Deleuze analyses within Bacon's paintings 
the production o f a haptic space. Bacon's painting does not simply invert the figurative's 
tactile /optical space into abstract expressionisms non-figurative manuel space, neither 
d o e s  it sublate the tactile/optical difference into the pure optical space of abstraction 
(where figuration is internalized) - it operates "figurally" within the figurative to produce a 
hap tic  space, which is when "sight itself discovers in itself a tactile function ("function de 
toucher") which is proper to it, and belongs to it, distinct from its optical function. Deleuze 
d ec la res  unequivocally at the end o f "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" that the 
"passage" from hand to "haptic eye", "is the great moment in the act of painting", since "it 
is th e re  that the painting discovers at its base and in its own way the problem of a pure 
log ic  to  pass from the possibility of fact to the fact"
10 G illes  Deleuze and Felix Guattari - "Mille Plateaux" (1980)
11. G illes  Deleuze and Felix Guattari - ibid -  (1980)
12 A lo is  Riegl "Die Spàtrbmische Kunstindustrie" - Vienna: Staatdruckerie (1927).
'T h e  Late Roman Art Industry" 2 vols (1901/1923) Rome (Archaeologica "series vol. 36 
(1985)).
13. W ilhe lm  Worringer - "Abstraction and Empathy; A  Contribution to the Psychology of Style". 
(1 908 /1948)trans. M ichael Bullock: New York: International Universities Press (1953)).
14 A n d re  Leroi-Gourhan - "Legeste et la parole" Paris: Albin Michel (1964/65).
15. G illes  Deleuze and Félix Guattari - op. cit (1980).
16. G illes  Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid (1980)
17. G illes  Deleuze and Felix Guattari - ibid (1980)
18 G illes  Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid (1980).
19 The haptic does not qualify a capabaility o f sight, the sight attributed to a
phenom enological body determined by an inherent/latent subjectivity, but delinates a 
sight/site where the subject is not constituted by either representation or phenomenological 
"sentir". This "vue sans regard" defines the affectivity of the body not as an organism but 
as com position of power ("vue sans regard" is a phrase from Patrick Vauday: See "Ecrit 
à vue": Deleuze -Bacon" in critique no 426 (1982) - the concise phrase, roughly "seeing 
w ith o u t looking", communicates the passivity/passion of a viewing/seeing experience 
w h ich  is non-constitutive, neither of what is seen nor of the seeing subject.
20. See - Deleuze's preface to  Mireille Buydens "Sahara: L'esthétique de Gilles Deleuze" 
Pans: Vrin(1990).
21 G illes  Deleuze op.cit (1981).
22 G illes  Deleuze and Félix Guattari - op. cit (1980).
23 G illes  Deleuze "Pourparlers. 1972-1990" Paris: Minuit (1990).
24 See "Le  lisse et let stire" in Mille Plateaux p. 474. As a primary illustration for their 
d iscussion of this kind of spaciality, Deleuze and Guattari propose the quilt, traditional in 
Am erican women's art.
25. 'T h e  nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; 
that is  his territorial principle" (Gilles Deleuze and Guattari "Mille Plateaux" p.381).
This essential trait may be expressed either in terms of the nomad relation to the space 
inhabited or in terms o f the space itself. Sedentary space is striated, marked by enclosures 
and paths/lines between enclosures, nom adic space is smooth, broken only by 
tem porary/fluctuating traits. It is a fluid space, variable in its contours and lacking any 
to ta liz ing  dimension/directionality. It is characterized instead by its plurality of local 
directions. It is a rhizomatic space.
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26. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit (1980).
27. Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 1 l'Image - Movement" Paris: M inuit (1983).
28. The term "conditional abstraction" is used by Kate Linker in "Individuals" catalogue 
published by the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art (1991) Identifying the "fading 
power of pure abstraction", Linker writes: "It follows from this that most abstract painting 
o f the 1980's is conditional abstraction, its intentions always qualified by plays o f abstract 
forms against figurative shapes, pure geometry against narrative structures, formal against 
historical concern". It is not the intention to develop a line of argument from this basis 
must simply to  use the phrase "conditional abstraction" as a suggestive catalyst.
29. The typical model for the conception o f the abstract within the philosophical tradition has 
been that of a taxonomic tree of distinct classes/types - One abstracts as one moves in an 
upward direction to higher levels o f generality and one concretises/instantiates as one  
moves down towards particulars/specific instances o f kinds Therefore the dialectic tha t 
Plato confirs upon Socrates centred upon the aim to discover the higher/more genera l 
Forms in the lower, more particular things which constituted them by confirming that the  
lineages are pure/unpolluted/unmixed, following the division o f the tree, notions of both 
analogy/resemblance and force/potential ("dynamics") would be made to cohere to th is  
"tree-structured" model.
30. See: Duns Scotus "Philosophical W ritings" trans. Allan W otter - New York: Nelson (1962) 
One can speak o f individuated entities within a plane o f consistency, but they are not 
persons/subjects/things/substances, rather they are what Deleuze and Guattari ca ll 
"hecceities" - a term borrowed from Duns Scotus, whose "haecceitas" may be translated
as "thisness".
31. Gilles Deleuze - Preface to "Dialogues" with Claire Parnet - Paris: Flammarion (1977). 
The formula is adopted again in "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?".
32 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1977).
33. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit (1980).
34 The introduction o f effectivity as a criterion directly poses the question o f the
im manence/arbitrariness of the restricting instance. Effectivity in this context requires 
neither a transcendent instance nor is it dependent upon the arbitrariness of an extrinsic 
limitation. Recalling Plateau six - "November 28,1947 How Do You Make Yourself a Body 
Without Organs?" of "Mille Plateaux", this would imply asserting that "effective" im manent 
restraint energises dissolution whilst transcendent lim itation blocks/represses it and lack 
of restraint exhausts it. This affirmation however, seems to require a Spinozan perspective 
where effectivity and affect compose the body of sensation. The immanent synthesis o f 
these two poles of sensation is what is exemplified in the final rubric of "Francis Bacon: 
Logique de la sensation", and perhaps the emphasis on the autonomy of the art work as 
m onument-sensation in "Qu 'est-ce-que la philosophie?" is in fact the expression o f th is  
immanence.
35. See: Gilles Deleuze "Le Bergsonisme" Paris: PUF (1968), and "Difference et répétition" 
on the concept o f the virtual. All problems communicate with one another and may be said 
to be explications of a single question. All ideas/problems, therefore, co-exist in a single 
virtual realm, an "informal" - pre-ceding all specific form) groundless ("sans fond") 
unfounded (effonde) Chaos. The virtual is a chaos of chance which prevails upon us as 
an imperative (the violence of the idea as a provocation to  thought) in the form o f a 
question.
36 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - op.cit (1980).
37 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985).
38 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
39. The introduction of affectivity as a criterion immediately poses the question o f the 
immanence/arbitrariness of the restricted instance Effectivity in this case neither requires 
a transcendent instance nor suffers from the arbitrariness o f extrinsic limitations. In the 
light of Plateau six of "Mille Plateaux" this would mean asserting that "effective'Vimmanent 
restraint energizes dissolution, whilst transcendent limitation blocks/represses it and lack 
o f restraint exhausts it. This affirmation however would appear to require a Spinozian 
point of view where effectivity and affect compose the body o f sensation. To reiterate the 
immanent relationship of these two kinds of sensation is what is produced in the final 
chapter of "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation", and perhaps the emphasis o f the
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autonomy of the art work as monument-sensation in "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" is 
none other than the expression o f this immanence.
40 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985)
41. This is one source o f contention with the film semiology of Christian Metz. Deleuze 
suggests that one m ust position the second of his definitions of abstract in the prior 
position, see it as first as to regard narration as only "an indirect consequence that flows 
from movement and time rather than the other way around" (G illes Deleuze - 
"Pourparlers").
42 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985)
43. The genetic continuity between "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" and Deleuze's earlier work 
is obvious but may be succinctly summarized in respect to aesthetics by the following 
quotation: 'T he  eternal object o f painting: to paint forces". This statem ent re-asserts the 
claim Deleuze made regarding the painting o f Francis Bacon - elaborating on Paul Klee's 
much repeated phrase, "not to render the visible, but to render visible" as signalling a 
"capture o f forces" and resolutely not a reproduction o f forms. (See: "Francis Bacon: 
Logique de la sensation")
44 See: Maurice Blanchot "L'entretien infini".
45. In 1995 David Salle directed a 90 mins, feature film "Search and Destroy", a dynamic and 
capricious narrative reminiscent superficially of John Landis "Into the Night"/Martin 
Scorsese "After Hours'VJonathan Demme "Something W ild" but suffused with sub- 
Godardian motifs. Including glorious character performances from Christopher W alken 
as a disturbed thrill addicted businessman (in an outlandish scene in which he sings and 
dances in a pop-art coloured restaurant we have a moment o f supreme visual 
"decadence" that goes a long way towards redeeming the films many flaws) and John 
Turturo as Ron, the cast also included Rosanna Arquette and Ethan Hawke, with the films 
executive producer Martin Scorsese appearing in a cameo role.
Undaunted, the IRS threatening Martin Mirkheim (Griffin Donne) with bankruptcy for 
unpaid taxes, the am bitious but as yet unsuccessful business entrepeneur attempts to 
audaciously fu lfil his dream  of becoming a movie producer, turning Dr Luther Waxling's 
(television therapist) "W inner's philosophy" book into a film. The journey from  Florida to 
LA "success" takes the underdog hero through a maze of enigmatic/bizarre/perverse 
expenences and strange characters, including principally the disturbed cable TV "self-help 
guru ’Vall American novelist Dr Luthar W axing (Dennis Hopper)
Salle adopts a d istinctive visual style using flat, brightly coloured, m ontage imagery shot 
by cinematographers Michael Spiller and Bobby Bukowski. It is the kind o f film  debut one 
would expect from  a collagist painter with .a "perverse" and irreverent sensibilty. A 
d is junctive fanatasia at the expense of the American myth o f success. A 
haphazard/throwaway paradoy, the film is lacking in formal discipline and obviously under­
rehearsed, but on occasion there is a scene/line/gesture that approaches a higher level 
o f excellence.
46 Throughtout Salle's em otional register one may discern a persistent theme that
consistently evokes a sense of emptiness at the core of being. (See: Lisa Liebmann 
"Harlequinade for an Empty Room": On David Salle" Artform Feb. (1987)). Salle 
undoubtedly has an acute sense of the threatening void, of the "Beckett-like" absurd 
hum an condition, and our vain attempt to impose order on the world. The dislocated 
quality of Beckett's stage images and his style of tragic vaudeville are resonant in Salle's 
dark hum our/disengagement/sense of the absurd • his quest for panoramic incongruity.
47. G illes Deleuze - op.cit. (1985).
48. See "David Salle; W orks on Paper" (1974-1986) ed. Ernst A Busche, including extensive 
texts. Institute o f Contem porary Art, Boston, December 9 1986 -February 8 1987. 
Drawing is indispensable to Salle's style: His painted line drawings have a kind of perverse 
wit - as if the drawings have drawn themselves, and he is being rather unkindly critical of 
the process. Salle's drawing refers to the standards or conventions of draftm anship in a 
way that is ironic and casual but very intense.
49 Jasper Johns - Interview in exhibition catalogue "Jasper Johns Drawings" London: Arts
Council o f Great Britain (1974).
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50 Jasper Johns - ibid. (1974).
51 Jasper Johns came to  the use of objects via Marcel Duchamp's Readymades. However,
he w ent beyond Ducham p in that he highlighted the difference between sculpture and 
pa in ting as it relates to the objects character Through transferring the Duchampian 
im pulse to another sphere of art practice, Johns established his own project in the 
exp lo ra tion  o f the nature of the object. In addition he also demonstrated a different 
concept. He painted flags and targets (between 1955 and 1960/61) as a mechanism by 
which he could play upon the words "thing" and "picture", a variant on the more traditional 
dichotomy of "realityY'illusion". By making the image either coincide with a real object or 
incorporate additional material - one flag or three flags, a target or a target plus other 
components - he suggested that the two words "thing" and "picture" cannot be separated 
in any meaningful way. In an interview in 1965 he said: "If the painting is an object then 
the  object can be a painting" (W  Hopps "Jasper Johns" Artforum ill No.6 March 1965). 
The question: is it art or an object? is rendered superfluous. In 1960 Johns illustrated the 
sam e point in sculpture, casting two Ballantine ale cans in bronze, one hollow, the other 
solid, he then overpainted the bronze to reproduce the cans illusionistically (see: M Kozloff 
"Jaspe r Johns" New York: Harry N Abrams (1969)).
52. W . H o p p s -ib id  (1965).
53. In foregrounding the examination of paintings attempt to investigate, as painting, its 
in ternal dynamic relation to sculpture, as an essential constituent o f the paintings 
fabrication, what is brought out is the primacy o f meaning that m ay then be attributable to 
ce rta in  component details o f the work integral to the construction o f the worfc. The 
"complication" o f the painted surface is not simply a self-reflexive concern with objectivity 
bu t a move towards a rigorous questioning o f the fundamental basis o f the activity of 
pa in ting , that is altogether more forceful because it is a question initiated external to 
painting while at the same time being incorporated within the painting itself. Similarly this 
analysis extends to the relation of Johns to Salle in the introduction o f material/fragments 
from  the "outside" world onto/into their painted surfaces - the presence o f elements that 
are both sculpture and painting becomes apparent, in a complex inter-relation within the 
painting.
In "M odernist Painting" (1961) Greenberg stated:
"It w as the stressing however, of the ineluctable flatness of the support that remained most 
fundam enta l in the process by which pictorial art criticised and defined itself under
M odernism . Flatness alone was unique and exclusive to that art......Flatness, two
dimensionality, was the only condition painting shared with no other art, and so Modernist 
pain ting orientated itse lf to flatness as it did to nothing else"
W hat emerges in Johns and Salles work is a continual re-evaluation/re-assessment of the 
trad itions of sculpture and painting that in turn initiates a questioning regarding 
reproduction and interpretation, undermining the basic assumptions of Modernist theory.
W h a t Greenberg w as advocating along the lines o f a formal criticism was an analysis in 
w h ich  the principles o f relevance were connected to an apparently coherent theory of 
developm ent/progression in modern art, a theory according to which the internal 
motivation appropriate to each form o f art resided in its tendency towards a self-definition 
and purity o f means.
G reenberg identifies what painting shares with no other artform/medium - that is its 
quality/condition o f flatness. The dynamic motivation of modernist painting is therefore 
exp la ined as the intensification of the degree o f flatness, a conceptual primacy that is 
centered on and orientated to the painting's external surface. This inevitably involves a 
negation of mimetic/descriptive/narrative content. In short this is essentially a rationale for 
lim iting criticism/explanation to a concentration upon the formal/technical aspects as the 
elem ents/com ponents o f progression.
54 Traditionally the term "aesthetics" has been deployed in an "immaculate'Vpure sense. This
prom otes the basic task of aesthetics as consisting dualistically in an operation to explicate 
a palpable absolute delineation o f art and aesthetic experience and additionally the 
fo rm u la tion  of a definitive criteria of aesthetic excellence. This "immaculate" view is 
specifically linked to the rise of Modernism and the tendency to emphasise the prominence 
of fo rm al values at the expense o f overt narrative content, culminating ultimately in the 
em ergence of non-objective art (Art reaches a stage of "autonomy", its production 
m otiva ted  and justified in purely artistic terms and it no longer depends upon external 
factors  that have reference to social utility) It is within the conception of the idea of the 
purity  o f the medium, of a "specific art", that the traditionalist relies on Greenbergian 
aesthetics is located. From this basic point alone he derives his account o f both the 
aesthetic meaning o f odernist painting and its essential continuity with tradition.
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It is in terms o f a repudiation o f Greenberg s work, and the type o f art which it came to 
represent, that much of both the art and the art-theory produced since the m id-1960's has 
to be understood.
For example, See V.Burgin 'T h e  End of Art Theory" London (1986), Rosalind E Krauss 
'T he  Originality o f the Avant Garde and Other Modernist Myths" Cambridge, Mass and 
London (1986), Mary Kelly "Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism" Screen 22.3 (1981) and 
"Post-Partum Document" London (1983), Lucy Lippard "Six Years: the dematerialization 
o f the Art Object" London and New York (1973) and "Get the Message? A Decade o f Art 
for Socal Change" New York (1984).
55. The question arises as to  whether art should be concerned with/preserve its own 
specialized laws/issues/competencies and singularly be addressed to an elevated elite, 
actual or ideal - (the Modernist paradigm preserves a "utopian" vision o f creative human 
expression untainted/unadulterated by either kitsch or political doctrine, it maintains an 
insulated, socially exclusive and gendered art together with an attendant discourse - or 
should alternatively art engage with the social/cultural world and express/foreground 
issues/controversies/interests that are negated or marginalized by dominant 
ideologies/narratives.
56. Clement Greenberg - 'Tow ards a Newer Laocoon" (1940). First published in Partisan 
Review VII No.4 - New York July/August 1940. and in F.Frascina (ed) "Pollock and After 
the Critical Debate" London: Harper and Row (1985).
57. Clement Greenberg - ibid (1940)
In this article Greenberg advances his first promotion of Abstraction, (see also: G.Lessing 
"Laocoon. An Essay upon the Limits o f Poetry and Painting (1766) New York (1969). The 
overall tone o f the argument appears firm yet undoctrinaire, part investigative/part 
declaritive, the uncertainty displayed as a positive factor. Equally discernable however is 
a strong ethical imperative that will be developed as an anti-relativist stance in the later 
"Modernist Painting" (1961). 'Tow ards a Newer Laocoon" presents a defence o f "purism" 
in art history/criticism. The "advanced'Vambitious" art produced by the Post- 
Impressionist/Fauvres/Cubists/Mondrain, according to Greenberg is an art which, 'lests 
society’s capacity for high art", and those practictioners labelled "purists" who promote the 
essential self-worth of abstract art above kitch culture and regarded as recognising the real 
"value of high art".
58. Clement Greenberg - "Modernist Painting" (1961). First published in Arts Year Book 1 Art 
and Literature No.4 Spring 1965, reprinted in C. Harrison and P. W ood (eds) "Art in 
Theory" 1900-1990. An Anthology o f Changing Ideas" Oxford: Blackwell (1992).
59. Classically Kant has been closely allied to the project of Modernity - his project interpreted 
as basically Modernist in that it attem pts to delineate finite lines of demarcation between 
philosophical knowledge/scientific method/aesthetic experience. However, while the 
introduction o f such divisions are implicit within the Kantian programme, there exists a 
furthur dimesion of complexity and comprehensiveness that can be applied and 
understood. The primary function o f the "Critique o f Judgement" is to dem onstrate that in 
addition to existing as a distinct category of human experience, the aesthetic is also a 
united assemblage of various com plex elements, whose appreciation is intricately linked, 
synchronically to theoretical reason and ethical freedom extending the dimensions of 
integrative comprehension.
Deleuze refers to what Rimbaud called the "dérèglement des sens". He is refering to the 
Modernity of Kant. In his view, it is not that Kantian "self-criticism" points the way to what 
is "M odern" or "Modernist" in art; rather, it is through the notion of an "unregulated" 
(déréglé) use of the faculties in its connection with two other "poetic formulas" ("Je suis un 
autre 'V the time is out of joint"), that Kant's philosophy opens to a Modernity he did not 
imagine" (See. Gilles Deleuze "La Philosophie critique de Kant" Paris: PUF (1963)).
60. In a manner sim ilar to the way the reader receives the impression that modern painting 
stands as a logical link in the progress of painting, so also does Greenberg's criticism 
represent a logical/progressive link in the course of the history of criticism. W hile 
Greenberg claims Kant as his essential source, Nicolas Calas (See: N. Calas 'The 
Enterprise of Criticism" in "Art in the Age of Risk" New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. (1968)) 
noted that his ideas owe more to  Hegel in reality, even though his influence observes its 
own limitations.
61 Clement Greenberg -"Art and Culture: Critical Essays" Boston: Beacon Press (1961) See
also: John O'Brien, "Greenberg's Matisse and the Problem of Avant-Garde Hedonism" in 
"Reconstructing Modernism" Ed. Serge Guilbaut - Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press (1990)
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62. Clement Greenberg - "American Type Painting" (1955) in F. Frascina and C Harrison (eds) 
"Modern Art and Modernism: A  Critical Anthology": London: Harper and R ow  (1982).
63. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - op.cit (1991).
64. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1985)
65. Gilles Deleuze "Dialogues" with Claire Parnet (1977).
66 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
67. The terms “interiorityTexteriorityrfixity" within the interpretive - the contested field of 
interpretation. It is thus that their meanings are important because they are  fluid. Even 
when apparently set/definite they remain open to negotiation. This is a lready present 
infinite that is located within the register of fmitude - the work has the cap ic ity  to be re- 
released, the possibility o f negotiation can never be entirely exhausted. At the primary level 
that endures is the presence of this possibility as an inherent and inelim inable potential.
68. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1994)
69. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1994).
70. Fredrich Nietzsche - 'Twilight o f the Idols" trans R.H. Hollingdale: Penguin (1990)
71. Peter Schjeldhl - "David Salle : Sieben Bilder" - Michael W erner in Koln (1985).
72. P.H. de Valenciennes "Roof-top in Sunlight, Rome" (c. 1782-4) Paris: Louvre.
73. T. Géricault "Portrait Study of a Black Man" (c. 1818-19). Winterthur, private collection.
The images o f Géricault are often and obviously quoted by Salle The fam o us painted 
studies o f severed limbs and the equally notable turbaned Turkish head, appear in 
perhaps a dozen paintings or more. Gericault's presence in Salle's oeuvre da tes  back to 
1985 "Gericault's Arm" in which a distinctively forceful depiction of a co rpse like limb 
emerges, violently and ominously, from the torso of a grey studio nude, in the p lace of her 
own arms and head. The painterly physicality and powerful emotional pitch recall both 
Géricault and perhaps Francis Bacon. (At first it would appear as if these examples 
represent the antithesis of a painter like Salle who prioritizes an intellectualized 
dry/distanced emotional frigidity, but Salle at his most ambitious attempts nothing less than 
History Painting, and therefore in the cause of such a progressive enterprise th e  foremost 
precedents are accessed).
In addition the visceral intensity o f Gericault's concentration allied to the  impassive 
rendering of disembodied bodily sections gives Salle’s studies a perverse and paradoxical 
carnality. Their peculiar intensity emanates from an imaginative indication towards 
"SadisnV'.This is what probably appeals to the Sadean in Salle.
74 David Salle in Peter Schjeldahl "Salle" New York Elizabeth Avedon Editions, Vintage
Books.
In a sim ilar vein the work of Robert Longo focuses upon the circum stances of the 
aestheticization of violence apparent within the contemporary condition, and inevitably, in 
consequence, participates, of necessity, in the counteractive précipitants o f the very 
activity it depicts. For example, in the series of aluminium reliefs, "Boys S lo w  Dance", 
generated from film-stills, Longo presents three ambiguous images of m en engaged in 
combat/an amorous embrace - Longo's images serve as emblems of the confrontation of 
antithetical meanings which characterize the present - suspended/static vis ions transform 
the physical interaction into a choreographed performance that suggests that the 
nature/quality of violence may be presented as a condition/an elegant aesthetic scenario 
that is analogous to/inseparable from its secondary representation on th e  level of 
photographs/films/television.
Longo, like Salle, is an ideal representative of post-avant-garde art. He has few  inhibitions 
regarding the aesthetic material he adopts. ("My aim is to make art which can hold its own 
against television, films and magazines") Longo concentrates his subjects around the 
them es of power and violence - the violence of war/the street/corporate culture. Power 
and violence engender a spasmodic/erratic/flickering state - Longo's imagines in 
installation work and paintings reel and dance in apparent uncontrolled contortions. It is 
frequently not possible to exactly determine/interpretate what principally catalyses these 
ecstatic movements/passages. There is no clear distinction that is defined between the 
violence in warfare, the violence apparent in contemporary society and the violence of 
images presented/promulgated by the mass media.
Longo and Salle may be said to have succeeded in re-introducing an attitude to the 
present art-scene which prevailed and was characteristic of the time of Baroque - they
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regard themselves as employing an entire range o f artistic techniques/strategies to 
concentrate primarily on effects. It is also the medium of film  which has inspired both 
practitioners, with its comprehensive apparatus for stimulating/evoking emotion and 
passion - additionally Longo emphasizes the staged/set-piece arrangement 
particular/notably in the category of installations.
In observing the production of Salle and Longo's work one can perceive a distinctive 
em phasis on "special effects" which frequently attempt to overpower the strident noise of 
the m ass media with visual material that is especially inflammatory - like their 
contemporary Julian Schnabel, they endeavour to overwhelm the viewer/audience with a 
trem endous barrage of images/means o f representation.
75. Salle s work from the period he was enrolled at the California Institute of the Arts, in 
Valencia, near Los Angeles (1970-75) shows evidence of much photographic based 
m atenal. In a four-scene piece o f four bathrobed women, "Untitled" (1973), each is 
photographed in a Kitchen situation, holding a cup of coffee and staring out o f the window. 
A d iffe ren t coffee brand label is placed at the lower edge o f each picture, an ironic 
com m ent on the way individuals become functions o f commerce - consumed by what is 
consumed. (Kenneth Baker discussed this work when it was included in Salle's first show, 
organized by Paul McMahon for Projects Inc., Cambridge Massachusettes (1974) - see 
Baker, Kenneth "It's the Thought that counts" - The Boston Phoenix 24 September 1974, 
section 2 8/9. Salle underlined the following sentence in the review: "What makes the 
piece successful as art is the way it connects our inquiry into its meaning with our 
incessant inquiry iinto what's going on with other people")
In “One Year at 55MPH" (1975) another earty work, Salle wearing aviator sunglasses, sits 
in the driver's seat of a car, facing the passenger's seat (and the camera). The title is 
placed directly/prom inently to the right. Numerous signatures surround the two sections 
of m ounted information.
Salle engages with popular images/objects, he then shows the perversity of the society as 
a w hole - its demoralizing of individuals by reducing them to an equation with 
images/objects which are in the end disappointingly vacuous. Salle's art is an aesthetic of 
discontent, disclosed via methods of contradiction that centre on the problematics of 
representation and object relations. Salle's concern appears to depart from an interest that 
illustrates the internal character of external objects, and the power of internal objects over 
the external world. He essentially constructs an equity of disillusioned longing between 
the internal and external worlds, a longing exacerbated/more intense because the objects 
he dep icts have an eternally perverse/partial nature.
In 1975 David Salle re-located in New York and was employed by a magazine company. 
This experience fuelled his earlier fascination with photography, with the iconography of 
m ass-circulation, especially the representation o f women as metaphors of 
consumerism/consumption.
In h isearly painting 'V iv id  Cuban W ords" (1980) the lush poolside image is drained of 
colour, sapping its glossy life and rendering it grisaille, in the aparent neutrality of a black- 
and-w hite  photograph. The figures make no contact - the two in the pool gaze at the 
woman on the left as we gaze at their luxurious environment, at the ostentatiously ersatz 
"nartura lness" o f the shaped pool and potted vegetation. G lamour appears/existing only 
at a d istance - via the photographic medium. The sixteen regular yellow dots on "Viv*d 
Cuban W ords" read like the serial on a negative, a distancing device that reminds us of 
the artifice of the infinite reproducibility, o f the “reality” before us. Salle's painting has often 
pivoted on the re-cycling of motifs, disjointed and juxtaposed, by adding multiple layers of 
mystification and incongruity complemented frequently with jangling disparate titles.)
76. After Joseph de Ribera's "Clubfooted Boy" (1652).
77. Gilles Deleuze - op-cit (1985).
78 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
79 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
80 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985).
81 The painting "Marking through Webern" (1987) is a complex and finely tuned performance 
that underlies the centrality of music and dance as analogous modes for discussing the 
way Salle structures his work and the kinds o f meanings it conveys. The works engender 
a condition where both choreographic and dance rhythm focus, moment by moment, on 
the concrete impetus o f musical structures.
Salle tw ice deployed/exercised these elements directly in the mid-1980's in partnership 
with the dancer and choreographer Karole Armitage, whom he met in 1982 and who was
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known for radically disjunctive/punk influenced ballets, such as "Drastic Classicism" and 
"W atteau Duets". In the Spring of 1986 an Armitage piece, with sets and costumes 
designed by Salle, was commissioned by Mikhail Baryshnikov for the American Ballet 
Theatre. Titled 'T h e  Mollino Room" after the modern Italian architect/designer Carlo 
Mollino, it opened at the Kennedy Center, W ashington and later the Metropolitan Opera 
House, New York and was performed to a score consisting o f two movements by 
Hindemith and a recording of a 1960's Mike Nicols and Elaine May routine called "My Son 
the Nurse".
(See "David Salle" by Peter Schjedahl, ArTrandom  (1989) "Karole Armitage and David 
Salle: Three years of the ballet stage").
The fact that Salle should have chosen to collaborate directly with Karole Armitage, is no 
cause for surprise. Armitage builds her work in much the same way as Salle with a similar 
insistence on a mosaic schemeAechnique o f componentsAragments, the same exploitation 
of dischord and the ambiguous, and even possibly the same understanding of the body 
as the location o f human inquiry. 'The Mollino Room" echoes Salle's willingness in his 
paintings to mix cartoon and quotations from Art History. The reference to Carlo Mollino 
is explanatory and appropriate - Mollino is a seminal figure in the evolution of European 
modem style and his work is based on the evocation and juxtaposition of different period 
styles. This is precisely the procedure/strategy o f Salle and Armitage in their respective 
domains. 'T he  European Phrasing of the Late Albert Ayler" (1987) for which Salle 
produced both the costumes and the decor is more ambitious. It is an eclectic fusion of 
music by W ebern/Stravinsky/Ayler together with Lord Buckley and Yo-Yo Ma It proved 
a dazzeling production, "Ayler hits a plateau o f harmonious erotic feeling, powerful and 
free....that I want to call courtly". (Peter Schjedahl - Review of Armitage/Salle collaboration 
'The Elizabethan Phrasing o f Albert Ayler").
W hat is significant is the push towards a synthesis within the clear evidence of the 
interdependence o f the sections/parts o f construction. Salle and Armitage aim to 
“structure" improvisation. W hat they locate in Ayler is the power o f convincing phrasing. 
W hat attracts Salle principally is Ayler's capacity to  arrange complex statements and to 
construct spontaneous variations which reflect the contours of a theme. Ayler adopts the 
technique o f extending a solo based on a simple theme because this allows him to create 
a series o f sounds o f extraordinary force and effectiveness, while at the same time 
maintaining the comprehensive architecture o f the piece in a direct and communicable 
mode. Salle in much the same way utilizes a method that enables him to problematize this 
field of references without losing control - fusing easy familiarity with radical ambiguity, 
creating a tension at the intersices of images wilfully dening the literal surface of meaning.
Salle's association with Arm itage led him not only to work as a costume/set 
designer/collaborater for her productions but it also gave the movement of the figure more 
prominence in his pictures. In the left hand panel o f 'The Trucks bring Things" (1984) the 
contorted female nude, head cropped dramatically by the lower edge of the canvas, seems 
to tumble among the furniture pieces - the movement appears extravagant/inexplicable. 
Daubed over this image hovers the head and shoulders o f a woman, disembodied, 
perhaps the absent head o f the naked figure beneath. Both images seem "half- 
remembered'Vhalf-perceived". Salle contrasts this with a motif taken from a famous mid­
century advertisement - a confident, bustling gent gestures to a barman to bring another 
drink to his table. This painting seems to concern the legibility of the body, indicating how 
the body's actions m ay be instinctive/particularized, ambiguous even incomprehensible.
82. The disparate elements com e to form an "integrated unity" a concept of pictorial and 
compositional space with a history - the space o f time. W hat enpowers the postmodern 
work of art is a principalled oscillation between presence and absence, between 
experience and its memory traces.
83 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1985)
84 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
85 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
86 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
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THE MIRROR OF ENIGMAS (NUMBERS IN THE DARK)
There exist many analogies that may be discerned between the work o f David Lynch 
and David Salle. Lynch's cinematic imagery appears redolent with possibilities that can 
as a mechanism operate as a metaphorical structure which, in the following section, 
firstly we can conduct an analysis of elements of David Salle's oeuvre, and secondly to 
progressively animate Gilles Deleuze's concentration, in his later work, on 
philosophy/cinema/art/literature. Ultimately the intention is to construct original linkages 
between these components - it is always a process of advancing Deleuzoguattarian 
terminology in other directions.
David Salle's paintings capture a glamorous/visually extravagant style and he finds a 
sim ilar elaborately constructed visual world in the cinema. Lynch has himself 
acknowledged, and it is an affirmation that is confirmed by Salle, that he is involved with 
the "melos" o f American melodrama, with the undercurrents/subtexts that flow under a 
story and allow one to express something beyond "narrative" possibilities. Both artists 
use violent but distanced/mediated images as a counterweight to surface 
superficiality/"sugary" excess. This distance is essentially apparent, and moreover it is 
a strategy that both artists use as a means of being present to the world, attentive and 
open The "story" becomes, then, a pretext, a support on which to hang a fascination with 
human insincerity and an overwhelming sense of melancholic despair Melodrama is a 
genre that is attractive explicitly because it is larger than life - an artifice to  present the 
most dramatic incidents and emotions o f life in one's own timescale and with one's own 
timing
The scenery in Salle's paintings, as frigid as it is manneristic, has much to  do with his 
fondness fo r the America of the 1950's/early 60's era, expressed not only in the 
design/furniture elements, but also often in garish/vibrant colour schemes Beginning 
with the early "nouvelle vague" paintings and culminating with his rhetorically disparate 
recent works this formative era reverberates throughout Salle's oeuvre. Elements of
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“........... the photograph on the dashboard,
taken years ago,
turned around backwards so the windshield shows, 
every  streetlight reveals a p icture in reverse, 
still so much clearer.........
REM
Nightswim m ing
Godard's compelling fusion of radical chic and television angst are inculcated in the 
atmosphere of Salle's first "New York paintings" and emanations from the "American 
G raffiti Dream" (“Life” for example magazine advertisements for alcohol 
cigarettes/sweets/household appliances/model's o f domestication) - supply most of the 
ostensible content/material of the later "Early Product Paintings". American middle-class 
ideals, in the sleek form/the perfect surfaces of Salle's depictions, take on the quality of 
something positively monstrous and oppressive. There is an ironic recognition that 
"decent-type" people in their small towns with their "white-fenced" values are desperately 
holding onto all they have got. Salle knowingly acknowledges that American fables of 
redemption are now a mere nostalgic illusion. They offer no psychic renewal. The old 
them e o f American individualism aspiring to move forward in time and space 
unencumbered by guilt or reflection in human limitations is certainly unavailable to the 
guilt-ridden psyche that defines the contemporary human condition. (1)
Salle has a real love for the popular myths of American culture and a genuine nostalgia 
for some lost age of innocence when life was simpler. He also knows however that this 
world may never have existed, that even at the time things were not the way the media 
represented them, and that our memory and imagination may well be based on untruths. 
Salle 's work suggests that all America is a society o f ghosts, and that contemporary 
American civilization in general has been seduced by the attributes of its own popular 
culture. It has become a country where nothing lasts, where people pursue visions that 
lead nowhere, and where all relationships are transitory. Not only has culture taken full 
possession of imagination/memory/identity, but the proliferation of images produced via 
interaction in time and space has led to a proliferation of the self, to a land of multiple 
schizophrenia
In David Lynch's 1986 film "Blue Velvet" Lumberton is presented in imagery which 
unmistakably conjures up mythic small-town America, (familiar from Capra and Sturges), 
orderly and lawful on the surface yet disturbed and chaotic underneath (2). Lynch has 
described "Blue Velvet" as a "story o f love and mystery. It is ostensibly about a guy who
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lives in two worlds at the same time, one of which is pleasant and the other dark and 
terrifying" (3). Neither of these two worlds are entirely contemporaneous with ours. 
Lynch succeeds in mixing the atmosphere o f the 1950's with that of today, so that w e are 
no longer able to locate exactly where we are. (The 1950's are a rich source of 
inspiration for Lynch. "Blue Velvet" and "Twin Peaks" are both imbued with an idealized 
pastiche o f a 50's "look" - clothes/cars/roadhouse diners/apron-dressed smiling 
women/high school parties/friendly local stores) For Lynch the main protagonist o f "Blue 
Velvet", Jeffrey Beaumont, also belongs to an earlier period: "The boy is an idealist. He 
behaves like young people in the 50's, and the little town where I filmed is a good 
reflection of the naive climate there was back then. The local people tended to th ink the 
way people did 30 years ago, their houses, cars and accents have remained the sam e” 
(4).
"Blue Velvet" as Lynch says is , "a film that deals with things that are hidden w ithin a 
small town called Lumberton and things that are hidden within people" (5)
"Blue Velvet" is informed by a complex world view, the central matrix is the locus fo r the 
generation of a series o f possibilities between civilization/savagery, pure love/carnality, 
morality/immorality, town/wilderness, possibilities ingrained within mythic Am erican 
fiction In a sense "Blue Velvet" regards/acknowledges the complexity of experience 
existing between good and evil. By extension the corollary of this is the 
conflicted/ambiguous philosophy of nature which we find in American culture. (6).
Lumberton is a fantasy mirror, an idyllic American utopia. Beyond the city and the 
suburbs, where family/community/morality decay at an ever-increasing rate, there is the 
small town at the edge o f nature Beyond the corrupting influence of contemporary 
civilization, the world is beneficent and man is best capable of realizing his full potential 
as simple, decent and hard working. Lumberton is home - a metonymy for Am erica - 
a typical American small town in the midst o f a forest, combining all the resources o f its 
organized com fort and sense of order to resist an infinitely mysterious environment. It 
is a town where one feels protected from emptiness and the forces of cosmic darkness,
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by the little restaurant, the fireman who waves hello from his big red fire engine, the 
sheriffs department run by a kindly sheriff and the houses with neat gardens bordered 
by white fences under a perfect blue sky, and where everybody knows everybody.(7).
However, in the film world o f David Lynch, order is unremittingly vulnerable - the forces 
of chaos lie just beneath the surface, ready to exploit any frailty. Beneath the well-tended 
suburban lawns ants and beetles tear each other apart with venomous intensity. (The 
insect incarnates the brutal/anonymous/swarming "animality" o f the species, an 
"animalistic" horror at its m ost "alien'Vincomprehensible, contradicting any existential 
notions of life. For insects "living" is reduced to mechanical reproduction and pullulation.) 
A  gold-framed photograph o f a high-school sophomore conceals a life of drug 
abuse/promiscuity/self-degredation Lynch penetrates the "civilized" surface of everyday 
life to discover strange undercurrents of perverse passion, probing beneath the layers 
to expose the dark/irrational motivations above which the mundane world is just a 
façade. (8).
Arriving in Lumberton, Jeffrey Beaumont enters an unstable town in the process of 
revelation, a process that threatens to peel away the town's homespun/calm surface and 
leave nothing but an incarnate evil underneath. Once night falls and the shadows 
deepen, one can perceive the malevolent presence of evil. In the opening sequence of 
"Blue Velvet’, the garishly red roses and yellow tulips contrasted against a perfect white 
picket fence and the vivid green of a freshly cut lawn, are a pastiche upon the 
stereotypical attributes of suburban happiness, the banal made strange with intent. 
Lynch's extreme imagery signifies a dissatisfaction with the cinema's constant recourse 
to clichéd images When, in the same sequence, a fireman on a passing fire-engine 
looks directly into the camera, smiles and waves, the effect is comic, but are we 
supposed to laugh? Beneath this suburban idyll, the forces of chaos seem to lay in wait, 
ready to engulf/disintegrate stability Is it that Lynch is laughing at himself, that he is 
mockingly lured into his own pastiched image of the suburban American dream? (9).
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The billowing blue velvet curtain in "Blue Velvet's" opening credits creates a mood of 
intrigue/subterfuge. Curtains conceal, both for the viewer inside looking out, and the 
observer outside looking in. They represent a shifting surface behind which may be 
discovered a performance, as in the theatre, or a performer, as in a nightclub. Curtains 
cover windows/doors/spaces. The velvet curtain represents the seductive surface of 
artifice
"I like the idea that everything has a surface which hides much more underneath" says 
Lynch "Someone can look very well and have a whole bunch of diseases cooking: there 
are all sorts o f dark twisted things lurking down there. I go down in that darkness and 
see what's there" (David Lynch) (10).
Lynch's preoccupation with surfaces implies a risk of dealing only with surfaces, 
specifically the superficial surface without depth. The television series 'Twin Peaks" 
guides the viewer through a multi-layered text of surfaces, with isolated moments of 
clarity. By contrast the film version T w in  Peaks": Fire Walk with Me" emerges as a text 
o f elaborate surfaces, with periodic revelations of what lies beyond the superficial.
The velvet curtain is David Lynch's metaphor for surface. We look behind the velvet 
curtain seeking meaning, but there is no guarantee we canl locate it. W hat we discover 
ultimately takes us beneath our own "surfaces", in mind and flesh - especially flesh.
"I'm real keen on the Mid-West, downtown L.A., Egyptian hieroglyphics, black-and-white 
German expressionism and art-deco" (11)
To balance the choice of expressionism in this list one might add:
"I like diners. I don’t like dark places. I like light places with Formica and metal and nice 
shiny silver -metal, mugs, glasses, a good Coca-Cola machine. So I'm looking for stories 
or a script in the 50's, you know, detectives and that kind of thing - diner s tu ff'
(David Lynch)(12)
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The realization of this is "Blue Velvet” , where 40’s "noir" meets 50's diner culture meets 
a postmodern "bricolage” .
David Salle clearly enjoys the crass over-simplifications, the uncomplicated vulgarity and 
the transparent falsity of 50's style Salle similarly to Lynch makes us complies to the 
sliding surfaces that are alluring and seductive as long as you ask no questions, where 
the skilful use o f simultaneity immediately complicates the image, and where as soon as 
we begin to unravel the distinct elements we become lost in a maze of questions and 
conflicting emotions. (13).
In certain of Salle's paintings, we are witness to the most hidden desires, secret longings, 
sexual obsessions. Deprived o f intimacy, they are dragged into the light and thereby 
enlarged onto an over dimensional format to such an extent that they are rendered 
objects of public display. For example the five-meter wide painting "The Tulip Mania of 
Holland" (1985) by its scale alone transfers the nocturnal world o f the peepshow into a 
sphere of general availability. There is no seductiveness, there rarely is with Salle's 
nudes, they lack pornography's obligatory illusion o f ecstasy - the models are engaged 
not in an act o f sexual play but in the laborious process of poses that precisely by 
appearing forced/unnatural dramatize the "reality" not the fantasy of femaleness. The 
upper panel is constructed from an "atomic-age" garishly coloured synthetic fabric, 
m aking an eloquent use o f the two-panel system - literally a realm unattainable, a 
firmament of dreams. Also included in this design scheme Salle integrates three images 
of African tribes-people in murky photographs, and four views o f a hyper-kitsch 50's 
Italian-style armchair. On the panel below along with the two nudes we have the sketch 
of a young man (from John Singer Sargent) and an insert painting of male genitals. The 
distorted perspectives, the placement of the nudes on examination table-tops generates 
distance anew, and an atmosphere of melancholic despair encircles the observer. The 
tension between above and below/far and near/then and now is a closed loop, endless 
and excruciating.
252
"Blue Velvet" like "Wild at Heart" (1990) and "Twin Peaks" (1989) offers a 
reckless/frenzied and often violent journey through peculiar and perverse worlds - the 
dark side o f the human psyche - and as an audience we function as voyeurs into these 
worlds; intrigued and fascinated by what we see, yet always distanced from it. One o f the 
dominant tones, that produces a degree of aesthetic consistency in Salle's work is the 
undercurrent of erotic play that becomes a syntax for dealing with controlled violence. 
In both Salle and Lynch's work there is an oscillation between the urge to repress 
knowledge into secrecy and the compulsion to reveal what is concealed. Salle's 
paintings, as with Lynch's later films are laced with figurations and gestures revealing a 
preoccupation with secret passages/naratives-mirrors/disguises/masks/eaves dropping 
secret relationships/individualism/the threat of sexual violence. Both artists achievement 
is to combine high dramatic/romantic pathos with postmodern pastiche. (14)
Lynch's work suggests a formal organisation of material which achieves interest by using 
forms interrogatively rather than in a closed, autotelic style (like Salle the "narrative units" 
are not conventionally arranged to be interpreted, rather they seem to point to a process- 
image-ordering/ derivation of meaning and significance). The actual plot of "Blue Velvet" 
is not an end in itself - it always serves a meaning, for "narratives" are not related for their 
own sake but for the demonstration o f something that extends beyond themselves - we 
can always figure out acts of reading that will offer a new and significant sense of an 
ending
In the project Deleuze does not try to abandon binarized thought, or to replace it with an 
alternative, rather binarized categories are played off against each other rendered 
molecular and analyzed in their molar particularities so that the possibilities of 
reconnections and realignments in different "systems" are established - (the 
outside/exterior does not necessarily remain eternally counterpoised to an inferiority that 
it contains) - the outside is the transmutability o f the inside. It is for this reason that 
Deleuze advocates linking the outside not with the inside, but with the "real". The outside 
is a "virtual" condition of the inside, as equally real (15), as time is the virtual o f space.
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The virtual is immanent in the real (Thought is the confrontation/encounter with an 
outside)
In the Deleuzian understanding of the time-image in cinema the outside is what displaces 
the  inside what emerges is passed from without to effect an inferiority, (the problem is 
posed to concepts, to thinking, from/as the outside that can only appear to thought as the 
u thought, and to sight as the unseen). The outside insinuates itself into thought, drawing 
knowledge outside of itself/outside of what is expected, producing a space it can occupy - 
an outside within the inside. Significantly Deleuze claims that the outside must be 
thought itself. Thought is projected/captured/identified insofar as it is integrated into 
networks of knowledge/subjectification.(16) (17).
It is not in a convergence but in the process o f disjunction that the outside is active in the 
production of an inside. This explains why, for Deleuze, the middle is always the 
privileged initiation point (thought is primarily operative "in between"). Thought begins in 
the middle/at the point o f intersection o f two series/events/processes that, however 
transitional, share a moment o f convergence. Ultimately however, the inferiority of this 
interaction is not the principle area of concern, alternatively the focus concentrates on the 
means of alignment/connection, creating a plane of co-existence facilitated by the 
operations of the outside. "Becoming" is the activity via which the two series transform - 
becoming is bodily thought, the ways thought/force/change come to invest/invent new 
series, metamorphosing new bodies from the old via an active engagement
'W hat counts i s .............the interstices between images (in cinema), between two images:
a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it"
(Gilles Deleuze) (18)
Becoming is what facilitates the action of a trait/line/orientation/event to be disengaged 
from a system/series/object which consequently may effect a transformation of the whole, 
m aking it no longer function singularly - it is a process of the encounter that releases
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something from each protagonistic element and in that process, makes "real" a virtuality, 
a series of enabling/transformative possibilities - both subject and object are transformed
via the encounter. (19).
Thought exists between a cause and its habitual effect, between one being and another. 
It is an unhinging/a re-arrangement of order/organization not to replace but to re-order. 
Thought may not primarily produce a new entity but may intersect to cause a 
"stammer"/hesitation/pause -  thought can actively function passively to interrupt 
habit/expectation by enabling something already in the series/subject/order to "become". 
Thought consists in extending the space/"zone o f indeterminacy" between stimulus and 
response producing further potential responses to the extent that confronted with an 
individual stimulus a reaction cannot be predicted. Thought-in-becoming is less a novel 
action than a non-action of derangement o f stimulus response circuits in order to create 
a space/zone where chance/change may intervene.
Lynch utilizes "narrative" units of a specific type; they are what he would term 
secrets/facets/atmospheres of a particular environment/world, like "found objects" within 
the milieux he creates on film. The "narratives" are the elements of information, or the 
style o f the brushstrokes, that define these constructs. ("Twin Peaks" operates as a 
fascinating contradiction: its overall direction concentrates upon the hunt for a killer, but 
this is a device/excuse for visiting the place Twin Peaks; the stories of the people who 
live there are full of idiosyncrasy/mystery/menace but they have no essential "narrative" 
purpose, hence the extension of narrative themes/flows into paranoid circuits and 
complications)
The European conception of the book ("the arborescent search and return to the old
world") is opposed to the American conception:".... there is the rhizomatic West, with its
Indians without ancestry, its ever-receding limit, its shifting and displaced frontiers. There 
is a whole American "map" in the West, where even the trees form rhizomes. America 
reversed the directions: it put its Orient in the West, as if it were precisely in America that
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the  earth came full circle; its W est is the edge of the East" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari) (20). The authors refer to Leslie Fiedler's "The Return of the Vanishing 
America" (21) to illustrate the geographic element that functions in American literature. 
They suggest that the search for an American "code" intersects with other searches. 
Deleuze and Guattari conclude that an American writer/artist creates a cartography within 
his or her style In contrast to the European model, each artist/writer constructs a map 
tha t is directly connected to the “ real” social movements crossing America. 
Supplementing this geographic/cartographic construct Deleuze and Guattari add a 
rhizomatic dimension, therefore this movement within American literature/texts is not 
specifically a question of a particular place, nor of a given moment in history, even less 
a particular category of thought. It is a question of a model, which is constantly set-up 
and then dismantled, and of a process which is constantly prolonged, which continually 
breaks off and begins again.
"the world is changing, and we are changing within it. As soon as you think you've got 
something figured out, it's different. That's what I try to do. I don't try to do anything new, 
or weird or David Lynch".
(David Lynch) (22).
The aura of degeneration and evil that emanates from "Blue Velvet" is one whose terror 
achieves its fear and its thrill not through a palpable darkness, but through an impalpable 
uncertainty As in many thrillers Jeffrey's motives become confused: "I don't know 
whether you're a detective or a pervert" Sandy says to him. Jeffrey uncovers a 
violent/transgressive side of his "wholesome" hometown but in doing so he also makes 
uncomfortable discoveries about himself.
"Blue Velvet" does not simply register some anterior evil lurking in the American 
landscape/psyche, but it constructs this evil (and its antithesis) through a fruitful 
imbalance of its formal operations. Far from simply fitting into pre-established traditions 
"Blue Velvet' challenges the basic assumption of traditions - that pessimism is somehow
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more real/true than optimism. The film  performs this challenge by making the evil 
catalytic and manoeuvrable rather than dogmatic and manipulative.
For the majority of analysis Deleuzian film-theory Is fram ed in a Bergsonian/Peircean 
language of "imagesVsigns". If inventively/procreatively one connects the final chapter 
of "Cinema 2" and the chapter on "le v isib leTI’enoncable" in "Foucault" one m ay perceive 
that cinema, like painting, can be for Deleuze an art that integrates/centres forces.
In "Foucault" Deleuze identifies Foucault's early "archaeologies o f knowledge" as 
organized around the opposition of "le visible" and "I'enoncable" - "that which can be 
seen" and "that which can be stated". W hat Foucault demonstrates is that knowledge 
takes shape via relations of forces that make certain th ings visible/sayable and others 
invisible/unsayable. In the historical formation of knowledge, configurations o f forces 
dictate the conditions of visibility/enunciability o f all possible objects of knowledge, but the 
forces o f the visible and the forces of the sayable are not the same, nor do the visible and 
the sayable directly relate to one another as referent to sign or signified to signifier. Each 
has its separate history of formation and each its separate configuration of forces, even 
though the two do impinge on and influence one another.
In his "archaeological studies" Foucault distinguishes the domains of the visible and the 
sayable and brings into relief the forces that shape those domains. In this sense, his 
work is consonant with the work of certain contemporary film-m akers, who in terms of 
Deleuzian film-theory take as their project the creation of a cinema that is explicitly audio­
visual, in which sounds and images are treated as separate components with 
autonomous modes of organisation/articulation. Deleuze argues for example, in "Cinema 
2" that the film-makers of the French New W ave disrupt the classic cinema's traditional 
co-ordination of sound and image and inaugurate an innovative practice in which sound 
and image function as self-contained compositional elements. In modern cinema, 
speech, instead of influencing organizing images, folds back on Itself and becomes de­
naturalized. "....new types of speech-act and new structurations of space. An
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"archaeological" conception almost in Michel Foucault's sense. It is a method that 
Godard was to inherit, and which he would make the basis o f his own pedagogy" (Gilles 
Deleuze) (23). For example in the later films of David Lynch, the characters deliver lines 
of dialogue as if they were overhearing someone else speaking, their speech resonating 
less w ith their interlocutors' discourse than with itself In addition visual images are no 
longer connected specifically to the rational co-ordinates o f a narrative space/time, but 
are juxtaposed in non-rational sequences that function as direct images o f time, while the 
visual space of the image becomes "archaeological, stratigraphic, tectonicf an 
anonymous/empty/disconnected space whose "pictorial or sculptural qualities depend on 
a geological, tectonic power as in Cezanne's Mountains" (Gilles Deleuze) (24)
"A whole pedagogy is required here, because we have to read the visual as well as hear 
the speech-act in a new way.... a "Godardian pedagogy" “(G illes Deleuze) (25)
This new regime consists of images and sequences that are no longer linked by rational 
cuts, which end the first or begin the second, but are re-linked in conjunction with 
irrational cuts, which no longer belong to either of the two and are valid in themselves 
(interstices). Irrational cuts thus have a disjunctive value,
W hat Lynch makes visible and sayable in his films are invisible and unsayable forces, the 
same forces that structure the Foucaultian archives of "le visible" and "l'énonçable". 
Lynch engages the forces that structure the visible and the sayable and by defamiliarizing 
conventional images and sounds, creates sonic and optic assemblages that render 
audible and visible unheard and unseen forces.
In the same way David Salle effects discordant "visual music" in paintings like "Black Bra" 
(1983) with its cinematic close-up of eyes, its Cezanne-esque apples, and its brandished 
brassière Indeed the painter's 1988 exhibition at the Mary Boone Gallery, which included 
such restlessly complex works as "The Wig Shop" (1987) "The Kelly Bag" (1987) and 
"Symphony Concertante 11" (1987), was remarkable for its compositional turbulence -
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doubled imagery, multiple inserts and aspects, frantically agitating semi-nudes, intricate 
reprises and head-on collisions of imagistic motifs. These are some of the Salle's 
darkest but imagistically richest works.
In Oeleuzian philosophy the emphasis on choice and an affirmation o f alterity requires 
the creation o f new concepts. In "Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque" (1988) (26), Deleuze 
constructs the notion of the fold as an anti-extensional concept of the multiple/an anti- 
dialectical concept of the event/ an anti-Cartesian concept o f the subject (27). Deleuze's 
fold is a figure of the multiple located in an anti-set-theoretical ontology - Deleuze's 
multiple folds/unfolds appear in the manner of an organic process of 
expansion/contraction which is in direct contrast to the Cartesian concept o f extension 
which is present and determined by shock(28).
Philosophy according to Deleuze, is not an inference, but rather a "narration". W hat he 
says about the Baroque can equally be applied to his own style of thought: "the 
description takes the place of the object, the concept becomes narrative, and the subject 
(becomes) point of view or subject o f the enunciation" (29). Baroque forms exist with an 
extrem e level o f intensity that is intrinsic to them, they fragment even as they 
evolve/develop, they tend to occupy space in every direction, to punctuate it, to become 
contemporary with all its multiple possibilities. Deleuze identifies in Liebniz's thought the 
play of a dualistic movement between fixity and passage, the activity o f a simultaneous 
m obility and closure of concepts. This confirms what Deleuze observes about the 
sufficiency o f Liebnizian reason, an "extraordinary philosophical activity which consists 
in the creation of principles", where there are "two poles, are towards which all principles 
are folding themselves together, the other toward which they are all unfolding, in the 
opposite way" The double movement characterizes what Deleuze calls "the extreme 
taste for principles", far from favouring the division into compartmentalization that 
"presides over the passage o f beings, o f things, and of concepts under all kinds o f mobile 
partitions" (30)
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"Le P li: Leibniz et le baroque" is not simply an explication o f a history of philosophy/art. 
Deleuze suggests that it is a process wherein the Baroque is reconcilled with the concept 
it is perceived to "lack". It may be said to be a stratum in the "geology" of the present (the 
continuity/discontinuity of the Leibniz series and its connections with various other series).
The most succinct formulation of the relations between the Baroque and the present 
would be that the Baroque"exists within our present condition" The Baroque in 
contemporary culture is not concerned with a nostalgia for the past but a possibility 
endem ic to and perhaps unrealizable in the present. If the contemporary condition is 
Baroque it is because of the unrelenting and prevailing crisis of postmodern culture 
requiring faster and faster circulation, more and more artifice to realise value and secure 
subjects. If a Baroque thought process is integrated within our present condition by 
means of the simultaneous mechanisms of an enclosure and an opening onto a world, 
the same it may be said is applicable to Leibniz. If we proceed to trace and integrate 
Leibnizian notions about a compound substance being composed of a multiplicity of 
monadic substances, and being defined in terms of existence as a unity of movement 
and transition, then one could interpret the singular predicates which define this notion 
as relations to the world. For example, one would have a Leibniz constituted around a 
number of "pre-individual" singularities - a “transvaluation" o f all values.
Deleuze argues that it is possible to discover the actuality of Lebniz across the 
range/spectrum of his work. For example, we might locate a key mechanism in Leibniz's 
m athem atics - the process of extracting an irrational numbe. The number within 
comprises o f a complete series of rational numbers, or as with existance/the sphere of 
contingent truths, the extraction of a differential relating incommensurable series and 
contained within "a certain potential".
The Deleuzian concept of the fold gives us a new Leibniz "incompossible" with the 
traditional Leibniz Leibniz's theories about "incompossibilty" may afford a way/method 
of thought regarding self-organizing systems. Reading Leibniz, Deleuze finds in his work
260
numerous examples of a root differential which brings together incommensurable series 
Leibniz use o f the Neo-Platonic triad of explication-implication-complication-already 
demonstrates the sharing of a common root, "le pli" - a substantive/verbal morphological 
form. Deleuze's reading of Leibniz replicates Leibnizian principles with the intention of 
extending his claim s beyond the limits he had established for them himself. "Leibniz 
innovates when he invokes a profoundly original relation among all possible worlds. By 
stating that it is a great mystery buried in God's understanding, Leibniz gives the new 
relation the name o f "incompossibility” . W e discover that we are in a dilemma of seeking 
the solution to a Leibnizian problem under the conditions that Leibniz has established. 
W e cannot know what God's reasons are, nor how he applies them in each case, but we 
can demonstrate that he possesses some of them, and what their principle may be" 
(G illes Deleuze) (31).
The notion of "Incompossibility" helps us explain Deleuze's proposition that Leibniz 
advocates God, but the contrary of this suggestion, Leibniz non-advocate, is not 
impossible/contradictory in itself. To explain how Leibniz the non-advocate is not 
contradictory in itself, another relation is needed, not between two differently conceived 
Leibnizes but rather between Leibniz the non-advocate and the world where Leibniz has 
advocated. The non-advocating Leibniz must be excluded from the world in which he 
has advocated and as a consequence the two worlds are in a relation of 
"incompossibility"(32) and world in which Leibniz does not advocate cannot pass into 
existence at the same time as the world of advocacy. Therefore one may suggest that 
a Leibniz that does not conform to established sentiments is perfectly possible and 
implies no contradiction but requires another world in which to be realized.
For Deleuze, Leibniz is the philosopher most closely identified with the Baroque. Leibniz 
is current in the ensemble of his research in his treatment of contradiction. He helps to 
explain/unfold w hat we know about the contemporary condition of the world. For the 
Baroque, a vital concern was centred around the new and a new ordering, as indeed it 
is, according to Deleuze, for Leibniz. The Leibniz series contains the Baroque event in
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so far as it develops in formal continuity with the exterior. Leibniz thus produces what 
could be an "individuation" of things, derived from the analysis of the requisites of the 
notion o f the fold. An infinite movement integrated within the subject either virtually or 
under a certain potential. The experience of the Baroque entails that o f the fold. Leibniz 
is the premier philosopher of "le pli", of curves and twisting surfaces. He re-figures/re- 
defines the phenomenon of "point of view"/perspective - o f "narratives" that invalidate 
"narratives" to develop the infinite possibilities o f serial form. Leibniz is acknowledged for 
prom oting the conception that all predicates are contained within the subject. A 
conception, that it has been claimed, prefigures the modern subject-predicate logic. 
Additionally it should be seen that the subject-predicate notion also operates on a 
metaphysical level, inculcated within the deterministic scheme that a monad unfolds only 
in the form  of a complete individual notion. Deleuze adapts this scheme to annotate the 
conception that all analysis is infinite, and m ore precisely the analysis of existants in 
term s o f the actually infinite.
The concept of the fold enables us to conceive o f a Deleuzian-Leibniz "incompossible" 
with the traditional Leibniz. The fold besides being a theme o f Baroque art can also be 
observed moving across the surface of the multiple subject matters o f the Leibnizian 
oeuvre. "Incompossibility" occurs, in Deleuze's configuration, when "series" diverge in 
the vicinity of a singularity. That is when the predicates of a subject imply a contradiction, 
one finds oneself, insofar as that subject exists, in the presence of another world. The 
world in which Leibniz operates transvaluations and the world in which he advocates exist 
in a relation of incompossibility. A  transvaluing Leibniz is therefore non-contradictory in 
that there would be two diverging Leibnizian series
For Leibniz neither the self nor the world works schematically. Everywhere the subject 
flickers iridescently, adhering to the forces that exert stress and define the individual 
body, its elasticity, and in its contorted notions in volumes that produce movement in/of 
extension The subject lives and re-enacts its own “genetic" development as a play o f 
folds. W ith the fold a fluctuation/deviation from the norm replaces the permanence o f a
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law, when an object assumes its place in a continuum of variation. The object acquires 
a new status "a temporal modulation'Ta continuous variation of matter''. The object is 
not divided from the template that formed it. A "continuous temporal molding" of 
serialized objects replaces a paradigm of spatiality by another, of temporal order. 
Deleuze notes that Leibniz's system of continuity and modulation transforms completely 
traditional notions about object and event, but simultaneously confirming to an order of 
preformation.
The fold is the principle of the Leibniz-Baroque series or more precisely its principle in 
relation to the contemporary world. Leibniz's work continues to be appropriately current 
because it contains within it, under a certain potential, an understanding o f the 
incommensurable relation to existence, being for the world as the infinite movement of 
folding, as the perfect co-incidence o f the forces of transcendence and immanence.
In the conclusion to "Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque", discussing painting, Deleuze suggests 
that paintings seem to exceed the parameters of their frame - the law of a perceptual 
series ("contained" within the space/time frame is a "subject") the world it comprises, 
cannot be held within, more exactly the representational content of the world. It is 
through the Baroque that the recognition emerges of the world being an hallucinatory 
presence/a fiction. Authentic being for the world requires a realisation of perception as 
precisely fictive.
"The Baroque is widely known to be typified by the "concetto" but only insofar as the 
Baroque "concetto" can be opposed to the classical concept." (Gilles Deleuze) (33). It 
is Leibniz that introduces a new conception to the concept which is in opposition to the 
classical conception o f the concept in the way that Descartes had conceived it and 
therein transforms philosophy
The Leibnizian concept, "is not a simple logical being, but a metaphysical being it is not 
a generality or a universality, but an individual; it is not defined by an attribute, but by
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predicates-as-events" (Gilles Deleuze) (34). Leibniz's myriad connections and series of 
concepts are not held in a prescribed order or unifying system. Multiplicity and a variety 
of inflections produce "events'Vvibrations" with an "infinity o f harmonics or submultiples". 
The Baroque is defined by the fold that goes out to infinity. In Leibniz's world one 
encounters no difficulty in reconciling full continuity in extension with the most 
comprehensive and unified individuality, "... the essence o f the Baroque entails neither 
falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather "realizing" something in illusion itself, or 
o f tying it to a spiritual "presence" that endows its spaces and fragments with a collective 
unity" (Gilles Deleuze) (35). The Baroque introduces a new type of “story" in which 
description replaces the object, the concept becomes narrative and the subject becomes 
a point o f view/subject of expression
Both David Salle's imagery in his paintings and David Lynch's films "Blue Velvet"/Twin 
Peaks'VW ild at Heart" are conducive to being interpreted within a Deleuzian-Leibniz- 
Baroque framework. Deleuze's analysis has proven that many Twentieth century art- 
form s can attest to the continuing vitality o f Baroque elements/schemes. A  type of 
postmodern Baroque (a distinctly postmodern form- Baroque as process rather than 
product) (36) utilizes familiar Baroque themes and devices, but these elements 
experience a transformation once they are immersed in the currents of, for example, 
painting/film/literature - instead of being a mere repetition o f formula alternatively this 
becomes a disruptive process o f transgression and uncertainty.
A  key aspect of the Baroque is its narrative ambiguity, ".. .stories enclosed one in the 
other, and the variation of the relation of narrator-and-narration" (Gilles Deleuze) (37) 
multiple story lines, fragments of interpolated narratives, puzzles within puzzles, 
frustrating the narrative flow by constantly fracturing, everywhere restructuring and 
undercutting meaning
Salle and Lynch take our desire fo r meaning and aggravate it. Explanations are Baroque 
and overtly complicated Like architecture - in place of highly detailed decoration (which
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distracts and produces confusion) or elaborate stained glass (glass which is opaque 
rather than transparent), the postmodern Baroque renders an excess of "narrative" 
messages The "narrative" line never settles into a familiar/constant linear structure for 
any significant length of time, it frustrates any a ttem pt to pin-down any one particular 
"narrative" form. Logic and meaning are confounded, each semiotic element which 
ordinarily would narrow the range of "narrative" meaning combines with other elements 
to expand/complicate the possible meanings. (38)
With "W ild at Heart" (1990) and “Twin Peaks: Fire W alk with Me" (1992) Lynch returns 
to the Baroque style of his early works. In these two prodigious/agitated films Lynch 
extends his search for a non-psychological cinema which combines textures and themes, 
a cinem a with a more extensive uncircumscribed/epic tone and free, unpredictable 
constructions The genre he was aiming for can be termed " cine-symphony", 
characterized by traits such as the use of powerful contrasts; the revelation rather than 
the concealm ent of the use of discontinuity in the  "architectural" structure; a broad 
application o f Dolby sound exploiting its resources to  obtain/contrast space/power in the 
sound; and a bolder mixture of tones and atmospheres. These components are still 
nevertheless to be integrated to form an expressive whole which is organized around 
elements displaying their disparateness. (39)
In "W ild at Heart" (1990) the film’s visual and sound leitmotivs and its system of 
alternating plots delays the emergence of anything concrete to the extent that it never 
arrives. The subject of the film resides precisely in the  chasm which is opened up by that 
very delaying mechanism. Additionally the film's violence leads nowhere. It neither 
procures a cathartic transcendence nor is it reinscribed to catalyze the action. Lynch 
introduces effects purely to shock and this specifically can be identified as the "meaning" 
of the film and the source of its special pathos. Its rhapsodic structure resembles that 
o f "Twin Peaks Fire Walk with Me" (1992) and involves a rectilinear trajectory, a forward 
flight which is intersected by encounters/episodes/visions that suddenly occur and then 
evanescently dematerialize.
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Lynch uses isolated sequences and discontinuous continuity acts within the narrative 
which have no direct bearing on plot development, disrupting the syntatic flow with 
random inserts, but forming integrated narrative segments. The ca r accident scene in 
"Wild at Heart" disrupts Sailor's and Lula's, to date, uneventful journey, and operates as 
a premonition o f the dark sequence of events to follow. In itself, the episode seems 
bizarre and out of context. A car wreck/severed bodies/and a young girl who dies of 
visually explicit head injuries, doesn't relate directly to Sailor and Lula's "story", but is 
suggestive of a mood/atmosphere. The film assumes a darker tone after the incident, 
and prepares us for a later negative lead In the final sequence, when Lula arrives to 
m eet Sailor, she encounters a similar meaningless and bloody road accident - like a 
harbinger of doom at their fateful meeting. The conspicuousness o f these effects is 
blatant in producing a recurrent Lynchian technique - violating the decorous convention 
that continuity cuts should be seamless/unnoticeable. Lynch uses their visibility as a 
structural procedure, in which the continuity cut is distinct from the elements linked, re­
enforcing the impression o f a fragmented/non-totalized structure.
Deleuze suggests that the characteristics o f a "new" cinema include: "the dispersive 
situation, the deliberately weak links, the voyage from, the consciousness of clichés, the 
condemnation of the plot. It is the crisis o f both the action-image and the American 
Dream" (Gilíes Deleuze) (40)
Lynch's cinema is at its most provocative/energized with the abstract sequences that 
supplement the narrative without relating directly to it. (The expressionistic shadowed 
face miming "In Dreams'Va severed ear in a field/warring ants beneath a newly trimmed 
suburban lawn, are a few examples of the visual idiosyncrasies that appear in "Blue
Velvet")
In "Wild at Heart" the "video-clip style" relies on images that are highly conspicuous in 
themselves There are distinct contrasts between one scene and the next, an 
emphatic/abrupt editing style and the periodic recurrence of short mental visions, or
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rather sound-image blocks which disappear as quickly as they arise. Discontinuity and 
th e  resulting contrasts are present in Lynch's work from the start and they have 
repercussions at every level o f his films formal structures as well as in their narrative 
arrangements.
Throughout "Wild at Heart" one may identify a recurrent theme concerning how two 
people, and by further extension, the world itself can hold together. This question is 
inscribed in the form of the film. Formally, the linkage of disparate and contrasting 
e lem ents - grotesque/picturesque, sentimental/bloody, poetic/abrupt, gentle etc. which 
com prise the film makes 'W ild at Heart” (1990) into a film of continuity cuts and hyphens. 
T h e  primacy o f the effects is blatant, thus producing one more effect, negating the 
traditional filmic convention that continuity cuts should be integrated/unnoticeable. With 
Lynch, their visibility becomes a structural procedure, in which the continuity cut is distinct 
fro m  the elements thus linked, and therefore re-enforces the impression of a 
discontinuous/poetically unstable structure.
Lynch 's addition of a happy ending, recalling the "Wizard of Oz" (1939) is deliberately 
unannounced so that it does not smooth over the variegated structure or provide a sense 
o f  ca lm  at the conclusion to a narrative full of dramatic and violent incidents. Lynch's 
hum our is a combination of cynicism and naivety - the happy endings of 'W ild  at Heart" 
and "Blue Velvet" are so overstated as to caricature the traditional happy ending - they 
are derisive appendages to mock narrative closure. The formal closure of "Blue Velvet" 
fu lfils  the promise of singing robins, but it is a fake robin; the formal closure o f "Wild at 
H eart" re-unites Lula and Sailor, who finally gets to sing "Love Me Tender", but the 
im plied ending leaves Lula's deranged mother still anxious to eliminate Sailor, and 
Santos with a still valid "hit” contract.
W ith  "Blue Velvet" Lynch demonstrates the art of making "ordinary" daily-life strange. The 
sm ooth  anonymous style of the shooting script injects an extensive measure of 
strangeness and terror into the simplest of images Utilizing a distinctive/consciously
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unusual editing style makes seemingly/originally banal im ages into something terrifying. 
(For example, there is a disturbing sequence in which Jeffrey opens his bedroom door 
one evening and walks down the stairs towards the living room on his way for a walk - 
this typical style shot begins in total darkness before it is illuminated by the bedroom door 
opening, creating the impression of an opening onto another more convulsive/ectopic 
world).
For "Blue Velvet" Lynch adopts the screen format of Cinemascope. Many of "Blue 
Velvet's" shots use a telescopic, wide-angle curved lens. The wide-angle lens allows the 
screen to accommodate vast rooms, (similar to the extensive dimensions of Salle's 
canvases), such as the living-room in Dorothy's flat/the W illiams family home Ben's 
place. The living space thus created, while virtually coinciding with the frame space, 
reinforces the feeling that the characters exist in settings which precede them.
Few contemporary painters have achieved Salle's vision o f an ambitious and fluid 
balance o f visual and literary constructs, his oeuvre is a complete and sustained 
"narrative" o f rapidly accumulated visual and worldly experience/information. (41). Salle 
does not have an instantly recognisable/definable signature style and his work provides 
neither structural symmetry nor narrative logic. W ha t we might discern is a 
contrived/inexorable emotional distance and a concentrated negation o f self-absorbed 
gesture. (If there is, for example, an "expressionistic" passage in a Salle painting its 
appearance suggests that he is "doing that style" so to speak). If there is a profound 
quality to Salle's accumulations of imagery - the rich incident often in endlessly variable 
combinations/beautiful/ugly febrile/clever/thoughtful/chic - there seems also a hollow 
resonance, a melancholic quality, as he makes vacancy seem  seductive.
Salle's paintings are strictly composed/highly organized but yet there is no established 
set pattern or dependable rhythm to the mechanism via which this dynamic operates. 
Pictorially childishly sketched areas with clashing colours appear next to technically 
adroit and masterfully executed line drawings, elegant pieces of fabric are covered with
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"tasteless" consciously "untalented" figure-drawings, reminiscent of the 1950's advertising 
im agery, fragments of Nineteenth Century illustrations appear superimposed on 
monochrome photographic transparencies of the human anatomy/body, enlarged elegiac 
im ages appear next to sub-Disney cartoon characters, newspaper photos next to "Afro- 
cubist" motifs, Giacomettiesque figures alongside arrangements of 1950's furniture and 
design pieces. Signs/meaning/value only develop through opposition, through 
conceptual and material difference. Salle's paintings do not seek the referenial meaning 
of the individual signs/images, but he works rather with the relative relationships among 
these signs/images. If Salle's oeuvre can be viewed from this standpoint we can suggest 
that th e  individual elements, scattered over the canvas, and superficially at least 
"arbitrarily" arranged, are analogous to an act of play that violates the conventions of 
language and rationality. What is aimed at here is not a classical totality of an associative 
plane o f meaning but rather the play of signifiers which, at every moment in the process 
of creation, of the signifying a c t both challenges and seeks to go beyond its own self- 
formulated boundaries. Using both figuration and "narrative” material Salle demonstrates 
that fo rm  can correspond to content in such a manner, so that at a particular moment 
language is at one with meaning, and the work emerges not as expression but as a 
creation
David Lynch's script o f "Blue Velvet" revolves around an extravagant logic, it is an 
eclectic fusion of sequences suffused with dream-like fantasy images of pictorial 
strangeness alternated with more impassive everyday scenes For example, such 
m oments when Sandy and Jeffrey talk together in the car/ the party scene/the town diner 
scene and so on - this ingrained banality is o f course essential to the story - it can be 
contrasted with the high-mannered stylization of the scenes in Dorothy's apartment and 
the series of violent scenes involving Frank. It was "Twin Peaks" that later confirmed 
definitively how David Lynch was able to endow the common-place with an 
extra/extraordinary dimension. "Blue Velvet's" familiarity and intimacy serve to show just 
how strange Lynch's version of reality is. Normal life proceeds precariously while around 
is darkness and violence (42). Thus "Blue Velvet" acquires a more interesting and
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beautiful atmosphere more entirely in tune with the disturbance it provokes in us. Lynch 
brings the horrid and the normal into a close juxtaposition until the viewer is unsure what 
it is that exactly constitutes normality. (43).
A  key term when describing Salle and Lynch's work is "act o f reading", both the paintings 
and the films allow the reader to travel through the "narrative" unfolding a multiplicity of 
interconnecting perspectives which are offset whenever there is an alternation from one 
to another. For example it is in "Blue Velvet's" potential for a constant substitution of 
identities (Sandy and Dorothy incarnate two sides of a female figure/Frank is both a 
m urderer and a father/Dorothy is a mother and lover) that enables the viewer to create 
a network of connections that is not simply dependent upon the mechanical/passive 
linear process of isolated data accumulated from different perspectives. In other words, 
all the units that constitute the conditions of a "narrative" can be mixed and matched to 
multiply and create new points o f departure/new "narrative" lines.
The Baroque is characterized by a polysemous fusion o f "authentic" representations 
which consistently forces the viewer into an uneasy oscillation between ways of 
understanding. The plot o f "Blue Velvet" does not operate according to any clear/rational 
principles. Frank has no essential motive for kidnapping Dorothy's husband and child, no 
more than Dorothy has for continually refusing to notify the police. The massacre at the 
end remains ambiguous. The mysteries which Detective W illiams elaborates to Jeffrey 
do not lead to any form o f revelation. Indeed the manner in which the detective is 
constantly depicted implies some hidden/alarming secret (incest with his daughter/an 
overarching conspiracy theory ) but ultimately nothing conclusive transpires. Even the 
prominent motif o f the severed ear obeys no comprehensible logic. In addition, lapses 
in the characters' behaviour add yet another controvertible layer of strangeness to the 
story Dorothy is in a highly emotional state when she talks to her husband and child on 
the telephone, but subsequently she does not address this issue with Jeffrey, and in fact 
Jeffrey himself, inconsistent to his general motivation in the film, does not offer to help
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them at this stage, nor does he even enquire after them. There is a proliferation of 
perfidious details such as these.
An overwhelming complexity o f narrative structure is integral to the Baroque. However, 
narrative is only a part o f what occurs in works of this type. Lynch and Salle's rationale 
is based overwhelmingly upon knowledge: how we acquire it, how we construct narratives 
out o f it, and how we use it. According to David Lynch, the central structure o f "Blue 
Velvet" concerns the fact that Jeffrey discovers evil but this does not alter his life, and 
Lumberton will revert to its normal existence. "That is the subject o f "Blue Velvet". You 
apprehend things, and when you try to see what it's all about, you have to live with it" 
(David Lynch) (44). The movement and meaning of "Blue Velvet" are metaphorically 
contained in its first sequence - Lumberton's sunny surface disrupted by a chance 
incident which leads inexorably to the penetration of what resides below.
W ithin this opening sequence is contained the first intimation of the theme of violence 
associated with the act o f looking. Jeffrey's mother watches television, on which we see 
a shot o f a gun. From then on, the film's tendancy is to offer “tableau-like" 
scenes/displays - Dorothy's night-club performance/Dean Stockwell's mimed rendition 
of "In Dreams'Vthe grotesque arrangement of corpses which Jeffrey discovers in 
Dorothy's apartm ent - which are always matched by an emphasis on seeing. From 
Frank's interdiction to Dorothy ("Don't you fucking look at me"), through Jeffrey's pleas 
on being discovered in her closet ("I didn't mean to do anything except see you"), to his 
realisation that he is "seeing something that was always hidden", the questions of 
power/fear/knowledge which drive the film are always linked to the idea of looking and 
vision The epitome of this is clearly the long, theatrical sequence in which Jeffrey spies 
on Frank's "abuse" of Dorothy. This becomes the films "moral" vortex, as it mirrors 
Jeffrey and Frank, emphasising Jeffrey's need to confront what lies within himself.
In between tw o horrific visions and two frightening journeys into the night, the hero is 
able to return to  the stability and the familiar environment of his home. One might
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therefore regard Jeffrey's experience as vague and only reflecting a fairly limited 
encounter with evil - that is if we accept the conclusion, the banal notion that the world 
is "strange" and imperfect. However, although we might not ever learn anything definite 
in the complex takes upon character formation, the subtlety is located in the detours 
used to reach these conclusions. In this respect Lynch adopts a superficial literalness 
which on the symbolic level enables him to penetrate much further. There is a quality in 
the fascination generated by "Blue Velvet" which resists the usual psychological 
interpretations, or more precisely which utilizes them so easily so that they become 
disconcerting.
As with David Salle, Lynch effects a series impersonal techniques in order to distance the 
viewer from the primary force o f the violence and emotion that he often depicts. Sex and 
violence in Lynch's films border on the obscene but they are not pornographic - the 
obscenity relates to the limits of degradation to which the human spirit can 
succumb/endure/experience. For the viewer, the question is not one concerning 
superficial provocation, but regards the means by which we may locate ourselves 
from/against the "depravity" o f the scenes projected
Consistent ambiguity and the "illogical logicality" of dream-structures are adopted 
frequently as major elements in "Blue Velvet'. This is particularly relevant for the crucial 
scene where Frank and Dorothy "make love" while Jeffrey observes. W hat is unusual 
primarily about this scene is its theatricality. (45). Frank demands of Dorothy, "Don't look 
at me" as he erupts with a torrent of obscenities He inhales gas which stimulates him 
further, intensifying his ritualised abuse of Dorothy. He clutches a blue velvet cord, a 
perverse mockery of an umbilical cord, as he sobs "Hello, baby. It's daddy" then inhales
once more, whimpering, foilowed by further obscenities "Don't look at me....." he shouts,
from which we realise the source of Dorothy's "performance". Jeffrey peers through the 
wardrobe door observing the scene acted out before him. All he can do is watch and 
listen (Throughout the film we never really discover who Dorothy is - we know her only 
through ! ,er performances - either on stage at the night club, or on various other "stages",
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specifically in front o f male audiences, all o f which she provides with a different scenario. 
The victim to Frank, the dominus to Jeffrey, and later the self-ingratiating lover. To her 
son she performs as "mother" but this is at a secondary remove before Frank and Ben 
and the curious assembly at Ben's place The nearest Dorothy com es to a "natural" 
representation is the final sequence - the slow-motion image as she em braces her little 
boy -( and in this sequence the camera performs for her)
One has the sense that the characters enact a series of ritual movements and behave 
entirely to please the voyeur, knowingly giving a performance. Dorothy crawls about and 
appears to get up with seemingly no other reason than to be seen by Jeffrey and us. 
However, immediately afterwards Jeffrey himself is forced to exhibit himself, as if on 
stage Therefore upon the next occasion when he has to hide because o f Frank's arrival, 
the situation can no longer be perceived in the same way. In addition the ensuing 
"fantasy" scene has an intrinsically disturbing quality which is not sim ply due to the 
explicit violence it contains, the scene's unsettling emotional impact seem s to arise from 
an archaic acoustic impression which endows it with a kind of troubling vagueness that 
can inspire bizarre feelings/interpretations/impressions. Moreover, the disjunctive 
structure is heightened/intensified by the sense of the scene occurring outside of time. 
The sentences which Frank re-iterates ("Don't you fucking look at me") reverberate as 
if in a memory. There is no distinction between the continuous scene in which Jeffrey is 
present and the sequences in which he recalls it. The scene is the very act of 
remembering, the unfolding of something which has already been inscribed. Finally the 
scene is de-sensitivised because it comes to resemble a ritual enacted for someone else. 
W e automatically assume it is directed for Jeffrey, but it could equally be for Dorothy 
herself
In "Blue Velvet" we can identify many existing worlds within the wider "narrative" 
framework No single narrative entity is allowed to dictate meaning o r significance 
(consistency is disrupted) thus opening the potential range and interaction o f "gestalten".
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(There is neither extended unity nor fragmented totality but a constantly transient 
displacing and evolving development from one condition to another) (46).
The film "Blue Velvet" can appear as a dream but a structured one. The Dorothy/Sandy 
parallel encourages us to regard the two women as one. Early in the film, when Sandy 
meets Jeffrey one night in a tranquil Lumberton avenue, she emerges from disquieting 
shadows and is accompanied by a tremor of wind, the music at this point is also 
peculiarly unsettling. Thus Sandy might apparently seem an ordinary high-school girl but, 
as she will recognise a number of times, she is in fact the starting point/instigator o f 
Jeffrey's meeting with the other woman(Dorothy) Later, in the diner where the two 
speak, as the adolescents they really are, Jeffrey relates to Sandy the specifics of the 
horrific/fascinating details he has discovered when breaking into Dorothy's apartment. 
Then, rather incongruously he tells her, (rather than Dorothy the character who most 
identifies with this description) "You're a mystery" Sandy and Dorothy exist as two sides 
o f the same female figure Their worlds are divided according to a traditional scheme - 
the  blonde associated with daylight and convention whereas the brunette belongs to 
night/darkness and transgression. If, at the film's conclusion Jeffrey resides in Sandy's 
dream  (47), the sugary-sweet world/the idyllic 50's paradise that she describes to him, 
one may think that he is here to stay However the words from the song Frank plays for 
Jeffrey still echo, recalled in a process of conscious association, "In dreams you are 
mine," therefore Frank will always find a way o f penetrating/subverting stability with chaos 
and anxiety. Frank's final removal from the film leaves Jeffrey's world "healed", but with 
its capacity for the bizarre still intact. The final image of an artificial robin with a bug in 
its beak serves precisely to emphasize this: Sandy's dream of restored harmony is 
fulfilled, but the quality of the image, its tone, signifies infinitely more than it symbolically 
represents
This sense of overloading pervades every aspect of "Blue Velvet' From the saturated 
colours of the opening sequence ( its too red roses/too white fence/too blue sky) through 
to  the ritualized/regressive excess of Frank's sexual violence, to the beautifully forced
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naïveté o f most of the dialogue, Lynch resolutely refuses any naturalistic norm. The 
narrative worlds o f "Blue Velvet" might superficially appear as fragmented and divergent 
but Lynch employs many structures/devices to enable the enaction of a process of 
creative communication.
Frank cuts off an ear (presumably from Dorothy's husband) and Jeffrey discovers it - the 
ear is a message from one to the other. Another interaction between the two men 
revolves around "letters". The sequence when Frank brutally attacks Jeffrey m ight at first 
seem grotesque and meaningless but underneath the surface of violence a more 
com plex series of effectual narratives operate. As with Salle the initial violence of the 
images is mediated and dispersed/distanced by a constellation o f generative/radical 
elements that facilitate multiple/further possibilities. Consequently when viewed through 
this framework the drama appears fundamentally different/altered from the perception 
at the initial encounter
Lynch's most explicit sequence of "psycho-drama" is the conflict between Jeffrey and 
Frank Jeffrey has flashes seeing himself in the roaring bestial incarnation of Frank, as 
he hits Dorothy. Frank manifests himself via the fissures of Jeffrey's conscious 
"normality" and becomes his dark self. As Jeffrey watches Dorothy perform at the  Slow 
Club and watches Frank watching Dorothy, he is disturbed by the thought that the  desire 
he experiences for the woman performing is not so far removed from Frank’s  desire. 
"You're like me” says Frank later to Jeffrey, as Jeffrey becomes attuned to h is own 
physicality, both the pleasure and pain that may be derived. Jeffrey's "joyride" with Frank 
and his gang is a journey into an unknown realm where he is fundamentally 
psychologically vulnerable. Jeffrey is disorientated - nothing seems real, not the location, 
not Ben/not Frank and his thugs/not even Dorothy. When the car stops Jeffrey is 
dragged out. Frank announces to Jeffrey that if he continues to intervene in his actions 
he will send him a "love letter", a bullet in the head. ( However, it is Frank who eventually 
receives the bullet from Jeffrey in Dorothy's apartment, just after we hear the country and 
western song entitled "Love Letters"). Frank continues his declaration by repeating the
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words of the song that has becomes his signature theme: "In dreams I walk with you/ln 
dreams I talk with you/ln dream s you're mine”. This can be read literally - 1 am the father 
and will always be with you, speaking to you. It is equivalently terrifying; you belong to 
me, you resemble me, we are alike, and paternal; whatever happens I will love you and 
I will never leave you. As a girl dances on the bonnet o f the car to the tune of Roy 
Orbison's "In Dreams" Frank recites the lyrics, wipes Jeffrey's face with a torn piece of 
blue velvet and instructs his thugs to hold Jeffrey down while he beats him savagely. 
Jeffrey's degradation marks his initiation into a netherworld realm o f the senses - if 
Dorothy gave him pleasure (they have made love once) then Frank's "joyride", as Frank 
promises, is a love letter that has "fucked him forever".
The ear symbol functions as a "gift" offered to Jeffrey by the" father" figure. The ear is 
a "passage-way" a symbol o f communication between worlds. The ear transmutes the 
gift o f passing through the surface, of travelling between worlds, then of "recovering" a 
"normal" world - at the end o f the film we exit through Jeffrey's ear Frank has offered 
Jeffrey a key to life and a gift o f  imaginative possibility.
Postmodernism's reaction against the psychological and mythical structures of 
Modernism when transposed into the genre of detective fiction (in this instance "Twin 
Peaks'T'Blue Velvet') enacts an appropriation/exploitation of the "detective narrative" as 
a paradiminic model in order to explain change and possibility For example in Robbie- 
Grillet's "Le Voyeur" the "detective novel" form foregrounds the absence of a conclusive 
ending or linear technology and displays the calculated non-presence of plot and 
describes its "story" as a "process”, a circle which has no end, a kind of calisthenics of 
perception. Like the work of Nabokov and Borges this is representative of "postmodern 
detection", an operation which ultimately denies the ability of the human to solve 
problems via "syllogistic order".
While a Borges text such as "The Garden of Forking Paths" ostensibly provides a form 
of ending it also engenders a disturbing sense o f unease/incompletion "Twin Peaks"
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basic narrative structure could be identified, in one sense, as a "pure analytic detective 
story", a fictional genre that lends itself to endless acts of re-readings. Narratives of this 
type, filmic/literary, place emphasis on the act o f reading and its processes. The story 
that Agent Cooper is trying to relate eventually manifests itself as a search for the nature 
of the narrative driving force itself - it is not a matter o f discovering/unveiling an ultimate 
interpretation o f the "plot'Vstory line. In a similar fashion Borges is known for his 
resistance as being categorized as a systematic writer. "I reject all systematic thought 
because it always tends to deceive"(48). However, his texts do search for the “ story” of 
their own unreadability and can be situated in a very systematic discourse in order to 
demonstrate various aporias o f interpretation and expose the act o f reading as resisting 
theoretical closures and rendered identification.
The traditional detective figure in literature may be viewed as the quintessential 
representative of Western, Post-Renaissance rational thinking, a character embodying 
an anthropomorphic/positivistic/teleological approach to reality. In pursuit o f final rational 
causes and linear design the detective envisions a world as a defined/constructed cosmic 
drama, in which crimes are solved by inferring casual relationships and problems 
eliminated through inductive reasoning.
The first season o f "Twin Peaks" conformed superficially to the basic principles of a 
detective novel. The narrative began with/at a dead body and then unfolded into a series 
of investigative responses to the murder o f the young woman; the arrival o f a “heroic" 
detective, the evaluation of physical/forensic evidence and the interrogation of 
suspects/witnesses. However, the series seemed, in the second season (if not earlier) 
to become something quite other than a televised detective novel. "Twin Peaks" 
compared itself with the literary detective novel in both its parody of the genre and its 
celebration of detective conventions, but, at the same time, the series subversively 
disassembled the narrative framework that structures detective fiction This subversion 
is essentially what made "Twin Peaks" so simultaneously like and unlike a detective 
novel
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The narrative form o f "Twin Peaks" can be interpreted within the parameters of a 
Deleuzian programme. The dramaturgy may be read as a mode of effectivity/action 
which scatters plot units/images into different linkages or new alignments without 
necessarily negating their essential materiality Ideally what is produced are unexpected 
intensities/peculiar sites o f indifference/new connections with other elements/objects. 
This generates affective/conceptual transformations that problematize/challenge/move 
beyond the primary intellectual/pragmatic frameworks Instead of the "eternal" status of 
a defined, the narrative has short-term effects, though they may continue to be explored 
after repeated viewings/analysis. The narrative only remains effective/energized if it has 
effects/produces re-alignments/re-arrangements. In Deleuzian terms such a text should 
be described as fundamentally moving "nomadological'T'rhizomatic".
In counterpoising the Lynchian narrative with Deleuzian rhizomatics, the question 
becomes one of how the narrative operates "differently". In essence how to regard a 
narrative structure that is beyond complementarity/polarization, beyond 
subjectivity/signification. The enigmatic story-lines provide no easy solutions - plot 
details/trails proliferate: no concrete closure is afforded - ready-made answers become 
a blockage for thought, that cannot and should not be answered but need to be 
continually posed/rigorously raised in such a way as to directly resist answers.
Deleuze is a thinker o f movement/difference, a cartographer of force rather than form 
and his aim is to produce a certain quality o f disruption or “ stuttering".
The second season of "Twin Peaks" offered a fundamental re-adjustment of the depiction 
of Cooper; the shift o f focus from Laura Palmer to Dale Cooper himself signals a number 
of other changes in both the epistemological and the narrative structures . The shift is 
principally, at first, one o f narrative structure, paradoxically the more we learn about Dale 
Cooper's past, the stronger the forward motivation of the series becomes. W hat has 
happened in re-starting "Twin Peaks" after the "solution" of Laura Palmer's murder, is a 
disruption o f the paradigmatic narrative structure of the detective novel.
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If one of the objects of investigation in the renovated/restarted narrative of the last nine 
episodes is Cooper himself, the other is Windom Earl. His arrival in "Twin Peaks" 
initiates a further disruption/dismantling of the detective-fiction narrative structure that 
was operative - if not predominant - in the first season. Windom Earle is so disruptive 
because he, even more than BOB, is a radically "serial" killer His murders do not 
remain in a retrievable/recuperative past because they are only understandable as parts 
of a chain of events that stretch into the future as well as into the past. Earle's narrative 
is one that connects the past to the future by, for example, stabbing a drifter exactly the 
way that he stabbed Caroline (Cooper's ex-girlfriend) in ways that are "diseased" but not 
disorganized there is perhaps, too much unity/coherence to Earle's narrative - Cooper 
relinquishes his status as an "outsider" to the “criminal/revenge narrative” operating in 
"Twin Peaks” - beginning at/before the moment he becomes a sheriffs deputy instead 
of a Federal Agent, the emphasis/dynamism supporting the structural framework of the 
series comes to be dominated by the force of the “revenge plot” narrative o f Windom 
Earle. This current pulls the events of the past through the vision of the present, 
transferring both past and present into the future. In this sequence o f episodes of the 
series it is possible to  view the past as locating itself in the present/future.
The ending of "Twin Peaks" is strictly antithetical to the plot structure o f classic detective 
fiction. It is common place in a detective novel to begin with a sense of innocence 
violated by the discovery of a m urder and then work to restore that innocence/ordering 
by identifying/negating the murder/murderer. "Twin Peaks", o f course, begins with a 
sense of innocence violated, but ends with the complete destruction of the detective hero 
who was supposed to  restore the stability of the social order In detective fiction 
investigative procedure may temporarily worsen the situation, for example, as it puts 
pressure on a murderer who m ay kill again, however in "Twin Peaks" there is the 
indication that the detective can ultimately do more harm than good.
W hile "Twin Peaks" contains elements of detective fiction, it subverts the narrative 
structure and intentions of the genre. Like Roman Polanski's film "Chinatown" it leaves
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us with the image of the detective defeated and vilified. The failure of the investigative 
plot to m aster the criminal plot or to recuperate the past transforms the 
parameters/dimensions o f the detective-fiction based scenario into the structural 
arrangement o f a multi/polyvalent postmodern narrative complex.
Developing from this many postmodern writers choose anti-detective fictional narrative 
structures in order to evoke the impulse to "detect", to violently frustrate it by refusing to 
solve the crime. This postmodern structure/arrangement violates Aristotelian 
expectations. Not only does it deny readers a conclusion, but also by refusing them the 
"pleasure" of catharsis produces pity/fear/dread. However, this quality of dread actually 
conveys the possibility o f freedom and infinite possibility. The "dreadful uncertainty" 
created by many postmodernist narratives, particularly in the anti-detective form, can 
open up new realms of consciousness unhampered by the constraints o f telos/positivism. 
In "Twin Peaks" it can be said that Special Agent Dale Cooper exemplifies a 
postmodernist detective.
"Twin Peaks" achieves one of the most endlessly deferred conclusions in television 
history, principally by having the last episode of series one create the complete/new 
narrative problem of Bob's invasion o f Cooper as his next vehicle for violence and 
murder. Denying the specificity or containment of the "criminal narrative" by extending 
what is usually an individual/group human agent into the non-human, conceptual realm 
o f "evil" itself, "Twin Peaks" transforms physical violence into a fluid/dynamic and a 
potentially ubiquitous entity that exists independently of human understanding/control. 
In addition "Twin Peaks" adulterated any linear narrative development; its "narrative" 
becomes increasingly episodic, incorporating ever proliferating subplots and gratuitous 
com ic scenes.
The development of narrative in "Twin Peaks" is essentially dependent upon the 
elim ination of boundaries - for the story (and series) to continue the horizons o f the 
"crimes" has to expand outwards in order to prevent any real solution (49). The lines of
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demarcation are both temporal and spatial involving a dissolution of the parameters 
delineating past/present/future; between physical and psychic space; between individual 
human beings; and between human and non-human. (The visions of several characters, 
the revelations both of past and future events, the Black and White lodges, inhabit a non­
physical location that can be accessed only via a time/space warp. The traditional 
barriers separating one consciousness from another frequently disappear - Cooper 
dreams Laura Palmer's "red room dream'VMaddy Ferguson says she was so close to 
her cousin she could "feel" her thoughts/non-human and non-physical entities invade 
physical and human space in order to activate damage in the case of "Bob", or warn or 
instruct as with Cooper's benevolent giant).
Events in 'Twin Peaks" break the rules of conventional ratiocinative detective narrative, 
just as Dale Cooper's crime-solving methods violate the tenets of scientific detection (50). 
No solution/ending is expected or delivered, or if found will only lead to the discovery of 
a wider/more elaborate crime/conspiracy that subsumes the earlier "solved" mystery. 
The result is that we move through a world where empty signifiers randomly 
appear/emerge amidst overtly determined ones, implying the necessity to 
pause/question the nature of all significations, and where quickly shifting signifiers leave 
a longing for meaning/a grasping at empty forms. "Twin Peaks" radically alters the grid 
of meaning/predictability, undermining any sense of order and producing phantom-like 
patterns. The ways we usually view/perceive the world seem anachronistic when 
positioned against the chimerical shifts that counter meaningless or the potential of 
meaning
During the first o f Agent Dale Cooper's prophetic dreams, Laura Palmer says to him "I 
am full of secrets. Sometimes my arms bend back". The task of discovering who killed 
Laura Palmer, and how her murder is related to another similar case in Montana, is 
transformed through the process of investigation into the task of uncovering Laura's 
secrets - which are the secrets of 'Twin Peaks" - and attempting to coerce them towards 
a coherent/related narrative The more we know, how ever, the harder it becomes to
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discern a clear pattern in the disturbing relations that are uncovered. Connections are 
multiplied until nobody seem s unrelated to the murder. Lynch in order to prevent 
closure, presents such a proliferation of material that connections can never be ultimately 
completed to a point o f finitude. (For example, after discovering that Leland Palmer 
murdered his daughter a fte r years of sexual abuse, we remain unsure of how the 
"demonic" entity "Bob” (a parasitic supernatural being who inhabits Leland Palmer) fits 
into the picture and how its actions can be separated from Leland's or from those of his 
other future hosts). In addition we lack any coherent way to connect "Bob" with the other 
“criminal narratives” of 'Tw in  Peaks". W hat T w in  Peaks" aims to present is a convoluted 
and complex web of secrets that integrally entangles its characters/inhabitants.
Laura's killer, although temporarily utilizing the form of Leland Palmer, has a separate 
identity, the psychotic entity "Bob". "Twin Peaks" transgress received narrative 
conventions by positioning the possibility o f both a natural and supernatural "solution" to 
the principle plot-motivating dynamic. As Thomas Pynchon states at the conclusion of 
"The Crying o f Lot 49", "E ither you have stumbled indeed....onto a secret richness and 
density of dream.. .or you are hallucinating it". "Twin Peaks" explores the allure o f the 
supernatural without completely privileging/mystifying it by concentrating on the indecisive 
quality of the "uncanny", rather than comprehensively engaging a totally occulted truth. 
"Twin Peaks" explores both levels without ever definitely adhering to either o f them.
"Twin Peaks", like the "Traverspiel" o f German tragic drama described by W alter 
Benjamin, is a spectacle o f moving that does not offer its audience any satisfactory 
consolation in the face of irredemiable loss. (51). As the series progresses, the mystery 
becomes ever more complex, and no single solution is ever suggested and therefore the 
outlets for the audiences vicarious mourning are stifled, leading to an ever-increasing 
level o f intensity
This process is concurrent with the Deleuzian programme o f evacuating the inside (of a 
subject/text/organism) forcing it to confront its outside. Evacuating/destabilizing any
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systemacity/organization/or usual/habitual functioning allowing a section/part/feature to 
"spin o f f7 mutate into a new organization/arrangement/system, to endlessly 
deflect/"become"/construct. The “narrative" of 'Twin Peaks" entails the exploration of the 
possibilities of "becoming", the virtualities latent in the plot, the capacity of the plot to link 
with and make other possibilities deflect/transform while being re-organized in the 
process.
The shifting relations of meanings represents an “active” process. This process plays 
upon the parameters of possible perceptions. The perceptual process tends to focus 
upon the interaction of figure and ground, to raise the figure or bring it closer. The 
imaginary border between figure/ground not only isolates discrete/individual units but 
disengages them from the contextual/connecting surface - this dislocation/dissection 
seem s central to the strategy of "Twin Peaks". It continually pulls 
events/images/language out o f their normal context and forces a process of continuous 
re-appraisal, (perhaps as ground instead of figure). Language and signification seem to 
foreground the primacy of multiple possible meanings. (For example among the clues 
revealed at the site o f Laura's m urder is a "broken heart" pendant - the other half o f 
which is tenderly held by her "boyfriend" James, literalizing his own broken heart).
W hen W indom Earle wants to taunt Cooper into a chess game he fashions a giant 
plaster pawn around a would-be victim. Rusty kills him and then sends the dead pawn- 
encased-in-a-pawn to Cooper. This kind of narrative punning, a playfulness with 
metaphors, making patterns transparent, displays an arbitrary nature that underpins the 
nature o f linguistic relationships/significations. W hat "Twin Peaks" accomplishes is a 
bringing into focus of the primacy o f artifice and illogic - the series illustrates how tentative 
patterns o f meaning actually are.
By recognising the artifice of what we usually take for order or how various constructs 
impose order on the world, we might come to some better view/understanding of our own 
nature as the "subject and the object" o f understanding. Viewed in this way the
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alternating figure/ground relations of order/disorder emerge as complementary, even 
defining some dimensions o f human nature. In one respect the series rendered 
transparent what we commonly and actually interpret as order, disturbingly revealing how 
arbitrary/elusive our linguistic codes really are. Yet in another respect it operated via 
sketching a deeper/more complex sense o f "order'1, one of which we are ultimately a part.
Part o f what characterizes the originality of approaches adopted by Lynch and Salle is 
the distance from humanism, a quality also found in the films of Peter Greenaway. T h is  
distance can be correctly identified as a certain type of artistic freedom. Lynch and 
Greenaway began their careers as painters who progressed through experimental film - 
making before they adopted more "mainstream" narrative tactics, and both could be 
described as formalists whose imaginative creativity prominently consists of their capacity 
to operate outside of the moral categories that restrict most forms of humanistic fiction. 
In other respects they are quite different - Lynch intuitive and poetic, while Greenaway 
intellectual and systematic - but the recent fascination of Lynch/Greenaway/Salle w ith  
violence/eroticism/cruelty unaccompanied by any capacity for empathy gives their la test 
works a cold "pornographic" lustre, refracting images that articulate the temper of the  
times.
The writer Jorge Luis Borges establishes with his work in prose that the acts of w riting 
and reading can actively turn into circular ruins (52) - a never ending process that can 
confuse and exasperate a reader so that one cannot think beyond the literal. It is no t 
merely as an artistic embellishment that the “ labyrinth" forms a vital narrative axis in 
Borge's fiction, since it's very significance represents all reading processes The w orlds 
in Borges's fiction are not pristine landscapes, normal and realistic but a complex very 
literary texture, a universe of readings that always connect with previously inscribed data. 
The characters in certain of Borges's texts ('The Secret M iracleVDeath and the 
C om pass'TThe Circular Ruins'TBorges and I") find themselves uncovering enigmatic 
sign codes, but the quest is never completed by the "author" figure In other words the  
act o f reading cannot simply be consummated inside the text, as a literal reading would
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be, but also outside o f it  Readers o f the "narratives" of Borges/Lynch/Salle/Deleuze are 
not principally consumers o f texts but “characters" actively engaged in a search for
meaning and significance.
The text is not just an inert artifact, a static object to be approached by the reader. In 
order to achieve a significant moment in communication the text must clearly be 
perceived as an event, as something that is in the process of happening. Deleuze, via 
Leibniz, Henri Michaux and Gaetau Clerambault identifies an event as a non-coincidence 
between language and interpretation, the virtual sensation of a sematic moment of 
totalization and dispersion. In a narrative it can be conceptualized as a seriality o f the 
revelation of experience/insight. The event is an immanent activity over a background 
o f totality, thinkable within the inferiority of the continuous - "Un elan vital" a complex of 
extensions/intensities/singularities which is both punctually reflected and accomplished 
in a flux. Deleuze suggests an excess in the occurrence o f the event distributed in the 
inexhaustible fullness of the world.
"the world itself is an event and, as an incorporeal (= virtual) predicate, the world must be 
included in every subject as a "basis" from which each one extracts the factors/manners 
that correspond to its point o f  view (aspects). The world is predication itself, manners 
being the particular predicates, and the subject, what goes from one predicate to another 
as if from one aspect o f the w orld  to another'’ (Gilles Deleuze) (53).
Deleuze summaries the fundamental import o f Leibnizian philosophy as operating 
between two poles. "Everything is always the same thing, there is only one and the same 
Basis; and: Everything is distinguished by degree, everything differs by manner ..." (54). 
Leibniz's philosophy pushes the limits of communication. The subject is enveloped in the 
predicate reciprocally, both as the  affirmation of a one and same world and of an infinite 
difference/variety in this world.
David Salle's later paintings contrive to test the borders of purist taste His works offer
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assemblages of strange resemblances, disturbing and frivolous pictorial moments, 
systematically disjunctive conjugations, abrupt delays, sudden departures that re-figure 
the semiotic flow as a translinguistic, quasi-narrative textual "thingness" whose 
resonantly distinct materialism frames the image through a more distinct, legible and 
conscious space of correspondence with the viewer.
Engaging the viewer rather than creating a sublime transcendent realm becomes the 
essential generative motivation. Salle's work is both assimilative and disseminative, that 
it is informed by the twin impulses of undecidability and indeterminacy. The 
undecidability is a function o f the viewer (55) - the myriad responses the viewer is 
capable of recognising as the potentialities of the work. The indeterminacy is a function 
of the work itself, it's internal contradictions/ambiguities
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MIRROR OF ENIGMAS (NUMBERS IN THE DARK) 
NOTES
1 It is curious to  observe how attracted Salle feels towards the painters of the post
Depression years - Kuhn/Soyer/Marsh/Hopper W hat appeals to him about this evocative 
scene painting o f American low-life/working people, of the bars/eateries/barber 
shops/cinemas/the vaudeville is that these artists present simply elements of an American- 
patchwork, an attempt to capture the particularity of that experience . This is certainly 
som ething that matters to Salle - to reveal the scene not through the meanings of the 
im ages but through the way they present themselves, to capture the 
relentlessness/inventiveness and capriciousness o f the time.
There is sufficient reason to suggest that the analogy with Edward Hopper may be 
extended further. Hopper was a true innovator with a searching eye and an intensely 
personal imagination allied to an apparently unforced non-quantifiable style. In Hopper’s 
paintings the style is in the image; style and im age are indivisible. There is a similarity in 
both Salle and Hopper in the way they focus on solitude - even when more than one 
person is portrayed we approach something very near to alienation/desolation. Hopper 
painted scenes from C20th Urban Am erican life, (magisterially considered/re- 
arranged/refined and finely composed), tha t no other artist considered as 
appropriate/useful subjects. He defined the particular mid-century malaise estrangement 
and alienation in urban angst. Hopper's reperto ire consisted most notably o f the world of 
ordinary men and women at work or in uneasy repose, in ordinary workplaces - the office, 
the motel room, the cafeteria, the suburban back porch.
Hopper tapped something disquieting and new in modern life that nobody else seemed 
willing to address, or else had rejected as an im possible task to resonant in visual terms. 
A sense o f loneliness in the crowd o f modern life, the feeling of estrangement in the new 
and harsher office/factory life, the isolation o f suburbia, the condition inside us, something 
o f what men and women began to experience by the early 30’s, within the terms and 
physical conditions of modem/urban/capitalist life.
John Hawkes perceptively writes o f Salle's exquisite discontent being apparent within a 
"landscape of indifferent hunters and vanished lovers" fully aware that "dead passion is 
the most satisfying" (See J. Hawkes "An O ffering" to David Salle in the Catalogue 
published in conjunction with a 1985 show at the Mary Boone Gallery). Salle's paintings 
of th is time are models o f referenial indusiv ity  and inscrutability, rendered with an 
unremitting composure and dexterous stylishness. Salle affirms the prevalent uncertainty 
that pervades the present condition - surveying an emptiness without and an emptiness 
within. Salle actively initiates the creation of a new role/offers a new performance/conducts 
a renewed transforma nee, amid the endless series.
2. The dram a of "Blue Velvet" is enacted in the imaginary Pacific Northwestern town,
Lumberton. The young protagonist, Jeffrey Beaumont, is a college student called back to 
his family home because his father has suffered a heart attack. Returning to his home­
town Jeffrey takes to running his fathers hardware shop W hen out walking one day he 
discovers a human ear in the grass, covered with insects. He takes this finding to a local 
policeman, Detective Williams, who subsequently te lls  him not to mention the incident to 
anyone. Upon leaving the detedives office, Jeffrey is approached by the detedive ’s 
daughter, a blonde called Sandy, who reveals she has overheard the preceding 
conversation from her room which happens to be situated diredly above her father's office. 
Sandy d ire d s  Jeffrey to a mysterious dark-haired woman called Dorothy Vallens, who is 
apparently under police surveillance and is allegedly implicated in a murder. It transpires 
that the human ear may belong to the missing husband o f Dorothy Vallens.
The adion continues as one night, Jeffrey with Sandy's assistance (although initially she 
is re ludan t to partidpate diredly,) breaks into Dorothy's apartment. When Dorothy, the 
cabaret singer at the Slow Club returns home earlie r than expeded, Jeffrey is forced to 
hide in a closet from which he firstly observes and then eventually takes part in a series 
of strange/violent/disturbing scenes. Dorothy first receives a phone call from her husband 
and small child who have been kidnapped by a crim inal psychopathic called Frank. She 
then discovers Jeffrey and with a kitchen knife, makes him exit the closet and get 
undressed She beings to caress Jeffrey but is interrupted by a knock at the door. Jeffrey 
returns to his hiding place from which he w itnesses Frank's violent behaviour. Frank 
terrorises Dorothy and forces her to engage in frenetic  intercourse punduated by insults 
and body blows, as he speaks successively in the voices of a baby and a father. This is 
intensified by unusual accessories such as an oxygen mask, from which Frank avidly 
inhales, and a strip o f blue velvet. W hen Frank fina lly  leaves, Dorothy brings Jeffrey out
of the closet and tries to arouse him. She allows him to explore her body and then 
demands that he strike her. He refuses (later he will consent but with obvious distaste) 
and leaves, with Dorothy in a distressed state ("Help me!"). She asks him to say nothing 
to the police.
As the story develops Jeffrey is drawn into a degenerate and perverse world, mysteriously 
he becomes Dorothy's secret lover, even as he falls in love with Sandy. His relationship 
with Sandy, arising from their complicity in these enigmatic events, proves to be one of 
reciprocated love.
As his investigation continues Jeffrey uncovers a violent drug-ring involving Frank, a 
police-officer with a yellow suit and a third man who he identifies as "the well-dressed 
man". Jeffrey is discovered one night at Dorothy’s apartment and coerced into 
accompanying Frank and his gang on a frenzied/destructive journey into the night, firstly 
to the house of an effem inate friend, Ben, an accomplice in their drug-trafficking 
conspiracy who is holding Dorothy's kidnapped husband and child, then in a speeding car 
Jeffrey is forced further w itness Franks psychotic rituals. On a stretch o f desolate 
wasteground Jeffrey is severely alternately assaulted and kissed by Frank, threatened with 
death, treated to a declaration o f love, and offered an invitation, by a now  highly 
unbalanced Frank, "to dream to g e th e r He is then abandoned shockingly injured.
Although visibly and mentally disturbed by these events Jeffrey recovers quickly. He 
relates the information from  his investigations to Detective W illiams, but omits the role 
played by Sandy. The policeman rather strangely tells him he should await further 
questioning. The main events now occur during one evening. Jeffrey and Sandy go to a 
party together, and declare the ir love for one another. On the way home they encounter 
Dorothy, appearing suddenly, presumably from Jeffrey's house. Naked and covered with 
marks of abuse, she clutches at Jeffrey as Sandy looks on shocked. Dorothy again pleads 
for help and the actions imply som e mutual secret association. Sandy slaps Jeffrey and 
leaves (although she will quickly forgive him).
At Dorothy's apartment Jeffrey finds the sinister after effects of a massacre, the yellow- 
suited man dead covered with blood sways, but remains on his feet. The husband lies 
bound and dead. W hen Frank return to the apartment this time in the guise o f the "well- 
dressed man" Jeffrey barely escapes with his life. Hiding once again in the closet he uses 
a trick to kill Frank with a bullet in the middle of the forehead.
W e next see Jeffrey in an idealized/calm  world. His father has recovered and Dorothy is 
re-united with her child. Sandy and Jeffrey are engaged in apparently mutual affection. 
In an enchanted hyper-idealized scene a robin appears in the garden, recalling the dream 
that Sandy related earlier to Jeffrey, an ecstatic vision of love/harmony - but the robin has 
an insect in it's beak. "It's a strange W orld" the couple conclude.
"Blue Velvet" is perhaps Lynch's most accomplished, tightly controlled yet 
intricate/convoluted work. The story is neither regular nor logical. The general shape is 
acutely bizarre, even more so in the details, the increasingly and seemingly inexhaustible 
sense o f visual material/psychological weirdness accumulates in the links o f the various 
"narrative" chains.
3. David Lynch - Interview in "L 'Ecran fantastique No. 53 February 1985 - dossier about
"Dune" including several interviews.
4 David Lynch - in "L'Ecran fantastique No 76 Jan. 1987 - about "Blue Velvet"
5. "David Lynch Presents: Ruth, Roses and Revolver" Arena BBC (UK) (1987).
6 On one hand there is the Puritan notion of the evil wilderness, exemplified by Hawthorne's
"Young Goodman Brown", and on the other hand we have the optimism of Emerson, for 
whom nature was, always and ever, beautiful/good/sublime, a reflection o f the 
countenance o f God.
These complex oppositions run throughout mythic American fiction e g see: Fenimore 
Cooper 'T he  Last of the M ohicans’TThe Pioneers" /  'W yatt Earp" (See Leslie Fiedler 
"Love and Death in the American Novel" - New York: Criterion (I960)).
7. Sim ilarly with 'Tw in Peaks" Lynch presents a timeless town embracing the decades
between 1950 and 1990. The forest is a symbolically complex signifier. The foundation 
of the 'Twin Peaks" community, tim ber is the town's economic resource, however just as 
the series opens the sawmill is running at a loss and a scheme is in operation to hasten 
its bankruptcy in order to implement a project of re-development which would consequently 
entail the destruction o f the forest/wilderness ("Ghostwood").
"Ghostwood" comes to represent the unknown/unknowable, a realm existing beyond the 
enclaves of civilization. "Ghostwood" is "nature" to Twin Peaks, "culture". Shots that link
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scenes consist o f trees in the wind /the forest/traffic lights over an empty road. 
"Ghostwood" is linked to  an arcane past - Hawk (the Native American Deputy) describes 
a "White Lodge" and a "Black Lodge" located in the woods; "the dweller on the threshold 
where you face your shadow" he says. Following the disappearance o f Major Briggs, 
Agent Cooper concludes "there's a powerful force that exists in those woods"
The wilderness, especially at night, represents for Lynch a fearful image.
"Twin Peaks" basic narrative structure could be identified in one sense, as a "pure 
meditation" upon an analytic detective story", This fictional genre lends itself to endless 
acts of re-readings. Narratives of this type, filmic/literary, place em phasis on the act of 
reading and its processes The story that Agent Cooper is trying to  relate eventually 
manifests itself as a search for the nature o f the narrative driving force itself. It is not a 
matter of discovering/unveiling an ultimate interpretation o f the "plof'/story line. In a similar 
fashion Borges is know for his resistance to be categorized as a systematic writer. "I reject 
all systematic thought because it always tends to deceive". However his texts do search 
for a story of their own unreadability that can be situated in a very systematic discourse in 
order to  demonstrate various aporias o f interpretation and expose the act o f reading as 
resisting any theoretical closure and "readerty" identification.
8. "Bobby Vinton's song "Blue Velvet" was the beginning o f a whole series o f ideas for the 
film. It conjured up a mood to do with small towns and mystery. And then, I'd always had 
a desire to sneak into a girl's apartment and watch her through the night. I had the idea 
that while I was doing this I'd see something which I'd later realise was the clue to a 
mystery. I think people are fascinated by that, by being able to see into a world they 
couldn’t visit. That's the fascinating thing about cinema, everyone can be a voyeur. 
Voyeurism is a bit like watching television - go  one step further and you want to start 
looking in on things that are really happening. That's where Sandy came into "Blue 
Velvet". She doesn't go  into Dorothy's world herself, but she prompts Jeffrey to go deeper 
and deeper".
The other starting point fo r the film was an idea about an ear - that an ear in a field could 
be a ticket into another world. Once found, it would be like a bell, answered in the night, 
nothing would be the same again. There are certain things which stand out when you are 
going down a street, out o f the ordinary things which just stick in your mind, things which 
sparkle like a little g ift left on a sidewalk. That doesn't happen all the time, but when it 
does it brings so m uch power that you can't forget it"
(David Lynch) (Quoted in "Everyone a Voyeur" Monthly Film Bulletin" April 1987)
9. "Blue Velvet" is among a number of films produced in the 1980's that delved beneath the 
surface of the American suburbs, uncovering disruptive elements/ 
psychopaths/brutality/sickness - elements successfully hidden away underneath 
wholesome images supported by television situation comedy/melodramas/the Mickey 
Mouse club etc.
'To me a mystery is like a magnet. W henever there is something that's unknown, it has a 
pull to  it. For instance, if you were in a room and there was a doorway open and stairs 
going down and the light just fell away, you didn 't even see the bottom, where the stairs 
ended; you'd be very much tempted to go down there"
(David Lynch quoted in 'T he  Heart o f the Cavern" (Sean French on the films of David 
Lynch) "Sight and Sound" Spring 1987).
The themes and elem ents of "Blue Velvet" have precursors in the expressionistic "noir/ 
"small-town" films of the 40's/50's - Lynch initiates a disquieting journey into "noir" territory. 
Confirming the "noir" connection are glimpses in "Blue Velvet" o f movies on T  V.- a hand 
advancing with a gun/feet climbing darkened stairs - that Jeffrey's m other and aunt are 
watching during his com ings and goings in his "real" "noir" adventure. "Blue Velvet 
successfully captures the mood of the small town "noir" films o f the 1950's, (film ''noir" o f 
the 1940's specifically encapsulated the fears/anxieties o f the metropolis - with the later 
50's "noir" films, nowhere was safe - the psychopath could be next door, an encounter on 
a train "Strangers on a Train" (1951 )/the town Sheriff "Touch o f Evil" (1958)/a visiting 
preacher 'The Night o f the Hunter (1955)/a half-forgotten character from  the past "Cape 
Fear" (1962). The apprehensive dimension o f the 1950's era is also represented in the 
increasingly popular science-fiction genre, expressing the fear of infiltration - Communism; 
"Pick up on South Street" (1953)/Aliens; "Invasion of the Body Snatchers" 
(1956)/radioactive fall-out; 'The Incredible Shrinking Man" (1957)Ahe vindictive woman; 
"Born to be Bad" (1950) all which threatening the ideal o f the nuclear family) and there 
is something of "N ight of the Hunter" in "Blue Velvet's" open invocation of 
horror/beauty/strangeness within the archetypal American heartland, but in the latter these 
elem ents prove m ore elusive/difficult to specifically locate. "Blue Velvet" also plays 
cleverly on a collective memory o f B-movie dialogue and situations - particularly the 
scenes between Jeffrey and Detective W illiam s - which it uses to preclude any
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conventional Identification between spectator and character. "All my movies", said Lynch, 
who claims to have started making films to enter into his paintings, "are about strange 
worlds that you can't go into unless you build them and film them. That’s what’s so 
important about film to me. I just like going into strange worlds".
(David Lynch) "Première" (USA) Voi. 4 No.1 September 1990.
10 Quoted in Jane Root: "Everyone a Voyeur" Monthly Film Bulletin - (April 1987)
11. "Rolling Sone" -November 13 1980.
12. "C in £ fantastique" - September 1984.
13. ’Tw in Peaks" brings directly into consideration (and in doing so problematizes the systems 
of narrative organization) the set of narrative practices associated with network TV. A cult 
work according to Umberto Eco must be susceptible to breaking/dislocation/unhinging, "so 
that one can remember only parts of it, irrespective of their original relationship with the 
w hole" Successively, via cult-constructing images/details/dialogue fragments, ’Tw in 
Peaks" solicited an engagement with the hyper-banality of its textual architecture.
The innovative elements/sections in the ’Tw in Peaks" pilot episode, for example , have 
little to do with basic aspects of the characters/plot; alternatively, they are matters o f mise 
en scene and certain areas o f emphasis involving inconsistencies/idiosyncrasies in the 
character and plot. In one scene, close to the beginning, following the credit sequence 
comprising tranquil views of the fictional North Western town of Twin Peaks. Peter Martell 
(Jack Nance) discovers the nude body o f a tortured and murdered teenage girl named 
Laura Palmer wrapped in plastic beside a lake; he calls the sheriffs  office in shock, and 
the sheriffs  secretary Lucy (Kimmy Robertson) summons the sheriff (Michael Ontkean) - 
who happens to be named Harry S Truman - to the phone in an extremely convoluted 
m anner. This totally inessential and absurd piece of confusion injected into a 
macabre/direful moment is an early signal that Lynch's auteurist intentions are principally 
to proceed neither with nor through the plot, but at oblique angles to it. This 1s ostensibly 
the pattern that Lynch traces throughout the pilot - constructing/inserting disjunctive 
segm ents in the "mechanical" surface/exterior plot and creating distinctive formalist 
designs inside them. 'Tw in Peaks" self-consciously plays, at a meta-narrative level, with 
our perceptions o f narrative connection/relationship/meaning - exaggerations o f both 
motivation and event are common-place, and together with repeated genre-splicing and 
constant shifts in pattern from murder mystery to soap opera to horror/tragic drama, 
fundam entally disengages our "normal" sense of narrative construction and ultimately 
make up the artificial order that drives such transparent narratives.
14. The films of David Lynch and the paintings of David Salle subvert and parody cliché. Both 
artists work can appear as games with clichés. Deleuze identifies clichés as "floating and 
anonymous images which circulate in the external world, but also penetrate each person 
and constitute his internal world, so much so that each one of us possesses no more than 
the psychic clichés by means o f which he thinks and feels, becoming himself a cliché 
amongst others in the world which surrounds him. Physical clichés of sight and sound and 
psychic clichés feed o ff each other. In order for people to survive such a world it is 
necessary that this miserable world has infiltrated into their innermost consciousness, so 
that inside is like the outside "(Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 1: L’Image - movement" Paris: 
M inuit 1983).
For example in several exchanges in "Blue Velvet", Sandy and Jeffrey ("fresh-faced" 
suburban adolescents) deliver the line "life is strange". Uttered once such a line would 
constitute a line of clichéd dialogue - with each subsequent repetition the line becomes a 
parody. The question is are Sandy and Jeffrey really claiming that "life is strange" or 
indicating that their character outlines are stereotypes that observe action within the film 
and find it strange. As cliché becomes stereotype - the duplication o f an original - it is also 
via implication, duplicáis an "archetype" - Lynch's conscious manipulation of the cliché 
within the opposing elements of "Blue Velvet" elevates the banal to a mythological level. 
Additionally in the concluding scenes o f "Blue Velvet", once "equilibrium" has been 
restored, a robin sings on the branch of a tree outside the immutable suburban home, in 
answer to Sandy's earlier wish/dream that everything will be restored to "normality", ’W hen 
the robins com e back". However it is revealed that the singing robin, is in reality a 
mechanical device, which the characters regard in wide-eyed delight, pretending that it is 
real. Is Lynch mocking the audience, the narrative conventions of a happy/closed ending, 
or is he simply layering another dimension upon a game of clichéd image-making?
15. The virtual is the "unsaid" of the statement/the unthought of thought. It is real and subsists 
in them, but has to be negated, at least momentarily, for a clear statement to be produced
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as ephemeral/superfidal effect. It is the role o f philosophy to explain that process of 
negation/to re-condition statements in the context o f their evolution.
16. Elsewhere in "Cinéma II" Deleuze equates the outside with force: "Forces always come 
from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority'. Such 
an interpretation enables the N ietzschean distinction between forces of action and 
reaction, as developed in "Nietzsche e t al philosophie" to apply directly to thought itself. 
Deleuze advocates an active thought, thinking that is productive/self-expanding.
17. In "Cinéma II" Deleuze poists the body as the catalyst/motivation of thought, its 
source/inspiration.
'The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, 
that which it has to overcom e to reach thinking. It is on the contrary 
that which it plunges into o r m ust plunge into, in order to reach the 
unthought, that is life. Not that the body thinks, nut, obstinate and 
stubborn, it forces us to  think, and forces us to think what is 
concealed from thought, life. Life will no longer be made to appear 
before the categories o f thought, thought will be thrown into the 
categories of life. The categories of life are precisely the attitudes of 
the body, its postures. "W e do not even know what a body can do" 
in its sleep, in its drunkenness, in its efforts and resistances. To think 
is to learn what a non-thinking body is capable of, its capacity, its 
postures".
(Gilles Deleuze)
18. Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 2 L'Image- Tem ps” les Edition Minuit Paris (1985).
19 In his explication of the movements/speeds of becoming Deleuze continually emphasizes
the way becoming-other refuses im itation/analogy, refuses to represent itself as like 
anything else - rather becoming is the activation/freeing of lines/forces/intensities from the 
parameters/constraints of an identity/fixed purpose to the transformation/problematization 
of identity.
20. Gilles Deluze and Félix Guattari "M ille Plateaux: Capitalisme e t Schizophrénie 11" Les 
Editions de Minuit Paris (1980).
21. Leslie Fiedler 'The Return o f the Vanishing American": Stein and Day New York (1968)
22. David Lynch - in "Czar o f Bizarre" Richard Corliss - Time 1 Oct (1990).
23. Gilles Deleuze - "Cinema 2 L'Image - Tem ps" Les Editions de Minuit Paris (1985).
24 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
25. Gilles Deleuze - ibid ( 1985)
26. Gilles Deleuze - "Le Pli : Leibniz et le Baroque" Paris : Les Editions de M inuit (1988).
27. See Alain Badiou "Gilles Deleuze, The Fold Leibniz and the Baroque" in Constantin V 
Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (eds) "G illes Deleuze and The Theatre of Philosophy 
New York/London - Routledge (1994).
28 It m ight be noted that Deleuze's organicist vision of the multiple threatens the notion of 
singularity, however it can be stated that for Deleuze singularities/events are not points of 
fracture but alternatively what singularizes continuity in each one of its individual folds. 
The event is an immanent active process, it is a creation that is conceivable only inside the 
inferiority of a continuum. It follows therefore that the multiple and the concept/the multiple 
and the one, are not situated in opposition to each other because the multiple exists by the 
concept and is necessary for the universal condition o f continuity and co-relatively the 
multiple is the original focus of the possibility of concepts - Deleuzian organicism does not 
simply revolve around a Leibnizian m odel of possible/extra-possible worlds but 
additionally/more exactly a Nietzschean scheme o f diverging series.
29 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1988)
30 Gilles Deleuze - ibid ( 1988)
31. Gilles Deleuze - ibid - (1988)
32. "W e have seen that the world was an infinity of converging series, capable of being 
extended into each other, around unique points. Thus every individual, every individual 
monad expresses the same world in its totality although it only clearly expresses a part of 
this world, a series or even a finite sequence. The result is that another world appears
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"when the obtained series diverge in the neighbourhood o f singularities". Compossible 
can be called (1) the totality o f converging and extensive series that constitute the world, 
(2) the totality o f monads that convey the same world (Adam the sinner, Caesar the 
Emperor, Christ the saviour....) Incompossibles can be called (1) the series that diverge, 
and that from  then on can belong to two possible worlds, and (2) monads of which earth 
expresses a world different from the other (Caesar the Emperor, and Adam the non 
sinner) The eventual divergence of series is what allows for the definition of 
incompossibility or the relation of vice-diction"
(Gilles Deleuze) -ib id  (1988).
33 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
34 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
35. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
36. The postmodern Baroque represents a fusion/merging/interactively corresponding 
movement between the two distinct Baroque elements distinguished by Deleuze in "Le Pli; 
Leibniz et le Baroque". The Baroque is a state of transition. Classical reason has 
disintegrated under the force of divergences/incompossibilities/discords/dissonances. The 
Baroque is the attempt to recognise reason by means of dividing divergences into multiple 
possible worlds, and by constructing from incompossibilities multiple possible border-lines 
between those worlds. Discords in the same world are resolved ultimately in accords 
because the only entirely irreducible dissonance exists between different worlds. In the 
Baroque the distinction between points of demarcation become less defined but what is 
lost in this process is regained in and through harmony "Confronted by the power of
dissonance, it discovers a florescence of extraordinary accords....... " (Gilles Deleuze - "Le
pli Leibniz et le Baroque") However this re-figuration is only temporary, the neo-Baroque, 
with the unfurling o f divergent series within the same world, disrupts the incompossibilities
at the sam e level. ",.........harmony goes through a crisis that leads to a broadened
chromatic scale, to an emancipation of dissonance or o f unresolved accords, accords not 
brought back to a tonality" (Gilles Deleuze - "Le p l i : Leibniz et le Baroque"). This musical 
analogy is appropriate in that it illustrates the rise of harmony in the Baroque model and 
then the consequent dissipation o f tonality in the neo-Baroque model - from a harmonic 
closure to an opening out onto a polytonality. The dual definitions constituting the 
postmodern Baroque exist as poles along a continuum-line between which meaning may 
be interpreted in a constant state o f oscillation. The postmodern Baroque requires a 
condition o f "capture" rather than one o f absolute closure.
37. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1988)
38 In Lynch's concluding sequence, to "W ild at H e art" (1990) Glinda, the Good W itch from
'The W izard of Oz", appears "deus ex machina" to Sailor and says, "Don't turn away from 
love" Sailor returns to Lula and sings "Love me Tender", a token act o f commitment for 
which he was "not ready" at the beginning of the film. Lynch's ending is a playful departure 
from road movie conventions. Traditionally the couple on the run. whether from the 
authorities or criminals, meet an ill-fated end. "You only Live Once" (Fritz Lang 
1936)rThey Live By Night" (Nicholas Ray 1949)/”Gun Crazy" (Joseph Lewis 1949)/"Au 
Bout de Souffle" (Jean-Luc Godard 1959)/"Bonnie & Clyde" (Arthur Penn 1967)/"Pierrot 
le Fou" (Jean-Luc Godard 1965).
David Lynch describes Lula and Sailor as "struggling in darkness and confusion like
everyone e lse .... The idea that there's some room for love in a really cool world is really
interesting to me" (David Lynch - Quoted in David Breskin "The Rolling Stone Interview 
with David Lynch" "Rolling Stone" 6 September 1990).
39 The one auditory effect which sums up the world of 'W ild  at Heart" is the amplified sound
of a match being struck, accompanied by various images o f conflagration - a burst of 
flame/a landscape o f fire/a human torch crashing about in an interior space. It is a 
baleful/apocalyptic effect - the post-industrial age enacting a process of inexorable 
termination. However, this is not the central matrix of the film, but merely a significant plot 
detail
'W ild  at Heart" is, in total, full o f “significant plot details“ - the film  ultimately is much more 
elaborate than its source novel (see: Barry Gifford - W ild  at Heart" Paladin: London
(1990))
The relationship between a fragment from 'W ild  at Heart" and the film as a whole may be 
the same as between W ild  at Heart" and the totality o f Lynch's films, assuming that a 
temporary form of totality can be objectified. The question of composition which enables
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a part to exist in its opaque, enigmatic presence seems closely allied to a question of 
scale. In as much as Lynch's works display each thing as belonging within a larger 
ensem ble of the next higher scale, and also o f containing something smaller from the 
scale below. The part and the whole, the container and contained are incommensurable.
In the passage between the multiple levels/worlds that structure the architecture o f Lynch's 
filmic constructs, one may discern changes of scale. Lynch shows that the universe may 
be unified, but at the same time the microcosmic elements do not exactly replace the 
m acrocosm  and vice-versa. In Lynch's way of depicting a scene there is frequently a 
dizziness in the extremes o f scale between which we live Hence his taste for contrasts, 
particu larly defined in "W ild at Heart", between vast wide-angle shots and extreme, 
microscopic .close-ups. In "W ild at Heart" we see both the cosmic stretch of the horizon 
with the last beams o f the setting sun glowing at its edge and the microphotographs of 
match flames.
Lynch's affirmation o f contrasts, in character/tone/scale/rhythm/worlds/sizes, is his method 
o f defining separate worlds. He introduces separations into the natural continuum, which 
is perceived symbolically as being undifferentiated because everything is a matter of 
intermediate stages, or, in the words of Leibniz, "natura non fecit saltus" His is the work 
o f creation.
40 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1985).
41 "At first glance the typical Salle painting is a visual Tower of Babel".
(Robert Rosenblum) (1984).
42 In 'Tw in Peaks" the FBI/Sheriffs office hunt for a killer is a "plot" device to enable a wider 
investigation o f small-town America with it's idiosyncratic characters, and sub-surface 
perversities. The hyper-absurdity of specific narrative and character contrivances 
periodically reduce the validity of the "place" to parody/pastiche. Consequently, the series 
is imbued with the dynamic o f the unexpected: it is television in which the viewer can be 
abruptly thrust into the unknown (e g. the "dream" sequences and the "Lodge" sequences) 
while still remaining located within the parameters of the genre of television drama, and 
with enough o f the appearance o f "normality" to, at least superficially, seem familiar.
The polarization of opposites prevails throughout the series. The development of the 
central characters provides examples of Lynchian transformations/Deleuzian 
"becomings/process o f metamorphosis". Almost thirty "plot-engaged" characters are 
presented throughout the first episode, most of whom subsequentlyundergo/experience 
a conversion from one extreme state to another. These processes o f metamorphosis 
provide sub-narratives which reflect the essence of the main narrative, and also echo a 
recurring them e in Lynch’s work. As we go beneath the surface image - the pristine 
appearance of Laura Palmer for example - we discover something else; the “person" who 
is Laura Palmer's shadow - promiscuous/pedatory/drug-addicted/defiled.
W ith the work of David Salle and David Lynch, dichotomy pervades the human condition 
as much as surfaces and the order of things (In a David Salle painting the polarities of the 
pictorial/visual elements are enagaged in a process of continuous interchangability. There 
is a conflict between "S e lf' and "shadow", opposites struggle for supremacy - decent 
becomes obscene, ugly becomes beautiful, wrong becomes right). The more extreme a 
position, the more easily it may be subject to transformation, a conversion/metamorphosis 
into its opposite. A ll dualities ultimately flow into one another, continually transgressing 
their own boundaries. (There is good in evil/evil in good).
43 Deleuze in "Cinema 2, L'lmage-Temps" conducts a Nietzschean analysis o f film-theory 
with the work of Orson W ells. (Chapter 6 'T he  Powers of the False" Section 2). This 
scheme forms the central structure of the Deleuzian cinematic vision/project. This may be 
extended and developed in order to encompass an operative examination of the films of 
o ther directors:
'There is a Nietzscheanism in Welles, as if Welles were retracing the 
main points o f Nietzsche's critique o f truth: the "true world" does not 
exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, 
and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous"
(Gilles Deleuze - "Cinema 2")
In th is subsequent section it is proposed that the work o f David Lynch can also be 
examined within the context o f Deleuzian-Nietzschean filmic theory.
In a Nietzschean vein Lynch consistently differs a system of judgement. In Lynch's later 
films there is no value superior to life, life is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it 
has "the innocence o f becoming", beyond good and evil. The critique o f the notion of truth
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returns constantly to  the impossibility of judg ing  man and life. In the work of m any film­
makers the system of judgement experiences a crisis, however it is nonetheless retained 
and transformed. In Lynch the system of judgem ent becomes tangibly impossible. Lynch 
creates characters who ultimately resist possible/defm ite judgement If the ideal o f truth 
d is in tegra tes, the relations of appearance are no longer sufficient to maintain the 
possib ility  o f judgement. In Nietzsche’s phrase " with the real world we have also 
abolished the apparent world" (Friedrich Nietzsche - T w ilig h t of the Idols" trans.R.J. 
Hollingdale- Harmondsworth:Penguin (1982)). In the prevailing condition we experience 
bodies that are intrinsically forces. These forces however no longer relate to a centre, they 
only interact with other forces, refer to other forces, that they w ill affect or that w ill affect 
them. This power is continuously maintained and the relation is necessarily enacted, even 
if in a variable style determined by the forces which are involved.
Deleuze suggests that the "short, cut-up" a nd  “piecemeal montage" and the "long 
sequence shot" serve a similar function - tracing  Nietzsche's concepts but in a filmic 
language/technique. The short-montage shot shows bodies in a successive manner, each 
of which exercises its force/experiences that o f  another. The sequence-shot displays in 
a corresponding way a relation of forces in its  variability/instability, its proliferation of 
centres and multiplication of vectors (the scene o f brutal violence/highly dramatized love, 
as Jeffrey is intensively beaten in "Blue Ve lvet") W ith both o f these techniques, there is 
the disruptive effect o f forces, in the image or o f the images in their relations. On occasion 
a short-montage reproduces a sequence-shot, through cutting as in the hyper-violent 
psychotic sex scenes in "Blue Velvet" or a sequence-shot may produce a short montage, 
through constant reframing.
W e might then infer that everything in life is a m atter of forces, if  it is understood that the 
relation o f forces is not quantative but necessarily impies certain "qualities". There are 
forces which are only capable of reacting to others in a single uniform way - Frank in "Blue 
Velvet" is only characterized by violence, irrespective of the m anner in which it is derived 
or in which direction it is motivated. This is a typ e  of exhausted force, even as it remains 
quantitively signifcant, can only ultimately destroy and kill, and perhaps term inate itself. 
It is here that it re-configurates a centre, but o ne  which coincides with death. Regardless 
of its significance/power this force, is exhausted because it does not possess the ability 
o f transformation. It is therefore retrogressive/collapsing/degenerate - it represents a state 
of impotence, the point at which the "will to pow er" is merely a will to dominate a being for 
death, which seeks it's own anihilation so long a s  it can react through the action o f others. 
Frank in "Blue Velvet" may be seen to represent impotence in the fullest sense of the 
delineation. He is a man of revenge not in th e  same manner, however, as the truthful 
man who claims to judge life - with the credentials of higher values. A "truthful m an" seeks 
truth, but such a man has strange motives, as if  in some way he were dualistic. Jeffrey in 
"Blue Velvet" would initially at least appear to epitom ize the truthful man, for an extensive 
period o f the film  he seems largely indifferent to the fate o f either Dorothy o r Sandy, 
engrossed in the process o f uncovering a delirious/secret/nightm are world. The truthful 
man ultim ately desires nothing more than to  be able to exercise judgement/superior 
valueAhe good. The truthful man takes himself to  be a higher m an, the man of revenge in 
contrast is a higher man who can claim to ju d g e  life by his own standards/authority. 
However, in actuality this is the same m otivation but simply in two forms. Jeffrey the 
truthfu l man invokes the law for judging but a lso has his double in Frank who takes 
revenge by nature and perversion. This is w hat Nietzsche term ed stages o f nihilism, the 
spirit o f revenge manifested in various forms - behind the truthful man who judges life from 
the adopted position of an apparently higher va lue  system there is his double the sick 
man.
" "the man sick with himself', who ju d g e s  life from the perspective of 
his sickness, his degeneration and his exhaustion...this is perhaps 
better than the truthful man, because a life of sickness is still life, it 
contrasts life with death, rather th a n  contrasting it with "higher 
values"....Nietzsche said "behind th e  truthful man, who judges life,
there is the sick man, sick with life  itself....  They are, however,
complementary as two figures o f nihilism , two figures of the will to 
power"
(Gilles Deleuze- "Cinéma 2").
It might seem that this process appears to be restoring a version o f a system of judgement. 
However, it is not a question o f judging life by a higher authority which would be good/true, 
it is a matter, more accurately, o f evaluating every human/action/passion/value in the 
context in relation to the life which they occupy. As Deleuze says, affect as immanent 
evaluatuon, replaces judgement as transcendent value. "I love or I hate" instead of "I 
judge". Nietzsche in his programme substitutes affect for judgement suggesting that 
beyond good and evil does not essentially im ply beyond good and bad. The bad m ay be 
exhausted and deteriorating but in this state it will include all the more potential for 
m ultiplication. The good is energetic and in the ascendence with the capability of 
transform ing/rejuvinating itself, to m etamorphose itself in accordance with the nature of
the forces it encounters, and which will correspondingly form a greater force with them, 
always increasing the power to live, always receptive to new possibilities.
In reality the positions good and bad are only arbitrary - there is only becoming, and 
becoming is the power of the false life, the will to power. Deleuze returns to the basis of 
his analysis from "Nietzsche et la philosophic" (1962). Interpretation entails what Deleuze 
calls a "method of dramatization" in Nietzsche. The question Nietzsche asks is not "what 
does it mean? but "who makes meaning?". "Good” and Bad" have no intrinsic meaning, 
but are symptoms of the way o f life of the speaker; only by "dramatizing" the words, by 
putting them in the mouth of a "master" or "slave" one can determine their sense. Deleuze 
proposes to negate all "personalist" references in understanding Nietzsche's method o f 
dramatization. W hen we ask "who makes this meaning?" the "who" does not refer to an 
individual as such/to a person, but rather to an event, that is to the forces in their various 
relationships in a proposition or a phenemenon, and to the genetic relationship which 
determines these forces/power.
Interpretation/evaluation are the basis of Nietzschean critical philosophy and that critique 
is itself in no way neutral/disinterested. Every evaluation expresses a mode o f existence. 
W hen the good/"noble" man evaluates he affirms his difference from the sickTbase" man 
and joyfully destroys what is negative within himself.
Ultimately the will o f the "goodVnoble" man to correct life is a “nihilistic" will, fo r the man 
o f good wants life to become as reactive and vengeful as he is, to turn on itself and 
annihilate itself.
There is a will to power in both types but the sick is no m ore than a will to dominate in the 
exhaustion of becoming-life, while the true is artistic, the creation of new possibilities in the 
advancement o f becoming. Nietzsche proposes to replace the will to truth with an 
affirm ative will to falsehood, an artistic will that would turn a will to deception into a 
superior/creative will. If becoming is the power of the false, the "good/"noble" raises the 
false to the nth power or the will to power to the level o f artistic becoming. Jeffrey might 
at first seem only a truth seeking man, but as the narrative strands of "Blue Velvet" develop 
he becomes adept in metamorphoses, with the ability to exist in two contrasting worlds - 
in the nightmare realm o f Frank's transgressive activities and in the hyper-idealized dream 
world symbolized by Sandy. Jeffrey's becoming maintains its innocence in spite o f his 
ecstatic/"horrific" experiences throughout the film. A t the conclusion he, as stated 
previously, remains principally unchanged. Jeffrey's good is subject to what is re-bom 
from life, what metamorphoses and creates. Out of becoming it makes a protean being - 
as an alternative to a uniform/fixed being. W hat Lynch characterizes in Jeffrey Beaumont, 
is the "goodness" of life initself, a strange goodness which takes the living being to 
creation. It is in this sense that we may articulate an authentic/spontaneous 
Nietzschean ism in Lynch.
Nevertheless Deleuze says "in becoming", the earth has lost the centre, not only in itself, 
but in that it no longer has a centre around which to turn. Bodies no longer have centres 
except that o f the ir death when they are exhausted and return to the earth to dissolve 
there. Force no longer has a centre precisely because it is inseparable from its relation 
to  other forces. In terms of film-technique this is represented by short-shots which 
invariably diverge to the right and to the left, and sequence shots that similarly produce a 
mixture of vanishing centres. Forces lose the dynamic centres around which they arrange 
space - movements themselves lose the centres of revolution via which they develop. In 
this s itu a tio n  we observe a mutation which is simultaneously cinematic and metaphysical. 
W hat contrasts with the model of truth is not movement - movement remains consistent 
with the true while it highlights invariable/points of gravity and stability o f the moving 
body/privileged points through which it passes/points o f fixity in relation to which it moves. 
This is the case for the essence of the movement - image determined by the effect o f truth 
which it invokes while the movement preserves its centres. This is what Deleuze has been 
suggesting throughout his filmic-theory.
" .....a cinematographic mutation occurs when aberrations of
movement take on their independence, this is, when the moving 
bodies and movements lose their invariants. There then occurs a 
reversal where movement ceases to demand the true and where time 
ceases to be subordinate to movement; both at once. Movement 
which is fundamentally decentered becomes fale movement, and 
time which is fundamentally liberated becomes power of the false 
which is now brought into effect in fase movement” (Gilles Deleuze - 
Cinema 2).
Deleuze suggests that it is Orson W elles who initiated this contingent. W elles in his 
conception o f bodies/forces/movement "constructs a world which has lost the energy at the 
centre or "configuration": the earth" (Gilles Deleuze - Cinema 2). W elles like Lynch 
subjects the conception o f a centre to a double transformative process establishing a 
“new” for/of cinema. The centre ceases to be a sensory-motor and becomes optical, 
determining a new regime o f description and correspondingly it becomes "luminous" 
determining a new progression o f " narration"
44. David Lynch interview with Marie-José Simpson in "La Revue du cinéma, no 424 February 
1987. (also includes essay by Jacques Zimmer).
45 "It's a strange world" Jeffrey says to Sandy in "Blue Velvet". W hy does he mention this
world? Is there another?. Actually, there are a number of worlds, and since we cannot 
maintain ourselves constantly in the same one, we have to accommodate this plurality.
In Lynch's film s characters are positioned in the ambiguous condition of having to 
exist/traverse between different worlds. For Lynch the theatre is one o f these worlds (for 
exam ple the classic-style "Slow Club" where Dorothy Vallens sings before a large 30's 
m icrophone/the Roundhouse in 'Tw in Peaks" where Julee Cruise sings, (the classic 
Lynchian m otif a stage on which a woman sings in a thin/ethereal/fragile voice). W hen 
Jeffrey enters Dorothy's apartment at night he has just walked onto a stage and is about 
to become an actor in a play. Her apartment is conceived as a stage set (filmed frontally). 
The only constant in Lynch's cinema is that more than one world exists. Lynch described 
"Blue Velvet" as a story "about a guy who lives in two worlds at the same time, one of 
which is pleasant and the other dark and terrifying". This is the sam e scheme as in 'Twin 
Peaks"/ "Fire W alk  with Me" - A  film about one woman it is also a film in which different 
worlds are so closely presented/connected that they begin to appear as one, though 
unstable and flickering. The problem is that characters can never remain in just one world 
- they have to pass from one to  the other, at their own risk.
46. See. G illes Deleuze "Proust et les signes" Paris: PUF (1979) and "Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie" with Fléix Guattari Paris: Les Editions de Minuit (1991).
47. Lynch makes this abundantly clear that this is still a dream via the explicit artificiality o f the 
robin on the window-cill. (Sandy reveals the dream she had the night she met Jeffrey. 
"There is trouble till the robins come", she tells him. T h e  robins w ill bring love into the 
world....". For once Sandy is centre-stage, she acts rather than reacts, is expressive 
rather than passive. Yet her eloquence here is embarrasing/hyper-comic/hyper-real in its 
naivety. Jeffrey a t this stage remains uncommitted, neither convinced by, nor dismissive 
of, the suggestion that the evil w ill perish and the suburban American dream/ideal will be 
restored once "the robins come").
48 See: Richard Pena "Borges and the New Latin American Cinema"/" Borges and His 
Successors. The Borgesian Impact on Literature and the Arts.” Ed. Edna Aizenberg. 
Columbia University of M issouri Press (1990).
49. In many respects, Episode 9 of 'Twin Peaks" was the pivotal/defining episode o f the 
series. W ithin two hours, it transformed nearly every character/plot/situation in the show 
so that they were re-directed to an ongoing narrative form. The concluding episode of the 
first series essentially erases/de-emphasizes most of the extant materials from the first 
season's plot developments any many of features/themes articulated by the first seasons 
central characters! - (the first eight episodes superficially followed the structural form of 
an episodic serial, many o f the central plot points princially seemed to head in a single 
direction with the implication that the narrative elements would tie up within the parameters 
familiar to the format o f the T V. series. However, the opening episode of the second 
series essentially re-wrote/erased many of the central plot strands from  the first season) - 
even more remarkable episode 9 re-invented/re-cycled numerous plot lines. On most 
prime-time continuous serials, the "cliffhangers" are usually resolved fairly rapidly or 
continued on a different level. The notion that a plot strand can be ‘ resolved’  and 
simultaneously that its conclusion can therin operate as the initiating factor to open another 
type o f plot involving the sam e protagonists in a different situation without different 
antagonists, and under a completely different object ,is virutally unprecedented.
For example Episode 9 there is almost nothing remaining from the previous material 
concerning the Laura Palmer investigation plot line which acted as the central axis defining 
the narrative development of the first eight episodes. Consequently, the investigation into 
the murder of Laura Palmer is re-invented in Episode 9 and a new set o f clues is laid out 
for the protagonists to follow. The first part o f the scenario is concerned with tidying-up 
and redefining old plotlines, the second part involves establishing new lines of narrative 
development for the second season The overall effect o f the new plot lines is to take the
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m urder investigation out o f terrestrial forensic territory in which it had been grounded 
during the first season and reorientate it towards the extraterrestrial dimension of the 
"G iant/BOBM dichotomy, re-directing attention to BO B and "his” human host (BOB figure 
who had not even been alluded to in the last three episodes o f the first season suddenly 
re-emerges forcefully in the second section of Episode 9.) The muder o f Laura Palmer is 
thus re-invented as a “Spiritual Crime ‘ as well as a physical one, and the dramaturgy is 
established for the revelations of the Black Lodge as well as its denizen BOB as the origin- 
point of the previously peripheral mention of "an evil in these woods” . (This is probably the 
first time in the series that the motivational pretext fo r Laura's murder is located away from 
Laura herself and her "wicked ways" and onto her actual killer - consequently it is 
necessary for the viewer to finally confront the brutality of Laura's murder at the end of this 
episode)
Despite its superficial/calculated similarities to the previous eight episodes, Episode 9 
additionally initiates a new hybrid narrative form fo r the second season, one that almost 
thoroughly replaces the episodic serial/continuous serial split from the first season. 
Instead o f running the mini-series plot in the foreground and the soap-opera plots in the 
background the episodes are divided into five specific delineated smaller episodic serials, 
each o f which sustains narrative unity on nearly all levels within the episodic serial but also 
is integrated into a wider, continuous narrative scenario that covers the complete 22 
episode season.
The result of this new narrative structure highlights the dexterity with which individual 
plotlines are established, deferred and rperhaps esumed. The idea of segregating the 
second-season's plotlines into units was highly innovative but even more inventive was the 
origin point of these new plotlines. In both prime time and daytime continuous serials new 
plots usually emerge from original characters introduced into the basic situation. The 
diffe rence in plotting in 'Tw in Peaks" second-season was that its new characters and 
plotlines were utilized to fill in enigmas in previously established situations. The plots of 
the second season moved forward by moving backwards, filling in more and more of the 
enigmatic "back-narrative" o f the series in order to advance from the previously 
established narrative lines into fresh areas. This "backward, then forward" motion o f plot 
is yet another inventive solution to the standard continuous serial problem of how to 
stimulate interest in the plotlines of future episodes in a way that is consistent with the raw 
material o f previous ones. This method provides m ore "credible" new plot-threads than 
the "investigative-exposition" method of season one, since new plotlines are forced to 
em erge in a less arbitary fashion. 'Twin Peaks", especially in the second season, was 
essentially designed as a specifically open-ended narrative intended to replicate itself 
endlessly if so required.
Dale Cooper’s detection methods result from the trust he places in the intuitive dimenion 
o f his unconscious - his use o f intuition is what distinguishes him from more traditional 
versions of the detective. Cooper's unorthodox crime-solving techniques include 
clairvouance, precognitivefshared" dreams, visions, and an obsession with Tibetian 
Buddhism  - they not only violate classic ratiocinative detection but also do not really 
provide any concrete "solutions" to the crimes manifested through out the narrative - his 
revelations usually lead to a larger series of unanswerable questions.
The "plot" in 'Tw in Peaks" opened up at the end o f the first season/beginning o f the 
second season, to the presence of a supernatural entity  whose unintelligible name "BOB" 
was crucial for the solution of the murder o f three women. This entity, whose last name 
and essence remain unknown, was gradually unveiled by agent Cooper's 
enigmatic/idiosyncratic attempts to decipher - via principles of Oriental philosophy and 
integrated elements of chance - a number o f clues, the messages left by an unknown 
"writer" in a set o f scattered letters, the design of a mysterious map that hosted 
extra terrestria l entities and the chess game on which the lives o f different character 
depended.
W ell into the narrative game of 'Twin Peaks" agent Dale Cooper pronounces "BOB's" 
name, but this literal plot wears out temporarily when the entity, responding to the name 
flies out of the body of Leland Palmer (significantly Laura's father). Similarly the characters 
in certain of Borges's texts; T h e  Secret MiracleY’Death and the C om passYThe Circular 
RuinsY'Borges and I" find themselves uncovering puzzling sign codes, but the quest is 
never completed by the author figure In the “narrative worlds", the act of reading cannot 
be consummated inside the text (as a literal reading would be), but also outside it.
W alter Benjamin 'T h e  Origins of German Tragic Drama" trans John Osborne London; 
Verso 1977)
See Jorge Luis Borges - Labyrinths (Ed Donald A  Yates and James E Irby) Penguin 
Books (1987)
53. Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1988)
54. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
55. The Time" that Salle sets forth in his fractured "narratives" is "anytime", the "p lace” is not 
an established/tangible "place" - the “mystery o f the spare locked room ' is the subject of 
virtually all o f his paintings. Tim e is repeatedly killed and scenes are set up by means of 
heavity motivated detailed descriptions o f miscellaneous paraphemalia/clothing/furniture 
and overall decor. Salle’s paintings seduce the viewer into a panoramic am orphous sea 
of memory/projection and aesthetic deja vu - an atmosphere of exquisite disconnection.
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From 1989 David Salle entered a prolific and divergent period of production. The first o f 
the “Tapestry Paintings" indicated a transitional state o f development as Salle evolved 
an increasingly elegant sophisticated and adroit aesthetic - ingeneously technical and 
strategically inventive ( a splashy advancement of technical skill, surface complexity and 
formal ambition) Salle's technique o f image derivation and its subsequent compositional 
implications (even though his "vocabulary" is polymorphous, his method is almost 
picaresque - traversing a particular cartographical path, evacuating linguistic/imagistic 
structures and reconditioning/recomposing them) forces the  maximum optical pleasure 
from each painterly incident, lending his canvases an a lm ost deliberate atmosphere of 
decadence.
From Cézanne to 60's Pop, the development of painting has always been engaged with 
artists for whom the problem of producing a "personal style" entailed testing the limits of 
painting to see if it was possible to push a stage or two further. Since the 60's however 
the problematics o f style have come to depend increasingly on conditions of personal 
selection/co-option, and how each artist uses a range o f available potential styles, 
creating an aesthetic from the plentitude of expedients. If each category of image and 
painterly technique could be presented as an artifact o f its time/place, then a/the, 
mosaic/fragmented/disjunctive structure of the artwork as a layering of the artifacts can 
emerge.
In David Salle's "Tiny in the Air“' (1989) the background is a genre gaming scene 
including nine figures around a table. Two medium-sized insert canvases, each depicting 
a nude model, manipulating an anotomy doll, in black-and-white, are located below the 
center-line and adjacent to the right edge. Two smaller inserts - a modern/"primitive" 
nude sculpture, Giacometti-like, in tan and yellow and an abstract torso, "Borges-like”, 
in red on grey/orange - follow on the left edge An open rectangle in blue inscribed over
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the painting's left section separates a large grey/blue "distintegrating" rectangular "block" 
below, and a beige/light grey outline of a period face above On the alternate side of the 
m iddle vertical floats an even more ethereal woman's face, painted with simple black 
lines.
With "Lampwick's Dilemma" (1989), perhaps Lampwick is the courtly-painted figure 
turned sideways with a walking-stick in his hand. Two vertically off-centre canvases are 
inserted into the painting's middle-ground - a green/black negative toned shot of a woman 
tennis player, and an organge/black negative toned female model exercising a contorted 
acrobatic-like pose with two child's decorated plastic balls, pushing her foot into the 
foregound. Several subsidiary images orbit the canvas perimeter - two small inserted 
canvases at the left end, one showing a Magrittean-pigeon with folded wings, the other 
a nude female torso, along the base are, from left to right, a blue outline of a 
"grotesque'Vdemonic mask, a light-blue abstract/"moderne" form, a dull green square 
with a pink-outlined ring: at the top left sits a substantial/prominent African sculpture in 
brown/peach. Light green and blue streaks meet at the upper left.
In the Spring of 1991 an exhibition of Salle's late'Tapestry of Paintings” opened at the 
Gagsonian Gallery, New York. This show initiated a period of new, cool maturity. Salle's 
palette now revolved around Greuze greiges, sickly high-mannerist yellows, and 
poignantly hollow slate blues. The background of each of these large paintings are lightly 
traced evocations of pastoral/festive Eighteenth-century scenes from traditional tapestry 
designs (for example, a treatment of ruins surrounding the Roman pyramid of Cestius 
dominates "Hamlet Mind" (1990-1991)). Against these backgrounds of pastiched old 
masters float typical Salle motifs, naked models/models dressed as harlequins/African 
tchatchkes/abstract smears o f paint, additionally Salle introduces a few new elements 
such as cartoon bubbles that hover aimlessly in most of the paintings ("Mingus in Mexico"
(1990), "E.A.J.A." (1990)) these bubbles, however, are empty - Salle has always 
trafficked in the inexpressible.
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These paintings integrate a synoptic overload of hermetic visual texts and manufactured 
inchoate images, seemingly united only by Salle's desire to combine them, correlating a 
multiplicity o f divergent images and unnameable presences, the painting resists any 
attempt at decipherment. The archaeology of dislocated images - the material 
components of the picture - reveal configurations of order and disorder via interactive 
process This animated strategy of affirmation and denial, the chaotic disjunctive 
narratives/texts creates a site that resists primary synthesis. This complex interaction 
articulates the resonant presence of difference within the picture frame that negates the 
possibility o f a defined synthetic totality. However, since the work is finished in its 
incompletion, "there must be a unity which is the unity o f that multiple piece, o f that 
multiplicity, as in all o f those fragments" (Gilles Deleuze) (1).
Deleuze's emphasis o f the fractional/portional demonstrates how we might view within 
David Salle's oeuvre a "communication that would not be posited as a principle, but 
would result from the play of (textual) machines and their detatched pieces, of their 
unconnected parts" (2). It is ultimately Leibniz who inspires this vision in Deleuze, since 
Leibniz "first posed the problem o f communication resulting from closed units or from 
what cannot be attached" (3). Via Leibniz's innovation, which demarcates the extended 
borders of communication, the subject is enveloped in the predicate, as Salle's intention 
is folded into its effect. Inclusion of the subject in the predicate implies that the world 
constitutes a chaotic comos/'chaosmos". Through Leibniz's system Deleuze conceives 
of art works that are composed of units that do not operate logically, that is, neither based 
upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality; nor formed or prefigured by those 
units in the course of a logical development. The condition is one of perpetual 
movement, metamorphosing or emigrating from one to another (4). If we can concur with 
the Leibniz -Deleuze scheme, outlined above, it becomes easier for us to also accept 
certain of the presuppositions arising and, by way of analogy, apply them to our present 
discourse on the late paintings of David Salle.
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In "Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque" the Deleuzian fold can be allied to the concept o f a 
subject that is neither Cartesian (reflection/cogito) nor Husserlian (focus/relation 
to/intentionality). The concept of the subject requires that the outside is conceived o f as 
the exact inversion of the inside, the world as a texture of the intimate and the 
microscopic in torsional relation to the microscopic. With such a concept, the subject 
emerges as multiple in series, a legitimate unfolding o f predicates - it is a point o f view 
from which there is a truth/an objectless subject, since knowledge is released from  all 
relations to object.
Deleuze draw s from Leibniz a "new relation between the one and the multiple" (5) 
"... there must also be multiplicity of the one and the unity of the multiple" (6). In Leibniz's 
"extreme taste fo r principles", Deleuze suggests, that there is one pole towards which all 
principles are folding themselves together - Everything is one and the same - and another 
pole towards which all principles are unfolding and distinguishing themselves - Everything 
is distinguished by degree and different. He concludes that no philosophy has ever 
pushed to such an extreme the affirmation of a one and same world, and of an infinite 
difference/variety in this world. The relation one to multiple is assembled and dispersed 
to form the quasi-relations one to one/multiple to multiple. These quasi-relations are 
subsumed under the concept without concept, “the fo ld” . The function of “the fold” is 
essentially to avoid distinction/opposition/a finalized binarity. In opposition to the 
Plato/Descartes conception of the multiple where the elements composing it are 
clear/distinct in their belonging, Leibniz-Deleuze offer the idea of the effect of nuance. 
Avoiding the definitive position that relates the predominance of the obscure Leibniz- 
Deleuze suggest that nuance can be adopted to dissolve latent oppositions - nuance is 
in this case the ultimate anti-dialectical concept. Continuity in this situation can be 
established specified/locally as an exchange of values at each point - the opposition 
clear/obscure is no longer separate or located in a hierarchical scheme.
The Leibniz-Deleuze concept o f the multiple is designed to inseparate itself from all 
thoughts and to multiply within the multiple all possible thoughts of the multiple, "....the
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really distinct is not necessarily either separated or separable"/" .....nothing is separable
or separated, but everything conspires" (7).
Deleuze-Leibniz shared relationship is founded upon a notion of the world as an intricate, 
folded and inseparable totality, such that any distinction is perceived as a m atter o f local 
operation, a conviction that the multiple cannot even be regarded as multiple, but only 
achieved as a fold. This is a culture of divergence (in the serial sense), which 
compossibilizes the most radical heterogeneties, this is fundamentally an opening without 
counterpart - "a world of captures rather than enclosures" (8). This state o f Deleuzian 
philosophy is therefore the capture of a life that is synchronistically total and divergent - 
grounded in Leibniz's assertion of one single image and same world, and of the infinite 
difference and variety located in this world and mediated via the Baroque: a texturology 
which proposes a general organicism/presence of organisms everywhere. (9).
Deleuze-Leibniz consider the world as "as series of inflections or events: it is a pure 
transm ission o f  singularities ."  (10). The category of the event is central, because it 
supports/envelops/dynamizes the category o f singularity. Therefore the question arises 
w hat is an event/the conditions of an event if everything is to be an event? (11). The 
Leibniz-Deleuze scheme integrates elements of Whitehead's theories into the 
programme (12) understanding the event as what singularizes continuity in each of its 
local folds and correspondingly the designation of the origin, always singular/local, o f a 
truth/concept or what Deleuze formulates as the "subordination of the true to the singular 
and the remarkable" (13). Therefore an event is both omnipresent/creative 
structural/extraordinary, and consequently the series of notions related to the event are 
continually disseminated and contracted into the same point. (14).
Tangibly, the event for Deleuze, means an immanent active process occurring over a 
background of a totality, an artificial construct admittedly, but discernable/thinkable within 
a continuum of inferiority - it is a complex of extensions/intensities/singularities which are 
contemporaneously punctually reflected/accomplished in a flux.
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In line with Leibniz's programme Deleuze attempts to configure the  monad as "absolute 
inferiority". Presenting the outside as the exact reversefm em brane" of the inside, 
conceiving the world as a texture of the intimate, thinking the macroscopic/molar in 
torsional as relation to the microscopic/molecular - these operations constitute the 
essential meaning of the concept of the Fold It is via the notion o f the Fold that Deleuze 
attempts to define a figure fo r interiority/subject that is neither reflection/cogito, nor 
relation to the focus/intentionality/nor a pure empty point/eclipse but an absolute 
inferiority, reversed so that it negates the relation to the All. Leibniz term s this "relation", 
which folds the absolute inferiority, onto the total exterior the "vinculum", and this is what 
enables the monadic interior to subordinate/highlight the exterior monads without 
recourse to transfigure the lim its of its inferiority. (15).
The conception of a subject as an inferiority whose exterior forms a "primitive" link to the 
infinite multiple/world includes three effects. Firstly it releases knowledge from any 
specific relation to an "object" Knowledge functions via recalling immanent perceptions, 
as an interior "membrane" mechanism, a subsumption/domination of multiplicities 
correlated in an assemblage. "I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to 
perceive means to unfold, then I am forever perceiving within the folds. E very perception  
is hallucinatory because perception  has no ob ject' (Gilles Deleuze) (16). Secondly the 
Deleuze-Leibniz programme composes the subject as a series/an unfolding of 
predicates, the subject is directly multiple providing multiple supports for the relation of 
several serial limits. Thirdly the Deleuze-Leibniz programme renders the subject the 
point/point of view from which there is a truthffunction of truth" - the  point of view from 
which truth is. Inferiority is essentially the embodiment of such a point of view The 
vinculum is additionally the arrangement of the factors of truth.
Essentially truth is variation which implies directly that it is only the case for a point of 
view This is not a variation o f truth between each individual subject but a condition via 
which the truth o f a variation appears to the subject. The conception o f truth as varying/in 
process requires that it is in each case ordered/arranged at one point /from situation to
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situation. The true is only m anifest in the moment that accounts for the variation that it
is. "... the point o f view is the power to order cases in each domain o f variation, a 
condition for the m anifestation o f the true". (Gilles Deleuze) (17).
In the later paintings of David Salle the concept of artifice features predominantly as the 
main compositional device, every episode/passage in Salle's work is positioned/layered 
with what appears to be highly conditioned predetermined arbitrariness Stray images 
o r their fragments systematically guide the eye through a network of references that 
seemingly, at least superficially, have little/nothing to do with one another. On one level 
Salle wants the question of the  possible meaninglessness of his work to  be a very real 
factor in the viewer's experience of each canvas. On a different level, however, Salle 
manipulates the viewers expectations in order to make some cogent points regarding the 
exchange value of aesthetic signs.
Concomitant with the "Tapestry Paintings" Salle was developing a num ber of other 
related pictorial themes tha t would eventually result in several d ivergent series of 
paintings - "The Black Glass'T 'Torn Poster7S ilkscreen"fG host"fBallet" Paintings. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the  experimentations dating from this period seem to lead 
directly to the most recent pop-like distillations, 'The Early Product Paintings". For 
example, "The Torn Poster" series (1991) inspired in part by 1950's "affic ism " (Mimmo 
Rotello etc...) mark a return to  post-war advertising imagery, together w ith  a renewed 
fascination with the use o f intersecting collage techniques and tramp I'oeil effects. 
Numerous "Early Product" leitmotifs, including a Margrittean pigeon (18) and a nautical 
life-saver are premiered in the  "Torn Poster" series, indeed retrospectively the "Torn 
Poster" paintings are almost "studies” for the later works.
The "Early Product Paintings" are cooly classical, summary works - derived from  Salle's 
college sketches. Their mood evokes an atmosphere that is distinctly elegiac. Almost
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all Salle's main themes, from furniture design to sub-erotica/"pornography" are 
represented to some degree. By openly acknowledging his present sources in Magritte
and the American tromp I'oeil painters Salle is declaring the "Early Product" works as 
History paintings to succeed the "classical" masterworks of pop
The arranged structure of the images is intentionally confused/confusing. They 
ostensibly require that we recognise/identify each style, each method of representation, 
interpret its individual meanings, and subsequently "reconcile" the equity o f meanings 
with a multiplicity of differences and, by extension come to terms with a cultural collapse 
as it is flattened out to a continuum, by the way we conceive/apprehend im ages in our 
transient experience. Postmodern painting is embedded in our "schizophrenic culture" 
which has developed in conjunction with/in response to, the continuous and relentless 
flow of visual/textual information that assails sense-perception. No principles of 
cohesion/synthesis/development seem easily discernable and no vision o f a unified 
history/narrative possible.
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NOTES
1. Gilles Deleuze - "Proust e t les signes" Paris: PUF (edition of 1979)
2. Gilles D e leuze-ib id  (1979)
3. Gilles Deleuze - Ibid (1979)
4. In the Final chapter o f "Le p li: Leibniz et le Baroque" Deleuze connects Leibniz's concept 
o f "new harmony" to Baroque and contemporary music (See: Ronald Bogue 
"Rhizomusicology" - Substance 20:3 (1991)). By virtue of the radiation of musical waves 
that move in and about m onads, the world is made up of "divergent series" and this 
resembles an infinity o f pleats and creases o f unified and dispersed matter. In "Qu'est -ce 
que la philosophic" Deleuze and Guattari suggest that deterritorialization, and its obverse 
reterritorialization, implicitly link “monadic/nomadic" thinking to the art of displacem ent 
transformation. Contem porary artists in the line o f Leibniz transform "monadology" into 
"nomadology". They becom e emigrant thinkers who deterritorialize accepted notions of 
space Forms, like modes o f folding disappear. The strategy of "Le pli" continually bends 
problems back to Leibniz’s fascination with infinite and curvilinear forms. Deleuze appears 
to use Leibniz's concept o f harm onics to advocate the possibilty of infinite thought within 
defined limits.
5. Gilles Deleuze - "Le pli: Le ibn iz et le Baroque" - Paris: Les Editions de Minuit (1988) 
Deleuze appears to have re-conceived his understanding of the relationship between the 
monads and the world. T h e  Baroque is identified, by Deleuze, not with an essence but 
with a function: "It does not invent things: there are all kinds of folds coming from the East, 
Greek, Roman, Romanesque, Gothic, Classical folds. .. Yet the Baroque trait twists and 
turns its folds, pushing them  to  infinity, fold over fold, one upon the other". The Baroque 
folds. It folds at two levels - both lower and upper, both matter (or body or world) and mind 
(or soul or subject) both outside and inside, both low and high, both thin and deep. In this 
movement, a subject is the expression of the world because the world is what the subject 
expresses. This m ovem ent for Deleuze is specifically Baroque. The notion o f "inter- 
expression" needs to be understood more precisely because there is a dom ain of 
"similitude" which forms the possibility of relations o f whole and parts which precedes the 
domains o f the monands o f substances or possible existents.
Spinoza has been taken as the  philosopher who succeeds in affirming difference as such 
in its immanence (See "Difference et repetion" (1968)). This affirmation is manifest in the 
notion of the "essence of m ode" that is central to the Deleuzian interpretation exemplified 
in "Spinoza et la Probleme de  I'Expression" (1968) that suggests that the essence of 
modes are intrinsic modes (intensive qualities that are singular and initself even if the 
corresponding mode does not exist. W hich is to say, while existing modes are always 
modes of a given attribute o f God, they are form ally distinct from those attributes. There 
is something like an essence of mode/singular which is indeed already implied in the 
notion that there are d iffe ren t attributes o f God, (e.g. thought/extension) which are 
nonetheless each infinite in th e ir own right - o r to adopt the phrase that Deleuze uses for 
Leibniz - formally diverse bu t ontologically one.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Perception and Thought have substance which enables 
them to maintain the proposition that thought/perception is always “real" and located 
“outside” even in fantasy - if  fantasy has substance it is a body, and its apprehension by 
another thought/body is as real as the perception o f an object, or body with extension 
(thought/perception have only "intension" or virtual reality/they are real but not objective). 
(See "Spinoza: Philosophie pratique" (1970/1981)). Effects (thoughts/perceptions) are 
things, in other words real beings with an essence/existence o f their own
6. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
7. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
8. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
9 There are two systems/paradigms of the Multiple: the mathematical and the organicist,
Plato/Aristotle. In opposing the fold to the set (Leibniz to Descartes) activates the 
organicist system The Deleuze-Leibniz system must be distinguished from the 
mathematical model for in mathematics it is individuation which constitutes a specification,
and this is not the case with physical things/orgamc bodies The distinction to be made is 
between the animal and the number, the Leibniz-Deleuze opt directly for the animal 
(essentially the Leibniz system is based in both animal psychology and animal 
monadology).
The pnncipte that concerns Deleuze is "individuation- and it is in regard of his notion o f the 
singular that Leibniz is employed. Additionally Leibniz represents an organicist scheme 
in opposition to a mathematical one, inasmuch as for Leibniz there is a distinction between 
the principle of individuation that governs in mathematics and that which governs bodies - 
the individuality o f the body comes from elsewhere. Deleuze would appear generally to 
have more sympathy fo r a notion radical plurality of individual sorts o r "amulacae" than for 
an abstracted "M athesis" that m ight be conceived as governing som e inert matter as to 
which the specificity o f the material would be secondary Leibniz's notion of a universe 
constituted by an infinite number o f animal souls (monads) which include (but do  not 
contain - Deleuze via Leibniz distinguishes between a given m onad's relationship to ether 
monads, a relationship o f pre-established harmony, and the fact that a given monad (or 
soul) "has" a body, or m ore precisely, a body (a "one") "appertains" to  a monad (an "Each" 
or "Every")), infinite numbers of sub-souls in relation to the notion o f "becoming anim al" in 
"M ille Plateaux".
10 G illes Deleuze - op.cit (1988).
11 See: Chapter 6 "W hat is an Event?" Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
12. W hitehead, Alfred North : 'The Concept of Nature" Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (1920), for extensions/intensities - the first components of the event: "Process and 
Reality "New York: M acmillan (1941) for pretensions "Adventures o f Ideas” - New York: 
Macmillan (1933).
13. G illes Deleuze - op.cit (1988)
14 It is a combination o f immanence and excessive infinity which enable us to comprehend
an event. Thinking the event or making a concept of the singular, always entails that a 
commitment and a subtraction should exist co-presentty, the worid/situation/condusion and 
the infinite. In Chapter 4  "Sufficient Reason" (Gilles Deleuze- ibid (1988)), Deleuze relates 
a version of the principle as 'the identity o f the event and the principle; which is m ore 
succinctly phrased when he states "Everything has a concept". Here once again, 
Deleuze’s sensibility is manifest through turns of style assembled to negate an established 
dialectic through the p lay of nuances.
".... for Leibniz, it is both true that the individual exists and that this is
in v irtue o f the power o f the concept; monad or mind. Thus this 
power of the concept (to become subject) does not consist in infinitely 
specifying a genre, but in condensing and prolonging singularities.
These are not generalities, but events, drops of events".
(Gilles Deleuze).
Leibniz/Deleuze say that the multiple exists by concept or the m ultiple exists in the One. 
This is the function o f the monad, to extract the one from within the multiple so that there 
m ay be a concept of this multiple. This enables a constructed equivalence to be discerned 
between "to be an elem ent of/"to belong to" ontological categories and to possess a 
property have a certa in predicate", categories of knowledge. Deleuze expresses this: 
"Finally, a monad has as its property, not an abstract attribute .. but other monads". 
Deleuze distinguishes between the operations of knowledgef'encyclopedic concepts" and 
the operations of tru th fconcepts  as events" It is within this distinction that 
Leibniz/Deleuze define two levels of thought of the world - the level o f "actualization" 
(m onads) and the level o f "realization" (bodies). It might be suggested therefore that in 
infinity, the monadic dim ension o f a given thing proceeds with the verification -as-truth o f 
what its corporeal dim ension is the expression of. or that the monad is an entity of truth, 
while bodies are encyclopedic assemblages However, simultaneously Deleuze folds one 
onto the other "repairing" the apparent gap generated via the initial divergence of the 
distinction.
W ithin this scheme there would apparently seem a contradiction between the principle of 
sufficient reason and the principle o f indiscernables However, for Deleuze, the 
connection of reason and the interruption o f indiscemables only facilitate at best flux - a 
hyper continuity: 'T h e  principle of indiscemables establishes cuts; but the cuts are not 
gaps or ruptures in the continuity. On the contrary, they redistribute continuity in such a 
way that there is no gap, that is the "best" way". Therefore within this scheme the 
universality o f events is also the universality of continuities For Leibniz/Deleuze 
"everything happens" implies that nothing is interrupted, and therefore everything has a 
concept, that o f its inclusion in continuity as an inflection of the fold.
308
Deleuze, in Chapter 5 - "Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty" has recourse to apply 
discursive elements from both Nietzsche and Mallarmé to evoke a "revelation of Thought- 
world that throws dice" because "... from them the world lacks principle, has lost its 
principles. That is why the roll o f the dice is the power o f afffirming chance, of thinking of 
chance in sum, which is above all not a principle but the absence of all principle. Thus 
Mallarmé gives to absence or nothingness what issues from chance, what claims to 
escape it all the while limiting it by principle" Deleuze aims to demonstrate that beyond 
the Leibnizian baroque is our world where chance/a gamble "makes incompossibles enter 
into the same world, shattered".
W ith in  the context o f the concept of the Fold Deleuze investigates the vital notion of 
vinculum - a subject directly articulating the classical closure o f the reflexive subject but 
w ithout reflexive clarity and the Baroque animalistic pacification o f the empiricist subject 
without the inevitable passivity. Deleuze identifies the requisites:
"(1) each individual possess a body that cannot be separated from it; (2) each one 
possesses a body insofar as it is the constant subject o f the vinculum that is fixed to it (its 
vinculum; (3) for variables this vinculum has monads taken en mass; (4) these masses of 
m onads are inseparable from infinities o f material parts to which they belong; (5) these 
material parts make up the organic composition o f a body, whose vinculum, envisioned in 
respect to the variables, assures its specific unity, (6) th is body is one that belongs to the 
individual monad, it is its body to the extent that it already avails itself of an individual uinity 
(thanks to the vinculum now envisioned in relation to the constant)"
(Gilles Deleuze)
G illes Deleuze - op.cit (1988)
G illes Deleuze - ibid (1988)
Magritte's leitmotif o f the pigeon (T h e  Murderous Sky" (1927)/"ClairvoyanceM (1936)/"Deep 
W aters" (1941) - finds its refrain in Salle's "A Double Life" (1993), a painting from the Early 
Product series that freatures two such birds. So too Magritte's image of an ambiguously 
draped section o f doth (’The Village o f the Mind" (1926)/The Ordeal o f Sleep" (1926/27) - 
appears in Salle's recent work, in many forms of photographic and painterly performances. 
It assumes the enveloping form  of a chadorlike cloak in the photo-silkscreened insert of 
a neoclassical Tapestry Painting "Hamlet Mind" (1990/91) and is a concealing vestment 
in the "Ghost Painting" series (1991-92). Additionally it can be located in the Early Product 
Painting "Exit W eeping" (1993) where it takes the form of a man’s "Mouchoir" 
compositionally floating yet pictorially located.
Magritte in fact provides Salle with far more than simply icorigraphic material. The effusive 
combination, in his work, o f repressed emotion and chimeric eroticism is of particular 
relevance. In addition his deadpan surrealism/cryptically meaningful narratives/subversive 
strategies, together with his use of words in paintings appear equally poignant. Overall is 
the importance o f Magritte's key position at the intersection of C19th/C20th Century 
European/American still-lifeArompe I'oeil traditions - the crossroads at which Salle, too, is 
presently located.
“He reads the story right through, every word o f it from beginning 
to end. By the tim e he finishes, dawn has come, and the room has 
begun to brighten. He hears a bird sing, he hears footsteps going  
down the street, h e  hears a car driving across the Brooklyn Bridge.
Black was right, h e  says to him self. I knew  it all by heart.....For
now is the m oment that Blue stands up from  his chair, puts on h is  
hat and walks through the door. And from this moment on, we 
know nothing”
Paul Auster - The New York Trilogy
FINAL CUT/LAST EXIT (MEMORIAL BEACH)
David Salle's paintings have a distinctive tone and style, an immediate impact and 
identity. As his work has developed - the quality of confrontation - which his paintings 
provoke has become simultaneously more direct and more complex. The purpose o f this 
project is to suggest that Salle's methods and concerns remain constant. He is an artist 
who has brought to painting an informed knowledge of the issues regarding 
presentation/representation/performance, of the interaction between the work and the 
audience, and the complicity generated and correspondingly surpressed by the spectator.
Salle's paintings generally articulate a spectral disengagement, a disconnection 
presenting an aggregate of signs/symbols that come to represent lived experience, 
because ultimately we recognise that this aggregate is all there is. Acknowledging a 
world in which everything is a representation, but which is still constant, it is via a 
recognition of the limitation of painting in the face of the widespread technologies o f 
reproduction/manipulation that Salle manoeuvres the medium of painting and 
"history"/"narrative" into oblique relationships - what sustains the project is the possibility 
that in the essential distance of painting from "history'V'narrative" one is able to confer 
some kind o f redress to  a society/social realm which is characterized by spectacle and 
"amnesia". The alienation effect that the paintings generate inculcates a film ic quality, 
something of that mediums ability, to recall emotion/sentiment at a distance, and film s 
adroit willingness to confront heightened emotional themes in parallel to the tawdry and 
everyday.
"M ais le concept n’est pas donné, il est créé, a créer; il n ’est pas formé, il se pose lui- 
méme en lui même, auto position. Les deux s’impliquent, puisque ce qui est véritable 
ment créé, du vivant a l'oeuvre d'art, jouit par l i  m tm e  d'une auto-position de soi. ou d'un 
caractère autopoétique a quoin le reconnâit D'autant plus le concept est crée, d'autant 
plus il se pose. Ce qui dépend d'une libre a c tiv ité  créatrice, c'est aussi ce qui se pose en 
soi-meme. indépendam m ent et nécessairement: le plus subjectif sera le plus objectif 
(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) ( 1)
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The question of philosophy is the  singular point where concept and creation are reiated 
to each other.
In Deleuzian philosophy a concept is both absolute and relative, that is relative to its own 
components/to other concepts/to the plane on which it is defined/to the problems it is 
supposed to address, but it is absolute through the condensation it enacts/the site upon 
which it locates on the plane/the conditions it assigns to the problem. As a whole it is 
absolute, but inasmuch as it is fragmentary it is relative. "Il est infini par son survol ou 
sa vitesse, mais fini par son m ovem ent qui trace le contour des composantes". (Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (2). The concept is real without being actual, ideal without 
being abstract. The concept may be defined by its consistency it's "endo- 
consistanceTexo-consistance", but also it has no reference, it is self-referential; that is 
it promotes itself and its object a t the same time that it is created. Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that it is "constructivisme" that unites the relative and the absolute.
"Le chaos chaotise, et défa it dans l'infini toute consistance, sans perdre l'infini dans lequel 
la pensée, le problème de la philosophie est d'acquérir une consistance plonge.. ." 
(Gilles Deleuze and Felix G uattari) (3)
As Nietzsche came to understand, the situation of thought is essentially a creation.
Deleuze suggests that art strugggles with chaos, it does so in order to bring forth a vision 
that illuminates for an instant - a sensation. Art situates elements o f chaos in a frame in 
order to form a "composed chaos” that becomes necessary, or from  which it extracts a 
chaoid sensation as variety. A  concept is a chaoid state par excellence - it refers back 
to a chaos rendered consistent, become thought, a mental chaosmos. Chaos is 
constituted from three "Chaoids" art/philosophy/science - as form s of thought/creation. 
"Chaoids" are the "realities" produced on the planes that cut through his chaos in different 
ways.
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The artist utilizes multiple chaotic varieties that no longer constitute a reproduction o f the 
sensory in the organ but establish a being o f the sensory, a being of sensation, on an 
anorganic plane o f composition that is able to restore the infinite The struggle with 
chaos in painting, is found in another way in philosophy, it is always a process of 
containing chaos by a secant plane that crosses it. Painters engage a catastrophe and 
leave a trace of th is passage on the canvas, the transition from chaos to composition.
Artists work with sensations. By means o f the material, the principle design of art is to 
extract the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another - to present 
a bloc o f sensations, a pure being of sensations. Art, in relation to the precepts/visions 
represented - artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. 
Deleuze suggests that art opens-up the triple organization of 
perceptions/affections/opinions in order to substitute "a monument" composed of 
percepts/affects and blocs of sensation that come to replace language. "Le monument 
n'actualise pas l'événement virtuel, mais il l'incorpore ou l'incarne: il lui donne un corps, 
une vie, un univers" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (4).
Paintings are images which interpret the world, wherein we are predisposed to regard 
them  as complexes of “narrative'Vexpressive/aesthetic significance which establish a 
particular way of viewing the world. Salle's paintings foreground a self-consciousness 
(conscious of its own meaning, a type o f analytical approach to images that emphasize 
a display of control over the philosophical questions of picture-making, of material and 
materiality and the nature of the painting's effects). W hat this suggests is a questioning 
o f painting, and within this the correlation of painting to image and representation - 
painting questioning the essence of its own possibility by contrasting/foregrounding the 
primacy of images and representation. The supposition of finitude and interpretation is 
transposed into a process whereby painting becomes the site of an active exposition. 
The painting maintains, central to its internal composition, the question of its own 
activity/presentation/interpretation, it therefore integrates as constant an affirmative 
irreducible quality - the essential means by which the painting exists/functions will always
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be in the manner of a question. This "ever present" question is not merely a supplement 
to the artwork but a precise/intrinsic element that plays a determining role in the act o f 
presentation.
Salle's conception of the artist represents a sim ilar change of interpretation. Instead of 
regarding art as emanating from  the creative subject, Salle appropriates narrative 
materials wherever he finds them, transforming/dislocating them from their original 
context/condition in order to pose questions/conflicts for our condition. Contrary to the 
ideology o f the individual subject, Salle's works tap collective sources and are addressed 
to collective meanings. W e have seen how he turns away from  any linear notions of 
narrative progression towards an open relationship to a variety/multiple of sources/ 
contexts/meanings - synthesizing conflicting interpretations within a single work.
For this reason, this is why, following a Deleuzoguattarian analysis, Salle's program is far 
m ore than an extension o f a Modernist programm e since he raises doubts about 
Modernist ideals and transposes over this in its place a more ambiguous veil in its place.
The analysis articulated within/throughout the project would appear to suggest the 
necessity for a re-assessment of the understanding of experience/thought/knowledge. 
Nietzsche's idea of experience as a field of fluctuating intensities points towards 
alternatives to the modern idea of the conscious/rational subject. In tracing out the 
implications of these notions it is appropriate to consider forms o f thought in a new light. 
Through the “death of the subject" one can register the loss of the fundamentals of 
Modernity, o f a rationally observed/rationally operating world. The circle that closed 
between the conscious subject and a rationally ordered world has been broken, and 
thinkers such as Nietzsche provide a basis for thought in the postmodern instant.
Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian provides part o f the basis for a re­
conceptualization of ideas o f legitimate action/knowledge. The standard ideas of 
action/knowledge are dependent upon maintaining a stable reference point for objects
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and a stable identity for subjects. Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian raises questions 
about notions of stability, especially if they are conceived in a static/unhistorical manner. 
His exposure of the genealogy of consciousness contributes particularly to historicizing 
concepts o f consciousness/action. Similarly his genealogical analysis o f value affects the 
modern idea of the individual and history/narrative.
T h e  individual, the "single man", as people and philosophers have hitherto understood 
him, is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a "link in the chain", 
something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line "man" up 
to and including h im se lf.
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (5)
W hat Nietzsche means is that human lineage is available to all, providing the materials 
from which one can appropriate elements in the formation of an identity. Although 
Nietzsche's point does not change the minimal notion of identity necessary for referential 
discourse, it does have the virtue of opening up questions of cultural formation/impact 
upon identity. W e have observed such a process in the work of David Salle where the 
muitiple variety of sources/narratives activated provide the substance for a continual re­
consideration, he emphasizes the multiple narratives that enter into experience in the 
C20th condition. (Postmodern ideas about textuality necessarily indicate a different 
understanding of human action).
Nietzsche suggested doubts that reasoning cannot be divorced from passionate desires, 
indeed Nietzsche advocated that the philosopher's desire to comprehend reality as 
definitive given is an illusion, since nothing is in effect "real" except our collections of 
desires/passions, that we may function with no other "reality" other than the "reality" o f 
our drives - for thinking is only the relationship o f these desires and their interconnection. 
(6) The most ambiguous dimension of the thinkers task is that reality is only accessible 
via our drives among which we may situate the drive for verbalization and the drive for 
visualization Therefore a thinkers action towards an understanding cannot be completed 
because of the thinker’s own embeddedness in the language/images creating more
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instances of language/image. In a related manner, questions simply generate more 
questions.
"The th inker thus expresses the noble affin ity o f thought and life: life m aking thought 
active, thought making life affirmative. In Nietzsche this genera l affin ity is not only the 
pure "Socratic secret "par excellence ', but also the essence o f a r t'
(Gilles Deleuze) (7)
This approach illustrates the implications o f the Nietzschean program that poists the 
modern conception of the conscious subject as superficial. Nietzsche aims to subvert 
the sharp distinctions positioned between the affective and the rational/between thought 
and imagination. Nietzsche re-interprets the psyche as "a fluctuation o f intensity” (8) 
presenting experience as a flow of pulsations moving in d ifferent directions and forming 
themselves into different patterns. Some o f them double back upon themselves to form 
a reflective consciousness. Therefore, the rational m ay be regarded as a set of 
structures emerging from fluctuations of energy rather than as a separate power. This 
is why Nietzsche conceives o f thinking as a relationship between drives and intensive 
m om ents. Rather than an aesthetics of reception, N ietzsche's works call for a 
performance hermeneutics, an incitement to action, to an action of transvaluing values.
Nietzsche's philosophical program articulated here is thus consistent with David Salle's 
notion of multiple layers of meaning. If the intensive m om ents of experience organize 
them selves into different levels/pattems, then the attainm ent of understanding is 
em bedded within the "activity” o f achieving ordered relationships from among these 
intensive moments. Pure chaotic thinking is unproductive because it merely creates a 
weak/confused response to the conditions under examination. Nietzeche views effective 
thinking as emerging from the sensual/linguistic materials that present themselves In 
fragmentary form within m om entary experiences. However, these moments are never 
self-contained since they constitute the narrative/historical flow  of a person's experience.
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With David Salle the canvas becomes a site of irreducibility, resistant to simplicity In 
accordance with postmodern theory we can suggest that Salle's work negates the idea 
of a depth o f background that determines the value o f s ignifies. W hat this implies (in a 
loss of depth background) is the loss of the idea that the signified determines the 
signifier. If we accept a shift to the interplay between various kinds of signifiers, which 
seems to be what is at issue in Salle's imagery, we witness what replaces the depth 
model is for the most part a conception o f practices/discourses/textual play. Thus depth 
is replaced by surface or by multiple surfaces.
The relationship of the concept of multiple surfaces to Nietzsche's ideas concerning the 
psyche as a field of fluctuating intensities that only gradually organize themselves into 
patterns o f thought operate very closely together because of the fact that when we 
remove the idea of a pre-figured depth background what remains is the interaction o f the 
intensities and forms of hierarchy themselves, often constructed into ''meaningful" 
discourses and "texts". Meaning/interpretation falls within an intertextual field, and is 
already charged with a meaning that calls, like anything else, for a critical examination/re- 
examination. There seems to be little doubt that Salle wants us to see this point, as it is 
exemplified by his frequent use of image fragments/textual fragments and references 
within his visualizations. He understands the process o f image-making as coincident with 
an ongoing effort to understand complex texts. Salle's paintings become sites for 
expressions/reflections, providing the emotional impetus for thought surrounding 
contensious areas. They leave us to resolve the conflicts they present in our own way, 
rather than pretending to possess solutions to the problems they depict.
The images/symbols/elements form a multiple co-relational correspondence to the 
painting, in the sense they are integral to the content, but in another they are parasitic 
upon/engaged within another external history/"narrative"/context. This reciprocal identity 
opens up the possibility o f a presence that re-defines the homogeneity of mimesis and 
representation. The terms/contingency o f representation becomes a site of 
equivocation/ambiguity that operates within the process o f presentation The painting
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therefore maintains as constant the question of what a painting is, opening up the space 
o f the question, and therefore ultimately resisting the possibility of an irrevocable/specific 
termination.
In a story by Jorge Luis Borges, the narrator discovers a crystal ripped "with all veins of 
light" where "all the places o f the earth meet without mingling beheld, from every possible 
perspective simultaneously". Deleuzian philosophy shifts as we look at it. It twists and 
coils into unexpected shapes - suddenly, rapidly, continuously, like a snake between 
stones, and every perspective yields new perceptions.
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FINAL CUT/LAST EXIT (MEMORIAL BEACH) 
NOTES
1 Gilles Deleuze and Fé\ix Guattari "Q u 'e sK e  que lad philosophie?" Editions de Minuit Paris 
(1991).
(Trans 'W hat is Philosophy?" Graham Burchel! 
and Hugh Tomlinson Columbia University Press 
(1994)).
2 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Ibid (1991)
3 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari ibid (1991)
4 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari ibid (1991)
5 Fredrich Nietzsche T w ilig h t o f the Idols" trans R.J. Hollingdale
6 Fredrich Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" trans R J. Hollingdale
7. Gilles Deleuze "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Paris: PUT (1962)
8 See Pierre Klossowski "Nietzsche Experience of the Eternal Return"
in David B Allison ed 'The New Nietzsche" New Yortc Dell
Publishing Co. (1977)
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